United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1914
VINCENT JAMES SANTONI, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL AND CEO, UNITED STATES POSTAL
SERVICE ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Lynch, and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Cynthia Dill for the appellant.
Evan J. Roth, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Paula D. Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellees
John Potter, United States Postmaster General, and Michael
Desrosiers. Peter T. Marchesi, with whom Wheeler & Arey, P.A. was
on the brief for appellees Barry DeLong and Randy Wing.
May 27, 2004
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Vincent Santoni appeals from the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on his claims against Michael Desrosiers and John E.
Potter, Postmaster General and CEO of the United States Postal
Service (USPS).1 Santoni, a former postmaster of Solon, Maine, was
arrested for indecent exposure by a local deputy sheriff.
Desrosiers, a postal inspector who had sworn out the arrest
warrant, accompanied the deputy sheriff and participated in the
arrest. Santoni subsequently filed an 18-count complaint against
Desrosiers, the USPS, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of
Somerset County, Maine, asserting a variety of federal
constitutional and state law claims in connection with the
allegedly unlawful arrest. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. Santoni appeals
from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
federal defendants2 on his Fourth Amendment claim under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), and his claims of unlawful arrest, assault, battery,
and false imprisonment under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
1
Both parties treat the claims against named defendant John E.
Potter as claims against the USPS. For simplicity, we refer to
this party throughout this opinion as the USPS.
2
Santoni filed this appeal against all of the original parties
but expressly abandoned his claims against the state defendants in
his brief to this court.
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U.S.C. § § 1346(b), 2671-2680. We affirm the decision of the
district court.
I.
On August 2, 1999, Michael Desrosiers, a postal inspector
for the United States Postal Service, learned that the USPS had
received a complaint concerning Vincent Santoni, the postmaster of
Solon, Maine. The complaint alleged that Santoni had exposed
himself to Heather M., a 15-year-old girl who resided in Solon. On
August 13, 1999, Desrosiers' supervisor instructed him to conduct
an immediate investigation.
On August 16, 1999, Desrosiers interviewed Heather, who
said that around 2 p.m. on July 15, 1999, she was riding her
bicycle across a bridge near the post office in Solon when she
heard someone call her name. She turned around and recognized
Santoni, whom she knew, standing by the edge of the water with his
pants down to his knees and both of his hands holding his exposed
penis. Heather told Desrosiers that for several years Santoni had
been making inappropriate sexual comments and gestures to her
during her visits to the Solon post office. Heather's mother, who
attended the interview, said that Santoni had also made
inappropriate comments to her and to other women. Desrosiers
prepared a type-written statement based on the interview, which
Heather reviewed and signed. Over the next few weeks, Desrosiers
interviewed other female customers of the Solon post office who
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reported that Santoni had touched them or made inappropriate
comments while he was at work at the post office.
On September 8, 1999, Desrosiers discussed the results of
his investigation with Andrew Benson, an Assistant District
Attorney (ADA) for Somerset County, Maine. At Benson's request,
Desrosiers arranged for a fellow postal inspector, who was also a
polygraph examiner, to administer a polygraph examination of
Heather. After receiving the results of the test, which Heather
passed, Desrosiers again discussed the case with ADA Benson. At
the conclusion of that discussion, the DA's Office authorized the
prosecution of Santoni on the criminal charge of indecent conduct,
a Class E misdemeanor under 17A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 854.
On October 5, 1999, Desrosiers appeared before the clerk
of the state district court in Skowhegan, Maine, to present a
request for a criminal complaint and a warrant for Santoni’s
arrest. He also submitted a supporting affidavit identifying
Desrosiers as a postal inspector and stating that he had probable
cause to believe that Santoni had committed the state law offense
of indecent conduct, in violation of 17A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 854.
The affidavit provided details about Desrosiers' interview with
Heather and stated that she had passed a polygraph examination.
The court clerk issued a criminal complaint against Santoni for
violating the indecent conduct statute and a corresponding warrant
for his arrest. At Desrosiers' request, Randy Wing, a deputy
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sheriff for Somerset County, accompanied Desrosiers to Santoni's
home, where Santoni was arrested. On April 21, 2000, Santoni was
tried in the Skowhegan District Court and was acquitted after the
court determined that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a
conviction for indecent conduct.3
On January 3, 2002, Santoni filed an 18-count complaint
in the United States District Court for the District of Maine
against the USPS, Desrosiers, Wing, and Somerset County Sheriff
Barry DeLong. He sued the USPS pursuant to the FTCA, 18 U.S.C. §
§ 1346, 2671 et seq., claiming that it was liable to him for
unlawful arrest, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional
distress, assault, battery, invasion of privacy, and negligent
supervision and training. He sued Desrosiers in his individual
capacity, seeking damages for violations of the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution pursuant to
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. Santoni brought analogous Fourth
Amendment claims against Wing and DeLong pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. He further claimed that all four defendants had engaged in
a civil conspiracy to violate his federal and state civil rights.
3
Heather had stated in her sworn statement and in a pre-trial
interview with ADA Mitchell that she had viewed Santoni's genitals
on July 15. However, during cross examination, she acknowledged
that she had not been able to see Santoni's penis because of the
placement of his hands around it. The district court found that
Heather's testimony failed to satisfy 17A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
854, which prohibits a person from knowingly exposing his or her
genitals.
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On April 8, 2002, Desrosiers and the USPS, the federal
defendants, moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on all of
Santoni's federal claims. The district court determined that no
constitutional rights had been violated and that, in any event,
Desrosiers was protected from liability on Santoni's Fourth
Amendment claim by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Although it
found that Santoni's FTCA claims against the USPS did not fall
within the FTCA's discretionary function exception, it held that
the claims failed on their merits. Therefore, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Desrosiers and the USPS and
dismissed Santoni’s claims against them. After the district court
granted summary judgment for the federal defendants, the lawsuit
proceeded against DeLong and Wing. Following discovery, the state
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted.
Santoni filed this appeal against all of the original defendants
but has chosen not to prosecute his claims against the state
defendants.
II.
On appeal, Santoni challenges the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Desrosiers on Santoni's Bivens
claim. He argues that because Desrosiers lacked authority under
state or federal law to make an arrest for a Class E state law
crime, the arrest of Santoni constituted an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. He further claims that
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Desrosiers is not entitled to qualified immunity. In addition,
Santoni argues that because the district court improperly
determined that the arrest was lawful, it erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the USPS on Santoni's FTCA claims. We address
each of these arguments in turn.
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo. Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92, 98
(1st Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate where the
evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is "material" if it "might
affect the outcome of the suit" under the applicable legal
standard. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A factual issue is "genuine" only "if a reasonable jury
could resolve it in favor of either party." Basic Controlex Corp.,
Inc. v. Klockner Moeller Corp., 202 F.3d 450, 453 (1st Cir. 2000).
In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2004).
B. Bivens Claim Against Desrosiers
1. Santoni's Arrest
Under Bivens, a person may sue a federal official in his or
her individual capacity for damages arising out of a constitutional
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violation committed under color of federal law. See Bivens, 403
U.S. at 389; Aversa v. United States 99 F.3d 1200, 1213 (1st Cir.
1999). Relying on Bivens, Santoni claims that because Desrosiers
had no legal authority to make an arrest for a state law
misdemeanor, his arrest of Santoni constituted an unreasonable
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4
We have not resolved whether an arresting officer's lack of
authority under state or federal law to conduct an otherwise
constitutionally valid arrest constitutes an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. The circuits are divided on this
issue. Compare Malone v. County of Suffolk, 968 F.2d 1480, 1482-83
(2d Cir. 1992) (whether officers have valid authority to arrest
pursuant to state law affects constitutionality of the arrest);
Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (10th Cir. 1990) (arrest
executed outside of the officer's jurisdiction violates the Fourth
Amendment and gives rise to a potential § 1983 action); and United
States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989) (custodial
arrest is constitutional if arresting officer had probable cause
and authority under state or municipal law to effect a custodial
arrest for the particular offense) with United States v. Bell, 54
F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 1995); ("[W]e do not think Fourth Amendment
analysis requires reference to an arrest's legality under state
4
The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause . . . ." U.S. Const. Amdt. 4.
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law."); Fields v. City of South Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th
Cir. 1991) (holding that there is no § 1983 cause of action for
false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause);
and Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1974) (same).
We do not reach this constitutional question5 because we conclude
that Desrosiers was authorized to swear out the criminal complaint
and receive the complaint and warrant for Santoni's arrest, and
that the warrant was executed under the lawful authority of Deputy
Sheriff Wing.
Under federal law, the United States Postal Service has
authority "to investigate postal offenses and civil matters
relating to the Postal Service." 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(7). This
authority is primarily exercised through the Postal Inspection
Service, which is charged with "[e]nforcing laws related to the
Postal Service, the mails, other postal offenses and other laws of
the United States." 39 C.F.R. § 224.3(b)(2).
The federal arrest powers of postal inspectors, however, are
limited and specifically defined, including the authority to "serve
warrants and subpoenas issued under the authority of the United
States" and to make certain warrantless arrests "for offenses
5
"[P]rior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal
courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision." Gulf
Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981); see also United States
v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 137 (1st Cir. 2004) (avoiding a
constitutional question about the relevance of subjective intent to
Fourth Amendment analysis of an administrative search where the
appellant's subjective intent argument "fail[ed] on its facts").
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against the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a); see also 39 C.F.R.
§ 233.1(a). Postal inspectors are not authorized under federal law
to execute a warrant or make an arrest for a state law offense.
See United States v. Univerzagt, 424 F.2d 396, 398 n.1 (8th Cir.
1970) ("Postal inspectors under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3061 are given power
to make arrests for postal offenses upon probable cause but are
given no power to make arrests for state offenses by either state
or federal statute."). Similarly, while Maine law permits some
specifically designated "federal officers" to make arrests to
enforce state law in certain situations, postal inspectors are not
among these officers. 25 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1502-A. Thus,
Desrosiers did not have authority under state or federal law to
make an arrest for a violation of state law.
Nonetheless, the district court concluded that although Maine
law did not confer upon Desrosiers authority to arrest Santoni, it
did authorize him to swear out a warrant for Santoni's arrest,
either in his capacity as a law enforcement official or as a
private citizen acting with the approval of the district attorney's
office. It further held that the execution of the warrant was
lawful because Desrosiers participated in the arrest as a private
citizen and was assisted by Deputy Sheriff Wing, who had an
affirmative duty to arrest Santoni. Santoni challenges both of
these determinations.
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a. Swearing Out the Criminal Complaint
In accordance with Maine law, a Maine district court clerk
may, in the absence or unavailability of a justice of the peace or
a prosecuting attorney or any of his assistants, prepare and draft
a misdemeanor criminal complaint "upon the request of any law
enforcement officer." 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 708. While the
statute does not define the phrase "law enforcement officer," the
district court interpreted it to include postal inspectors. We
agree.
When interpreting a statute under Maine law, words and phrases
are to be construed in accordance with "the plain meaning of the
enactment." 1 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72. Applying this rule of
statutory construction to 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 708, we find
that "any" law enforcement officer includes every kind of law
enforcement officer, regardless of whether or not the officer is
statutorily authorized to enforce state law. Moreover, we have
regularly recognized postal inspectors as law enforcement officers.
See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo Figueroa, 34 F.3d 33, 43 (1st
Cir. 2002) (for sentence enhancement purposes, defendant should
have known that postal inspector was a “law enforcement officer”);
see also Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2002)
(Plaintiff “applied for a position as a postal inspector, a highly
competitive law enforcement position.”); Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d
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1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (The Postal Inspection Service is “the
law enforcement branch of the United States Postal Service.”).
Santoni argues that the phrase “law enforcement officers” as
used in 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 708 does not include postal
inspectors because postal inspectors are not among those federal
law enforcement officials vested with the "power to enforce state
law" under 25 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1502-A. However, 15 Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 708 does not limit authority to swear out a criminal
complaint to state law enforcement officers and federal officers
who are specifically empowered to enforce state law. Nor does 25
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1502-A place any limitations on the kinds of
officers who may swear out complaints. Therefore, we agree with
the district court that the phrase "any law enforcement officer"
does not preclude postal officials from swearing out criminal
complaints.6
6
Because we conclude that Desrosiers was a law enforcement
officer for the purposes of 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 708, we do not
consider the district court's alternative holding that the court
clerk properly issued the complaint to Desrosiers in his capacity
as a private citizen because the district attorney's office
approved the prosecution. See 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 708
(providing that in the absence or unavailability of a justice of
the peace or prosecuting attorney, a court clerk may issue a
complaint to a person who is not a law enforcement officer for a
non-felony offense "with the approval of the Attorney General or
his designee").
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b. Executing the Arrest Warrant
Santoni also argues, however, that even if Desrosiers was
authorized to swear out and receive the complaint, he had no
authority to carry out the arrest of Santoni. Once an arrest
warrant is issued, only an "officer authorized by law" may execute
that warrant. Me. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(1). As noted, postal
inspectors are not among those officers authorized under Maine law
to execute arrest warrants. 25 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1502-A.
Santoni argues that Desrosiers also had no authority to execute the
arrest in his capacity as a private citizen. Therefore, he claims
that "the district court's conclusion that Desrosiers was
authorized as a private person to arrest Santoni was clearly
erroneous and should be reversed."
Santoni is correct that Maine law does not authorize private
citizens to make an arrest for a Class E crime not committed in
their presence. See 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16; cf. Unverzagt,
424 F.2d at 398 (postal inspector's arrest of individual for
carrying a concealed weapon was valid under Nebraska law that
authorized private citizens to make an arrest for a felony
committed in their presence). However, the district court held
that Santoni's arrest was lawful, not because Desrosiers had state
law authority to execute the warrant, but because Deputy Sheriff
Wing participated in the arrest. In light of Wing's knowing
participation in the arrest, the court explained that it "would be
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elevating form over substance to conclude that the validity of the
arrest depended on which of the two men uttered the words 'You are
under arrest,' or placed the Plaintiff in handcuffs."
We agree with the district court's conclusion that Santoni's
arrest was lawful because it was carried out under Wing's lawful
authority. Under Maine law, an arrest warrant "shall be executed
by any officer authorized by law." Me. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(1).
Deputy Sheriff Wing was clearly authorized – and indeed, required
– by law to arrest Santoni under 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 602,
which provides that "[i]t is the responsibility of all police and
sheriff departments and their officers to use all reasonable
efforts to execute the outstanding arrest warrants of which they
are aware." See also Kane v. Anderson, 509 A.2d 656, 657 (Me.
1986) (concluding that "the execution of an arrest warrant is a
ministerial rather than a discretionary function"); Carroll v. City
of Portland, 736 A.2d 279, 283 (Me. 1999) ("[A] ministerial act is
mandatory and requires no personal judgment or choice.") (emphasis
in original). It is undisputed that Wing accompanied Desrosiers at
Desrosiers' request to Santoni's residence where Santoni was
arrested and then transported by Wing and Desrosiers to the
Somerset County Sheriff's Department. Based on these facts, the
district court appropriately concluded that Wing was aware of the
outstanding arrest warrant and had a legal duty to execute it.
Desrosiers' presence at the arrest, for the purpose of assisting
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Wing in the execution of the warrant, did not render that arrest
unlawful under state law or constitutionally infirm. Cf. Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (holding that "it is a violation
of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or
other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant
when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of
the execution of the warrant").
For the first time on appeal, Santoni argues that summary
judgment was inappropriate because it is reasonable to infer that
Wing was not aware of the warrant and therefore had no obligation
to execute it. This argument relies on statements made by Wing in
a deposition taken on January 31, 2003, five months after the entry
of summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants. As Santoni
acknowledges, however, this transcript was not available to the
district court and therefore is not part of the record on appeal.
Moreover, Santoni never argued below that Wing was unaware of the
warrant. Indeed, his complaint suggested that Wing knowingly
participated in the arrest, with a reference to the "illegal arrest
of Santoni by defendants" and the claim that "Defendants DeLong and
Wing did not have probable cause to arrest Santoni" (emphasis
added). Similarly, in his opposition to the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, Santoni alleged that Desrosiers "arrested
plaintiff without authority to do so and that the other defendants
knew it was unlawful but agreed to participate" (emphasis added).
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Because Santoni failed to raise below his theory that Wing had no
obligation to arrest Santoni because he did not know about the
warrant, this argument is now procedurally defaulted. See
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 59
v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) ("If any
principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most
extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in
the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.").
In sum, Desrosiers had valid authority to swear out the
criminal complaint and receive the complaint and warrant for
Santoni's arrest, and Wing had valid authority to execute that
warrant. Therefore, we agree with the district court that
Santoni's arrest was lawful under Maine law and that it did not
constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Qualified Immunity
Because Santoni has not presented a viable constitutional
claim, we do not consider whether Desrosiers is protected from
liability by qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194
201 (2001) ("If no constitutional right would have been violated
were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further
inquiries concerning qualified immunity."); Flowers v. Fiore, 359
F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Upon finding that there was no
constitutional violation, we do not address the issue of qualified
immunity.").
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C. FTCA Claims Against the USPS
We next consider whether the district court erred in granting
summary judgment for the USPS on Santoni's tort claims of unlawful
arrest, assault, battery, and false imprisonment.
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.,
provides a limited congressional waiver of the sovereign immunity
of the United States for torts committed by federal employees
acting within the scope of their employment. Under the statute,
the United States may be held civilly liable "in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Certain types of intentional
torts are exempted from the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity,
but the statute allows claims against the United States for the
torts of “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution” arising out of “acts or
omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the
United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
This waiver of sovereign immunity, however, is subject to a
number of statutory exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. One defense
raised in the proceedings below was the discretionary function
exception, which shields from liability claims “based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
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discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). If the discretionary
function exception applies, the agency is completely immune from
suit, and the claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 360 (1st Cir.
1991).
The district court held that the discretionary function
exception did not preclude consideration of Santoni’s tort claims
against the USPS for alleged harms arising from Desrosiers’
participation in the arrest of Santoni. Because Desrosiers acted
outside the scope of his federal authority as a postal inspector
when he participated in this arrest (regardless of whether his
conduct was authorized under state law), the court concluded that
the discretionary function exception did not apply.7 As we
recently noted,"courts have read the Supreme Court's discretionary
function cases as denying protection to actions that are
unauthorized because they are unconstitutional, proscribed by
statute, or exceed the scope of an official's authority." Thames
Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 254-55 (1st
Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). However, we have not resolved
whether the discretionary function exception extends to actions
7
The USPS does not challenge this determination on appeal;
indeed, the attorney for the government conceded at oral argument
that the discretionary function exception does not bar
consideration of Santoni’s claims.
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that are otherwise outside the scope of an official's actual
federal authority, and we need not do so here. Nor do we address
whether Desrosiers had implied federal authority to participate in
the arrest to the limited extent of swearing out the criminal
complaint, receiving the arrest warrant, and assisting Wing in the
execution of that warrant. See, e.g., id. at 260 (holding that the
discretionary function exception applied where the Coast Guard had
implied statutory authority to order the evacuation of a sinking
ship). Assuming, arguendo, that the USPS is not shielded from
liability by the discretionary function analysis, Santoni’s tort
claims fail on the merits.
As noted, under the FTCA, the USPS is liable for the torts of
its agents, "in the same manner and to the same extent of a private
individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Because
the alleged tortious conduct took place in Maine, we look to Maine
tort law in determining the defendant's liability under the FTCA.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
Santoni's claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, assault,
and battery rely on the premise that Desrosiers acted at least
negligently by arresting Santoni without any lawful authority to do
so. Under Maine law, the torts of assault and battery by a law
enforcement officer require either a false arrest or the use of
excessive force during or after taking an individual into custody.
Bale v. Rider, 290 A.2d 359, 360 (Me. 1972). Similarly, in order
to establish a tort claim of false arrest and false imprisonment
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“the authority upon which [P]laintiff is confined must be
unlawful.” Nadeau v. State, 395 A.2d 107, 116 (Me. 1978) (stating
elements of false imprisonment claim); see Jedzierowski v. Jordan,
172 A.2d 636, 637 (Me. 1961) (holding that false arrest is one
means of committing false imprisonment).
As we have already concluded, supra, Santoni was arrested and
confined upon valid state law authority. Desrosiers’ participation
in the arrest did not render it unlawful under state law or the
Fourth Amendment. Because Santoni’s arrest was lawful, there is no
basis for finding liability for false arrest, false imprisonment,
assault, or battery. Therefore, we conclude that the district
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
on Santoni’s FTCA claims against the USPS.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants is affirmed.
So ordered.
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