United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2530
MARIA DEL ROSARIO ORTEGA; SERGIO BLANCO,
by themselves and representing minors
BEATRIZ BLANCO-ORTEGA and PATRIZIA BLANCO-ORTEGA,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
STAR-KIST FOODS, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Freddie Pérez-González, with whom Juan J. Martínez-Rodríguez
and Freddie Pérez-González & Assoc., P.S.C. were on brief, for
appellants.
David C. Indiano, with whom Alexander H. Bopp and Indiano &
Williams, P.S.C. were on brief, for appellee.
June 2, 2004
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. In April 1999, Beatriz Blanco-
Ortega, then nine years old, cut her right pinky finger on a can of
Star-Kist tuna. That is not normally the stuff of lawsuits in
federal court, but her injuries were more than trivial and led to
surgery, the prospect of future surgery, and minor permanent
disability and scarring. Beatriz, along with her parents and
sister, sued in federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1332. The claims of Beatriz's family members were
composed of emotional distress damages, with the mother asserting
medical expenses as well. Plaintiffs' choice of federal court was
no doubt influenced by the fact that civil jury trials are
unavailable in the local courts of Puerto Rico.
The case raises two issues. First is the classic
question whether each of the plaintiffs meets the amount-in-
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). The district court, using an analytic approach that we
have since rejected, see Stewart v. Tupperware Corp., 356 F.3d 335,
339 (1st Cir. 2004), held that it was a legal certainty that none
of the plaintiffs' claims was worth $75,000 and so dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. As to the injured child, Beatriz,
we reverse and hold that it is not a legal certainty that she could
not recover an award over $75,000. But we uphold the district
court's conclusion that none of Beatriz's family members satisfies
the amount-in-controversy requirement.
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The second question is whether Beatriz's family members
may nonetheless remain as plaintiffs under the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This is a very difficult
question, new to this court, on which the circuits have split. We
hold that by limiting supplemental jurisdiction to "civil action[s]
of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,"
§ 1367(a), Congress preserved the traditional rule that each
plaintiff in a diversity action must separately satisfy the amount-
in-controversy requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal
of Beatriz's family members' claims for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I.
On April 17, 2000, Beatriz Blanco-Ortega, along with
three family members, filed a diversity suit against Star-Kist
Foods Inc., Star-Kist Caribe Inc., and their unnamed insurers in
the district of Puerto Rico. Besides Beatriz, the plaintiffs
consisted of her mother, Maria del Rosario-Ortega; her father,
Sergio Blanco; and her sister, Patrizia Blanco-Ortega. The
defendants promptly moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, claiming that there was not complete diversity of
citizenship because Star-Kist Caribe Inc., the branch of Star-Kist
that does business in Puerto Rico, was a Puerto Rico citizen for
purposes of the diversity statute. The district court agreed and
dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
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The plaintiffs re-filed their complaint on February 28,
2001, this time only naming Star-Kist Foods, Inc. and its unnamed
insurers as defendants. The complaint alleged that Beatriz had
suffered physical damages of not less than $500,000 and emotional
damages of not less than $400,000. It also alleged that each of
her three family members had suffered emotional damages in excess
of $150,000 and that Mrs. Ortega had also incurred $4,927.07 in
past medical expenses and $25,000 in estimated future medical
expenses.
On October 24, 2001, Star-Kist moved for summary
judgment, alleging that none of the plaintiffs could satisfy the
$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The district court
agreed and on July 18, 2002, once again dismissed all of the
plaintiffs' claims without prejudice for want of jurisdiction. The
four plaintiffs appeal that decision.
II.
A. Amount-in-Controversy Requirement
In 1938, the Supreme Court established the basic standard
by which to evaluate a challenge that a plaintiff has not met the
jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement:
The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in
cases brought in federal court is that, unless the law
gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff
controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.
It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is
really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify
dismissal.
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St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89
(1938) (internal citations omitted).
"Under St. Paul, a plaintiff's allegations of damages
that meet the amount-in-controversy requirement suffices unless
questioned by the opposing party or the court." Spielman v.
Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001). Once a defendant
questions jurisdiction by challenging the amount of damages alleged
in the complaint, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
it is not a legal certainty that the claims do not involve the
requisite amount.1 Id. at 4; Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23,
30-31 (1st Cir. 2001). "A party may meet this burden by amending
the pleadings or by submitting affidavits." Dep't of Recreation &
Sports v. World Boxing Ass'n, 942 F.2d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1991).
When there are several plaintiffs, each must present claims that
meet the jurisdictional amount.2 Clark v. Paul Gray Inc., 306 U.S.
583, 589 (1939). Once a district court dismisses for failure to
1
At one point, the district court wrongly said that "once the
defendant challenges the amount of damages alleged in the
complaint, then the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to establish
facts indicating that, to a legal certainty, the claims involve
more than the jurisdictional minimum." This is incorrect; the
plaintiff need only show it is not a legal certainty that the
claims will not result in a verdict for the amount in controversy.
The double negative has substantive meaning. Ultimately, it
appears the district court did use the correct standard regarding
the plaintiffs' burden despite this error in laying out the law.
2
We address the supplemental jurisdiction question below.
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meet the jurisdictional amount, the court of appeals reviews that
judgment de novo. Spielman, 251 F.3d at 4.
The basic error committed by the district court was to
evaluate the amount-in-controversy by reference to amounts that the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has found reasonable in tort cases.
As we noted in Stewart, the analogy is imperfect in multiple
respects, most notably because Puerto Rico does not have jury
trials in civil cases. 356 F.3d at 339. We thus conduct the
amount-in-controversy inquiry de novo, looking to each plaintiff
individually.
The plaintiffs presented the following evidence in
response to Star-Kist's challenge to the amounts alleged in the
complaint: the deposition testimony of each of the four plaintiffs,
the medical report of Dr. Zegarra (Beatriz's treating physician),
hospital records, receipts for the payment of Beatriz's treatment,
pictures of Beatriz's hand after the surgery, and the testimony of
both the school nurse and the school paramedic who initially
treated Beatriz when she cut herself.
This evidence established that after Beatriz cut her
pinky finger while opening a can of Star-Kist tuna, she went to the
school infirmary. The nurse and a paramedic were able to stop the
bleeding after fifteen to thirty minutes. The nurse said that the
cut was deep and bled profusely. A school official called Mrs.
Ortega at home to tell her about Beatriz's injury, and Mrs. Ortega
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went to the school to pick up Beatriz. Mrs. Ortega then took
Beatriz to the emergency room of a nearby hospital, where a doctor
indicated that Beatriz may have severed her tendons and nerves.
Mrs. Ortega contacted Dr. Zegarra, a hand surgeon, by phone while
she was at the hospital, and scheduled an immediate appointment.
Together, Mrs. Ortega and Beatriz went immediately from the
hospital to Dr. Zegarra's office.
Dr. Zegarra confirmed that Beatriz had in fact damaged
her nerves and tendons and determined that she required surgery.
He was unable to secure an operating room for that day, so the
surgery was scheduled for April 22, the next day. The surgery,
which required Beatriz to be put under general anesthesia,
successfully repaired Beatriz's deep flexor tendon and digital
nerve. After the surgery, Beatriz attended physical therapy, which
was painful, three times a week for a three-month period. Beatriz
continued the physical therapy for eight months in total and wore
a cast throughout that entire period. The therapy impaired her
ability to write and paint in school and forced her to drop out of
a volleyball tournament. Her finger bears a small scar and is
slightly bent. Despite the successful surgery, Beatriz has been
diagnosed with a 3% partial permanent impairment of the functioning
of her hand. The medical prognosis is that the injury could become
worse as she grows and that she may need more surgery.
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Given Beatriz's permanent physical impairment, the
surgery, and the claimed pain and suffering (bearing in mind the
potential impact of the injury and its aftermath on a young girl),
we cannot say to a legal certainty that Beatriz could not recover
a jury award larger than $75,000. See Stewart, 356 F.3d at 340
(plaintiffs met jurisdictional minimum where evidence suggested
that each had suffered permanent physical impairment, had endured
non-trivial pain and suffering damages by having to spend honeymoon
in a hospital, and might require future medical services); Gebbia
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000)
(plaintiff's allegations that, as a result of falling in
defendant's store, she sustained injuries to her wrist, knee and
back, resulting in permanent disability and disfigurement and
causing pain and suffering and lost wages, were sufficient to meet
jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement); Rosenboro v.
Kim, 994 F.2d 13, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he presence of
medical evidence showing that a plaintiff is suffering from a
continuing or permanent physical impairment [is] an important
indicator" in determining whether the plaintiff meets the amount-
in-controversy requirement).
The other plaintiffs fare differently. Mrs. Ortega
presented evidence that she paid $4,927.07 for past medical
expenses and says that she anticipates paying $25,000 in future
medical expenses. She also claims that her emotional distress
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damages totaled $250,000. We assume arguendo that Mrs. Ortega can
claim the past medical expenses and some future medical expenses.3
But there was no support at all for the $25,000 figure for future
medical expenses that she alleged, and a lower figure appears to be
in order, given that past expenses were less than $5,000. Even if
she could claim all $25,000, there is still quite a gap between the
medical expenses and $75,000.
We conclude that Mrs. Ortega cannot fill this entire gap
with her emotional distress damages. Cf. Jimenez Puig v. Avis
Rent-A-Car Sys., 574 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1978) (amount-in-
controversy requirement of $10,000 was not met in claim for short-
lived embarrassment and anger resulting from a car-rental clerk's
public destruction of credit card and announcement that plaintiff
had failed to pay his bills). One of the normal responsibilities
of parenthood is dealing with a child's cuts and scrapes, and here
the injuries were relatively minor. Neither Beatriz nor her mother
sought any counseling relating to the injury. Moreover, Mrs.
Ortega did not personally witness Beatriz's accident or the
immediate aftermath.
Mrs. Ortega tries to argue that she meets the
jurisdictional amount by relying on remittitur cases. Certainly
courts may resort to analogous cases involving remittitur in
3
As for future medical expenses, Mrs. Ortega suggested in her
deposition that any future surgery Beatriz might have on her finger
would be elective.
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determining whether a plaintiff can meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement in a diversity case. But the utility of remittitur
cases will vary depending on at least three factors -- the factual
similarities between the cases, the difference in viewpoints
between the start of a case and the end of a case, and both the
jury award in the remittitur case and the amount to which it was
reduced.
Remittitur of a jury award is ordered when the award is
"grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the
court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it
to stand." Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st
Cir. 1995). In such cases, the rule in this circuit is that the
jury award should be remitted "to the maximum that would be upheld
by the trial court as not excessive." Jones & Jones v. Pineda &
Pineda, 22 F.3d 391, 398 (1st Cir. 1994). The plaintiff has a
choice between accepting the remittitur amount or opting for a new
trial. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 771 F.2d 579,
588 (1st Cir. 1985).
While remittitur determinations are based on what has
been proved at trial, amount-in-controversy determinations are made
at the outset of the case. See generally 14B Wright & Miller, Fed.
Prac. & Proc. § 3702 (2d ed. 2003). This different procedural lens
complicates determining whether there is sufficient factual
similarity between the remittitur case and the jurisdictional case.
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To be useful, the facts of injury and damages that were actually
proved to the jury in the remittitur case must be similar to the
facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that
could be proved in the jurisdictional case.
Moreover, for an analogy to a remittitur case to be
useful, the difference between the numbers involved in the
remittitur case must be taken into account. These amounts are (1)
the jury award that was deemed excessive in a remittitur case and
(2) the amount to which that award was remitted. If, assuming the
cases are otherwise similar, both numbers are above the
jurisdictional minimum (i.e., $75,000), then the remittitur case
supports the conclusion that the amount-in-controversy requirement
has been met. Similarly, if both the jury award and the amount to
which it was remitted are less than $75,000, that supports the
conclusion that the amount-in-controversy requirement cannot be
met.
More problematic are remittitur cases hovering around the
jurisdictional amount -- i.e., cases in which the jury award is
above the jurisdictional amount but the amount to which the award
was remitted is below the jurisdictional amount. In theory, the
amount to which the award was remitted should be the maximum
possible amount that was legally permissible, and thus should be
the applicable basis of comparison. But theory is often a long way
from reality. As we have noted before, "converting feelings such
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as pain and suffering and the loss of enjoyment of life into
dollars is not an exact science." Smith, 177 F.3d at 33 n.5. One
safety valve for the inherent difficulty in selecting a remittitur
amount is that the plaintiff is given the choice of accepting the
reduced amount or opting for a new trial. See Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 771 F.2d at 588. The difficulty in converting pain and
suffering into a dollar amount makes each case very fact-specific,
thus decreasing the usefulness of a remittitur case hovering around
the jurisdictional amount.
Mrs. Ortega argues by reference to a remittitur case,
Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1999). In that case,
a husband and wife were shopping in defendant's store when the wife
was struck on the head by a cooler that fell from a shelf. Id. at
22. As a result of the blow, the wife lost consciousness for close
to a minute, leading the husband to administer mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation. Id. at 22. He testified that he believed his wife
was dead. Id. at 23. Eventually an ambulance arrived, and
paramedics placed a cervical collar around the wife's neck and
transported her on to the ambulance using a stiff board that had
been placed underneath her. Id. at 22. The wife suffered from the
blow for months after the injury. Id. The jury awarded the
husband $250,000 in emotional distress damages, and the appellate
court remitted that award to $100,000. Id. at 32-33. Mrs. Ortega
argues that her case is similar to the husband's in Smith and that
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even the $100,000 amount to which damages were remitted in that
case is larger than the $75,000 minimum.
Mrs. Ortega's reliance on Smith fails even though both
the original award and the reduced amount were greater than the
jurisdictional minimum, because Mrs. Ortega's case is not
sufficiently factually similar to Smith. Beatriz's injury, on the
basis of the plaintiffs' complaint, was not nearly as dramatic or
disruptive as the wife's injury in Smith. No one believed that
Beatriz would die of the cut on her finger and there was no
dramatic witnessing of the accident, unlike in Smith. Moreover,
unlike the husband in Smith, Mrs. Ortega has not alleged that the
accident has in any way strained her relationship with Beatriz.
See id. at 23.
Beatriz's sister Patrizia has an even less substantial
claim for emotional distress damages than her mother. Patrizia was
a student in Washington, D.C. at the time of the injury and did not
return home due to the accident. Although she did take Beatriz to
some physical therapy sessions after she returned from school over
the summer, Patrizia did not miss any work or school obligations to
do so. Like the others, there is no evidence of Patrizia's
receiving any counseling services in connection with her little
sister's injury. It is legally certain that Patrizia could not
recover an award over $75,000 for her emotional distress.
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It is also legally certain that the claims of Beatriz's
father, Sergio Blanco, do not meet the $75,000 threshold. Mr.
Blanco is divorced from Beatriz's mother and does not live with
Beatriz. He spent half a day at the hospital during Beatriz's
surgery, but he did not bring Beatriz to any medical appointments.
Mr. Blanco's claim to emotional distress damages over $75,000 is
too tenuous.
In short, only Beatriz's claim satisfies the
jurisdictional requirements of § 1332. Her family members' claims
do not meet the minimum amount-in-controversy, and no other
independent basis for federal jurisdiction (e.g., federal question
jurisdiction) exists over those claims.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction under § 1367
This leaves the issue of supplemental jurisdiction.
Beatriz's family members cannot file their own suits against Star-
Kist in federal court. The question is whether the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, allows them to proceed in
federal court nonetheless on the basis of Beatriz's
jurisdictionally sufficient claim.
Though simple to state, the question has not been
answered in this circuit,4 and its proper resolution is far from
clear. The courts of appeals are sharply divided over whether
4
We noted the issue in the class-action context in Spielman
v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 7 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001).
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§ 1367 allows parties who cannot themselves satisfy § 1332's
amount-in-controversy requirement to sue in federal court by
joining forces with a plaintiff who can. The Supreme Court once
granted certiorari to resolve the matter, but it ultimately split
4-4 and affirmed without opinion. See Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc.,
529 U.S. 333 (2000).5
The problem has actually arisen in two contexts, each of
which is the subject of a circuit split. First, there are cases --
like Beatriz's -- involving the ordinary joinder of additional
plaintiffs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. Compare Stromberg Metal
Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996)
(where one plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-controversy
requirement, § 1367 permits jurisdiction over transactionally
related claims by co-plaintiffs who do not), with Meritcare, Inc.
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1999)
(each co-plaintiff must independently satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement). Second, there are cases involving the
claims of absent class members in diversity-only class actions.
Compare Allapattah Serv., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1254
(11th Cir. 2003) (section 1367 authorizes jurisdiction over all
class members' claims if the named plaintiffs satisfy the amount-
in-controversy requirement); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d
5
An unexplained affirmance by an equally divided Court has no
precedential value. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,
304 (1996).
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927, 934 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d
110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); and In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d
524, 528 (5th Cir. 1995) (same), with Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232
F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (section 1367 does not extend
jurisdiction over class members who do not independently meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement); and Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co.,
160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998) (same).6 Because the same
statutory language applies in both contexts, some courts have
lumped the two together for purposes of § 1367. See, e.g.,
Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 218; Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931. Our case
involves only Rule 20 joinder, however, and we express no view
regarding the application of § 1367 in class actions.7
Even aside from the circuit split, this is an area where
courts are wise to tread carefully. The problem of pendent-party
jurisdiction implicates some of the most sensitive and enduring
issues in the law of federal jurisdiction, and it directly affects
6
The district courts in our circuit are similarly split.
Compare Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 43, 52
(D. Mass. 2002) (section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction
over pendent party plaintiffs who do not themselves satisfy
requirements of § 1332); and Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 177 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D. Mass. 1997) (same), with Arias v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 111, 115 (D.P.R. 2001) (each
plaintiff must independently meet the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction); and Mayo v. Key Fin. Servs., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 277,
278 (D. Mass. 1993) (same).
7
In our view, class actions raise unique problems that will
be better addressed with the benefit of briefing and argument in a
case requiring us to consider them. See infra note 19.
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the allocation of judicial business among the state and federal
courts. In the end, certainty can come only from Congress or the
Supreme Court. For now, we disagree with the Seventh Circuit and
join the Third Circuit in holding that, at least in cases of Rule
20 joinder, § 1367 did not upset the settled rule that each
plaintiff must independently satisfy the diversity statute's
amount-in-controversy requirement.
1. Background
Before 1990, it is clear, Beatriz's family members could
not have joined in Beatriz's diversity suit unless they each stood
to recover more than the minimum amount required for jurisdiction.
As early as 1911, the Supreme Court declared that "[w]hen two or
more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for
convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the
demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount." Troy
Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911). That rule is
now commonly associated with Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583
(1939), which reaffirmed Troy Bank after the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 306 U.S. at 589. Even after
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), in which the
Supreme Court approved pendent-claim jurisdiction in federal-
question cases, see id. at 725, Clark remained good law:
"[M]ultiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims must each
satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement for suit in the
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federal courts." Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294
(1973); see also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976)
(distinguishing pendent-party jurisdiction from the type of
pendent-claim jurisdiction permitted in Gibbs). If the Clark rule
applies in this case, we should affirm the dismissal as to
Beatriz's family members but vacate as to Beatriz, thereby leaving
Beatriz free to choose between proceeding alone in federal court or
voluntarily dismissing her complaint and re-filing together with
her family in the Puerto Rico courts. See Clark, 306 U.S. at 590.
Whether Clark continues to apply today depends on how one
reads 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
which was enacted by Congress in 1990. See Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 310. In
relevant part, § 1367 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as
expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in
any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article
III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction founded solely on
section 1332 of this title, the district courts
shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under
subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against
persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over
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claims by persons proposed to be joined as
plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking
to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such
rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over such claims would be inconsistent with the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
The impetus for Congress's adoption of § 1367 was the Supreme
Court's 5-4 decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545
(1989). See generally Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534
U.S. 533, 539-40 (2002). Finley did not deal with the amount-in-
controversy requirement. Rather, the plaintiff in Finley had filed
suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), alleging that the government's failure
to maintain certain airport runway lights had contributed to the
death of her husband and children in an airplane accident. 490
U.S. at 546. Later, she amended her complaint to add state-law
tort claims against two new defendants, a municipality and a
utility company. No independent basis for federal subject-matter
jurisdiction existed over those claims. Id. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the plaintiff could not have brought her entire
action in state court because federal jurisdiction in FTCA cases is
exclusive, but it held nevertheless that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the "pendent-party" state-law claims. Id. at
555-56. The Court concluded by noting that Congress was free to
reverse that result if it wished. Id. at 556.
Congress did so in § 1367. See Raygor, 534 U.S. at 540;
id. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B. v.
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The Vessel "Lady Abby", 980 F.2d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer,
C.J.) (section 1367 overturns Finley). The text of the statute,
however, can be read to do more than overturn Finley.8 The
jurisdictional grant, which appears in section (a), is not limited
to cases like Finley involving exclusive federal jurisdiction, or
even to federal-question cases generally. Instead, subsection (a)
permits the district courts to hear any claim arising from the same
constitutional case or controversy "in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction." Subsection (b)
then creates an exception to that grant for certain claims in
diversity cases. The result is a jurisdictional grant of such
apparent breadth that, as one commentator succinctly put it, "the
statute has created confusion in a number of areas in which
principles were thought to be well established." 13B Wright,
Miller, & Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3567.2 (2d ed. 2003).
2. Section 1367 and the Clark Rule
One such area of confusion involves the continued
validity of Clark in the wake of § 1367. The case law on this
issue is split between two competing interpretations of § 1367.
8
See Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster
of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 Emory L.J. 963, 980
(1991) ("Congress could have overruled the holding in Finley quite
simply and cleanly, without affecting other areas. . . . Why the
statute had to go further, we do not know. That the statute went
further, there can be no doubt.").
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The first, adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Stromberg,
turns on Congress's failure to include Rule 20 plaintiffs among
those parties who cannot rely on supplemental jurisdiction where
doing so would be inconsistent with § 1332. See § 1367(b)
(restricting supplemental jurisdiction over parties joined as
plaintiffs under Rules 19 or 24, but omitting Rule 20 plaintiffs).
On this reading, § 1367 overturns Clark and extends supplemental
jurisdiction over claims asserted by diversity plaintiffs who
cannot meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, provided that at
least one plaintiff in the action has a jurisdictionally sufficient
claim. See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 930-32.
The second interpretation, originally suggested in an
article by Professor Pfander9 and later adopted by the Tenth
Circuit in Leonhardt, emphasizes the requirement in § 1367(a) that
the district court must first have "original jurisdiction" over an
action before supplemental jurisdiction can apply. See Leonhardt,
160 F.3d at 640 (citing Pfander). On this reading, § 1367
preserves the rule in Clark and thus does not supply supplemental
jurisdiction where, as in this case, only one of the named
plaintiffs meets the amount in controversy. Although Leonhardt
was a class action case, the Third Circuit subsequently endorsed
its reasoning in Meritcare, a Rule 20 joinder case with facts
9
Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The
Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109 (1999).
-21-
analogous to the case at bar. See 166 F.3d at 221-22 (citing
Leonhardt with approval).
We recognize that plausible textual arguments can be made
in favor of either of these readings. For the reasons that follow,
however, we conclude that Leonhardt and Meritcare embody the better
reading of § 1367.
a. Text of § 1367
We begin with the text of the statute. BedRoc Ltd. v.
United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 1593 (2004). Given the historical
and legal background against which Congress enacted § 1367, we
think the Leonhardt/Meritcare approach makes the best sense of the
statutory text. Still, neither Leonhardt nor Meritcare fully
explained the historical and doctrinal significance of Congress's
choice of words in § 1367. Given the long history of the Judicial
Code and the enormous body of law and scholarship that surrounds
it, that context provides a crucial guide to the meaning of the
statute. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 124 S. Ct.
1570, 1579 (2004) (assuming, in interpreting a federal statute,
that "Congress legislated against [a] background of law,
scholarship, and history").
The first sentence of § 1367 specifies that supplemental
jurisdiction can only apply in a "civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction." § 1367(a). That
phrase unambiguously invokes the language that Congress has used
-22-
for more than two hundred years to confer jurisdiction on the
federal district courts in civil cases. Nearly every
jurisdictional grant in Title 28 provides that "the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction" of "civil action[s]" within the
scope of the grant. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal
questions), 1332 (diversity), 1335 (interpleader), 1337
(antitrust), 1338 (intellectual property), 1339 (postal matters),
1340 (internal revenue). Such grants, in turn, have been the
subject of judicial interpretation for centuries. E.g.,
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). By invoking
the concept of a district court's "original jurisdiction" over a
"civil action," Congress presumptively incorporated into § 1367 the
longstanding, judicially developed doctrines that determine whether
those statutes confer "original jurisdiction" over a particular
civil action. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't
of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 614-15 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from
which it was taken . . . ." (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952))).
That is important because, under well-settled law,
joinder and aggregation have different implications for the
-23-
existence of "original jurisdiction" in federal-question and
diversity cases. Under the federal-question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, the original jurisdiction of the district courts is
triggered if the action "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." All that is required is the
federal question. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 738, 822 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.); see City of Chicago v.
Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-66 (1997). Joinder
questions arise only after "original jurisdiction" is established,
and only to the extent that the court seeks to decide non-federal
questions incident to disposition of the federal question.10 See
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 822.
Under § 1332, by contrast, joinder and aggregation
questions can actually determine whether the district court has
"original jurisdiction" over the action. Joinder affects original
jurisdiction through the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, supra. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S.
381, 389 (1998) ("The presence of [a] nondiverse party
automatically destroys original jurisdiction . . . .").
Aggregation issues affect original jurisdiction because Clark
10
Until 1980, the federal question statute also had an amount-
in-controversy requirement. See Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369 (eliminating the amount-in-controversy
requirement from § 1331). If that requirement were still in effect
today, aggregation issues would affect the existence of "original
jurisdiction" under § 1331.
-24-
prohibits multiple plaintiffs from combining their claims to clear
the amount-in-controversy bar. See 306 U.S. at 589. Strawbridge
and Clark, in turn, are binding interpretations of the diversity
statute. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S.
523, 530-31 (1967) (complete diversity rule is statutory); Snyder
v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) (Clark anti-aggregation rule is
statutory). Unless both rules are satisfied, the statute does not
confer original jurisdiction on the district court. Sheldon v.
Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) ("Courts created by statute
can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.").
Thus, Congress preserved both Clark and Strawbridge by
providing that, before supplemental jurisdiction can attach, the
district court must first have "original jurisdiction" over the
action. See Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367:
The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109, 148-
49 (1999). In a diversity case, if the Clark rule is not met, or
if the parties are not completely diverse, then the "original
jurisdiction" requirement in § 1367(a) is not satisfied and
supplemental jurisdiction will not attach. On the other hand, if
the parties are completely diverse and each plaintiff separately
meets the amount-in-controversy requirement, then § 1332 is
satisfied and the "original jurisdiction" requirement is met. If
so, § 1367 will support any transactionally related claims that the
plaintiffs may wish to bring -- but only so long as § 1367(b) is
-25-
satisfied, and only as long as original jurisdiction is not
destroyed. This last qualification is important because it
precludes a plaintiff from, for example, using § 1367 to circumvent
Strawbridge by amending her complaint to add a nondiverse party
after "original jurisdiction" is initially established. Cf. Grupo
Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 124 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2004)
(noting that a post-filing change in the parties to an action,
unlike a change in the initial parties' citizenship, can affect
subject-matter jurisdiction); Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco
Healthcare Group, L.P., 362 F.3d 136, 140-41 (1st Cir. 2004)
(subject-matter jurisdiction was destroyed and dismissal was
required where a diversity plaintiff amended its complaint to join
a non-diverse party).
On this reading of § 1367, Beatriz's family members
cannot rely on supplemental jurisdiction to support their claims:
their complaint does not satisfy Clark, so "original jurisdiction"
fails under § 1332. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 336. As a result, this
"civil action" is not one "of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction," and § 1367 does not apply.
We are persuaded to adopt this reading of the statutory
text for several reasons. First, it gives effect to Congress's
requirement that the district court must have "original
jurisdiction" over the "civil action" before supplemental
jurisdiction can apply. See Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 237 (1st
-26-
Cir. 1999) (statutes should be interpreted to give effect to every
word and phrase). Congress could have applied a different test in
§ 1367(a) -- for example, it could have permitted supplemental
jurisdiction whenever any single claim in the action would have
supported original jurisdiction if it had been brought by itself.11
But that is not what the statute says.12 See Pfander, supra, at 141
11
The dissent would apply such a test in this case. According
to the dissent, § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction
whenever the district court has "original jurisdiction over a
claim." (emphasis added). The problem with the dissent's theory is
that § 1367(a) does not refer to original jurisdiction over
"claims." Rather, the statute requires a "civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction." § 1367(a)
(emphasis added).
That distinction is critical. The Supreme Court has never
held that original jurisdiction exists over a "civil action" under
§ 1332 simply because one claim in the action is between diverse
parties and exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. On the contrary,
original jurisdiction does not lie unless all of the parties in the
case are diverse. See Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S.
381, 388 (1998) ("A case falls within the federal district court's
'original' diversity 'jurisdiction' only if diversity of
citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there is
no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same
State."). Similarly, § 1332 is not satisfied, and original
jurisdiction over the "civil action" does not exist, unless each
plaintiff independently satisfies the amount-in-controversy
requirement. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 336; Clark, 306 U.S. at 589.
Because the complaint in this case fails this requirement, original
jurisdiction over the "civil action" is absent and § 1367 is
inapplicable.
12
The dissent argues that a single claim is sufficient to
create original jurisdiction over a "civil action" under § 1332
because courts are not normally required to dismiss the entire
action when a jurisdictional flaw is discovered. Rather, a court
may simply dismiss the offending parties. See, e.g., Newman-Green,
Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 836 (1989) (courts of
appeals may cure jurisdictional defects by dismissing dispensable
nondiverse parties); Clark, 306 U.S. at 590 (dismissing parties who
failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement but retaining
-27-
(noting that the statute "appears to reject the notion that a
single, jurisdictionally sufficient claim will support the exercise
of plenary pendent jurisdiction in diversity matters").
Second, our reading of § 1367's "original jurisdiction"
requirement is consistent with the settled meaning of identical
language in 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the removal statute. Section 1441,
like § 1367, applies only if the "civil action" in question is one
"of which the district courts . . . have original jurisdiction."
§ 1441(a). Relying on that language, the Supreme Court has
interpreted § 1441 to prohibit removal unless the entire action, as
it stands at the time of removal, could have been filed in federal
court in the first instance. See, e.g., Sygenta Crop Protection,
Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 (2002); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham,
489 U.S. 838, 840 (1989) (per curiam). Section 1441 has thus been
held to incorporate the well-pleaded complaint rule, see City of
Chicago, 522 U.S. at 163; the complete diversity rule, see
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996); and rules for
calculating the amount in controversy, see St. Paul Mercury Indem.
Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291-92 (1938). By the time
jurisdiction over the party that satisfied it). This argument
confuses the existence of original jurisdiction with remedies for
its absence. Original jurisdiction over the "civil action" may be
achieved by dismissing certain dispensable parties. But as long as
the offending parties are present, original jurisdiction over the
"civil action" cannot exist, see Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389 ("The
presence of [a] nondiverse party automatically destroys original
jurisdiction . . . ."), regardless of whether any single claim in
the action would satisfy § 1332 by itself.
-28-
Congress enacted § 1367 in 1990, this interpretation of § 1441(a)
was well-settled. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n, 489 U.S. at 840;
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Met. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27 (1983).
Given this background, it is significant that Congress
included the same "original jurisdiction" requirement in § 1367.
See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972)
(noting that "practical experience in the interpretation of
statutes [indicates that] a legislative body generally uses a
particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context").
Congress purposefully employed language in § 1367(a) that had
already been interpreted in § 1441 to incorporate the traditional
doctrines of federal jurisdiction -- including Strawbridge and
Clark.
Another advantage of our interpretation of § 1367 is that
it aligns statutory supplemental jurisdiction with the judicially
developed doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as they
existed prior to Finley. Congress took the opportunity in § 1367
to codify the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under
a single heading. See City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 165; Iglesias
v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 1998). Neither
of those doctrines permitted a diversity plaintiff to circumvent
the requirements of § 1332 simply by joining her claim in an action
-29-
brought by another, jurisdictionally competent diversity
plaintiff.13 We see no indication in § 1367 that Congress wanted
to alter that rule. Notably, where Congress did intend to alter
existing law in § 1367, it took pains to do so directly and
unequivocally. See § 1367(a) (repudiating Finley in a separate
sentence: "Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.").
Finally, our interpretation explains the omission of Rule
20 plaintiffs from § 1367(b). This was the "apparent incongruity"
on which the Seventh Circuit relied in Stromberg. See 77 F.3d at
932. Stromberg reasoned that because Congress omitted claims by
Rule 20 plaintiffs from § 1367(b), it must have intended to allow
permissively joined plaintiffs to bring claims that § 1332 would
not otherwise support. Id. at 931-32. In our view, there is a
better explanation. The permissive joinder of a nondiverse party,
13
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, which allowed
plaintiffs to assert non-federal claims in federal court, was
applicable only in federal-question cases. See 7C Wright, Miller,
& Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1917 n.7 (2d ed. 2004); Carnegie-
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1988); see also Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) (noting
that the lower court had erred in relying on Gibbs, a pendent
jurisdiction case, because the case before the court did not
involve a federal claim). Ancillary jurisdiction, by contrast,
applied in both federal-question and diversity cases, but that
doctrine "typically involve[d] claims by a defending party haled
into court against his will." Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376 (emphasis
added); see also id. at n.18. Moreover, the Court in Kroger made
clear that a party could not resort to ancillary jurisdiction where
doing so would effectively circumvent the complete diversity rule.
See id. at 375-77.
-30-
whether in the original complaint or afterwards, destroys complete
diversity and thus deprives the court of "original jurisdiction."
Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389; Am. Fiber & Finishing, 362 F.3d at 140-
41. Likewise, "original jurisdiction" is destroyed by the joinder
of a Rule 20 plaintiff who, like Beatriz's family members, cannot
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. See Snyder, 394
U.S. at 336-37 (noting that the requirement that each plaintiff
must separately pass the amount-in-controversy bar derives from
§ 1332).14 Supplemental jurisdiction in such a case fails at the
threshold of § 1367(a), so there was simply no need for Congress to
include Rule 20 plaintiffs in subsection (b) in order to preserve
Clark or Strawbridge. See Pfander, supra, at 148.
A few courts have rejected this reading of § 1367 on the
ground that nothing in the statute suggests the phrase "original
jurisdiction" has a different meaning in diversity cases than in
federal-question cases. See, e.g., Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261
F.3d 927, 936 (9th Cir. 2001); Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
14
The Supreme Court has not specifically held that plaintiffs
joined under Rule 20 after the filing of the original complaint
must also satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. That
result, however, is probably inevitable in light of Clark and
Snyder, for "[o]therwise an appellate court could be called on to
sustain a decree in favor of a plaintiff who had not shown that his
claim involved the jurisdictional amount, even though the suit were
dismissed on the merits as to the other plaintiffs who had
established the jurisdictional amount for themselves." Clark, 306
U.S. at 590; cf. Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare
Group, LP, 362 F.3d 136, 140-41 (1st Cir. 2004) (addition of a non-
diverse party after filing of original complaint destroyed
diversity jurisdiction).
-31-
229 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50-51 (D. Mass. 2002). That argument is
misplaced. The requirement of "original jurisdiction" in § 1367(a)
has the same meaning in every case: that some underlying statutory
grant of original jurisdiction must be satisfied. What differs
between federal question and diversity cases is not the meaning of
"original jurisdiction" but rather the requirements of sections
1331 and 1332. Under § 1331, the sole issue is whether a federal
question appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded
complaint; the identity of the parties and the amounts they stand
to recover are largely irrelevant. Section 1332, by contrast,
predicates original jurisdiction on the identity of the parties
(i.e., complete diversity) and their ability to meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement. So the "original jurisdiction" language
in § 1367 operates differently in federal-question and diversity
cases not because the meaning of that term varies, but because the
requirements of the underlying statutes are different.
Nor does this reading of the statute make § 1367(b)
superfluous. By itself, § 1367(a) would authorize a wide variety
of supplemental claims in diversity cases -- counterclaims by
defendants, cross-claims among plaintiffs, claims by and against
intervenors, and so on. Section § 1367(b) is important because it
ensures that this authorization does not functionally undermine the
requirements of § 1332. Suppose, for example, that the defendant
in a diversity case impleads a nondiverse party under Fed. R. Civ.
-32-
P. 14. Section 1367(b) would prevent the plaintiff from asserting
a non-federal claim against the impleaded party. This example, of
course, is Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365
(1978), in which the Supreme Court held that permitting ancillary
(now supplemental) jurisdiction over such a claim would allow
diversity plaintiffs to "defeat the statutory requirement of
complete diversity by the simple expedient of suing only those
defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to
implead nondiverse defendants." Id. at 374. Section 1367(b)
codifies Kroger's anti-circumvention rationale, not merely as
against parties impleaded under Rule 14, but in a variety of
situations in which "original jurisdiction" may technically exist
but the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction "would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."
See Rowe, Burbank, & Mengler, A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction,
40 Emory L.J. 993, 995 (1991) (explaining that subsection (b)
implements Kroger's rationale). Nothing about our interpretation
of § 1367(a) obviates this provision.
Admittedly, our reading of § 1367 is not perfect. One
difficulty is that while § 1367(b) does not mention Rule 20
plaintiffs, it does refer to "claims by persons proposed to be
joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19" -- a reference that is
technically unnecessary under our reading of the statute, since the
joinder of a nondiverse party as an indispensable plaintiff would
-33-
likewise destroy original jurisdiction under § 1332.15 See, e.g.,
Gonzalez v. Cruz, 926 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). And, on policy
grounds, there are certainly litigation efficiencies to be gained
by an interpretation of § 1367 that would permit Beatriz's family
members' claims to proceed in federal court alongside her own. See
Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 932.
But no reading of § 1367 is perfect -- the alternative
approach embodied in Stromberg, for example, accords no
significance to Congress's use of the term "original jurisdiction."
In light of the historical and legal context to Congress's
enactment of § 1367, including the settled interpretation of § 1441
and the established limits on pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,
we conclude that Congress intended to preserve the Clark anti-
15
Congress may have included the reference to Rule 19
plaintiffs simply to be clear that a plaintiff joined as an
indispensable party under Rule 19 is in exactly the same situation
as one who intervenes as of right under Rule 24(a). Before the
enactment of § 1367, ancillary jurisdiction worked differently
under Rules 19 and 24. See generally Rowe, Burbank, & Mengler,
Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 74 Judicature 213, 215 (Dec./Jan. 1991) (describing
the identical treatment of plaintiffs under Rules 19 and 24 as the
"one modest but significant way" in which § 1367(b) was intended to
alter prior law).
Similarly, others have offered explanations for the reference
in § 1367(b) to claims against persons made parties under Rule 19
or 20. See, e.g., Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section
1367: The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev.
109, 144-46 (1999) (Rule 20 defending parties); Rowe, Burbank, &
Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental
Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 Emory L.J. 943, at
957-58 (1991) (hereinafter Rowe et al., Compounding or Creating
Confusion) (Rule 19 defending parties).
-34-
aggregation rule by requiring that the district courts must have
"original jurisdiction" over the "civil action" before supplemental
jurisdiction will lie.
b. Section 1367 and the Complete Diversity Rule
There is a further reason why we reject the alternative
reading of § 1367 set out in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Stromberg. As we have said, Stromberg's reading of the statutory
text is, while imperfect, at least plausible. Yet it also has
surprising and far-reaching consequences: if § 1367 permits the
permissive joinder of plaintiffs who cannot meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement, then it also permits the joinder of non-
diverse plaintiffs. Nothing in the statute distinguishes between
the Clark amount-in-controversy requirement and the complete
diversity rule in Strawbridge. So if Stromberg's interpretation of
§ 1367 is correct, Congress overturned nearly 200 years of case law
interpreting § 1332 and authorized a potentially huge expansion of
the federal docket. Moreover, it did so not by amending the
diversity statute itself, but instead by failing to mention Rule 20
plaintiffs in § 1367(b).16
16
Stromberg itself recognized that "[s]upplemental
jurisdiction has the potential to move from complete to minimal
diversity." 77 F.3d at 932. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that § 1367(b) is adequate to protect the interests served by the
Strawbridge complete diversity rule. Id. Like many commentators,
we disagree. See, e.g., Fallon, Meltzer, & Shapiro, Hart &
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 1491 (5th ed.
2003) (describing the omission of Rule 20 plaintiffs from § 1367(b)
as "puzzling" because it allows plaintiffs "to circumvent the
-35-
We do not think Congress intended § 1367 to work such a
revolution in the law of diversity jurisdiction. Cf. Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457, 467-68 (2001) ("Congress . . .
does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in
vague terms or ancillary provisions -- it does not, one might say,
hide elephants in mouseholes."). Congress has long maintained a
policy of restricting diversity jurisdiction, not expanding it,
chiefly by raising the amount-in-controversy bar.17 Indeed, the
same congressional Federal Courts Study Committee that proposed
overturning Finley and codifying supplemental jurisdiction also
proposed eliminating most forms of diversity jurisdiction. See
Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts Study
complete diversity requirement of § 1332"); Gold, Note,
Supplemental Jurisdiction over Claims by Plaintiffs in Diversity
Cases: Making Sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2133,
2167 n.140 (1995) (the omission of Rule 20 plaintiffs must be
"inadvertent[]" because a literal reading of § 1367(b) "would allow
plaintiffs to strategically circumvent the complete diversity
requirement"); Rowe et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion,
supra, at 961 n.91 (describing § 1367(b)'s silence about Rule 20
plaintiffs as a "potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity
requirement").
17
In 1887, the minimum amount in controversy was $2,000. See
Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552. Since that time, Congress has
repeatedly raised, and never lowered, the required sum. See Act of
March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091 (raising the minimum amount in
controversy to $3,000); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554,
§ 2, 72 Stat. 415 (raising the minimum amount to $10,000); Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201,
102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (raising the minimum amount to $50,000);
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205,
110 Stat. 3847 (raising the minimum amount to $75,000). We leave
aside the special case of class actions. See infra note 19.
-36-
Committee 39 (1990) ("We believe that diversity jurisdiction should
be virtually eliminated . . . . [N]o other step will do anywhere
nearly as much to reduce federal caseload pressures and contain the
growth of the federal judiciary."). Congress did not accept that
proposal, to be sure, but that hardly suggests it wanted to expand
diversity jurisdiction. On the contrary, only a few years after
enacting § 1367, Congress again raised the amount-in-controversy
bar in an effort to reduce the diversity caseload in the federal
courts. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847 (raising the minimum amount in
controversy from $50,000 to $75,000). The Supreme Court, too, has
repeatedly admonished that in light of the burgeoning federal
caseload, diversity jurisdiction must be narrowly construed. See,
e.g., Snyder, 394 U.S. at 340-41; City of Indianapolis v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,
270 (1934).
Against this background, it is implausible to us that
Congress undermined Strawbridge and overturned Clark by such an
unlikely and obscure device as the omission of Rule 20 plaintiffs
from § 1367(b). Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 124 S. Ct. 1555, 1564
(2004) (refusing to adopt a textually plausible interpretation of
a statute because it was "farfetched that Congress meant . . . to
start down such a road in the absence of any clearer signal");
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 & n.23 (1991) ("[I]f Congress
-37-
had such an intent, Congress would have made it explicit in the
statute, or at least some of the Members would have identified or
mentioned it . . . . Congress' silence in this regard can be
likened to the dog that did not bark.").
Moreover, Congress has continued to regard Strawbridge as
good law even after § 1367. Since 1990, Congress has enacted at
least two statutes limiting the rule of complete diversity. Each
time, Congress has done so clearly and conspicuously, carefully
circumscribing the situations in which Strawbridge will not apply.
See Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, § 11020(b)(1)(A), 116 Stat. 1758 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1369) (granting the district courts original jurisdiction
over "any civil action involving minimal diversity" between adverse
parties arising from any single accident in which 75 natural
persons died, and further defining "minimal diversity" in the case
of both natural and corporate parties);18 Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
37, § 15(c), 113 Stat. 185 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6614(c))
(granting the district courts original jurisdiction over "any Y2K
action that is brought as a class action," except where a
"substantial majority" of the plaintiff class is from the same
18
The dissent points to the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA) as evidence that Congress is backing away
from its long history of restricting diversity jurisdiction. We
disagree. Our conclusion is that Congress is keenly aware of the
limits on diversity jurisdiction and expects those limits to apply
except where, as in the MMTJA, it specifically and unambiguously
alters them.
-38-
state as the "primary" defendants and the claims in the action will
be governed primarily by the law of that state).
Congress thus knows how to limit Strawbridge clearly when
it wishes, and it would have had little reason to enact these
statutes if it believed that it had already undermined the complete
diversity rule in the supplemental jurisdiction statute. Plainly
it did not so believe, and that understanding informs our choice
among plausible interpretations of § 1367. FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) ("At the time a
statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible meanings. Over
time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings.
. . . This is particularly so where the scope of the earlier
statute is broad but the subsequent statutes more specifically
address the topic at hand.").
c. Legislative History of § 1367
Finally, the legislative history of § 1367 strongly
corroborates the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
repudiate Clark or Strawbridge. Resort to legislative history is
appropriate where, as here, the text of a statute is susceptible to
two textually plausible interpretations. Lapine v. Town of
Wellesley, 304 F.3d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2002); Hernandez-Colon v. Sec.
of Labor, 835 F.2d 958, 960 (1st Cir. 1988). That is particularly
true in this case, given that our sister circuits have reached
conflicting answers to the same question based on the same
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statutory text. Cf. In re BankVest Capital Corp., 360 F.3d 291,
297 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[W]e are hard-pressed to endorse any 'plain
meaning' argument where, as here, other federal courts have reached
conflicting answers to the same question based on the same 'plain'
language.").
The legislative history of § 1367 is somewhat muddled in
its details, but one fact is certain: Congress did not believe
that § 1367 would make significant changes to the law of diversity
jurisdiction. The House Judiciary Committee report -- the only
congressional report concerning the provision that became § 1367 --
stated that the bill was intended to "essentially restore the pre-
Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on . . .
supplemental jurisdiction." H. Rep. No. 101-734, at 28 (Sept. 10,
1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, at 6874. The same
report made clear that Congress anticipated no sweeping changes in
the operation of § 1332: "In diversity cases, the district courts
may exercise supplemental jurisdiction, except when doing so would
be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of the
diversity statute." Id.
The bill's sponsors similarly did not believe that § 1367
would alter the fundamental rules of diversity jurisdiction.
Senator Grassley stated that the bill did not "represent major
changes in the law." 136 Cong. Rec. at S17578 (Oct. 27, 1990). He
and other sponsors repeatedly described the bill as
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"noncontroversial." See, e.g., id.; id. at H13313 (Oct. 27, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). And Congress treated it that way
-- committee hearings on the bill lasted only one day. See Rowe,
Burbank, & Mengler, supra, at 1005 (describing the process afforded
to the bill in Congress as "meager"). At no point in the
legislative process did any member of Congress suggest that § 1367
would overturn Clark, undercut the complete diversity rule, or
otherwise dramatically expand federal diversity jurisdiction.19
III.
We hold that § 1367 does not authorize jurisdiction over
Beatriz's family members' claims. Those claims would have been
barred under Clark before 1990, and we conclude that Congress did
not upset that rule when it overturned Finley and codified the
prior law of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in § 1367.20
19
We express no view on the related but distinct issue of
whether § 1367 overturns the Supreme Court's holding in Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), that each class
member in a diversity-only class action must meet the
jurisdictional amount in controversy. See id. at 301. The
application of § 1367 to diversity-only class actions is a
different problem for several reasons, including because (1) the
complete diversity rule applies with diminished force in the class-
action context, see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.
356, 366 (1921); (2) section 1367(b) does not mention Rule 23 at
all, while it mentions Rule 20 at least as to defending parties;
and (3) there are conflicting signals in the legislative history as
to whether Congress intended to overrule Zahn, see Payne, 229 F.
Supp. 2d at 51-52 (summarizing the "murk[y]" legislative history on
this point).
20
The dissent argues that Congress could not have intended
this result because it is too similar to the outcome in Finley,
which Congress meant to overturn. The analogy to Finley, however,
-41-
The judgment of the district court is affirmed as to
Beatriz's family members. As to Beatriz, the judgment is vacated
and the case is remanded. On remand, Beatriz may elect to proceed
alone in federal court or, if she wishes, voluntarily dismiss her
complaint so that she and her family may re-file in the Puerto Rico
courts.
(Dissenting opinion follows)
is both inaccurate and unpersuasive. Finley involved an
exclusively federal claim under the FTCA; this case is predicated
only on diversity. That is a critical difference: the rules of
pendent jurisdiction have always been more flexible in federal-
question cases than in diversity cases, see supra note 13, no doubt
to facilitate a federal forum for claims arising under federal law.
The federal interest in Beatriz's family members' ability to
assert their state-law claims in federal court is much more
attenuated.
In Finley, moreover, there was no forum available in which the
federal plaintiff could assert all of her claims. See Finley, 490
U.S. at 555-556. In this case, by contrast, such a forum is
readily available: the courts of Puerto Rico. It was the
plaintiffs who chose to sue in federal court. Against that
background, the dissent's judicial efficiency arguments ring
hollow. Cf. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376 ("A plaintiff cannot complain
if ancillary jurisdiction does not encompass all of his possible
claims in a case such as this one, since it is he who has chosen
the federal rather than the state forum . . . .").
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Concurring in part, dissenting
in part II.B). I concur in part II.A of the majority opinion. I
also agree that courts are wise to tread carefully when deciding
cases, such as this, where a court must interpret a statute
defining the parameters of its own powers. My agreement with the
majority opinion, however, ends there.
In an attempt to limit diversity jurisdiction, the
majority opinion mixes a "sympathetic textualist" approach to
statutory interpretation with a dash of legislative intent to reach
a conclusion that is contrary to the plain language of § 1367. The
irony of the majority opinion is that it espouses the virtue of
legislative intent, yet adopts a reading of § 1367 that was never
articulated by any Congressperson or their staff, by any judge or
jurist, nor by any academics, or, most importantly, by any of the
very drafters of the statute from the time the statute was adopted
in 1990, until such "intent" was just espoused in 1998. Section
1367 was the law for over seven years before a new alternative
interpretation of § 1367 was proposed by Professor Pfander and
adopted by the Tenth Circuit. See Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160
F.3d 631, 639 n.6 (10th Cir. 1998). This dubious approach has now
been adopted by this circuit, despite the fact that it ignores the
plain meaning of § 1367, causes the same word in the statute to
have two meanings, and makes an entire provision of § 1367
meaningless.
-43-
It is because I believe that a court's role is limited to
applying the statute, not changing the statute, that I respectfully
dissent. In doing so, I join the majority of our sister circuits
that have interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to grant a district court
jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff's claim that does not meet the
amount-in-controversy, if a co-plaintiff's claim satisfies the
amount-in-controversy requirement.
I. Joinder and class actions
Before analyzing § 1367 and its meaning, one observation
must be made. The majority begins its analysis of § 1367 by noting
that our sister circuits are evenly split on the issue of whether
§ 1367 allows a plaintiff who does not independently meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332 to remain in federal
court. This statement is misleading. While it is true that only
two circuit courts, the Third and Seventh Circuits, have addressed
§ 1367's applicability outside the context of a class action, in
reality, five circuit courts have interpreted § 1367 to allow a
plaintiff who does not independently meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement of § 1332 to remain in federal court, whereas three
circuit courts require them to take their claims to state court.21
21
Compare Allapattah Serv., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248
(11th Cir. 2003) (holding supplemental jurisdiction exists in a
diversity class action as long as one named plaintiff satisfies the
amount-in-controversy requirement); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261
F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (same), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104
(2002); Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001) (same),
cert. dismissed, 536 U.S. 979 (2002); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc.
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Rather than addressing these cases and their arguments, the
majority opinion casts them aside by arguing that the class action
context differs from the Rule 20 joinder context. Such a
characterization is misguided for several reasons.
First, the majority opinion fails to acknowledge that for
§ 1367 purposes, Clark and Zahn stand for the same principle. In
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., the Supreme Court held that each
plaintiff's claim must meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.
306 U.S. 583 (1939). In Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., the Supreme Court
held that each class member's claim must meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement. 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). Thus,
Clark "is the nonclass analog to Zahn. Section 1367, on its face,
overrules Clark, just as it overrules Zahn." Richard D. Freer, The
Cauldron Boils: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Amount in Controversy,
and Diversity of Citizenship Class Actions, 53 Emory L.J. 55, 58
n.19 (2004).
v. Press Mech. Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
supplemental jurisdiction exists over a party who failed to meet
the amount-in-controversy requirement); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d
524 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding supplemental jurisdiction exists in a
diversity class action as long as one named plaintiff satisfies the
amount-in-controversy requirement), with Trimble v. Asarco, Inc.,
232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding supplemental jurisdiction
does not exist in class action diversity case); Meritcare Inc. v.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
supplemental jurisdiction does not apply to a diversity case);
Leonhardt, 160 F.3d 631 (holding supplemental jurisdiction does not
exist in class action diversity case).
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This position has been adopted by every circuit court to
consider the issue. As the Seventh Circuit noted, "§ 1367 does not
distinguish class actions from other cases . . . [and section 1367]
affects Clark and Zahn equally." Stromberg Metal Works, 77 F.3d at
931.22 Similarly, the Third Circuit, the only circuit with which
the majority aligns itself, admits that "the line of cases from
Pinel to Zahn applies equally to joinder cases and class action."
Meritcare Inc., 166 F.3d at 218.23 The purpose of Zahn was to
clarify that, for amount-in-controversy purposes, the proposition
established in Clark applies in the class action context. See
Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301; Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335-37
(1969) (treating class actions the same as cases with joined
plaintiffs for purposes of aggregation rules).
Second, if a distinction were to be made between class
actions and joinder, the distinction would favor allowing
supplemental jurisdiction in joinder situations, and not in class
action situations, as "it is hard to avoid remarking that allowing
thousands of small claims into federal court via the class device
22
See also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997) (agreeing that § 1367
allows supplemental jurisdiction in either a class action or
joinder situation); Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 122-29 (Motz, J.,
dissenting) (interpreting the majority's interpretation of § 1367
to apply to Rule 20 joinder as well as class actions).
23
See also, Richard D. Freer, Toward a Principled Statutory
Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction in Diversity of Citizenship
Cases, 74 Ind. L.J. 5, 21-22 (1998).
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is a substantially greater expansion of jurisdiction than is
allowing a single pendent party." Stromberg Metal Works, 77 F.3d
at 931. Thus, it is "easy to imagine wanting to overturn Clark but
not Zahn; it is much harder to imagine wanting to overturn Zahn but
not Clark, and we have no reason to believe that Congress harbored
such a secret desire." Id.
II. The plain meaning of § 1367
When interpreting a statute, the starting point is the
statute's text. See Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 9 (1st
Cir. 2004). Section 1367(a) provides that district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form part of the
same case or controversy as any civil action of which the court has
original jurisdiction.24 For diversity purposes, a district court
has original jurisdiction if the plaintiff's citizenship differs
from the defendant's and the claim exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.
Section 1367(b) creates exceptions to § 1367(a) if (1)
jurisdiction is based on diversity (§ 1332), (2) the plaintiff is
24
Section 1367(a) states: "(a) Except as provided in
subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by
Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties."
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the party seeking to assert supplemental jurisdiction against
persons made parties under Rule 14 (third-party practice), 19
(mandatory joinder), 20 (permissive joinder), or 24 (intervention)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or persons proposed to be
joined as plaintiffs or intervene as plaintiffs under Rules 19 and
24 respectively, and exercising jurisdiction over the supplemental
claims would be inconsistent with the statutory requirements of
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332.25
Section 1367(c) creates further exceptions, notably
awarding a district court discretion to decline supplemental
jurisdiction if the supplemental jurisdiction claim predominates
over the claim that has original jurisdiction.26
25
Section 1367(b) states: "In any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on
[diversity], the district courts shall not have supplemental
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against
persons made parties under Rule 14 [third-party practice], 19
[mandatory joinder], 20 [permissive joinder], or 24 [intervention]
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons
proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or
seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules,
when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."
26
Section 1367(c) states: "(c) The district courts may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if-- (1)
the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction."
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Applying § 1367(a) to the present case is
straightforward. Before supplemental jurisdiction can apply, a
district court must have original jurisdiction over a claim. In
this case, the district court has jurisdiction over Beatriz's
claims because Beatriz is a citizen of a different state than Star-
Kist and has alleged claims for which it is not a legal certainty
that the damages are less than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Since the district court has jurisdiction over Beatriz's claims, it
may assert supplemental jurisdiction over Beatriz's family members'
claims if they arise out of the same case or controversy. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). There is no dispute that all of the claims in
this case arise out of the same case or controversy.
Supplemental jurisdiction may attach unless one of the
exceptions applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) & (c). The exceptions
pertaining to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 (third-party
practice), Rule 19 (mandatory joinder), Rule 20 (permissive
joinder), or Rule 24 (intervention) are inapplicable to this case
as there are no claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties
under those rules. The further exception pertaining to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19 does not apply as Beatriz's family
members are not indispensable parties. The last exception
pertaining to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 24 does not
apply as the family members are not seeking to intervene. Thus,
none of the exceptions in § 1367(b) apply.
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The exceptions in § 1367(c) also do not apply. The
claims of Beatriz's family members do not raise novel or complex
issues of Commonwealth law, their claims do not substantially
predominate Beatriz's claims, and there do not tend to be any
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Thus, a plain,
straightforward reading of § 1367 results in the district court
having jurisdiction over Beatriz's family members' claims.
III. The majority opinion's alternative approach
The majority opinion disagrees with this conclusion,
however, by arguing that the term "original jurisdiction" in
§ 1367(a) has two distinct meanings. In federal-question cases,
§ 1367 applies if at least one claim qualifies for "original
jurisdiction." But, in diversity cases, the majority argues,
§ 1367 applies only if all claims qualify for original
jurisdiction. This contrived reading of § 1367 is wrong for
several reasons.
First, the majority's interpretation of § 1367(a)
violates "the basic canon of statutory construction that identical
terms within an Act bear the same meaning." Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992). In this case, not
only does the majority opinion define identical terms differently,
it defines the same term differently. There is "nothing in the
text of subsection (a) to suggest, even remotely, that there is
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such a difference in meaning." See Gibson, 261 F.3d at 936;
Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 115-16.
The majority opinion appears to be oblivious to this
blatant violation of the rules of statutory construction because it
believes Congress "presumptively incorporated into § 1367 the
longstanding, judicially developed doctrines that determine whether
those statutes confer 'original jurisdiction.'" (emphasis added).
In addition to there being no authority for this "presumption," the
majority incorrectly applies another longstanding doctrine that
accompanies original jurisdiction to reach that conclusion. For
supplemental jurisdiction purposes, the majority contends that the
term "original jurisdiction" in a diversity case requires that
every claim meet the requirement of "original jurisdiction." In
stating this principle, the majority overlooks the process by which
a court determines if "original jurisdiction" exists. Both §§ 1331
and 1332 "confer original jurisdiction over designated 'civil
actions' . . . [which] consist of a cluster of claims, . . . [and
which] the rules of federal subject-matter jurisdiction apply on a
claim-by-claim basis." John B. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental
Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A Progress Report on the
Work of the American Law Institute, 74 Ind. L.J. 25, 41-42 (1998);
see also Freer, 53 Emory L.J. at 82-83. One claim's failure to
qualify for original jurisdiction does not mean that all claims
fail to qualify for original jurisdiction. Whether the case is
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filed in federal court or removed to federal court, "it is
incontrovertible that [§ 1332] . . . requires only the dismissal of
the jurisdictionally insufficient claims, not the entire action."
Oakley, 74 Ind. L.J. at 47; Freer, 53 Emory L.J. at 82-83; see
also Clark, 306 U.S. at 590 (maintaining jurisdiction over one
claim that met the amount-in-controversy and dismissing the claims
that failed to meet the amount-in-controversy). Thus, the fact
that a case contains claims that destroy diversity does not prevent
the court from maintaining jurisdiction over the claims that
qualify for "original jurisdiction." See Oakley, 74 Ind. L.J. at
47; Clark, 306 U.S. at 590; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 21;
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 834-35 (1989)
(holding that courts of appeals have the authority to dismiss a
dispensable non-diverse party).
The very language of § 1367 incorporates this concept.
Section 1367(a) states that a court shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are "so related to claims
in the action." The "other claims" join the related claims (those
qualifying for original jurisdiction) as part of the civil action.
In this case, Beatriz's claims qualified for "original
jurisdiction." On remand, it will be undisputed that Beatriz's
claims constitute "a civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Once the majority
opinion concluded that the district court had "original
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jurisdiction" over the "civil action" consisting of Beatriz's
claims, it should have turned to § 1367's statement that "in any
civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction [(Beatriz's claims)], the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other [related] claims
[Beatriz's family's claims)]." Id. Instead of taking this step,
the majority opinion attempts to redefine the practice of
interpreting § 1332 claims to achieve a result contrary to that
dictated by § 1367.27
Further, the majority's interpretation of § 1367(a)
violates "[t]he cardinal principle of statutory construction . . .
to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,
. . . rather than to emasculate an entire section." United States
v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1955) (internal quotations and
27
The majority attempts to justify its approach by arguing
that Congress should have explicitly stated that supplemental
jurisdiction exists if one claim supports original jurisdiction.
First, such specificity is not required as it is undisputed that
one claim can constitute a civil action.
Second, we can argue "could have" or "should have" ad infinitum.
If Congress had wanted to limit supplemental jurisdiction in cases
such as this, for example, it could have inserted a Rule 20
plaintiff exception into § 1367(b), as it did for other Rules of
Civil Procedure. If Congress had done so, the majority would not
need to resort to its dubious "sympathetic textualist"
interpretation of the statute.
In a case like this, a debate over what Congress could have done
is unproductive and unnecessary when a plain reading of the statute
produces one clear result: a district court has jurisdiction over
supplemental claims if the district court has original jurisdiction
over a claim in the civil action.
-53-
citations omitted). The majority's interpretation of § 1367(a)
eviscerates portions of § 1367(b). As the majority is forced to
admit, its interpretation of § 1367 makes the Rule 19 exception in
§ 1367(b) "unnecessary." What the majority does not admit is that
its interpretation makes other provisions of § 1367 superfluous.
See Freer, 53 Emory L.J. at 81. For example, according to the
majority's interpretation of § 1367, "original jurisdiction" would
not exist over a claim made by a plaintiff against a non-diverse
defendant joined under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The majority's interpretation cannot be correct,
however, because section 1367(b) specifically excepts supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff against a non-diverse
defendant joined under Rule 20. See Gibson, 261 F.3d at 936;
Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 115. The only reason § 1367(b) would contain
such an exception is if § 1367(a) provides jurisdiction for joined
claims against non-diverse defendants. If, as the majority
contends, "'original jurisdiction' under subsection (a) were
determined by looking at all the claims in the complaint, there
would have been no jurisdiction under § 1332 (and hence no
'original jurisdiction') in the first place." Gibson, 261 F.3d at
936. Thus, the exclusion of supplemental jurisdiction of claims by
non-diverse parties joined under Rule 20 would be surplusage.
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IV. Congressional intent & legislative history
Recognizing that its interpretation of § 1367 results in
an "imperfect" reading based on "presumptions," the majority
opinion attempts to buttress its position by referring to
Congressional intent and legislative history. The majority opinion
begins by noting that "Congress has long maintained a policy of
restricting diversity jurisdiction." Relying on "long maintained"
policy is problematic for several reasons. First, Congressional
action in the past sheds little light on what the 101st Congress
believed when it passed § 1367. Rather than speculate on what was
done in the past, it is more fruitful to look at the actions of the
Congress that adopted § 1367. In 1990, the same Congress that
passed § 1367 was given the Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee which recommended "diversity jurisdiction should be
virtually eliminated." This recommendation was rejected by
Congress. We should not achieve through judicial action what the
Federal Courts Study Committee could not convince Congress to
achieve. Ultimately, it is not unreasonable to believe that
Congress read the plain language of § 1367, recognized that it
allowed diversity jurisdiction for supplemental plaintiffs, and
voted for it.
Second, the continued validity of Congress's "long
maintained policy" of restricting diversity jurisdiction is called
into question by Congress's expansion of federal jurisdiction based
-55-
upon minimal diversity in the Multiparty Multi-Forum Trial
Jurisdiction Act in 2002. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369.
Third, and perhaps most convincing is the fact that a
proposed amendment achieving the majority's result in this case,
that would limit supplemental jurisdiction in Rule 20 & 23 cases
has been circulating in Congress since 1998. Freer, 53 Emory L.J.
at 58-59. This amendment has done nothing more than circulate for
six years. Id. Congress has reasonably rejected that view.
To conclude its opinion, the majority cites to an
admittedly "muddled" legislative history for support. The
legislative history, however, is so sparse and contradictory that
it neither supports nor undermines the majority opinion's
conclusions. Section 1367 was passed by the House of
Representatives with no floor discussion on any part of the
statute. Freer, 53 Emory L.J. at 73. The Senate voted on § 1367
with little debate. Id. The bill was introduced by Senator
Grassley as "noncontroversial."
What little legislative history surrounds § 1367 is
internally contradictory. For example, § 1367 "was said to be part
of the 'less controversial' proposals of the . . . Federal Courts
Study Committee . . . [but] that Committee never drafted a statute
on supplemental jurisdiction." Richard D. Freer, Compounding
Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life after Finley and the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 Emory L.J. 445, 471 (1991).
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Further, despite the Senator's words, and excluding the controversy
surrounding supplemental jurisdiction, § 1367 was highly
controversial because of its treatment of Rule 19 and its adoption
of a proposal that differed substantially from the Federal Court
Study Committee proposal. See Christopher M. Fairman, Abdication
to Academia: The Case of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, 19 Seton Hall Legis. J. 157, 164 (1994).
Perhaps the most relevant piece of legislative history is
the fact that Congress passed § 1367 in reaction to the Supreme
Court's holding in Finley, which held that a plaintiff suing the
United States in a Federal Tort Claims Act case could not join a
defendant, against whom there were only state law claims, without
an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. See Finley v.
United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Had Finley not been overturned
by § 1367, a plaintiff, such as the one in Finley, would have been
required to either (1) split the case in two and bring the federal
claim in federal court and the state claims in state court, or (2)
forsake one of the two claims. To prevent such a result, Congress
enacted § 1367.
The majority opinion in this case achieves a result
similar to that Congress was trying to avoid by overruling Finley.
As in Finley, the plaintiffs in this case must either (1) pursue
Beatriz's claims in federal court and her family's claims in state
court, (2) dispose of her family's claims altogether, or (3) pursue
-57-
all of the claims in state court. The first option leads to a
waste of judicial resources and a potential for inconsistent
verdicts. The second option deprives Beatriz's family of their day
in court. The third option, not present in Finley, deprives
Beatriz of a federal forum and of her right to a trial by jury, as
her case would not receive a jury trial in the Commonwealth
courts.28 As Congress showed by overturning Finley, being faced
with these options should be avoided.
Ultimately, as the majority concedes, the legislative
history is muddled and can be used to support or to contradict
either position. In the end, the unclear legislative history
leaves us where we started: with the text of the statute.
V. Conclusion
The majority proposes an interpretation of § 1367 that
not one Congressman or drafter of § 1367 ever espoused, much less
envisioned. In contrast, I support a plain reading of § 1367 that
even the drafters admitted was the correct plain reading of the
statute.29 The majority proposes an interpretation of § 1367 that
28
The third option is also unrealstic considering judgments
in the Commonwealth courts are far below those awarded in the
federal courts. See, e.g., Stewart v. Tupperware Corp., 356 F.3d
335 (1st Cir. 2004).
29
See Rowe Jr., Burbank, & Mengler, Compounding or Creating
Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor
Freer, 40 Emory L.J. 943, 961 n.91 (1991) (recognizing that the
§ 1367 left a "potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity
requirement").
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violates many rules of statutory construction. In contrast, I
support a reading of the statute in which words are not required to
have double meanings and each phrase has a purpose. Last, the
majority's interpretation leads to a waste of judicial resources
and the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. In contrast, I
support a reading which preserves judicial resources.
I am comforted by and conclude with a statement by the
Supreme Court in Finley: "Whatever we say regarding the scope of
jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be
changed by Congress" or, in this case, by the Supreme Court.
Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
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