United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1852
NYDIA ESTADES-NEGRONI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
THE ASSOCIATES CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA,
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES,
ASSOCIATES FIRST CAPITAL CORPORATION,
ASSOCIATES CORPORATION OF PUERTO RICO, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Alfredo Fernández-Martínez, with whom José A. Fernández-Paoli,
and Delgado & Fernández, LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Heidi L. Rodríguez-Benítez, with whom Jorge I. Peirats, and
Pietrantoni Méndez & Alvarez, LLP were on brief, for appellees.
July 28, 2004
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Nydia
Estades Negroni ("Estades") brought an action against the
Associates Corp. of North America ("Associates Corporation"),
Associates Financial Services ("Associates"), Associates First
Capital Corp., and Associates Corporation of Puerto Rico
(collectively "defendants"), alleging unlawful discrimination
because of her age and disability in contravention of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2003), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12182-12189 (2003), and several provisions of Puerto Rico law.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants; Estades now appeals. After careful review, we affirm.
I. Background1
Estades was hired by Associates in 1986. Between 1989
and 1990, she became aware of financial irregularities regarding
loans carried out by some of her co-workers in Associates' Arecibo
I branch. In 1992, Estades reported the irregularities to Juan
Irizarry, Group Assistant Vice President at Associates, through his
secretary, Haydeé López. As a result of Estades's allegations of
fraud, several audits were performed that resulted in the firing of
several of her co-workers, including her supervisors, in 1993.
1
We largely reproduce the facts as stated in the district court's
opinion, Estades Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 208 F. Supp.
2d 144, 145 (D.P.R. 2002), but present them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d
12, 17 (1st Cir. 2003).
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After she reported the irregularities, Estades alleges
she experienced a "pattern of discrimination." According to
Estades's brief, "her supervisors were bothered by Estades's
whistle-blowing activities." Estades contends that, as a result,
her workload was increased to the point of being "excessive."
Estades also claims that she requested her workload be reduced to
its original level or that an assistant be hired; her employer
refused both requests. She also alleges that the director of human
resources, at least one of her supervisors, and several of her co-
workers at Associates made "age motivated remarks."2
In March 1996, Estades experienced chest pains and
visited a doctor, who diagnosed her with severe depression. On
March 21, 1996, Estades, following her doctor's recommendation,
reported to the State Insurance Fund ("SIF"). The SIF examined
Estades and found her to be disabled; she was placed on leave to
receive medical treatment.
On April 9, 1996, Estades requested short-term disability
benefits under Associates' employee benefits policy (the "Policy").
The Policy was administered by Associates Corporation and managed
2
Estades's brief extensively cites to her own deposition and
those of Irizarry and Wilfredo Ortíz Guerra in cataloguing the
allegedly ageist remarks made by her supervisors and co-workers.
Although our prior opinion was withdrawn to permit consideration of
several of appellant's evidentiary submissions in English, our re-
examination of the case leads us to affirm dismissal of the ADEA
claim based on the alternative rationale relied upon by the
district court.
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by Prudential Healthcare Group ("Prudential"). Estades received
short-term disability benefits for the maximum period possible,
from March 1996 to September 1996.
On May 2, 1996, Carmen Hernández, a social worker with
the SIF, interviewed Estades in connection with her request for
treatment. SIF referred Estades to Dr. Pablo Pérez Torredo, a
psychiatrist, for evaluation. On June 18, 1996, Dr. Pérez Torredo
issued his final psychiatric report, diagnosing Estades with
adaptive disorder with mixed emotional symptoms and recommending
that she receive additional psychotherapeutic treatment.
On August 23, 1996, Associates notified Estades that her
short-term disability benefits would expire on September 27, 1996.
Associates further informed Estades of her right to apply for
long-term disability benefits ("LTD") and recommended that she also
apply for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits ("SSDI") to
supplement her income.
On September 25, 1996, Estades applied for LTD. In her
application, Estades certified that her emotional state did not
allow her to concentrate on or to perform her job functions.
Furthermore, she indicated that the date for her return to work was
not available, and that she did not expect to return to any other
occupation.
In a letter dated January 7, 1997, Prudential denied
Estades's request for LTD based on lack of medical evidence
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supporting her claim that her condition kept her from performing
her duties as Branch Operations Manager. The denial letter
informed her of her right to appeal the denial of LTD. Estades
appealed Prudential's decision in a letter dated February 25, 1997.
On March 19, 1997, Estades's employment with Associates
was terminated with an effective date of February 28, 1997, because
her short-term disability benefits had expired, her application for
LTD had been denied, and she had not reported to work. On
April 15, 1997, Prudential reconsidered its denial of LTD and
approved Estades's request retroactively to September 18, 1996.
Estades was reinstated in her employment with Associates with LTD
status. As part of her LTD benefits, Estades was entitled to
receive 60 percent of her salary while undergoing treatment. On
May 2, 1997, Estades sent a letter to Associates stating her desire
to return to work on June 1, 1997.
Prudential informed Estades that if her recovery was
delayed she could be required to apply for SSDI. She applied, and
on July 7, 1997, she was granted SSDI retroactively to September
1996. The Social Security Administration found that, under its
rules, she had become disabled on March 20, 1996.
On April 29, 1998, Aetna US Healthcare ("Aetna"),
Associates' new health insurance carrier, sent Estades a letter
stating that, based on the medical information in their possession,
her claim for LTD had been approved. Aetna further informed
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Estades that, under a plan provision, she was required to file for
SSDI benefits and to provide them with proof of application. The
letter further informed Estades that failure to comply would result
in suspension and termination of benefits.
Rather than comply with Aetna's request, Estades told
Aetna to ask Prudential for a copy of her SSDI award letter.
Estades stated that she refused to provide Aetna with a copy of the
letter because "they had been so bad to her."
On June 2, 1998, Aetna sent Estades a second letter
requesting that she inform the company of the status of her SSDI
application. On August 11, 1998, Aetna sent Estades a letter
informing her that her LTD benefits were terminated effective
July 31, 1998, because Aetna had not received from Estades any
proof that she had at least applied for SSDI. Aetna further
informed Estades that she was entitled to petition for a review of
that decision within sixty days. She appealed, but the appeal was
denied on October 1, 1998, because Aetna had not received a copy of
her SSDI award letter. After October 1, 1998, Estades did not make
any further efforts to obtain LTD. Estades has not contacted
Associates regarding her availability or desire to return to work
since her LTD was terminated in August 1998.
Estades is currently undergoing psychiatric treatment and
has not made any attempt to find another job because her
psychiatrist has told her she is still unable to work.
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On June 5, 1998, Estades filed a complaint against
defendants alleging that they violated the ADEA and the ADA, and
raising supplemental law claims under Puerto Rico Law.3
The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.
The motion was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended that
the court grant the motion for summary judgment. Estades filed her
objections to the report and recommendation.
On May 30, 2002, the district court issued an opinion and
order adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and
dismissing Estades's causes of action under the ADEA and the ADA.
The district court dismissed the supplemental state law claims
without prejudice because no federal claims to ground original
jurisdiction remained before the court. Estades now appeals the
district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of her
state claims.
II. Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law based on the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review a grant of summary judgment de
novo, construing the record in the light most favorable to Estades,
3
Plaintiff filed her complaint before Aetna terminated her LTD
benefits.
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the non-movant. Rosenberg, 328 F.3d at 17. We may affirm the
district court's decision on any grounds supported by the record.
Rodríguez v. Smithkline Beecham, 224 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000).
A. Age Discrimination Claim
Estades argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on the ADEA claim because she presented direct
evidence of age discrimination. In the alternative, Estades claims
summary judgment should not have been granted with regard to the
prima facie case because a genuine issue of material fact exists
regarding whether she was actually or constructively discharged.
The ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer . . . to
discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's age."
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In an ADEA case, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving [s]he would not have been discharged "but for
[her] age." Serrano-Cruz v. DFI P.R., Inc., 109 F.3d 23, 25 (1st
Cir. 1997). It goes without saying that a plaintiff's failure to
present a triable question of material fact as to her having
suffered an adverse employment action dooms an ADEA claim from the
start. Under the circumstances of this case, we begin, therefore,
by considering whether the record supports her claim to have
suffered an adverse employment action at the hands of Associates.
When she first became ill, Estades applied for and
obtained short-term disability benefits under Associates' employee
benefits policy. Before those benefits expired, Associates
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notified Estades that she could apply for long-term disability
benefits and recommended that she apply for SSDI. The insurer,
Prudential, at first denied her request for LTD, but notified her
of the right to appeal which she exercised. As a matter of fact,
Estades's employment with Associates was terminated as of February
28, 1997. Once Estades obtained a favorable appeal of her LTD
denial on April 15, 1997, she was reinstated retroactively and with
benefits.
We find that this sequence of events does not contain a
discharge actionable under the ADEA. Neither do Estades's
subsequent difficulties with AETNA, ultimately resulting in the
termination of her long-term disability benefits, establish that
Associates discharged her. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of
Estades's ADEA claim, agreeing with the district court that she
failed at the threshold to support the claim that she suffered an
adverse employment action.
B. Failure to Accommodate Claim
Estades also claims that Associates violated the ADA by
refusing to grant the accommodations she requested, namely
reduction of her workload or provision of an assistant.4 The ADA
prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
4
Neither Estades's complaint nor her briefs before this court
present any claim that she was discharged because of her
disability. Rather, she focuses on the issue of accommodation.
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to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employer violates the ADA if it "knows of a
disability yet fails to make reasonable accommodations." Higgins
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir.
1999). To survive summary judgment on her "reasonable
accommodation claim, [Estades] must produce enough evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that (1) [s]he is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, (2) [s]he was able to perform the essential
functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation,
and (3) [Associates], despite knowing of [Estades]'s disability,
did not reasonably accommodate it." Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334
F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2003). We focus our attention on the third
prong: whether Associates knew of Estades's disability yet failed
to accommodate her.5
Before she was diagnosed with depression, Estades
requested a reduced workload or the aid of an assistant. Under the
ADA, requests for accommodation must be express and must be linked
to a disability. See Cruz Carrillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc., 148 F.
5
Estades also discusses her qualification to perform the job.
The district court states that "Estades failed to proffer
sufficient evidence that she could perform her duties with or
without any reasonable accommodations as required by the ADA," but
makes no further comment on this prong. Estades Negroni, 208 F.
Supp. 2d at 148. Because we find Estades failed to present
sufficient evidence on the third prong, we need not address whether
she could perform her duties. Cf. Rocafort, 334 F.3d at 119
("assum[ing], without deciding," that defendant met his burden with
regard to the first two prongs where plaintiff failed to meet
burden on the third prong).
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Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D.P.R. 2001). An employer need not provide
accommodations where it does not know an employee has a disability.
See Reed v. Lepage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir.
2001) ("The employer has no duty to divine the need for a special
accommodation where the employee merely makes a mundane request for
a change at the workplace."); see also EEOC, Enforcement Guidance:
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, FEP (BNA) 405: 7601, at 7605-06 (March 1,
1999) ("before addressing the merits of the accommodation request,
the employer needs to determine if the individual's medical
condition meets the ADA definition of 'disability,' a prerequisite
for the individual to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation"),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/accommodation.html.
Associates did not know Estades was disabled when she requested the
accommodation -- she had not yet been diagnosed with a disability
at the time she sought a reduced workload or an assistant.
Although Estades argues that her depression was evident when she
requested the accommodation, the record does not support this
claim. Finally, there is no evidence that the request was
expressly repeated after Estades was diagnosed with a mental
disability.
We uphold the grant of summary judgment on the ADA claim
because Associates was unaware of Estades's disability when it
denied her requested accommodation.
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C. State Law Claims
The district court acted "well within its broad
discretion" in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and
dismissing without prejudice the state law claims because no
federal claims remained. Lares Group, II v. Tobin, 221 F.3d 41, 45
(1st Cir. 2000).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
summary judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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