Forest v. Pawtucket Police Department

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 03-2652

RICHARD J. FOREST; NANCY FOREST; ELIZABETH FOREST

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

PAWTUCKET POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF PAWTUCKET, by and
through its Treasurer, Ronald Wunschel; SCOTT M.
FEELEY, in his individual and official capacity;
JOHN CLARKSON, in his individual and official capacity;
GEORGE L. KELLEY, in his individual and official capacity;
DENNIS SMITH, in his individual and official capacity;
WILLIAM MAGILL, in his individual and official capacity;

Defendants - Appellees

JEFFREY T. MONTELLA; GAIL MONTELLA, individually and as
parent/legal guardian of Jeffrey T. Montella;
CHARLES MONTELLA

Defendants
_____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, Senior U.S. District Judge]
______________________

Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Rosenn, Senior Circuit Judge,*
Howard, Circuit Judge.
______________________

*
Of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting by designation.
Jeffrey D. Sowa was on brief for appellant.
Marc DeSisto was on brief for appellee.

July 28, 2004
 ROSENN, Senior Circuit Judge. This appeal presents an

important, although not infrequent, question arising out of the

delicate relationship between a teacher and student in the public

school system. The question is: how deep must a police

investigation extend before there is sufficient probable cause for

the arrest of a school teacher accused of sexually molesting a

student? At stake is the professional career and reputation of a

high school teacher on one hand, and on the other the safety,

health, and moral values of the student. Caught between the two

are the police officers called to investigate and, if warranted, to

arrest for prosecution.

A fifteen-year-old male student complained to his high

school principal that his special education teacher had sexually

molested him while in class. The complaint led to an investigation

and the arrest of the teacher by the Pawtucket, Rhode Island,

Police Department. The charge against the teacher, Richard Forest

(“Forest”), a Massachusetts resident, was ultimately dismissed by

the state court. Forest thereupon brought a civil suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District

of Rhode Island against the City of Pawtucket, the Police

Department, and individual officers, claiming a violation of his

Fourth Amendment rights under the Federal Constitution.1 The

1
The pertinent language of the Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

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District Court found that the police officers had reasonable

probable cause to arrest Forest and granted summary judgment in

their favor. Forest timely appealed. We affirm.

I.

Forest had been employed by the Pawtucket School District

in Rhode Island as a full-time special education teacher at Tolman

High School for 30 years. At the time of the events relevant to

this case, he taught a “life skills” course for special needs

children. Jeffrey Montella (“Montella”), one of his students, left

Forest’s classroom on January 24, 2000, and went to the principal’s

office to report an incident of misconduct. Montella informed

Principal Rousselle (“Rousselle”) that Forest touched him

inappropriately in a sexual manner during class. Montella provided

a written statement to Rousselle detailing the incident.

At approximately 5 p.m. that evening, Montella and his

mother, Gail Montella, went to the Pawtucket Police Department and

filed a complaint against Forest. Montella gave Officer Dennis

Smith a written statement alleging that Forest “grabbed and rubbed

[his] penis during class.” Montella also disclosed that Forest had

rubbed his shoulders and legs in the past, in a way that made him

uncomfortable.

Officer Smith referred the complaint to Detectives Scott

Feeley and William Magill, who reinterviewed Montella and his

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”

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mother on that same evening. During the second interview, Montella

drew a diagram depicting the seating arrangement in the class at

the time of the alleged incident. The diagram shows that when the

misconduct allegedly occurred, there were four other students in

the classroom, two sitting beside Montella and two sitting across

the room facing him. A teaching assistant, Cheryl Ann Lainhart,

was seated a short distance to the left of the row occupied by

Montella and his two fellow students.

Gail Montella also provided a written statement to the

detectives. She affirmed that her son told her about the

inappropriate touching that occurred earlier in the day, and that

her son had complained in the past about Forest rubbing his

shoulders and thigh. Ms. Montella explained that when her son

originally complained of inappropriate touching, she did not

believe it to be significant because she assumed that Forest was

simply being nice to her son. She also assumed that Forest’s

attention to Montella was not out of the ordinary, as Forest had

been generous with the Montella family in the past, giving them a

large bag of gifts at Christmas and a $50 gift certificate to a

grocery store. Ms. Montella explained in her statement that she

believed her son’s story about the alleged misconduct in the

classroom because Forest had always been nice to her family, and

therefore her son had no reason to lie in order to harm him.

Detectives Feeley and Magill interviewed Principal

Rousselle on the same evening of the complaint. Rousselle

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confirmed that Montella had come to his office during class that

day, made an oral complaint, and provided a written statement

regarding the incident. After confirming the incident with

Rousselle, the detectives called Forest at 8:30 p.m., leaving a

message on his answering machine, and again at 9:10 p.m., when they

reached Forest on the phone. The detectives asked Forest to come

to the police station, but Forest declined because he could not

reach his attorney. At 10 p.m., after speaking with his attorney,

Forest called the detectives and agreed to voluntarily appear at

the police station. On January 26, 2000, Forest was arrested and

charged with second degree sexual assault.

Detective Feeley prepared the affidavit in support of the

arrest warrant on the evening of January 24, after he received the

complaint from Montella, verified the incident with Montella’s

mother, and confirmed the incident with Principal Rousselle.

Feeley did not interview Forest, the teaching assistant, or any

other students present in the classroom at the time of the alleged

incident. But, Feeley stated that he found Montella’s claim to be

credible.

The affidavit in support of the arrest warrant recounted

Montella’s story, explaining that Forest asked Montella about his

new fleece jacket, and allegedly rubbed Montella’s penis while he

reached upward to feel the jacket material. Feeley did not include

in the affidavit an explanation that Montella was a special needs

student taking Ritalin for his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity

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Disorder, nor did he indicate that there were other students in the

classroom during the alleged incident who may have witnessed the

event. Bail Commissioner Ernest Pratt reviewed the affidavit,

found probable cause to arrest Forest, and signed the warrant.

The Pawtucket School Department investigated Montella’s

allegation and found that “[t]here was no credible evidence

presented that Jeffrey Montella was fondled sexually by Richard

Forest in the Life Skills Class.” Subsequently, the Rhode Island

Attorney General’s office declined to prosecute, and the Rhode

Island state district court dismissed the case.

After the charges were dismissed, Forest brought suit

raising eleven counts against multiple defendants.2 Counts I

through VII, which included claims brought under the Fourth and

Fifth Amendments plus multiple state law claims, were raised

against the city, the police department, and several officers

involved (“Pawtucket Defendants”). Counts VIII through XI included

state law claims raised against Montella and his family members

(“Montella Defendants”). Only the Pawtucket Defendants filed a

motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the District

Court. Therefore, counts VIII through XI involving the Montella

Defendants were not considered on summary judgment before the

2
The District Court maintained jurisdiction over the
original federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over
the state law claims pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a). This court has jurisdiction over an appeal of
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.

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District Court, and are not now before this court on appeal.

Furthermore, Forest only appeals the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment on Count I involving the alleged violation of his

Fourth Amendment rights. Our review is limited to this single

issue.

II.

Forest’s Fourth Amendment claim asserts that his

constitutional rights were violated because he was arrested without

probable cause. The District Court granted summary judgment on

this claim based on two separate, but related grounds. First, the

District Court found that the detectives had probable cause to

arrest Forest, and thus there was no constitutional violation. The

Pawtucket Defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Second, the Court’s finding of no constitutional violation also

justified summary judgment on the merits of the § 1983 claim. See

Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d 784, 787 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining

that although qualified immunity and the merits of § 1983 suit are

separate inquiries, a finding of no constitutional violation may

resolve both).

We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Grant’s Dairy-Maine LLC v. Comm’r of Maine Dept. of

Agric., Food and Rural Res., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2000). We

review all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, and will affirm if we conclude that there are no issues of

material fact, and the Appellees deserve judgment as a matter of

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law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Savings

Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1995).

III.

Qualified immunity is not a defense on the merits, but is

“an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of

litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (citation

omitted). Consequently, it is important to resolve the immunity

question as early as possible in the litigation. Id. at 201.

Government officials will not be entitled to qualified immunity if

their conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right that is

“clearly established.” Id. Thus, the first threshold inquiry must

be whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the

party claiming injury, show that an officer’s conduct violated a

statutory or constitutional right. If the facts do not support the

violation of a right, then the inquiry ends at that point, and the

court does not proceed to the second question of whether the right

allegedly violated was clearly established. Id.

Probable cause analysis requires inquiry into the facts

and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge at the

time of arrest to determine if a person of “reasonable caution and

prudence” would have believed that the defendant committed a crime.

Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985). It does not

require evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

“[P]robable cause need not be tantamount to proof beyond a

reasonable doubt . . . . Probability is the touchstone.” U.S. v.

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Grant, 218 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “The

probable cause standard does not require the officers’ conclusion

to be ironclad, or even highly probable. Their conclusion that

probable cause exists need only be reasonable.” U.S. v.

Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1999).

This court has affirmed that police officers can

justifiably rely upon the credible complaint by a victim to support

a finding of probable cause. B.C.R. Transport Co., Inc. v.

Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that although not

a per se rule, a probable cause determination predicated on

information furnished by the victim is generally considered

reliable). Therefore, the primary inquiry in this case is whether

there is any evidence that the officers acted unreasonably when

they determined that Montella’s accusation was credible, in light

of all the circumstances known at the time.

Forest argues that the accusation was inherently

unreliable because Montella alleged that the incident occurred in

front of an entire classroom of students and a teaching aide, none

of whom were interviewed prior to the arrest. However, the facts

known to the detectives at the time of arrest do not support this

conclusion. Montella did not claim that Forest molested him in

clear view of an entire classroom of students. According to the

diagram provided by Montella, there were only four other students

and a teaching assistant in the class at the time of the incident,

and only two of the other students were facing Montella. The

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others in the room were situated to Montella’s side where they

would not necessarily have had a clear view. Also, Montella

explained that Forest was commenting on, and touching Montella’s

jacket when the alleged molestation occurred. Therefore, it was

reasonable for the detectives to conclude that even an eye witness

would not necessarily have recognized any inappropriate touching.

Forest also argues that because Montella was a special

needs student, his credibility should have been questioned. But

there is no evidence that Montella’s condition of Attention Deficit

and Hyperactivity Disorder, and his prescription of Ritalin, had

any effect on his credibility. Rather, Detective Feeley believed

that Montella was not mentally incapacitated in any relevant

manner, and made an independent determination that Montella was

“fairly intelligent and credible.”

Finally, Forest argues that under Bevier v. Hucal, 806

F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1986), the officers were required to interview

readily available witnesses before seeking an arrest warrant.

However, Bevier does not support Forest’s argument. In Bevier, the

police arrested two parents for child abuse with absolutely no

investigation or evidence supporting the abuse, even though

witnesses who could have been consulted were readily available.

Id. at 128. In this case, the police did conduct an investigation.

The detectives interviewed Montella twice to ascertain his primary

accusation, interviewed his mother to verify the account and learn

that Montella had complained in the past of inappropriate touching,

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and confirmed the events with Principal Rousselle. All of the

information gleaned from these interviews and statements provided

reasonable evidence to support probable cause.

Forest asserts that the officers should have interviewed

the other students in the classroom and the teaching assistant

before seeking the arrest warrant. However, the law is clear that

once police officers are presented with probable cause to support

an arrest, no further investigation is required at that point.

See, e.g., Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 f.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir.

1996) (noting that officers are not required to conduct mini-trials

before arrest).

We agree with the District Court that probable cause

existed to arrest Forest. Therefore, there was no violation of

Forest’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the Pawtucket Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity.

IV.

Forest argues in the alternative that the Pawtucket

Police exaggerated the evidence presented in the arrest warrant

knowing that Montella’s claim was not credible. A Fourth Amendment

violation may be established if a defendant can show that officers

acted in reckless disregard, with a “high degree of awareness of

[the statements’] probable falsity.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d

781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Forest asserts that

the officers acted with reckless disregard because they relied on

witnesses who were not present during the incident (i.e. Montella’s

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mother and Principal Rousselle), and because the officers added

information about Forest’s gift giving to the Montella family,

which was speculative and irrelevant.

We believe that Forest’s claim of reckless disregard must

fail. First, the detectives did not rely on the statements of

Montella’s mother and Principal Rousselle to verify the account of

the alleged assault in the classroom. Rather, the detectives

relied on those statements to confirm (1) that Montella actually

left the classroom and went straight to the principal’s office to

report the incident, and (2) that Montella had complained of

inappropriate touching by Forest in the past. Both of these items

were relevant to a finding of probable cause. Second, the

inclusion of Forest’s generosity towards the Montellas in the past

was relevant when considered in the context explained by Montella’s

mother. Gail Montella stated that she believed her son’s claim

because he had no reason to harbor any ill will towards Forest;

Forest had been kind to the Montellas in the past. Therefore, the

inclusion of this fact directly supports Montella’s credibility.

Forest also argues that the officers omitted crucial

facts from the affidavit, particularly that the alleged assault

took place in front of the entire class and the teaching assistant.

Yet, as explained above, Forest’s assertion that the incident took

place in front of the entire class is an overstatement. The entire

class consisted of only five students including Montella, and only

two of the students were facing Montella at the time of the alleged

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incident. Additionally, Montella alleged that the touching took

place under the pretense of Forest’s feeling his jacket, so under

this scenario, even an eye witness may not have realized what was

occurring. Therefore, the officer’s omission of these facts from

the affidavit was not misleading, and there is no basis for the

claim of reckless disregard.

V.

For the reasons set forth above, the District Court’s

grant of summary judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear its

own cost.

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