United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2470
BOSTON'S CHILDREN FIRST, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CITY OF BOSTON, et al.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Robert J. Roughsedge, with whom Michael Williams, Chester
Darling, and CPCR: Citizens for the Preservation of Constitutional
Rights, Inc. were on brief, for appellants.
Frances S. Cohen, with whom Erica L. Hovani and Dechert LLP
were on brief, for appellees.
January 18, 2005
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs, a non-profit
organization1 and ten white children living in Boston, challenged
the City's former and current school assignment systems in a case
that the district court noted "may possibly be the concluding
chapter in thirty years of litigation over the effort to
desegregate the Boston public schools." Boston's Children First v.
Boston Sch. Comm., 260 F. Supp. 2d 318, 319 (D. Mass. 2003). In
rulings that we recently affirmed, the district court rejected the
majority of the plaintiffs' claims but awarded nominal damages to
two children who were denied seats at their preferred schools
because of their race. See Anderson v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 71
(1st Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs2 then sought attorney's fees as a
"prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court
denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' de minimis success
on the nominal damages claim did not entitle them to a fee award.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1
The non-profit organization, Boston's Children First ("BCF"),
was a party to the original suit but the court subsequently
concluded that it lacked organizational standing. Boston's
Children First v. Boston Sch. Comm., 183 F. Supp. 2d 382, 402 (D.
Mass. 2002).
2
We recognize that the reference to "plaintiffs" in this
decision could be a source of confusion. When we refer to
"plaintiffs" in describing the background of this case, we are
referring to all the plaintiffs who initiated the underlying suit.
However, when we discuss the plaintiffs who were prevailing parties
in this litigation, we refer only to the two plaintiffs who were
awarded nominal damages.
-2-
I.
Plaintiffs initiated the underlying suit on June 21,
1999, challenging the Boston Public Schools ("BPS") Controlled
Choice Student Assignment Plan ("Old Plan") on the grounds that it
improperly considered students' race when assigning them to schools
in an effort to achieve "ideal racial percentages."3 The
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Old Plan violated their
federal and state equal protection rights, as well as injunctive
relief and damages.
On July 14, 1999, the Boston School Committee voluntarily
amended the Old Plan to eliminate race as a factor in the school
admissions process ("New Plan"). The plaintiffs responded by
adding a plethora of claims to their suit. They ultimately sought
(1) a declaratory judgment that both Plans violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,4
3
As noted, the litigation for which plaintiffs now seek
attorney's fees is part of a long saga involving the desegregation
of Boston's public school system. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens,
160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998). For a more complete history of the
suit brought by the plaintiff children and BCF, see Boston's
Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Mass.
1999) ("BCF I"); Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 98 F.
Supp. 2d 111 (D. Mass. 2000) ("BCF II"); Boston's Children First v.
Boston Sch. Comm., 183 F. Supp. 2d 382 (D. Mass. 2002) ("BCF III");
Boston's Children First v. Boston Sch. Comm., 260 F. Supp. 2d 318
(D. Mass. 2003) ("BCF IV"); Boston's Children First v. Boston Sch.
Comm., No. 99-11330-RGS (D. Mass. May 27, 2003) (unpublished) ("BCF
V"); Anderson v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004).
4
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 prohibit deprivations of
constitutional rights under color of state law.
-3-
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 and Article 111 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights;6 (2) a permanent injunction
ordering BPS to admit plaintiffs to the schools of their choice,
prohibiting BPS from considering race in school assignments and
governance, ordering BPS to redraw attendance zones, and granting
BCF access to school records to monitor BPS's compliance with these
orders; and (3) nominal and compensatory damages for plaintiffs who
were not admitted to their preferred schools under the Old Plan.
In February 2002, the district court ruled that it would
consider the plaintiffs' damages claim separately from their claims
for prospective relief. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary
judgment on the damages claim on November 1, 2002, seeking nominal
damages for all ten student-plaintiffs. That motion noted that the
defendants had admitted earlier in the litigation that two
students, John Feeney, Jr. and Kathleen McCoy, were denied seats
based on their race under the Old Plan.7 It also emphasized that
the defendants had not conceded that the Old Plan was
5
Title VI prohibits institutions receiving federal funds from
engaging in racial discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
6
Article 111 states that "[n]o student shall be assigned to or
denied admittance to a public school on the basis of race, color,
national origin or creed."
7
The defendants initially conceded in November 2000 that three
students' placements were affected by race. In August 2001, they
retracted the admission regarding one student, Kayleigh Barry-
Meltzer, explaining that it had been based on a mistaken assumption
regarding the seating capacity at her preferred school.
-4-
unconstitutional. The parties then entered into unsuccessful
settlement discussions, with the defendants expressing a
willingness to pay "nominal damages" to Feeney and McCoy but an
unwillingness to address the plaintiffs' additional request that
they admit the Old Plan had been unconstitutional. The court
ultimately granted the defendants an extension for responding to
the summary judgment motion, allowing them to file their opposition
after a bench trial on the plaintiffs' claims for prospective
relief.
Over the course of four rulings between 1999 and 2003,
the district court rejected all of the plaintiffs' claims for
prospective relief. BCF I, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 262; BCF II, 98 F.
Supp. 2d at 117; BCF III, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 395-401; BCF IV, 260
F. Supp. 2d at 334. In the last of these rulings, following the
bench trial, the court upheld the New Plan against the plaintiffs'
equal protection challenge and declined to retain jurisdiction to
ensure that BPS did not return to using race in its seat assignment
policy. BCF IV, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 330-34. The court concluded by
noting that
[P]laintiffs should not underestimate what they have
accomplished. By bringing this lawsuit, they have
persuaded the School Committee to abandon a
constitutionally dubious school admissions policy.
Plaintiffs have not obtained all of the relief they
sought, principally because the court believes that their
ultimate goal, mandatory neighborhood school assignments
. . . is not constitutionally compelled.
Id. at 334.
-5-
With the plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief thus
resolved, the parties returned to the issue of nominal damages. In
their May 21, 2003 response to the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, the defendants again conceded that Feeney and McCoy had
been denied seats based on their race and indicated that they were
"willing to have this Court enter judgment awarding nominal damages
to these plaintiffs." However, asserting that no damages may be
awarded absent the deprivation of a constitutional right, the
defendants opposed a nominal damages award for the eight plaintiffs
who had not shown that they were deprived of a seat based on their
race. The defendants also urged the court not to address the
constitutionality of the Old Plan.
The court's May 27, 2003 ruling on the motion for summary
judgment awarded nominal damages to Feeney and McCoy on the grounds
that they "were denied seat assignments at their preferred schools
because of their race" but without expressly stating whether the
Old Plan was unconstitutional. BCF V, at 1. Stressing that
nominal damages may not be awarded "absent the deprivation of a
constitutional right," the court denied damages to the remaining
plaintiffs, who could "make no showing of a deprivation under Texas
v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam)." BCF V, at 1.
Although the plaintiffs who were denied damages appealed that
denial, the defendants did not cross-appeal from the nominal
damages award.
-6-
The plaintiffs then moved for attorney's fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b), which provides that in a federal civil rights
suit, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party
. . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." The
district court acknowledged that "a plaintiff who wins an award of
nominal damages is properly deemed a 'prevailing party.'"
Nevertheless, it denied any attorney's fees, concluding that:
While "hollow" may be too harsh a word, a one dollar
nominal award to two of ten original plaintiffs, the
entitlement to which was conceded by the defendants from
the virtual outset in an otherwise unsuccessful lawsuit,
will simply not bear the weight of the policy that
Congress intended to promote by enacting section 1988.
This appeal followed.
II.
Because a trial judge familiar with the intricacies of a
case is in the best position to evaluate a motion for attorney's
fees, we review the denial of such a motion for manifest abuse of
discretion. See Díaz-Rivera v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 124
(1st Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we "confine our review to whether
the district court has made a mistake of law or incorrectly weighed
(or failed to weigh) a factor in its decision." Richardson v.
Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Gay Officers Action
League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 292-93 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Apart
from mistakes of law . . . we will set aside a fee award only if it
clearly appears that the trial court ignored a factor deserving
significant weight, relied upon an improper factor, or evaluated
-7-
all the proper factors (and no improper ones), but made a serious
mistake in weighing them.").
A. Fee-shifting pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988
"In the United States, the prevailing litigant is
ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from
the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Congress, however, has created exceptions to
this "American Rule," permitting fee-shifting in some contexts to
encourage meritorious litigation that benefits the plaintiff and
the public interest. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96
(1989). 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is one such exception. As previously
noted, § 1988(b) provides that in federal civil rights actions,
including those brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
Section 1988 requires a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the
plaintiff is a prevailing party, and (2) if the plaintiff is a
prevailing party, what constitutes a reasonable fee award. See,
e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992). The first inquiry
has substantial implications because, despite § 1988's
discretionary language, we have interpreted the statute to mean
that "'awards in favor of prevailing civil rights plaintiffs are
virtually obligatory.'" Díaz-Rivera, 377 F.3d at 124 (quoting Gay
Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 293); see also Casa Marie Hogar
-8-
Geriatrico, Inc. v. Rivera-Santos, 38 F.3d 615, 618 (1st Cir. 1994)
("prevailing plaintiff is presumptively entitled to fee-shifting"
in a civil rights case). Still, a court may properly deny a
prevailing party's motion for attorney's fees if circumstances of
the case would make a fee award unjust. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 118
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429
(1983).
B. Prevailing party status
To prevail, a party must "'succeed on any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit [it] sought
in bringing suit.'" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (quoting Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). A voluntary
change in conduct due to the filing of the suit itself is not
sufficient to confer prevailing party status. Buckhannon Bd. &
Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 600-10 (2001) (rejecting the "catalyst theory" as a basis for
prevailing party status); New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v.
Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2002). Rather, the benefit
achieved must be a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal
relationship between the parties." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
The district court correctly concluded that prevailing
party status cannot be based on the School Committee's decision to
amend the Old Plan, and plaintiffs do not argue to the contrary.
Although eliminating race in the seat assignment plan was one of
-9-
the plaintiffs' central goals in bringing the suit, a fee award
based on the School Committee's voluntary actions would rest on the
"catalyst theory" that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in
Buckhannon. See 532 U.S. at 610. The plaintiffs claim instead
that the nominal damages award makes them a prevailing party. We
agree.
The Supreme Court has held that "a plaintiff who wins
nominal damages is a prevailing party under § 1988." Farrar, 506
U.S. at 112. This holding recognizes that nominal damages are a
"material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties"
because "[a] judgment for damages in any amount, whether
compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant's behavior for the
plaintiff's benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of
money he otherwise would not pay." Id. at 113. Here, the district
court ordered the defendants to pay nominal damages to two
plaintiffs, Feeney and McCoy. As Farrar recognized, that order
"materially alter[ed] the legal relationship between the parties,"
and thus conferred prevailing party status on the plaintiffs. Id.
at 112.
In support of their argument that our case law dictates
a contrary result on the prevailing party issue, the defendants
cite Maine School Administrative District No. 35 v. Mr. R., 321
F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003). There, we explained that "the change
effected [by the plaintiff's success] must be material; a purely
-10-
technical or de minimis victory cannot confer prevailing party
status." Id. at 15; see also Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12 ("[A]
plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim
materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits
the plaintiff."). It is true that many of our cases, including
Maine School Administrative District No. 35, consider the
"technical" or "de minimis" nature of a victory as part of the
prevailing party inquiry, rather than in determining what
constitutes a reasonable award. 231 F.3d at 15. However, the
Supreme Court's holding in Farrar precludes any argument that an
award of nominal damages is "a purely technical or de minimis
victory" that bars prevailing party status. Id.
In Farrar, the Court specifically considered "whether a
nominal damages award is the sort of 'technical,' 'insignificant'
victory that cannot confer prevailing party status." 506 U.S. at
113-14. As we have already discussed, the Court answered this
question in the negative, concluding that nominal damages effect a
material change and therefore confer prevailing party status. The
"'technical' nature of a nominal damages award" bears instead on
the reasonableness of the fees awarded rather than on prevailing
party status, and the district court's analysis proceeded
accordingly. Id. at 114.
-11-
C. Reasonable attorney's fee
The plaintiffs emphasize that we are "virtually
obligat[ed]" to grant a fee award to a prevailing party. Gay
Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 293. However, as Farrar itself
acknowledges, "[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who
formally 'prevails' under § 1988 should receive no attorney's fees
at all." 506 U.S. at 115.
Farrar was a § 1983 civil rights suit in which a
plaintiff sought $17 million in damages against six defendants who
had allegedly conspired to violate his due process rights. A jury
found that one of the defendants had "committed an act or acts
under color of state law that deprived [Farrar] of a civil right,"
but that this conduct was not a proximate cause of his damages.
506 U.S. at 106. The district court awarded Farrar $1 in nominal
damages and $280,000 in attorney's fees. The Fifth Circuit
reversed the fee award, finding that Farrar's victory was too
insignificant to confer prevailing party status under § 1988.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning but affirmed the fee award reversal. It held that Farrar
was not entitled to fees, despite the fact that the nominal damages
award conferred prevailing party status. The Court explained that
"the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a
fee award is the degree of success obtained." Id. at 114 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Where Farrar sought $17
-12-
million in compensatory damages but received only $1 in nominal
damages, he obtained such a small degree of success as to make "the
only reasonable fee . . . no fee at all." Id. at 115.
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to explain the
relationship between nominal damages and a fee award. While
"[n]ominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory
make[,] . . . a substantial difference between the judgment
recovered and the recovery sought suggests that the victory is in
fact purely technical." Id. at 121. Other relevant factors
include "the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff
claims to have prevailed" and whether the success furthered a
public purpose. Id. at 121-22; see also O'Connor v. Huard, 117
F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing similar considerations).
Where the district court has properly weighed the foregoing
factors, there is no abuse of discretion to merit a reversal. See
id.
Here, the court explained its denial of fees in an eight-
page ruling that reviewed the course of the litigation and set
forth the relevant law. It concluded that the nominal damages
award, "the entitlement to which was conceded by the defendants
from the virtual outset," was too de minimis a victory in relation
to the plaintiffs' other claims to merit a fee award. See Farrar,
506 U.S. at 114; Me. Admin. Sch. Dist. No. 35, 321 F.3d at 14-15
(fee award cannot be based on a "hollow victory"). The plaintiffs
-13-
claim that this ruling was an abuse of discretion because it failed
to recognize the significance of the nominal damages award --
namely, that the award included an implicit finding that the Old
Plan was unconstitutional and would thus have a preclusive effect
if the defendants attempted to revive the Plan. The defendants
contend that the award did not include such a finding.
We acknowledge that the language of the decision
explaining the nominal damages award is susceptible to both
parties' readings. The court said the following:
John Feeney[, Jr.] and Kathleen McCoy were denied seat
assignments at their preferred schools because of their
race. For that reason they are entitled to an award of
nominal damages, and defendants do not contend otherwise.
Defendants are correct, however, that absent the
deprivation of a constitutional right, nominal damages
may not be awarded. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
266-67 (1978). As the remaining plaintiffs can make no
showing of a deprivation under Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S.
18, 21 (1999) (per curiam), no damages, nominal or
otherwise, may be awarded.
BCF V, at 1. Although the nominal damages judgment does not
specify that the Old Plan was unconstitutional, the plaintiffs
assert that such a finding was necessarily implicit in light of the
court's own statement that nominal damages must be premised on a
constitutional injury. Losing a seat assignment because of race is
not, per se, a constitutional deprivation. Race-conscious policies
are permissible if they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest, which may include remedying past
discrimination, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
-14-
507 (1989) (considering whether Richmond's race-conscious plan for
city construction contracts was "narrowly tailored to remedy prior
discrimination"), or achieving educational diversity, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit the [University of Michigan] Law School's
narrowly tailored use of race in admissions to further a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body."). Thus, the plaintiffs reason, the
defendants' concession about the role of race in the plaintiffs'
seat assignments does not, standing alone, admit the constitutional
violation required to support an award of nominal damages. The
deprivation was unconstitutional only if the assignment plan was
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest, or, in other
words, if the Old Plan was unconstitutional.
Yet, the nominal damages decision does not address the
issues of compelling interest and narrow tailoring that would be
integral to a fully developed legal analysis of the
constitutionality of the Old Plan. Nor did the court explicitly
state that Feeney and McCoy had suffered a constitutional injury.
Its comment that nominal damages require such an injury was not an
explanation for Feeney and McCoy's award, but rather for the denial
of damages to the remaining plaintiffs. See BCF V, at 1. Indeed,
the only basis that the court cited for Feeney and McCoy's award
was their loss of seats because of their race -- the point conceded
-15-
by the defendants. This language suggests that the award did not
include a finding that the Old Plan was unconstitutional.
We recognized this ambiguity in the nominal damages
decision when we considered the merits of this case on appeal,
noting that "[a]lthough the district court never explicitly
described the Old Plan as unconstitutional, . . . nominal damages
in this context require a constitutional violation." Anderson, 375
F.3d at 80 n.12. Based on this logic, we accepted "the colorable
premise that the Old Plan was unconstitutional" for the purposes of
our analysis.8 Id. However, the court's ruling, if any, on the
constitutionality of the Old Plan was not directly before us in
that appeal. Now that we must decide in the context of this
attorney's fees appeal whether the court, in fact, ruled on the
constitutionality of the Old Plan, we conclude that there was no
such ruling. Instead, the court awarded nominal damages on the
basis of the defendants' concession, which acknowledged the
dispositive effect of race in the school assignments of Feeney and
McCoy, but which rejected any conclusion that the Old Plan was
unconstitutional.
8
In the appeal on the merits, the plaintiffs argued that the
unconstitutionality of the Old Plan required a presumption that the
New Plan was also motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.
We declined to adopt such a presumption, noting that even if the
Old Plan had been unconstitutional, "BPS voluntarily discontinued
the use of the Old Plan once it concluded that the Plan was
constitutionally suspect . . . and replaced it with a racially
neutral assignment system . . . ." Anderson, 375 F.3d at 84-85.
-16-
This conclusion is compelled by the following
considerations:
(1) The constitutionality of the Old Plan was not
actively litigated; the court refused to consider injunctive or
declaratory relief regarding the Old Plan once the New Plan was in
place. Indeed, the court's description of the Old Plan as
"constitutionally dubious" in a ruling denying prospective relief
one month before the nominal damages award, BCF IV, 260 F. Supp. 2d
at 334, signals that it did not consider the constitutionality of
the Old Plan a resolved question.
(2) The defendants' motion opposing summary judgment,
filed soon after the decision denying prospective relief,
recognized that a finding on the constitutionality of the Old Plan
would require the court to try issues that it had not previously
considered and therefore urged the court to award damages without
reaching the constitutional issue. In essence, the defendants
expressed a willingness to pay nominal damages to Feeney and McCOy
without admitting any constitutional injury. As we have discussed,
the language of the ensuing award is consistent with this position.
(3) Any remaining ambiguity on this point is resolved by
the district court's decision denying attorney's fees. There, the
court described the basis for the plaintiffs' prevailing party
status as "a one dollar nominal award to two of ten original
plaintiffs, the entitlement to which was conceded by the defendants
-17-
from the virtual outset . . . ." (emphasis added). Again, the
defendants had conceded only that they were willing to pay damages
because Feeney and McCoy were denied seats based on their race, not
because the Old Plan was unconstitutional. The district court's
description of its own judgment thus forecloses the plaintiffs'
argument that it found the Old Plan unconstitutional.
Viewed in this light, the nominal damages award does not
represent a victory on a significant legal issue. To the contrary,
it represents such a minimal success in the context of this
litigation that the district court supportably concluded that "the
only reasonable fee is . . . no fee at all." Farrar, 506 U.S. at
115. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
attorney's fees.
Affirmed.
-18-