United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1546
CHELSEA SMITH,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
FITCHBURG PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Leval,* Senior Circuit Judge.
Theodore M. Hess-Mahan, with whom Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP,
Julia K. Landau, and Massachusetts Advocates for Children, were on
brief, for appellant.
Doris R. MacKenzie Ehrens, with whom Mary L. Gallant, and
Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP, were on brief, for appellee.
March 22, 2005
*Of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.
STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Chelsea
Smith ("Chelsea"), by and through her parents, Linda and Deane
Smith ("Chelsea's Parents"),1 initiated a proceeding before the
Bureau of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA"), pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §
1400 et seq., against the Fitchburg Public Schools ("Fitchburg")
seeking home and hospital special education services. After a
series of pre-hearing orders and ultimately a private settlement,
Chelsea received all of the relief sought. Chelsea's Parents
subsequently commenced this action in the district court to recover
attorneys' fees and expenses as a prevailing party pursuant to 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3), which provides for an award of attorneys' fees
to parents of a student with a disability who is the "prevailing
party" in an action or proceeding brought under the IDEA. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fitchburg on
the ground that Chelsea was not a "prevailing party" within the
meaning of Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). We
affirm.
1
Under the IDEA, it is the aggrieved child's parents who may
initiate a due process hearing under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), and who
may seek attorneys' fees as prevailing parties in such a hearing
under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). For convenience, however, we use
"Chelsea" and "Chelsea's Parents" interchangeably throughout the
opinion.
-2-
I. BACKGROUND
The material facts in this case are undisputed. At the
time these proceedings were initiated, Chelsea was a thirteen-year-
old girl living with her parents in Fitchburg, Massachusetts and
enrolled as a student at St. Joseph's School. When Chelsea was
two, she was diagnosed with liver cancer and underwent extensive
treatment including chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery. As a
result of that treatment, she suffers from partial hearing loss and
ongoing gastrointestinal, respiratory, and other serious
impairments. She depends on hearing aids and classroom assistance
because of her disability.
Chelsea attended the Fitchburg public schools from 1993
to 1997, during which time Fitchburg provided special education
services consisting of speech and language therapy. In 1997,
Chelsea's Parents withdrew her from the public school and enrolled
her in St. Joseph's School, a non-public, parochial school located
in Fitchburg. Fitchburg continued to provide Chelsea with special
education services at St. Joseph's.
In early 2001, Chelsea became ill due to complications
from her earlier treatment, requiring multiple prolonged
hospitalizations and surgeries. As a result, Chelsea missed a
significant amount of school. In June 2001, Chelsea was
hospitalized again, and, in August 2001, when it became clear that
Chelsea would be absent from school for an extended period of time,
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her parents asked that the principal of St. Joseph's contact
Fitchburg's special education department to request special
education services for Chelsea while she was hospitalized.
Fitchburg informed the principal that it was not required to
provide such services because Chelsea was a regular student
enrolled in a non-public school.
In September 2001, Chelsea's Parents hired a private
tutor to provide Chelsea with educational services while she was in
the hospital, and directed that the bills be sent directly to
Fitchburg. Fitchburg refused to pay these bills.
As a result, on November 6, 2001, Chelsea's Parents filed
a request for an administrative hearing before the BSEA seeking an
order requiring Fitchburg to: (1) pay for Chelsea's tutoring at
home and in the hospital; (2) convene an IEP meeting to address
Chelsea's special education needs;2 and (3) implement the resulting
2
The terms "TEAM meeting" and "IEP meeting" are used
interchangeably. Both terms refer to a meeting of a disabled
child's "IEP Team" which consists of "(i) the parents of a child
with a disability; (ii) at least one regular education teacher of
such child (if the child is, or may be, participating in the
regular education environment); (iii) at least one special
education teacher . . . ; (iv) a representative of the local
educational agency . . . ; (v) an individual who can interpret the
instructional implications of evaluation results, who may be a
member of the team described in clauses (ii) through (vi); (vi) .
. . other individuals who have knowledge or special expertise
regarding the child . . . ; and (vii) whenever appropriate, the
child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
-4-
IEP.3 Chelsea was subsequently discharged from the hospital on
November 11, 2001, although her medical condition prevented her
from returning to school at that time. Because Fitchburg continued
to refuse to provide special educational services for Chelsea,
Chelsea's Parents arranged for Chelsea to be tutored at home.
On December 4, 2001, the BSEA Hearing Officer initiated
a conference call with the parties, and at that time, Fitchburg
orally agreed to convene a TEAM meeting on December 12, 2001 to
evaluate Chelsea's special education needs. On December 12, 2001,
because Fitchburg had not convened the TEAM meeting, Chelsea filed
a motion requesting that the BSEA Hearing Officer order Fitchburg
to convene the meeting. Fitchburg did not oppose the motion, and
on December 20, 2001, the BSEA Hearing Officer issued a ruling
granting Chelsea's motion, stating that "Fitchburg will use its
best efforts to convene the TEAM on January 4, 2002 but in no event
will the TEAM be convened any later than January 11, 2002." On
January 10, 2002, Fitchburg's counsel informed Chelsea's Parents
that the TEAM meeting would take place the next day. Due to the
3
IEP is the abbreviation for an "Individualized Education
Program," which is defined in the IDEA as "a written statement for
each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and
revised in accordance with this section and that includes-(i) a
statement of the child's present levels of educational performance
. . .; (ii) a statement of measurable annual goals . . .; (iii) a
statement of the special education and related services and
supplementary aids and services to be provided to the child . . .;
[and] (vi) the projected date for the beginning of the services .
. . and the anticipated frequency, location, and duration of those
services . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
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short notice and conflicts with Chelsea's medical appointments, the
TEAM meeting was rescheduled and eventually convened on January 18,
2002.
As a result of the TEAM meeting, Fitchburg determined
that Chelsea was entitled to receive "home/hospital education
services" despite her enrollment in a private school. Soon
thereafter, the parties, under the guidance of the BSEA Hearing
Officer, commenced negotiations for a settlement agreement to
include home/hospital tutoring, reimbursement for prior tutoring
expenses, execution of the IEP, and payment of attorneys' fees.
Following a BSEA Hearing Officer-initiated conference call, the
Hearing Officer issued an Order, noting that the "[p]arties
reported that they were discussing settlement," and confirming that
"School Counsel will send a written proposal for settlement by
March 25, 2002 at 12:00 p.m." The Hearing Officer also scheduled
a follow-up conference call for March 25, 2002 at 3:00 p.m.
Fitchburg sent a draft settlement agreement to Chelsea on
March 21, 2002. After the March 25, 2002 conference call, the BSEA
Hearing Officer issued an Order to Show Cause why the case should
not be dismissed in light of the parties' impending settlement. At
that time, however, Fitchburg had not yet provided Chelsea's
Parents with the proposed IEP4 and a signed copy of the settlement
4
The record shows that Chelsea's Parents were provided with a
handwritten draft of the IEP at the conclusion of the TEAM meeting
on January 18, 2002, however, at that time, Fitchburg indicated
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agreement. Accordingly, Chelsea's counsel responded to the show
cause order, requesting that the case remain active until Chelsea
received the IEP and both parties had executed the settlement
agreement. On April 29, 2002, after another conference call, the
BSEA Hearing Officer ordered Fitchburg to send Chelsea's Parents
the IEP by Thursday, May 9, 2002 at 3:00 p.m.5 and scheduled a
conference call for Friday, May 10, 2002 to further discuss the
pending settlement. That order stated that Fitchburg's failure to
send the IEP by May 10, 2002 would result in sanctions. Fitchburg
faxed the IEP on May 9, 2002, but did not forward a signed copy of
the settlement agreement. During the May 10, 2002 conference call,
Fitchburg said that it would send Chelsea's Parents a copy of the
settlement agreement, and would review Chelsea's Parents' proposed
changes to the IEP. Fitchburg's promises were again memorialized
in an Order issued by the BSEA Hearing Officer that same day, and
a follow-up conference call was scheduled for May 21, 2002.
Chelsea's Parents forwarded the proposed changes to the IEP on May
14, 2002, and on May 20, 2002, sent a letter to Fitchburg's counsel
noting that they had not yet heard back from Fitchburg about the
that it would have to "clean up" the IEP, and Fitcbhurg's counsel
described this "cleaning up" as "correct[ing] grammar, punctuation,
etc. and put[ting] the IEP into typewritten form."
5
The actual order says "Thursday, May 2," although the parties
do not seem to dispute that the IEP was due on May 9, the day
before the conference call scheduled for May 10.
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proposed changes, despite the fact that a conference call was
scheduled for the next day.
On May 23, 2002, the BSEA Hearing Officer issued a second
ruling, this time ordering, under threat of sanctions, that
Fitchburg respond to Chelsea's Parents' proposed changes to the IEP
no later than May 31, 2002. The ruling also set up a conference
call for June 3, 2002.
During the June 3, 2002 conference call, the parties
discussed and agreed upon several proposed changes to the IEP. In
addition, the parties acknowledged that it was time to convene
another TEAM meeting to discuss services for Chelsea during the
summer months. In an order memorializing the conference call, the
BSEA Hearing Officer stated that Fitchburg would send Chelsea's
Parents a copy of the settlement agreement and would execute the
changes to the IEP agreed upon in the conference call. The order
also stated that by the next conference call, scheduled for June
11, 2002, a date for the TEAM to reconvene would be set.
On June 7, 2002, Fitchburg executed the settlement
agreement and forwarded it to Chelsea's counsel. Fitchburg did
not, however, send an executed IEP reflecting the changes agreed
upon during the June 3, 2002 conference call. On June 10, 2002,
Chelsea's counsel sent Fitchburg a letter stating that Chelsea had
not received the signed IEP. On June 19, 2002, Chelsea's counsel
sent the BSEA Hearing Officer a letter stating that Chelsea still
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had not received the signed IEP. On June 26, 2002, Chelsea's
counsel sent yet another letter to the BSEA Hearing Officer stating
Chelsea still had not received the signed IEP, and requesting a
Hearing Officer-initiated conference call to address Fitchburg's
failure to provide a signed copy of the IEP.
On July 2, 2002, the BSEA Hearing Officer issued an order
requiring Fitchburg to "execute a signed IEP no later than July 5,
2002." The order stated that Fitchburg's failure to do so might
result in sanctions. On July 16, 2002, Fitchburg sent Chelsea's
Parents a signed IEP, and Chelsea's Parents executed the settlement
agreement that same day. The settlement agreement provided, inter
alia, that (1) Chelsea is a child in need of special education
services; (2) Fitchburg would reimburse Chelsea's Parents for
Chelsea's home/hospital tutoring expenses; (3) Chelsea's Parents
would withdraw with prejudice their request for a hearing before
the BSEA; (4) the settlement agreement did not constitute an
admission that the services previously proposed or implemented for
Chelsea were in any way inappropriate or inadequate; and (5) the
Agreement did not release the claims of Chelsea's Parents against
Fitchburg for payment of their legal fees in connection with this
matter and that the Agreement did not, in any way, affect the
Parents' right to seek payment of their legal fees from Fitchburg
in an appropriate forum.
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After signing the settlement agreement, Chelsea's Parents
withdrew their request for a hearing. The case was dismissed on
July 17, 2002. On August 15, 2002, Chelsea's Parents brought this
action in the District Court of Massachusetts, alleging that
Chelsea was a "prevailing party" in a proceeding under the IDEA,
and thus was entitled to attorneys' fees, expenses and costs
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Chelsea's Parents also
claimed they were entitled to fees because 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) provides that attorneys' fees may be awarded if
an IEP meeting is "convened as a result of an administrative
proceeding." The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The district court allowed Fitchburg's motion for summary judgment,
holding that "[t]he ultimate settlement (rather than adjudication)
of this case compels the denial of prevailing party status to
[Chelsea]." Chelsea's motion for summary judgment was denied.
Chelsea's Parents filed this timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
The issue we must decide is whether the pre-hearing
orders that precipitated the final resolution of Chelsea's claim by
private settlement, a few accompanied by the threat of sanctions,
provide sufficient judicial imprimatur to make Chelsea a
"prevailing party" for purposes of the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Buckhannon. We review this question of law de novo. Doe v.
Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2004).
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A. The IDEA and the Massachusetts Special Education Law
The IDEA was enacted "to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education . . . designed to meet their unique needs." 20 U.S.C §
1400(d)(1)(A).6 In order to determine whether a child has a
disability for purposes of the IDEA, and to evaluate the particular
needs of that child if deemed eligible for special education
services, an IEP Team is to convene and prepare an IEP. Id. §§
1414(d)(1)(A) & (B). In the event the state or local educational
agencies do not follow this procedure, for example by not convening
an IEP Team meeting when required, not preparing and implementing
an IEP in a timely fashion, or not preparing an IEP that adequately
addresses the needs of the child, the IDEA provides certain
procedural safeguards, including the right to an impartial due
process administrative hearing, see id. § 1415(f),7 and a right to
appeal an adverse decision in that hearing to the federal district
court, see id. § 1415(i)(2). The IDEA also provides that the
parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party in
6
The Massachusetts Special Education Law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
71B, implements the requirements of the IDEA.
7
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) provides: "Whenever a complaint has been
received [with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child,
or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
child], the parents . . . involved in such complaint shall have an
opportunity for an impartial due process hearing." In
Massachusetts, such hearings are conducted by the Bureau of Special
Education Appeals ("BSEA") by a BSEA hearing officer.
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such an administrative proceeding or law suit may recover, in the
court's discretion, reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. §
1415(i)(3)(B).
The award of attorneys' fees for a prevailing party under
the IDEA is subject to certain limitations, including one that
provides: "Attorneys' fees may not be awarded relating to any
meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result
of an administrative proceeding or judicial action . . . " Id. §
1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). Chelsea's Parents contend that an award under
this paragraph is not subject to the "prevailing party"
requirements of the general IDEA provision dealing with the award
of attorneys' fees, id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). We disagree. Section
1415(i)(3)(B) of Title 20 clearly provides that the prevailing
party requirement applies to "any action or proceeding brought
under this section." (Emphasis added.). This "section" refers to
"section 1415," and includes all administrative and civil actions
brought under the IDEA.
B. Buckhannon and the "Prevailing Party" Requirement
To evaluate whether a party is a "prevailing party" for
purposes of the IDEA, we are guided by the Supreme Court's decision
in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department
of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).8 See Doe, 358
8
Although the issue in Buckhannon was the fee-shifting
provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §
3601 et seq., and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
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F.3d at 29-30 (holding that Buckhannon applies to the fee-shifting
provision of the IDEA). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that
for a party to be considered "prevailing," there must be a
"material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,"
532 U.S. at 604 (quotation omitted), and there must be "judicial
imprimatur on the change." Id. at 605 (emphasis in original).9
The Buckhannon Court went on to state that a "defendant's
voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what
the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary
judicial imprimatur." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court then
noted that it had "only awarded attorneys' fees where the plaintiff
ha[d] received a judgment on the merits or obtained a court-ordered
consent decree." Id. By contrast, the Court stated that it had
not awarded attorneys' fees "where the plaintiff ha[d] secured the
reversal of a directed verdict, or acquired a judicial
pronouncement that the defendant ha[d] violated the Constitution
unaccompanied by 'judicial relief.'" Id. at 605-06 (emphasis in
original) (internal citation omitted). The Court expressly
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., this court held in Doe that the Supreme
Court's reasoning in "Buckhannon is presumed to apply generally to
all fee-shifting statutes that use the 'prevailing party'
terminology, including the IDEA." Doe, 358 F.3d at 25 (citing T.D.
v. La Grange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir.
2003)).
9
It is undisputed that, for purposes of the IDEA, a party may
"prevail" in an administrative hearing--thus the appropriate
involvement of a BSEA hearing officer can provide the necessary
"judicial imprimatur."
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rejected the "'catalyst theory,' which posits that a plaintiff is
a 'prevailing party' if it achieves the desired result because the
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's
conduct." Id. at 601, 605.
C. Cases Interpreting Buckhannon
There is disagreement among our sister circuits whether
the Supreme Court intended "judgments on the merits" and "consent
decrees" to be the only forms of success conferring prevailing
party status, or whether these two forms are mere examples of the
types of relief that can confer such status. Compare Christina A.
v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that
"Buckhannon . . . makes it clear that a party prevails only if it
receives either an enforceable judgment on the merits or a consent
decree."), with Pres. Coalition v. Fed. Transit Admin., 356 F.3d
444, 452 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "Buckhannon does not limit
fee awards to enforceable judgments on the merits or to consent
decrees"); see also T.D. v. La Grange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d
469, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2003) (implicitly holding that "prevailing
party" status under Buckhannon is not limited to judgments on the
merits and consent decrees in finding a party was "prevailing"
after it obtained a court-ordered case-study evaluation under the
IDEA despite ultimately resolving the case by private settlement);
Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (implicitly
holding that fee awards are not limited to enforceable judgments on
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the merits and to consent decrees in finding that "an order
containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally
a consent decree for purposes of [Buckhannon], even if not entitled
as such").
In this circuit, we have not squarely addressed whether
judgments on the merits or consent decrees are the only forms of
relief sufficient to confer prevailing party status, whether a
functional equivalent of such relief may be adequate, or whether
any other types of relief could satisfy Buckhannon's requirements.
In a case decided after Buckhannon, but expressly not deciding
whether Buckhannon applied to the fee-shifting provisions of the
IDEA, we awarded fees to a party who had successfully fended-off a
motion for a temporary restraining order, noting that "the denial
of the School District's motion [for a TRO] was effectively a final
judgment on the merits on [one of the School District's claims]."
Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R., 321 F.3d 9, 16-17
n.6 (1st Cir. 2003). Subsequently, in Doe, in holding that
Buckhannon indeed did apply to the fee-shifting provisions of the
IDEA, and thus barred recovery for fees following a purely private
settlement, we took "no position on whether forms of judicial
imprimatur other than a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered
consent decree may suffice to ground an award of attorneys' fees."
Doe, 358 F.3d at 24 n.4.
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Here, Chelsea's Parents did not obtain a final judgment
on the merits, and their private settlement was not incorporated
into a consent decree. Thus, Chelsea's Parents do not satisfy the
requirements of a narrow reading of Buckhannon. See Christina A.,
315 F.3d at 993 (holding that a party need obtain either a consent
decree or a final judgment on the merits to be deemed a "prevailing
party" under Buckhannon). Furthermore, we need not decide today
whether a party could prevail under Buckhannon in the absence of a
consent decree or a final judgment on the merits, because, as we
will discuss below, neither the interlocutory orders and rulings,
nor the final order dismissing the case provide the necessary
judicial imprimatur on the change in the legal relationship between
the parties. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 604-05. Lastly, we need not
rule out the possibility that an egregious case of foot-dragging
terminated by a judicial or quasi-judicial procedural order may be
sufficient to confer prevailing party status under Buckhannon,
because the record does not reveal that Fitchburg was being
willfully obstructionist.
In one line of cases applying an expansive reading of
Buckhannon, courts have held that "[w]here a settlement agreement
is embodied in a court order such that the obligation to comply
with its terms is court-ordered, the court's approval and the
attendant judicial over-sight (in the form of continuing
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement) may be equally apparent,"
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such that an order containing the agreement "may be functionally a
consent decree for purposes of [Buckhannon], even if not entitled
as such." Smyth, 282 F.3d at 281; see T.D., 349 F.3d at 478 ("We
agree with the Fourth Circuit's recent conclusion [in Smyth] that
some settlement agreements, even though not explicitly labeled as
a 'consent decree' may confer 'prevailing party' status, if they
are sufficiently analogous to a consent decree."); John T. v. Del.
County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating
that "a stipulated settlement could confer prevailing party status
. . . . where it (1) contained mandatory language, (2) was entitled
'Order,' (3) bore the signature of the District Court judge, not
the parties' counsel, and (4) provided for judicial enforcement")
(emphasis and citation omitted); see also Smyth, 282 F.3d at 281
("We doubt that the Supreme Court's guidance in Buckhannon was
intended to be interpreted so restrictively as to require that the
words 'consent decree' be used explicitly."). For an order to be
considered the functional equivalent of a consent decree, however,
"[t]he obligation to comply with a settlement's terms must be
expressly made part of a court's order for jurisdiction to enforce
the settlement after dismissal of the action to exist." Smyth, 282
F.3d at 283; see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 381 (1994) ("The judge's mere awareness and approval of
the terms of the settlement agreement do not suffice to make them
a part of his order."). Thus, "[e]ither incorporation of the terms
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of the agreement or a separate provision retaining jurisdiction
over the agreement will suffice for this purpose." Smyth, 282 F.3d
at 283. In contrast, "[w]here a court merely recognizes the fact
of the parties' agreement and dismisses the case because there is
no longer a dispute before it, the terms of the agreement are not
made part of the order and consequently will not serve as a basis
of jurisdiction." Id.
Here, Chelsea does not argue that the order dismissing
her case is the functional equivalent of a consent decree, and thus
we deem that argument waived. See, e.g., Smilow v. Southwestern
Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 43 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Issues
raised on appeal in a perfunctory manner (or not at all) are
waived.").10
A second line of cases espousing an expansive reading of
Buckhannon has developed, holding that the relief obtained by one
party satisfied the requirements of Buckhannon, even though the
party "prevailing" on that one issue ultimately lost in the final
judgment or entered into a private settlement agreement for the
remaining claims. Essential to each of these cases is the judge's
substantive involvement providing the necessary judicial imprimatur
on the change in the legal relationship between the parties.
10
We note that neither party included a copy of the order of
dismissal by the BSEA in the record before the district court.
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In T.D. v. La Grange School District Number 102, 349 F.3d
at 480, the Seventh Circuit held that even though the parties
ultimately entered into a private settlement (that was not embodied
in a court order), the parents were "prevailing" in an
administrative hearing for purposes of Buckhannon when they
successfully convinced the hearing officer to order the school
district to conduct a case-study evaluation to determine their
child's eligibility for benefits under the IDEA. The Seventh
Circuit, reversing in part the decision of the district court, held
that the parents were eligible for an award of attorneys' fees for
"prevailing" in the administrative hearing, but not for the time
spent in negotiations for the final settlement. Id. The Seventh
Circuit stated that the determination that the child was eligible
for IDEA benefits as a result of the court-ordered case-study
evaluation "represented some success for T.D. because prior to his
request for the due process hearing the school had not acknowledged
that T.D. was even eligible for IDEA benefits." Id. Thus, a
material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties
(that is, the school district's determination that T.D. was
eligible for special education services), was effected by the
hearing officer's order (after a review of the merits that the
school district was legally required to conduct a case-study
evaluation), which provided the necessary judicial imprimatur on
T.D.'s relief. See id.
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Similarly, the Second Circuit in Preservation Coalition
of Erie County v. Federal Transit Administration, 356 F.3d at 452,
held that a party was "prevailing" under Buckhannon when it
successfully convinced the district court to order the defendants
to prepare a new Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS)
under threat of injunctive relief, even though the case was
ultimately resolved by a settlement agreement embodied in a
Stipulation and Order.11 After determining that the Stipulation and
Order was "functionally a private settlement agreement," the court
concluded that "appellee obtained prevailing party status under
Buckhannon when it obtained a court order requiring appellants to
prepare a SEIS under threat of further injunctive relief." Id. at
451, 452. This was because "[t]he SEIS was both judicially
sanctioned and effectuated a substantive, material alteration in
the legal relationship of the parties." Id. at 452 (emphasis in
original). And, as the Second Circuit noted, "[a]lthough the
district court declined to issue an injunction, it found the [Final
Environmental Impact Statement] inadequate" and ordered the
defendants to prepare a [Supplemental Environmental Impact
11
Preservation Coalition involved the fee-shifting provision
of the National Environmental Policy Act, which allows fee awards
to a party who "substantially prevails" in an action to enforce its
provisions. The Second Circuit has held that "the terms
'prevailing party' and 'substantially prevails' are fundamentally
the same for purposes of determining whether a plaintiff can
recover under a fee-shifting statute," and thus Buckhannon applies.
Pres. Coalition, 356 F.3d at 450 n.3.
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Statement]." Id. at 448. Thus, the judge's substantive order
effected a material alteration in the legal relationship between
the parties.
In Maine School Administrative District Number 35,
although not directly applying Buckhannon, we followed similar
reasoning in holding that parents who successfully defended against
a school district's attempt to change their child's placement were
prevailing parties and thus entitled to attorneys' fees under the
IDEA. See 321 F.3d at 17. We noted that "[b]ecause the district
court denied injunctive relief on the basis that the School
District had not adduced sufficient proof to satisfy the [standard
for changing the student's placement], it [was] readily evident
that the appellants successfully defended [the original suit
brought against the parents to keep their child out of the school
because the school district thought the child was dangerous] on the
merits." Id. Thus, the district judge's substantive ruling was
the cause of a material alteration in the legal relationship
between the parties.
D. Applying Buckhannon to Chelsea's Case
We begin our application of the law to the facts of
Chelsea's case with the obvious--the relief obtained by Chelsea at
the administrative level was not in the form of a consent decree or
a final judgment on the merits, and thus does not warrant
attorneys' fees under a narrow reading of Buckhannon. See
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Christina A., 315 F.3d at 993 (holding that a party need obtain
either a consent decree or a final judgment on the merits to be
deemed a "prevailing party" under Buckhannon). Chelsea wisely does
not argue as such. But, our inquiry does not end there. As we
have not decided in this circuit whether to adopt a narrow or broad
reading of Buckhannon, we do not foreclose the possibility of a
broad reading, and look to determine whether Chelsea's relief, even
though not in the form of a consent decree or a final judgment on
the merits, comports with the overarching requirements of
Buckhannon; that is, whether the involvement of the BSEA Hearing
Officer provided the necessary judicial imprimatur on a material
alteration of the legal relationship between the parties. See
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05. We thus first identify the change
in the legal relationship between Chelsea and Fitchburg, and then
ask whether that change was effected by the judicial actions of the
BSEA Hearing Officer.
1. The Change in the Legal Relationship
As a result of her initiation of proceedings against
Fitchburg, Chelsea did receive all of the relief she requested. In
Chelsea's complaint, she initially sought an order requiring
Fitchburg to: (1) pay for Chelsea's tutoring at home and in the
hospital; (2) convene an IEP meeting to address Chelsea's special
education needs; and (3) implement the IEP. By the time the case
was dismissed by the BSEA Hearing Officer, Fitchburg agreed to do
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everything requested. Thus, there was a material alteration in the
legal relationship between Chelsea and Fitchburg. Under
Buckhannon, however, that is not enough to justify an award of
attorneys' fees; there must be judicial imprimatur on that change.
See 532 U.S. 604-05.
2. The Involvement of the BSEA Hearing Officer
The judicial involvement in this case came in the form of
a series of orders and rulings by the BSEA Hearing Officer that
memorialized the voluntary concessions made by Fitchburg and
attempted to keep the settlement process moving forward in a timely
manner.12 At the time the orders were imposed, the BSEA Hearing
Officer had not yet joined issue on the question of Chelsea's
substantive entitlement to an IEP because the BSEA Hearing Officer
had not yet convened a due process hearing. The issue before the
BSEA Hearing Officer at the time of her orders and rulings was
simply whether she should continue to promote settlement efforts
or, instead, take immediate action on the parents' request for a
due process hearing under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Thus, it appears
from the record that the BSEA Hearing Officer's orders and rulings
were issued to justify the BSEA Hearing Officer's implicit decision
12
Chelsea does not seriously contend that there was judicial
imprimatur on Fitchburg's decision to reimburse her parents for
prior tutoring at home and in the hospital, part of the relief she
received as a result of the settlement agreement. Thus, we
appropriately limit our discussion to whether there was judicial
imprimatur on Fitchburg's convening of the IEP meeting.
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to delay the due process hearing in favor of private settlement,
not to place the weight of judicial authority behind Fitchburg's
substantive concession that Chelsea was entitled to an IEP.
To be sure, standing alone, the BSEA Hearing Officer's
December 20, 2001 ruling requiring Fitchburg to convene a IEP
meeting "in no event . . . later than January 11, 2002" might be
viewed as an order, similar to the order in T.D., 349 F.3d at 480,
compelling Fitchburg to convene an IEP meeting because the Hearing
Officer determined Fitchburg was legally required to do so under
the IDEA. A closer look at the record, however, reveals that this
was merely a ruling memorializing a substantive concession by
Fitchburg and an effort to keep pre-hearing settlement negotiations
moving forward. Without being compelled to do so by the BSEA
Hearing Officer, Fitchburg had orally (and voluntarily) agreed to
convene an IEP meeting on December 12, 2001 during the December 4,
2001 BSEA Hearing Officer-initiated conference call. When
Fitchburg failed to convene the meeting on December 12, Chelsea
filed a motion requesting that the BSEA Hearing Officer order
Fitchburg to convene the meeting. Significantly, Fitchburg did not
oppose the motion. Thus, when the BSEA Hearing Officer issued its
ruling stating that "Fitchburg will use its best efforts to convene
the TEAM on January 4, 2002 but in no event . . . any later than
January 11, 2002," the officer was mandating that Fitchburg convene
a TEAM meeting by a specified date. The BSEA Hearing Officer never
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reviewed the merits of whether Fitchburg was required under the
IDEA to convene the IEP meeting; the Hearing Officer only was
requiring Fitchburg to follow through with what Fitchburg had
already voluntarily promised to do.
Lastly, we note that in this case, the BSEA Hearing
Officer can be described as being simply efficient and business-
like, forcing Fitchburg to move more rapidly. It is not clear from
the record that Fitchburg was being willfully obstructionist. And,
at no point did Fitchburg refuse to comply with an order of the
BSEA Hearing Officer, nor was the Hearing Officer ever compelled to
make good on her threats of sanctions against Fitchburg. Thus, we
need not today foreclose the possibility that such judicial
intervention in a clearer, or more extreme, case might justify an
award of attorneys' fees under Buckhannon.
III. CONCLUSION
The pre-hearing orders that hastened the final resolution
of Chelsea's claim by private settlement did not provide sufficient
judicial imprimatur on Chelsea's relief to make her a "prevailing
party" under Buckhannon. The district court was correct to deny
Chelsea attorneys' fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), and, as
the prevailing party standard announced in Buckhannon also applies
to an award of fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii),
Chelsea's claim under that subparagraph fails as well. The
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district court's orders, granting summary judgment to Fitchburg and
denying Chelsea's motion for summary judgment, are AFFIRMED.
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