UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 99-31130
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee
VERSUS
EDWIN EDWARDS; STEPHEN EDWARDS; CECIL BROWN; ANDREW MARTIN; BOBBY
JOHNSON; GREGORY TARVER; AND ECOTRY FULLER
Defendants-Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
March 8, 2000
Before JONES, DUHE’ and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Edwin W. Edwards, Stephen Edwards, Cecil Brown, Andrew Martin
Bobby Johnson, Gregory Tarver, and Ecotry Fuller (the “Defendants”)
appeal the district court's denial of their motion to lift a court-
imposed gag order. We dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
Three days after the United States indicted the Defendants for
racketeering, the district court entered the gag order on November
9, 1998 pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 53. The gag order
restricts the parties, attorneys and witnesses from making certain
extrajudicial comments. No party initially objected to or filed
motions with the district court to re-consider or to amend the gag
order. Ten months later, the Defendants filed a motion on
September 16, 1999 to lift the gag order. The district court
denied the motion calling it “frivolous.” The Defendants then
filed a notice of appeal arguing that the gag order was imposing “a
continuous prior restraint on speech which [wa]s damaging the
[D]efendants ability to obtain a fair trial.”
This court's jurisdiction is limited to final decisions of the
district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A decision is not final unless
it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.” In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena,
190 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cunningham v. Hamilton
County, _U.S._, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 1919-20 (1999)). There is no final
judgment in this case.
We have applied the collateral order doctrine, notwithstanding
the absence of final judgment, only when the orders “are
conclusive, resolve important questions separate from the merits,
and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment
in the underlying action.” In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena, 190 F.3d at
381 (quoting Cunningham, 119 S.Ct. at 1919). In criminal cases we
have applied the collateral order doctrine “with the utmost
strictness” and have limited it to the denial of only three types
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of motions: (1) motions to reduce bail; (2) motions to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds, and (3) motions to dismiss under the
Speech or Debate Clause. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 190 F.3d at
381 (citing Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794,
799 (1989)).
The collateral order doctrine does not apply to the district
court's denial of the Defendants' motion to lift the gag order.1
Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
DISMISSED.
1
The Defendants argue that we should extend the collateral order
doctrine to orders that restrain speech in connection with pending
cases. See United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 598 (6th Cir.
1987). We decline to do so under the circumstances of this case.
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