United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 04-1992
04-1993
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
YAMIL MATOS-QUIÑONES
and
JORGE ALBERTO ORTIZ-FELICIANO
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
H.S. García, United States Attorney, was on brief, for the United
States.
Raymond E. Gillespie for Yamil Matos-Quiñones.
Elaine Pourinski for Jorge Alberto Ortiz-Feliciano.
August 2, 2006
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Yamil Matos-Quiñones and Jorge
Alberto Ortiz-Feliciano each pled guilty to one count of carjacking
with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, resulting in
death. 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3). The victim was a sailor in the United
States Navy, stationed in Puerto Rico. The district court
sentenced both defendants to life imprisonment. The defendants now
claim that the district court misunderstood and failed to explain
the intent element of § 2119(3). They argue that, given a proper
understanding of that intent element, the district court would not
have found a rational basis for their pleas. They also contend
that if the district court had explained the intent element of the
carjacking charge as the Supreme Court explained it in Holloway v.
United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999), they would not have pleaded
guilty. Defendant Matos-Quiñones alleges an additional error:
that the government violated its plea agreement with him by urging
the judge to impose a life sentence rather than a term of years.
We affirm.
I.
We draw the facts from the change of plea hearing, the
pre-sentence report, and the factual stipulation agreed to by the
government and defendant Matos-Quiñones. See United States v.
Colón-Solis, 354 F.3d 101, 102 (1st Cir. 2004). We leave some
details for discussion in connection with the defendants'
allegations of error.
-2-
On a mission for their colleagues in the illegal drug
business, the defendants were looking for a sports utility vehicle
to steal. They saw a Toyota they liked outside a video rental
store in Fajardo, Puerto Rico. When the Toyota’s owner emerged
from the store, the defendants approached him. Both defendants
brandished handguns. Defendant Ortiz-Feliciano pressed his handgun
against the victim's back and said, according to the FBI agent who
investigated the crime, "get in the car if you want to live." The
defendants seized the keys to the Toyota and ordered the victim, at
gunpoint, to lie down in the rear of the vehicle. They then drove
the stolen Toyota towards Rio Grande.
While driving, the defendants asked the victim where he
lived. He said that he was a native of North Carolina but was
living at the Navy base in Ceiba. Once Ortiz-Feliciano realized
that the victim was a sailor, he decided to kill him. Several
minutes later, the defendants stopped in a wooded area. When the
victim attempted to escape, Matos-Quiñones hit him with his
handgun. The defendants then led the victim into the nearby woods.
Matos-Quiñones removed a piece of jewelry from the victim's person
as the victim pleaded for his life. Then Ortiz-Feliciano shot the
victim in the back of the head.
The defendants soon were apprehended and confessed
essentially to the facts outlined above. Initially, Ortiz-
Feliciano told investigators that Matos-Quiñones attempted to shoot
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the victim but that his gun had jammed. However, Matos-Quiñones
denied either attempting to shoot the victim or intending that he
be killed. Federal authorities charged each defendant with aiding
and abetting the other in one count of carjacking with intent to
cause death or serious bodily injury, and two counts of firearms
violations. After consultation with counsel, the defendants agreed
to plead guilty to the carjacking count. In exchange, the
government pledged not to seek the death penalty, to dismiss the
firearms charges, to recommend a sentencing guideline level of 40
for both defendants, and to stipulate that Matos-Quiñones "was not
the shooter of the victim and did not at any time intend that the
victim be killed."
II.
This case involves the relatively complex intent element
of § 2119, the federal carjacking statute, which the parties
interpret differently. The arguments also reveal some confusion as
to whether Matos-Quiñones's indictment as an aider and abettor
somehow changes that intent element. We provide some preliminary
explanations before addressing the defendants' arguments.
A. The Carjacking Statute
The statute to which the defendants pled guilty, 18
U.S.C. § 2119, reads:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that
has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce from the person
-4-
or presence of another by force and violence
or by intimidation, or attempts to do so,
shall . . .
(3) if death results, be fined under this
title or imprisoned for any number of years up
to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
Contrary to the suggestion of the government, this statute is not
a felony murder analog.1 See United States v. Rosario-Díaz, 202
F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[C]arjacking is a specialized
offense, requiring a specific criminal act and a narrow mens
rea."). Even "if death results," the statute requires "intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm." A felony murder statute is
defined by the absence of any such intent element.2 Consequently,
1
The government argues that "Matos-Quiñones overlooks the
operation of the felony-murder rule," and that he "could be found
guilty of first-degree murder . . . without any finding as to
premeditation or a specific intent to kill." That statement is
misleading. Federal law does incorporate a traditional felony-
murder rule for homicides committed in federal enclaves and other
places where the federal government has special law enforcement
responsibility. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (federal murder statute); 18
U.S.C. § 7 (defining "the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States," in which the federal murder
statute applies). However, the defendants were not indicted for
violating § 1111.
The only potential applicability of the felony-murder rule
here was in the sentencing proceedings. That is because the
sentencing guidelines reference the federal murder statute in
connection with calculations of the base offense level for
carjacking crimes. See United States v. Martinez-Bermúdez, 387
F.3d 98, 100-101 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that the offense
guideline for carjacking is U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(c), which in turn
references U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 for offenses that would constitute
murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had they occurred "within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
2
For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 defines a homicide as first-
degree murder if it was "committed in the perpetration of . . .
-5-
the carjacking charges against the defendants required the
government to prove not only that the defendants committed a
carjacking and that they killed the victim, but also that they
acted "with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm."3
1. "Conditional Intent"
In Holloway, the Supreme Court confronted the meaning of
the phrase "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm"
in the carjacking statute. The question in Holloway was "whether
that phrase requires the government to prove that the defendant had
an unconditional intent to kill or harm in all events, or whether
it merely requires proof of an intent to kill or harm if necessary
to effect a carjacking." 526 U.S. at 3. The Court answered that
question as follows:
The specific issue in this case is what sort
of evil motive Congress intended to describe
when it used the words "with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm" . . ..
More precisely, the question is whether a
person who points a gun at a driver, having
decided to pull the trigger if the driver does
not comply with the demand for the car keys,
possesses the intent, at that moment, to
robbery." The federal robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2111, contains
no requirement that the perpetrator intend to inflict bodily injury
or death. So, under the federal felony-murder rule, a defendant
can be convicted of first-degree murder even though he never
intended (even conditionally) to inflict physical harm on the
victim. That is not the case under the carjacking statute.
3
There has been at least one failed attempt to abolish the
"intent to cause death or serious bodily harm" requirement from the
carjacking statute. See H.R. 4472, § 803(a), 109th Congress, 1st
Session (2005).
-6-
seriously harm the driver. In our view, the
answer to that question does not depend on
whether the driver immediately hands over the
keys or what the offender decides to do after
he gains control over the car. At the
relevant moment, the offender plainly does
have the forbidden intent.
Id. at 6-7. In short, if this case had gone to trial, the
government would have had to prove that the defendants a) took or
attempted to take the victim's car through force and violence or by
intimidation, b) that they acted with conditional or unconditional
intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, and c) that death
resulted.
2. The "Relevant Moment" for Conditional Intent
We have encountered cases, including this case, where a
carjacking defendant is accused of stealing a car, taking its
driver as a hostage, and later killing or harming the driver even
though the defendant already was in control of the car. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lebrón-Cepeda, 324 F.3d 52, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2003)
(concerning a defendant who argued that his intent to seriously
harm or kill the victim had not developed until after he had seized
control of the victim's car and realized that the victim was a
police officer); United States v. Evans-Garcia, 322 F.3d 110, 112-
13 (1st Cir. 2003) (same). In these cases, defendants have
suggested that they were not guilty of carjacking because their
intent to harm or kill the victim did not exist at the beginning of
the carjaking. See id. at 114. In other words, these defendants
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contend that they could not be found guilty of carjacking if a jury
finds that their intent to kill or seriously harm the driver
developed only after the car had been taken. This interpretation
of the carjacking statute stems from the several references in
Holloway, as in the quotation above, to the carjacking defendant's
intent as of the "moment" of a carjacking. The Court summarized
its holding as follows:
The intent requirement of § 2119 is satisfied
when the Government proves that at the moment
the defendant demanded or took control over
the driver's automobile the defendant
possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill
the driver if necessary to steal the car (or,
alternatively, if unnecessary to steal the
car).
Holloway, 526 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added).
The defendants contend that we have interpreted the
above-quoted language in Holloway to mean that a defendant is not
guilty of carjacking if his intent to kill or seriously harm the
driver develops only after he has stolen the driver's car and taken
the driver as a hostage. See Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d at 63 ("[T]he
mental state required by the statute ('intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm') is measured at the moment that the defendant
demands or takes control of the vehicle."). Other circuits
addressing this issue have decided that intent in a carjacking case
must be measured at "the precise moment [the defendant] demanded or
took control over the car." United States v. Harris, 420 F.3d 467,
478 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
-8-
United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 685 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[T]he statute directs the factfinder's attention to the
defendant's state of mind at the precise moment he demanded or took
control over the car."). See also Hornby, Pattern Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District Courts of the First Circuit, 2005
R e v i s i o n s , 1 5 7 , a v a i l a b l e a t
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/practices/Criminal_Jury_Instructions.
pdf (last visited July 6, 2005) (citing Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d at
63 for the requirement that the carjacking defendant "intended to
cause death or serious bodily harm at the time [he/she] demanded or
took control of the motor vehicle").
The government takes a different view, arguing that the
statute applies as long as the proscribed intent existed at any
time while the defendants had control over the victim and his car.
To that end, the government urges us to adopt a position set forth
in a concurring opinion by a member of our court: that Holloway
should not "be read to limit the jury's focus to the commencement
of the carjacking in cases like this one, which . . . involve
takings [of hostages] that occur over some period of time."
Lebrón-Cepeda, 324 F.3d at 63 (Howard, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted).4
4
We also said the following in Ramos Burgos v. United States,
313 F.3d 23, 30 n.9 (1st Cir. 2002):
We do not here set forth the temporal limits of a
carjacking under § 2119. But we reaffirm, without
-9-
As we will explain, the facts of this case, like those in
Lebrón-Cepeda, do not require us to resolve the question whether
the intent element for carjacking must be measured at the
commencement of a prolonged carjacking. Accordingly, we will
simply assume without deciding that the defendants' view of the
issue is correct.
B. Liability as an Accomplice in a Carjacking Case
The indictment reads that "aiding and abetting each other
with the intent to cause death and serious bodily injury, [the
defendants] did take a motor vehicle . . . from [the victim], by
force and violence . . .." This charge indicted both defendants as
principals and as aiders and abettors. See, e.g., United States v.
Bennet, 75 F.3d 40, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1996) (analyzing a similar
indictment). As it turns out, both defendants pled guilty as
principals. There was, as we will explain, an ample factual basis
for those pleas.
However, unwilling to fully acknowledge his culpability
as a principal, Matos-Quiñones argues that the stipulation that he
"was not the shooter of the victim and did not at any time intend
that the victim be killed" means that he did not share Ortiz-
Feliciano's criminal intent and could not be found guilty as Ortiz-
Feliciano's accomplice. It is true that an aider and abettor
hesitation, that the commission of a carjacking continues
at least while the carjacker maintains control over the
victim and her car.
-10-
"'must share in the principal's essential criminal intent.'"5
United States v. Tarr, 589 F.2d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1978) (quoting
United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1977)). See
also, e.g., LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 13.2(b) 2d ed.
(2003) (an accomplice is liable only when he shares the "requisite
mental state" for the principal's crime); Evans-Garcia, 322 F.3d at
314 ("The aider and abetter must have shared the principal's
criminal intent."); United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 591 (1st
Cir. 1994).6 If § 2119 required proof of intent to kill, Matos-
Quiñones, who "did not at any time intend that the victim be
killed," could no more be guilty as an aider and abettor than he
could as a principal.7 However, the carjacking statute makes proof
5
The challenge in aiding and abetting cases is framing this
"vital element" for the jury. See Tarr, 589 F.2d at 59-60; see
also United States v. Medina-Román, 376 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2004)
(discussing the historical basis for our aiding and abetting
standard); United States v. Geronimo, 330 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir.
2003) (discussing our pattern jury instructions on aiding and
abetting); United States v. Otero-Méndez, 273 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.
2001) (discussing aiding and abetting liability for carjacking);
United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234-35 (1st Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that the two elements of aiding and abetting liability
are that the principal committed the charged crime and that the
accomplice "became associated with [the principal's criminal]
endeavor and took part in it, intending to ensure its success").
6
Where the mental state required of the principal is less
than specific intent, the same is true of the mental state of the
aider and abettor. See Geronimo, 330 F.3d at 74.
7
The parties understand the stipulation to mean that Matos-
Quiñones never had even a conditional intent to kill the victim.
The government does not suggest that the stipulation could be read
to mean that Matos-Quiñones did not want to kill the victim, but
was willing to do so in order to steal the car.
-11-
of an intent to "seriously harm" the driver sufficient to impose
liability. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11. Matos-Quiñones's intent to
inflict serious bodily harm on the victim was not the subject of
any stipulation, and he could be guilty as a principal or as an
aider and abettor on the basis of such intent.
III.
We first address the overlapping issues common to both
defendants: whether there was a factual basis for the intent
element of the carjacking charge and whether any errors in the plea
colloquy prevented a knowing and voluntary plea. We then address
Matos-Quiñones's claim that the government violated its plea
agreement with him.
A. The Plea Colloquy
1. Standard of Review
Neither defendant objected to the district court's plea
colloquy before taking this appeal. Indeed, while more than a year
and a half passed between the guilty pleas and the sentencing
hearings, neither defendant sought to withdraw his plea during that
period. Accordingly, "we review only for plain error." United
States v. Morrisette, 429 F.3d 318, 322 (1st Cir. 2005).8 To earn
8
If the defendants had "call[ed] the district court's
attention to the alleged errors in the plea proceedings," our
review would be for abuse of discretion. United States v. Delgado-
Hernández, 420 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2005). The abuse of
discretion standard also would apply if the defendants had made a
motion after the plea hearing, but before sentencing, to withdraw
their pleas pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(B). See United States v.
-12-
relief, the defendants must show (1) that an error occurred, and
that the error (2) was "clear or obvious," (3) affected their
"substantial rights," and (4) "seriously impaired the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United
States v. Duarte, 246 F.33 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). To meet prong
three, each defendant "is obliged to show a reasonable probability
that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea."
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76 (2004).
2. Basis in Fact for the Pleas
The defendants contend that the district court violated
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 by accepting their guilty pleas in the absence
of a factual basis for the intent element of the carjacking charge.
Their claim is that they did not have any intent to harm or kill
the victim until after they had seized his car and learned while
driving towards Rio Grande that he was a sailor. Hence, they
argue, their intent to harm or kill did not meet the "at the
moment" requirement of Holloway. As we indicated above, we will
assume the validity of the defendants' reading of Holloway.
Rule 11 requires that "[b]efore entering judgment on a
guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis
for the plea." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). We have explained that
the district court "has a duty," in plea proceedings, "to ascertain
whether the record permits a conclusion that the plea has a
Mescual-Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
-13-
rational basis in fact." United States v. Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d
33, 37 (1st Cir. 2005). However, Rule 11 does not require "a test
of guilt versus innocence," id., much less proof "'beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is in fact guilty,'" id.
(quoting United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 403 (1st Cir. 1970)).
The idea is for the district court to ensure that there is, on the
record as it stands at the time of the plea, a reasoned basis to
believe that the defendant actually committed the crime to which he
is admitting guilt. See United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 41
(1st Cir. 2004). The facts relevant to this inquiry "may come
either from the defendant's admissions and concessions or from
credible evidence proffered by the government and not contradicted
by the defendant." Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d at 37.
First, as to Ortiz-Feliciano, the evidence proffered by
the government easily met the requisite standard, even under his
interpretation of the law. To take the victim's car, Ortiz-
Feliciano pressed a loaded handgun against the victim's body and
threatened the victim with death. The presence of ammunition, the
death threats, and the fact that he eventually did kill the victim,
provide a rational basis to believe that Ortiz-Feliciano was
willing to fire his gun if necessary to steal the car. See Lebrón-
Cepeda, 324 F.3d at 56-57 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that conditional
intent to kill could be inferred as to two defendants from fact
that one of the defendants "placed a loaded and cocked revolver
-14-
against [the victim's] head . . . and verbally threatened him").
See also United States v. Jones, 188 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that conditional intent could be inferred from brandishing
of handgun and death threats).
The stipulation between the government and Matos-Quiñones
precludes any rational basis to believe that he, too, had a
conditional intent to kill the victim. However, as we indicated
above, the intent element of the carjacking statute requires that
"at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the
driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously
harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car." Holloway,
526 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). The record provides a factual
basis that Matos-Quiñones had the requisite intent "to seriously
harm." Like Ortiz-Feliciano, he threatened the victim with a
handgun at the moment of the carjacking. He later demonstrated his
willingness to inflict violent harm when he struck the victim with
his handgun.
In short, the record provided an adequate basis for the
district court to conclude that both defendants were guilty as
principals in the carjacking death of the victim. Both defendants
participated in taking by force and intimidation a vehicle subject
to the jurisdiction of the federal government. Both defendants
possessed "at the moment [they] demanded or took control over the
driver's automobile . . . the intent to seriously harm or kill the
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driver if necessary to steal the car." The victim's death
resulted. These are the elements that the statute requires. See
18 U.S.C. § 2119(3).
3. A Knowing and Voluntary Plea
Rule 11 requires that the district court ensure that a
defendant's guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. The due process
clause requires the same. See, e.g., Delgado-Hernández, 420 F.3d
at 19. "[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all of the
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary
unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in
relation to the facts." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,
466 (1969). Accordingly, Rule 11 explicitly requires that the
district court "inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands . . . the nature of each charge to which the
defendant is pleading." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). The
district court's obligation "includes ensuring that the defendant
understands the elements of the charges that the prosecution would
have to prove at trial." United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2000). Both defendants contend that the
district court failed to adhere to this requirement in its
explanation of § 2119's intent element. Matos-Quiñones also
asserts error in the district court's failure to define what it
means to be an aider and abettor.
The district court did not explain the intent element of
-16-
the § 2119 charge as it was defined in Holloway. Rather, the court
essentially read the indictment to the defendants, stating:
To be found guilty of this offense if a trial
were to be held, the Government had to -- must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you
unlawfully, and aiding and abetting each
other, with intent to cause death and serious
bodily injury, did take this motor vehicle
that has been identified in Count One of the
indictment that had been transported, shipped,
or received in interstate or foreign commerce,
from [the victim], by force and violence, and
inflicted serious bodily injury on him, that
is, shooting and killing [the victim].
Even if this explanation of the intent element constituted error
(an issue we do not decide),9 the defendants cannot satisfy the
third prong of the plain error test. As we stated above, to do so
they must demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that they would
not have pleaded guilty if the district court had explained the
charges correctly. To this end, the defendants claim that they may
not have pleaded guilty if they had known that they could have
defended themselves at trial on the theory that they had no intent
to harm or kill the victim before they realized, some minutes after
"the moment" they took the car, that the victim worked for the
9
But we do add two details. The district court should not
have said that the statute required proof that the defendants had
an intent to cause death and serious bodily harm. As we have
explained, the statute requires an intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm. Also, Matos-Quiñones's argument about the district
court's failure to explain aiding and abetting liability is
unpersuasive. As we explained above, Matos-Quiñones was liable as
-- and pled guilty as -- a principal. There was no need for the
district court to explain a superfluous legal concept at the plea
colloquy.
-17-
Navy. Specifically, Matos-Quiñones says (and Ortiz-Feliciano joins
this argument): "had he fully understood that a jury would need to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill or at least
seriously injure the driver at the moment of seizing the vehicles,
there is a reasonable likelihood, based on this record, that he
would not have pled guilty."
We find this argument implausible on two grounds, even
though we assume the validity of its premise about the relevant
law. First, as we have already explained, there was abundant
evidence that the defendants were willing to cause death or, in
Matos-Quiñones's case, serious harm to the victim at the moment
they demanded control over the car. Given this evidence against
them, the defendants could not possibly have thought that the
theory they now propose could have resulted in their acquittal.
Second, despite the brutality of their crime against the victim,
the defendants had obtained a plea agreement that precluded a death
sentence. (Both defendants had been declared "death eligible," and
had each been appointed two attorneys qualified to represent
defendants in capital cases.) The defendants would have faced the
possibility of a death sentence if they had chosen to go to trial.
Of course, the defendants were entitled to risk a trial against
long odds. They were also entitled to risk that a jury would not
impose a death sentence. But there is nothing in the record to
suggest that they would have been willing to take those risks if
-18-
the district court had explained the charge differently.
Certainly, the defendants have not shown "a reasonable probability
that, but for the [alleged] error, [they] would not have entered"
their pleas. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 76.
B. Defendant Matos-Quiñones's Sentence
At his sentencing hearing, defendant Matos-Quiñones
objected to the government's argument that he should be assessed a
full share of responsibility for the victim's death. Although the
plea agreement allowed the government to make any sentencing
recommendation, Matos-Quiñones argued that the government's
argument was inconsistent with the government's stipulation that
Matos-Quiñones "was not the shooter of the victim and did not at
any time intend that the victim be killed." The government
countered that even after the plea agreement incorporating the
stipulation, it retained the right to argue that Matos-Quiñones was
fully culpable for his participation in the carjacking. The
district court reasoned that there was nothing in the plea
agreement and stipulation that required the government to surrender
its contention that Matos-Quiñones was fully liable for the
victim's death.
"[W]e hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to the
most meticulous standards of both promise and performance," United
States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Therefore, a defendant is entitled not
-19-
only to the government's "technical compliance" with its
stipulations but also to the "benefit of the bargain" struck in the
plea deal, United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1995),
and to the good faith of the prosecutor, United States v. Frazier,
340 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 2003). With these principles in mind, we
have reviewed carefully the plea agreement and the transcripts of
the change of plea and sentencing hearings. Finding no
inconsistency between the government’s stipulation and its
sentencing argument, we conclude that the government's conduct at
the sentencing afforded Matos-Quiñones the "benefit of the bargain"
he had negotiated before pleading guilty.
By stipulating as it did, the government waived any right
to refer to evidence that Matos-Quiñones had attempted to kill the
victim and intended his death. Conversely, the stipulation allowed
Matos-Quiñones to make an impassioned argument to the district
court that he was not equally responsible for the victim's death.
Although this argument would have been available in any event, it
was far more effective than it otherwise would have been because of
the stipulation. As the transcript shows, the argument won the
serious attention of the district court.
On the other hand, the plea agreement incorporating the
stipulation did not require the government to concede that Matos-
Quiñones was less than fully liable for the crime to which he had
pleaded guilty. First, the district court was correct in observing
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that nothing in the stipulation precluded Matos-Quiñones's full
liability for the charged crime. Second, the government's
agreement with Matos-Quiñones, like its agreement with Ortiz-
Feliciano, stipulated a guideline sentence level of 40 and
prohibited the defendant from arguing for a downward departure.
The guidelines specifically authorize a departure in cases where
one defendant sentenced under the murder guidelines is less
culpable than his co-defendants. See U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, application
note 1 (providing for a downward departure of as much as ten levels
when a defendant punishable under the first-degree murder guideline
is less than fully-culpable for the victim's death); U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1(c) (referencing § 2A1.1 for certain carjacking offenses).
That the agreement forbade Matos-Quiñones from arguing for a
downward departure on this ground emphasizes that the government
had not surrendered its right to argue that Matos-Quiñones could be
sentenced on the same terms as Ortiz-Feliciano.
In short, the stipulation allowed Matos-Quiñones to make
a more plausible argument that he should not be sentenced to the
same term as Ortiz-Feliciano. However, the plea agreement
incorporating the stipulation did not require the government to
concede this point, or to forego an argument to the contrary. The
fact that the stipulation did not help Matos-Quiñones avoid a life
sentence does not mean that the government delivered less than it
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had promised.
Affirmed.
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