United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-1774
ALAN NISSELSON, TRUSTEE OF THE DICTAPHONE
LITIGATION TRUST,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
JO LERNOUT ET AL.
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lipez and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Max Folkenflik and Regina Griffin, with whom Folkenflik &
McGerity, Brauner Baron Rosenzweig & Klein, Karen D. Hurvitz, and
Law Offices of Karen D. Hurvitz were on brief, for appellant.
George A. Zimmerman, with whom Matthew J. Matule and Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP were on brief, for appellee SG
Cowen and Company, LLC.
Janet B. Fierman, with whom Thomas W. Evans, Robert M. Cohen,
and Cohen & Fierman, LLP were on brief, for appellee Mercator
Assurances, S.A.
Robert J. Kaler, with whom Eric Neyman and Gadsby Hannah LLP
were on brief, for appellees Flanders Language Valley Fund et al.
Michael P. Carroll, with whom Michael S. Flynn, Sean C.
Knowles, Phineas E. Leahey, Davis Polk & Wardwell, Kevin J.
Lesinski, William J. Hanlon, Kristin G. McGurn, and Seyfarth Shaw
LLP were on brief, for appellee KPMG LLP.
Thomas J. Gallitano, Conn, Kavanagh, Rosenthal Peisch & Ford
LLP, John B. Missing, Ada Fernandez Johnson, and Debevoise &
Plimpton LLP on brief for appellee GIMV, N.V.
Michael J. Stone, Peabody & Arnold LLP, George A. Salter,
Nicholas W.C. Corson, and Hogan & Hartson LLP on brief for appellee
Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren.
Robert P. Trout, John Thorpe Richards, Jr. and Trout Cacheris,
PLLC on brief for appellee Lessius Management Consulting, N.V.
Andrew Good, Good & Cormier, Roger E. Zuckerman, Steven M.
Salky, P. Andrew Torrez, and Zuckerman Spaeder LLP on brief for
appellee Louis-H. Verbeke.
November 8, 2006
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to explore
an arcane corner of the world of corporate finance. In the
underlying series of events, a corporate shark, using fraudulent
means, induced an allegedly innocent target corporation to enter
into an ill-advised merger. After both the shark and the merged
entity drowned in red ink, plaintiff-appellant Alan Nisselson (the
trustee), appointed by the bankruptcy court to prosecute any causes
of action that the merged entity might possess, attempted to mount
various claims arising out of the innocent target's legal rights.
Those rights, of course, were twice removed from the damages that
formed the basis of the suit: they were passed along once to the
surviving corporation (at the time of the merger) and again to the
trustee (during the bankruptcy proceedings).
Emphasizing this genealogy, the district court dismissed
the action on two grounds; it determined that the trustee lacked
standing to pursue the claims and that, in all events, the rascality
of the shark was as a matter of law imputed to the surviving entity
in the merger (and that, therefore, the hoary in pari delicto
doctrine barred the suit). See Nisselson v. Lernout, No. 03-10843,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28655, at *20-21 (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2004).
Concluding, as we do, that the second of these determinations
withstands scrutiny — the trustee's claims are incurably tainted
because they derive from the itself-complicit surviving corporation
— we affirm the judgment below.
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I. BACKGROUND
We glean the pertinent facts from the amended complaint,
supplementing those facts as needed by documents fairly incorporated
therein and matters susceptible to judicial notice. See Centro
Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2005); In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 15-16
(1st Cir. 2003). While the scheme that lies at the center of this
case comprises a complex tale of sophisticated financial chicanery,
we rehearse here only those features essential to an understanding
of the present proceeding. We urge the reader who thirsts for
greater knowledge to consult the array of published opinions
emanating from related litigation. See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006); Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004); Bamberg v. SG Cowen,
236 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2002); Filler v. Lernout, 230 F. Supp.
2d 152 (D. Mass. 2002); In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 208 F.
Supp. 2d 74 (D. Mass. 2002).
By the time the new millennium dawned, Dictaphone
Corporation (Old Dictaphone), a company chartered under the laws of
Delaware, had established itself as a force in the healthcare speech
and language applications market. Lernout & Hauspie, N.V. (L&H), a
Belgian corporation that ran its United States operations from
headquarters in Massachusetts, was itself an international leader in
various speech and language sectors. In hopes of swallowing up its
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competitor, L&H began courting Old Dictaphone; it described in
glowing terms its financial stability and the profitable synergies
that a merger could generate. Negotiations ensued.
Not surprisingly, Old Dictaphone conducted extensive due
diligence investigations into L&H's fiscal health. During the course
of that review, L&H's senior officers, investment bankers, attorneys,
and auditors touted its financial prowess. Against this rose-colored
backdrop, Old Dictaphone agreed to a stock-for-stock merger. The
parties memorialized the terms in a merger agreement dated March 7,
2000.
The merger took place less than two months thereafter: L&H
acquired all the outstanding stock of Old Dictaphone in exchange for
approximately 9,400,000 shares of L&H common stock. Based on the
trading price of L&H stock at the time of the closing, the exchange
corresponded to a merger price of roughly $930,000,000.
As part and parcel of the transaction, Old Dictaphone
merged into Dark Acquisition Corp. (Dark), a wholly-owned subsidiary
of L&H created under Delaware law for the express purpose of
effectuating the merger. L&H's chief executive officer, defendant-
appellee Gaston Bastiaens, doubled in brass as Dark's chief executive
and lone director. He also signed the merger agreement on its
behalf.
Under the terms of the merger agreement, Dark inherited Old
Dictaphone's assets (including any existing legal claims) and assumed
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Old Dictaphone's liabilities. This arrangement corresponded to the
dictates of Delaware law. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 259(a). Dark
survived the merger and Old Dictaphone ceased to exist. Dark then
changed its name to Dictaphone Corporation (New Dictaphone).
The honeymoon was brief. Shortly after the merger had been
consummated, L&H announced that the financial picture it had painted
and displayed was not an accurate portrayal. As matters turned out,
nearly two-thirds of L&H's reported revenue from 1998 through mid-
2000 had been improperly recorded, so that an apparent $70,000,000
net profit for that period was in fact a net loss of a similar
magnitude. The price of L&H shares plummeted and, on November 29,
2000, L&H and New Dictaphone filed voluntary petitions for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
We fast-forward to New Dictaphone's approved plan of
reorganization. As part of that plan, the corporation conveyed its
interest in any claims arising out of the merger to the Dictaphone
Litigation Trust (the Trust). That assignment galvanized this suit:
acting on behalf of the Trust, the trustee filed a civil action in
federal district court seeking damages to compensate for the "loss
or diminution of [Old Dictaphone's] value as a going concern."
The trustee's amended complaint characterizes the gross
misstatments of earnings as the mainspring of a fraudulent scheme
designed to inflate the value of L&H's stock. As the trustee
envisions it, this scheme, which played out over a four-year period,
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was concocted and executed by the defendants in this case (who
include the officers, directors, investment bankers, attorneys, and
auditors of L&H, and divers entities related to them). The fallout
from it rendered worthless the consideration that Old Dictaphone and
its shareholders received (assumption of Old Dictaphone's debt and
shares of L&H stock).
In his amended complaint, the trustee asserts federal
securities and racketeering claims, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a);
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, as well as supplemental
state-law claims for fraud, unfair trade practices, negligent
misrepresentation, and conspiracy. The theory underlying each and
all of these initiatives is that L&H, through its senior management,
knowingly engaged in a scheme to classify research and development
expenditures as fictional revenue in order to inflate the value of
the company's stock. Then, knowing that they were selling a lie,
L&H's hierarchs flaunted the company's ever-increasing stock price
and used its apocryphal earnings to persuade Old Dictaphone and its
shareholders to enter into a stock-for-stock merger. L&H relied on
its investment bankers, attorneys, accountants, and related entities
to substantiate its false claims; those parties, the trustee
contends, knew that L&H was spinning a yarn, yet assisted it in
perpetrating the fraud.1
1
This suit comprised one of many filed in the wake of L&H's
revenue restatement. In one such related action, Stonington
Partners, Inc., which had owned ninety-six percent of Old
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Various defendants, led by SG Cowen (an investment banking
house), filed motions to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). All
of these motions argued, in relevant part, that the trustee lacked
standing and that his claims were barred under the in pari delicto
doctrine. Some of the motions advanced additional grounds for
dismissing particular claims. The trustee vigorously opposed the
motions.
In due course, the district court granted Cowen's motion
and dismissed the trustee's federal claims against Cowen with
prejudice. See Nisselson, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28655, at *20-21.
The court rested its decision on two alternative grounds. First, it
concluded that the in pari delicto doctrine barred the claims because
the trustee had inherited them from New Dictaphone, an entity itself
implicated in the alleged fraud. See id. at *12-15. Second,
interpreting and applying the Delaware standard for distinguishing
direct and derivative claims, it concluded that the trustee lacked
standing because the claims asserted belonged to Old Dictaphone's
former shareholders, not to Old Dictaphone itself. See id. at *15-20
(discussing, inter alia, Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Dictaphone prior to the merger, sued for damages allegedly incurred
when it traded its once-valuable interest for what ended up being
worthless paper.
For his part, the trustee has brought separate actions for
breach of fiduciary duty against Old Dictaphone's former directors
and controlling shareholders and for breach of contract and
negligence against the accountants and investment bankers who
counseled Old Dictaphone during the merger negotiations.
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Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004)). For the same reasons, the
court, in a series of subsequent orders, granted the other appellees'
motions to dismiss.2 This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
We review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal orders de novo, assuming
the truth of all well-pleaded facts contained in the operative
version of the complaint and indulging all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff's favor. See McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 266
(1st Cir. 2006). Facts distilled in that fashion may be augmented
by reference to (i) documents annexed to it or fairly incorporated
into it, and (ii) matters susceptible to judicial notice. See Centro
Medico del Turabo, 406 F.3d at 5; Rodi v. S. New Engl. Sch. of Law,
389 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2004). Where, as here, a district court
rests its decision on alternative grounds, an appellate court need
not explore both; if it determines that one such ground fully
supports the order of dismissal, the court may end its deliberations
at that point. See Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34,
41 n.7 (1st Cir. 1991).
This case presents an idiosyncratic procedural feature.
While most Rule 12(b)(6) motions are premised on a plaintiff's
putative failure to state an actionable claim, such a motion may
2
The lower court did not reach any of the additional arguments
proffered by the defendants, nor do we.
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sometimes be premised on the inevitable success of an affirmative
defense. See, e.g., In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers, 324 F.3d at 16;
Blackstone Realty v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 2001); Keene
Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815, 820 (1st Cir. 1948).
Dismissing a case under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of an affirmative
defense requires that "(i) the facts establishing the defense are
definitively ascertainable from the complaint and the other allowable
sources of information, and (ii) those facts suffice to establish the
affirmative defense with certitude." Rodi, 389 F.3d at 12.
A. Standing.
The district court characterized both the in pari delicto
doctrine and the absence of cognizable injury as evincing a lack of
standing. See Nisselson, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28655, at *12-13.
Part of this characterization is inapt: the in pari delicto doctrine
does not implicate a plaintiff's standing to sue but, rather,
constitutes an affirmative defense. See Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145, 1149-50 (11th Cir.
2006); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir. 2003); see also
Baena, 453 F.3d at 6 (noting that the doctrine is, on occasion,
"dubiously" referred to as implicating standing).
This does not mean, however, that we must grapple with the
district court's alternative "distinct injury" holding first. Even
though challenges to a plaintiff's standing are often considered
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threshold issues in federal cases, see, e.g., Pagán v. Calderón, 448
F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2006); Eulitt v. Me. Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d
344, 351 (1st Cir. 2004), such challenges must be addressed first
only if they call into question a federal court's Article III power
to hear the case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523
U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). The constitutional prerequisites for Article
III standing are satisfied so long as a plaintiff colorably alleges
an actual injury that is both traceable to the defendant's conduct
and redressable by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992); Ramírez v. Sánchez Ramos, 438
F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2006).
In this case, those prerequisites have been fulfilled. For
purposes of their motions to dismiss, the defendants wisely choose
not to contest the trustee's assertion that the conduct attributed
to them resulted in a redressable injury; instead, they posit that
the trustee is seeking to prosecute claims that, although cognizable
in a federal court, belong exclusively to Old Dictaphone's former
shareholders. The determination of who may maintain an otherwise
cognizable claim turns on a question of prudential standing, not one
of Article III standing. See Baena, 453 F.3d at 5; see also Ramírez,
438 F.3d at 98.
That frees our hands: Steel Co.'s ban on hypothetical
jurisdiction extends only to issues involving Article III
jurisdiction and, hence, Article III standing. There is no
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counterpart rule that demands the resolution of objections based on
prudential concerns before other issues can be adjudicated. See
Baena, 453 F.3d at 5; McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 127 (1st
Cir. 2005).
Mandatory rules aside, courts should not rush to rely on
hypothetical jurisdiction. See Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 23
(1st Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, one situation in which hypothetical
jurisdiction, if otherwise proper, may be invoked is when doing so
would avoid the need to sort out thorny jurisdictional tangles. See,
e.g., McBee, 417 F.3d at 127; Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Employees'
Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 1999). As we explain briefly,
just such a tangle exists here.
Although the decision in Tooley may have helped to clarify
the often elusive distinction between direct and derivative claims,
that distinction remains tenebrous. See Richard Montgomery
Donaldson, Mapping Delaware's Elusive Divide: Clarification and
Further Movement Toward a Merits-Based Analysis for Distinguishing
Derivative and Direct Claims in Agostino v. Hick and Tooley v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 389, 404
(2005) (listing the "determination of who suffered the harm — the
corporation or the shareholder(s)" as one of the potentially
confusing issues left open under Tooley). More to the point, it is
not immediately apparent how the Delaware court's newly announced
two-part test, 845 A.2d at 1033, should apply to the unique facts of
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this stock-for-stock merger. Because the record reflects a clear and
sufficient basis apart from standing for affirming the district
court's judgment, we bypass these uncharted waters.
B. The In Pari Delicto Doctrine.
In pari delicto is both an affirmative defense and an
equitable defense. Broadly speaking, the defense prohibits
plaintiffs from recovering damages resulting from their own
wrongdoing. See Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec.), 133 F. 3d 377,
380 (6th Cir. 1997). The label derives from the Latin phrase in pari
delicto potior est conditio possidentis, which admonishes that "[i]n
a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the condition of the [defending
party] is the better one." Black's Law Dictionary 791 (6th ed.
1990).
The doctrine is grounded on twin premises. The first is
that "courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes
among wrongdoers." Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,
472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985). The second is that "denying judicial
relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring
illegality." Id.
The in pari delicto defense has long been woven into the
fabric of federal law. See id. at 307 (discussing the doctrine's
historical development); see also Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922
F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1990); Duncan v. Me. Cent. R. Co., 113 F. 508,
509 (C.C.D. Me. 1902). It does not make a difference that some of
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the trustee's claims are premised on state law. Those claims invoke
the law of Massachusetts — and the Massachusetts courts, like the
federal courts, have warmly embraced the in pari delicto defense.
See, e.g., Council v. Cohen, 21 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Mass. 1939);
Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
As originally conceived, the in pari delicto doctrine
forged a defense of limited utility. Over time, however, courts
expanded the doctrine's sweep, deploying it as a basis for dismissing
suits whenever a plaintiff had played any role — no matter how modest
— in the harm-producing activity. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at
307. Deploring this overly commodious construction, the Supreme
Court later reined in the doctrine and returned it to its classic
contours. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 635 (1988); Bateman
Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310-11. This retrenchment, which governs here,
restricts the application of the in pari delicto doctrine to those
situations in which (i) the plaintiff, as compared to the defendant,
bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the wrong he
seeks to redress and (ii) preclusion of the suit would not interfere
with the purposes of the underlying law or otherwise contravene the
public interest. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 311 (discussing
the doctrine's application to federal securities laws); see also
Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1154. Recent Massachusetts case law mirrors
these refinements. See, e.g., Choquette, 836 N.E.2d at 332-33.
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While the application of this binary paradigm may vary
slightly depending on the nature of the particular claim asserted,
courts nonetheless speak of a single doctrine. This is because the
analysis ordinarily will be the same across a spectrum of different
causes of action. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F.
Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 345-46 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Coopers
& Lybrand, 322 F.3d at 160.
The court below adopted this one-size-fits-all approach in
addressing the in pari delicto defense; it neither distinguished
among the various counts nor differentiated between federal and state
law. The trustee has not objected to this approach, so he has waived
any argument either that a claim-by-claim analysis is obligatory or
that some material differences exist between applicable federal and
state law. See Domegan v. Fair, 859 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1988)
("It is too familiar to warrant string citation that we will not
consider arguments which could have been, but were not, advanced
below."). Consequently, we employ the same generic strain of the in
pari delicto doctrine throughout our review.
C. Establishing the Appropriate Benchmark.
To apply the requisite two-part paradigm in the
circumstances of this case, we must answer a threshold question: Who,
exactly, are the proper parties for the purpose of determining
relative blame? The trustee's answer to this query is
straightforward. Because his claims originate with Old Dictaphone,
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he asseverates that this indisputably innocent party is the relevant
entity for purposes of the comparison required by the binary in pari
delicto test. Since Old Dictaphone was the victim rather than a
perpetrator of the alleged fraud, the trustee's thesis runs, it bears
less responsibility than any of the defendants and, therefore, the
defendants fail to satisfy the first precondition for use of the in
pari delicto defense. On that basis, the trustee claims an
entitlement to recover for the injury that Old Dictaphone suffered
when it was duped into proceeding with the merger.
We assume, for argument's sake, that Old Dictaphone would
have been a proper party to sue for the asserted injury. See supra
Part II (A). Even so, the trustee's reasoning is flawed; his
analysis entirely overlooks that, pursuant to both the merger
agreement and the governing law, see Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 259(a),
upon the consummation of the merger Old Dictaphone vanished into thin
air and New Dictaphone inherited all of Old Dictaphone's choses in
action. Under the approved plan of reorganization incident to New
Dictaphone's bankruptcy, those litigation rights were passed along
once more — this time to the Trust (and, thus, to the trustee). See
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Because the lineage of the trustee's claims
passes directly through New Dictaphone, any right that the trustee
may have to assert those claims derives directly from New Dictaphone.
This chain of descent means that the trustee — despite his
protestations to the contrary — is not acting in the place and stead
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of Old Dictaphone but, rather, in the place and stead of New
Dictaphone.
This genealogy is important. Giving effect to it, the
trustee may assert only those claims that New Dictaphone could have
asserted prior to seeking the protection of the bankruptcy court.
See Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (In re Mediators, Inc.), 105 F.3d 822,
826 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541. After all, a trustee
in bankruptcy cannot and does not acquire rights or interests
superior to, or greater than, those possessed by the debtor. See
Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1150; 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 541.04 (15th ed.
2006) (noting that "nothing in section 541 [of the Bankruptcy Code,
defining property of the estate] can revest a debtor with property
lost prepetition" and describing property of the estate as including
"causes of action").
Given the line of descent delineated by operation of the
corporation and bankruptcy laws, we think that the in pari delicto
defense must be available to a defendant in an action by a bankruptcy
trustee whenever that defense would have been available in an action
by the debtor. See Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1152; see also Baena, 453
F.3d at 7 (assessing the debtor's culpability to determine whether
the in pari delicto doctrine barred a bankruptcy trustee's claims).
As a necessary corollary of that proposition, there is no "innocent
successor" exception available to a bankruptcy trustee in a case in
which the defendant successfully could have mounted an in pari
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delicto defense against the debtor. See R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at
356-57.
The explication of these principles suffices to answer the
threshold question here. Consistent with both precedent and
analytic rigor, we hold that New Dictaphone is the relevant
comparator vis-á-vis the defendants for the purpose of determining
the viability of the latter's in pari delicto defense. Old
Dictaphone's innocence is irrelevant to that inquiry.
D. Applying the Paradigm.
Having determined that New Dictaphone is the entity of
interest for purposes of the required comparison, we move to the
question of what actions can, at this stage of the proceedings, be
imputed to it (and, thus, to the trustee). See Baena, 453 F.3d at
7. In an effort to mount a preemptive strike, the trustee posits
that because all imputation inquiries entail fact-specific
determinations, an in pari delicto defense that relies on imputed
conduct cannot be adjudicated on a motion to dismiss. Although the
trustee's premise is partially correct — the extent to which
fraudulent conduct can be implied depends heavily on the specific
facts of a given case — he casts the net too wide.
The reporters are replete with examples of fact-dominated
questions, normally grist for the jury's mill, that may
appropriately be resolved by a motion filed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). See, e.g., Epstein v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 460 F.3d 183, 188
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(1st Cir. 2006); Rodi, 389 F.3d at 16. The key is whether the
factual scenario, as pleaded, is clear enough to permit peremptory
resolution of the dispositive issue. See Rodi, 389 F.3d at 16
(explaining that when the facts alleged in the complaint preclude
a finding in the plaintiff's favor on a particular claim or defense,
"a court may enter an order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)").
When a case hinges on imputation and the pleaded facts, construed
in the light most flattering to the resisting party, dictate
imputation, a court is free to decide that question on a motion to
dismiss. See, e.g., Baena, 453 F.3d at 8 (affirming dismissal on
in pari delicto grounds after imputing fraudulent conduct to debtor
corporation); Coopers & Lybrand, 322 F.3d at 164; (noting that the
court historically "has affirmed the dismissal of . . . claims on
the pleadings upon findings that in pari delicto had been
established in the complaints"); Terlecky, 133 F.3d at 380
(affirming dismissal when the debtor "admit[ted] in his complaint
that the debtor's own actions were instrumental in perpetrating the
fraud").
We look to state law to ascertain when wrongful conduct
should be imputed to a corporation. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
512 U.S. 79, 84 (1994); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Nickless (In re Advanced RISC Corp.), 324 B.R. 10, 14 (D. Mass.
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2005).3 Here, the case law leaves little doubt that Massachusetts
law governs the imputation calculus. See O'Melveny & Myers, 512
U.S. at 83-85 (emphasizing the importance of the substantive law of
the state in which the causes of action arose, rather than the law
of the state of incorporation, to determine imputation).
Under Massachusetts law, a parent and its wholly-owned
subsidiary are generally regarded as separate and distinct entities.
See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp.,
960 F.2d 1080, 1091 (1st Cir. 1992); Berger v. H.P. Hood, Inc., 624
N.E.2d 947, 950 (Mass. 1993). Courts may, however, disregard the
corporate form when doing so will defeat a fraud practiced by those
who control the subsidiary corporation. See My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Mass. 1968).
Relatedly, the fraudulent conduct of persons or entities who
exercise complete control over a corporation may be imputed to the
corporation when those actors have used the corporation as a vehicle
for facilitation of the fraud. See, e.g., Consove v. Cohen (In re
3
To the extent that the trustee's claims are premised on
federal statutes, we arguably have discretion to use federal common
law, as opposed to state law. See O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 84
(explaining that where a particular cause of action arises under a
federal statute, a federal court, for this purpose, writes on a
pristine page). Even so, license to apply a uniquely federal test
is not tantamount to mandating such a test. Mindful that two of
our sister circuits recently have opted for state-law tests of
imputation in connection with federal claims, see Edwards, 437 F.3d
at 1149; R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 358, and that no party to this
litigation has requested us to fashion federal common law, we use
Massachusetts jurisprudence as the yardstick for measuring
imputation across the board.
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Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 984 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying
Massachusetts law and imputing fraudulent conduct of individual who,
"as the company's president, director, and sole shareholder, . . .
was in a position to control the disposition of its property");
Merrill Lynch, 324 B.R. at 14-15 (applying Massachusetts law and
imputing principals' fraudulent conduct to debtor corporation where
the relationship was "one of complete control"); Demoulas v.
Demoulas, 703 N.E.2d 1149, 1171 (Mass. 1998) (applying Massachusetts
law and denying bona fide purchaser status to a corporation, under
an imputation theory, when the "sole voting trustee of 100 percent
of the [corporation's] stock" had actual knowledge of adverse claims
against the purchased property).
With this backdrop in place, the trustee's remaining
arguments against imputing L&H's fraudulent conduct to its wholly-
owned subsidiary lack force. The trustee himself has observed that
in pari delicto cases often result in imputation of fraudulent
conduct to a corporation when those responsible for the scheme are
"the sole decision-maker[s] for such entity, exercising complete
control over its management." Appellant's Br. at 43 n.21. This
observation accurately reflects the case law. See, e.g., Coopers
& Lybrand, 322 F.3d at 164-65 (imputing fraudulent conduct to debtor
when complaint established that its controlling shareholders
"dominat[ed] and controll[ed] the corporation" and were responsible
for "orchestrat[ing] the fraudulent conduct"); R.F. Lafferty, 267
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F.3d at 359-60 (imputing fraudulent conduct to debtor corporation
and dismissing trustee's case on in pari delicto grounds where the
individuals masterminding the fraud were the debtor's sole
shareholders); Merrill Lynch, 324 B.R. at 14-16 (dismissing
trustee's action on in pari delicto grounds when debtor corporation
was formed by the defrauders for the express purpose of carrying out
the fraudulent plan). Since New Dictaphone, not Old Dictaphone, is
the proper focal point of our imputation inquiry, see supra Part II
(C), this case fits snugly within that integument. We explain
briefly.
Here, the amended complaint leaves no doubt but that L&H
played the primary role in contriving the scheme to acquire Old
Dictaphone under false pretenses. The amended complaint also
establishes that L&H created New Dictaphone (née Dark) for the
express purpose of furthering this artifice. L&H's control over New
Dictaphone during the course of the scheme is indisputable. In
addition to owning all of New Dictaphone's stock, L&H installed its
president, Bastiaens, as New Dictaphone's chief executive officer
and sole director. Bastiaens, in turn, ensured New Dictaphone's
complicity in the fraud's climactic event when he executed the
merger agreement on its behalf.
These uncontroverted facts are telling. Because the
amended complaint shows beyond hope of contradiction that L&H
created and controlled New Dictaphone in order to perpetrate the
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harm-producing fraud, we have no principled choice but to impute its
conduct to New Dictaphone for the purpose of applying the in pari
delicto paradigm. See Merrill Lynch, 324 B.R. at 15; Demoulas, 703
N.E.2d at 1172; My Bread Baking, 233 N.E.2d at 751.
The trustee tries to find sanctuary by pointing out that,
after the merger, the directors of Old Dictaphone (presumably
innocent) became directors of New Dictaphone. This datum does not
alter our conclusion. The first prong of the in pari delicto
inquiry focuses on "the unlawful activity that is the subject of the
suit." Pinter, 486 U.S. at 636. Accordingly, a party's culpability
vel non must be based on its status at the time the alleged
illegality occurred. See Baena, 453 F.3d at 10 (finding no
Massachusetts case law supporting a theory that in pari delicto is
in any way modified when "prior management was at fault but the
claim [is] asserted on behalf of creditors or shareholders").
Here, of course, the fraud that underpins the trustee's
claims was complete at the moment the companies merged. Therefore,
any post-merger changes in New Dictaphone's corporate governance or
management are beside the point. Simply put, bankruptcy trustees
do not have access to an "innocent successor" exception as a way of
shielding themselves from the operation of an in pari delicto
defense. See R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 356-57; see also Baena, 453
F.3d at 10.
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The trustee's next attempt to elude the toils of the in
pari delicto doctrine involves the well-recognized adverse interest
exception. Generally, a wrongdoer's fraudulent acts will not be
imputed to a corporation when the wrongdoer is acting contrary to
the corporation's present interests. See, e.g., Baena, 453 F.3d at
8 (listing looting as a "classic example" of adverse conduct);
Sunrise Props., Inc. v. Bacon, Wilson, Ratner, Cohen, Salvage,
Fialky & Fitzgerald, P.C., 679 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Mass. 1997)
(concluding that "unauthorized acts [should] not [be] imputed to the
principal when the agent has acted fraudulently toward the
principal"). Endeavoring to squeeze within these narrow confines,
the trustee contends that L&H's scurrilous conduct is tantamount to
looting because L&H convinced Old Dictaphone to surrender its assets
for worthless paper.
This contention is ill-conceived, for the trustee's sights
are trained on the wrong entity. Accepting the allegations of the
amended complaint as true, L&H's actions were adverse to Old
Dictaphone and its shareholders — but they were not adverse to New
Dictaphone (a corporate shell which, in effect, was in league with
the defrauder and as a result received something for nothing).
Since we already have determined that New Dictaphone, not Old
Dictaphone, is the focal point of the imputation inquiry, see supra
Part II (C), the adverse interest exception does not apply.
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The trustee has yet another string to his bow. He argues
that even if New Dictaphone is the proper focal point of an in pari
delicto analysis, the adverse interest exception precludes us from
imputing L&H's fraud to its subsidiary because New Dictaphone was
"entirely indifferent" about whether Old Dictaphone received fair
value for its assets or whether L&H used skulduggery to effect the
acquisition. Appellant's Reply Br. at 19. We find this argument
unpersuasive. In our view, mere indifference is insufficient to
show adversity. The adverse interest exception applies only to
those whom the fraud has disadvantaged. See Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 282(1) (explaining that the exception attaches only when
an agent secretly acts adversely to his principal). In this
instance, the allegations of the amended complaint make manifest
that New Dictaphone benefitted from the fraud: it was the surviving
entity in a merger that netted it over $900,000,000. New
Dictaphone, as a beneficiary of L&H's chicanery at the time the
fraud was consummated,4 cannot rely on the adverse interest
exception to avoid imputation. After all, a party cannot accept the
avails of fraudulent conduct without also bearing responsibility for
4
Because the adverse interest exception turns on how the
alleged wrongdoing affected the immediate interests of the party
who seeks its shelter, New Dictaphone's subsequent implosion is of
no moment. See Baena, 453 F.3d at 7; accord Beck v. Deloitte &
Touche, Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 144 F.3d
732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying Florida law); Cenco Inc. v.
Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying
Illinois law).
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that conduct. See Tremont Trust Co. v. Noyes, 141 N.E. 93, 98
(Mass. 1923).
To summarize succinctly, L&H was the main player in the
alleged fraud and its parlous behavior must be imputed lock, stock,
and barrel to its offspring (New Dictaphone). It follows inexorably
that New Dictaphone, in contemplation of law, bears at least as much
responsibility for the asserted wrongdoing as any of the
defendants.5 Hence, the moving defendants have satisfied the first
requirement for establishing an in pari delicto defense.
We move next to the second requirement. As said, this
prong implicates public policy concerns. The trustee contends that
allowing the defendants to hide behind the in pari delicto doctrine
would frustrate the purpose of the securities laws because it would
allow participants in a fraudulent scheme to shield themselves from
liability. This contention is wide of the mark.
As we have pointed out, the trustee is not bringing claims
on behalf of an innocent target of the fraud but, rather, on behalf
5
As a fallback, the trustee suggests that the relevant
comparison entails matching New Dictaphone's culpability against
the culpability of L&H. That suggestion is faulty. When deciding
whether to recognize an in pari delicto defense, an inquiring court
must consider whether the party alleging injury (here, the trustee,
who stands in the shoes of New Dictaphone) bears substantially
equal (or greater) responsibility as the party or parties asserting
the defense (here, the defendants). See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S.
at 306 (emphasizing the relative culpability of the "[defending]
party" as compared to the plaintiff (alteration in original)). L&H
is not a defendant in this action.
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of a complicit party. Viewed in that light, the trustee's policy
concerns ring hollow.6 See Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1155 (finding
public policy exception inapplicable in analogous circumstances).
The trustee also asserts that withholding application of
the in pari delicto doctrine would promote the goal of
"discourag[ing] wrongdoers from engaging in future fraudulent
schemes and violations of the securities laws." Appellant's Br. at
38. That resupinate reasoning turns reality on its head. To permit
the trustee to proceed in these circumstances would be equivalent
to giving New Dictaphone a second bite at the cherry, allowing it
first to reap the benefits of the fraud and then to attack the
defrauders. The securities laws were enacted to protect investors
from deceptive practices, see Pinter, 486 U.S. at 638, not to give
the intended beneficiaries of deceptive practices a back-door means
of ensuring a profit.
Finally, the trustee strives to persuade us that we should
repel the defendants' in pari delicto defense because, in the
absence of that defense, the creditors of Old Dictaphone ultimately
would receive the fruits of any recovery. We find this argument
unconvincing; despite the interposition of the in pari delicto
6
In all events, dismissing the claims at issue here will not
allow the defendants to escape unscathed. The amended complaint
and matters susceptible to judicial notice reveal that many of the
defendants are facing or have faced not only criminal charges but
also a myriad of other civil suits relating to their respective
roles in the alleged fraud.
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defense, the creditors remain free to proceed in their own right,
untainted by New Dictaphone's role in the alleged wrongdoing. See
Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1151; Terlecky, 133 F.3d at 380; Merrill Lynch,
324 B.R. at 16.
This arrangement is especially preferable because the
Trust beneficiaries may well include parties (most notably L&H) who
were themselves complicit in the underlying fraud. If we were to
suspend the operation of the in pari delicto defense in this case,
creditors with unclean hands would profit equally with innocents.
If, however, each creditor must proceed by individual suit, the
righteous may recover while the tainted, unable to circumvent the
in pari delicto bar, will be hoist by their own petard.
At oral argument, the trustee insisted that the
alternative of direct suits by creditors is illusory because
creditors lack contractual privity with the investment bankers,
lawyers, and accountants who comprise the trustee's targets. Thus,
the argument runs, if we afford these targets the safe haven of an
in pari delicto doctrine, creditors will be completely foreclosed
from accessing those pockets that are deep enough to compensate them
at anything higher than pennies on the dollar.
This jeremiad is unavailing. Even assuming that the
trustee's premise is true — and we have some doubt about its
validity — the equities are not nearly so clear-cut. First, the
creditors (or the trustee, on their behalf) may well succeed in
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suits against Old Dictaphone's former directors, controlling
shareholder, and outside accounting professionals. See supra note
1. Second — and more important — our holding today breaks no new
ground. As such, the potential for default under these
circumstances is something about which creditors had notice —
something that should have been priced into their decisions to
extend credit. Equity does not require courts to provide a belt
when creditors had fair warning that they ought to have purchased
suspenders.
III. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we conclude that uncontroverted facts
sufficient to establish the in pari delicto defense are definitively
ascertainable from the amended complaint and other allowable sources
of information. These include L&H's creation of New Dictaphone for
the express purpose of effectuating the fraud-inspired merger and
its exercise of complete control over New Dictaphone until the fraud
was consummated. In these circumstances, L&H's conduct must be
imputed to New Dictaphone. Consequently, New Dictaphone shares the
culpability of the fraud's progenitor and, as such, bears as much
or more responsibility for the wrongdoing as any of the named
defendants. In the absence of any compelling public policy reason
to allow New Dictaphone to seek damages from those that assisted in
executing the fraudulent scheme — and the trustee has identified
none — the in pari delicto doctrine precludes New Dictaphone (and,
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hence, the trustee) from advancing the type of claims that are at
issue here.
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing the
trustee's amended complaint.
Affirmed.
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