Bogan v. City of Boston

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 06-2028

ALBERTHA BOGAN, individually and as Guardian and next Friend of
TYLA BOGAN, ERYN BOGAN and CHAD BOGAN,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

CITY OF BOSTON, BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, BOSTON FIRE
DEPARTMENT, CITY OF BOSTON INSPECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
MAYOR THOMAS M. MENINO, KEVIN JOYCE, LUIS ARJONA, JAMES HOLMES,
and REGINA HANSON, NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION of GROVE
HALL, and VIRGINIA MORRISON,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Marianne B. Bowler, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

Before

Lynch, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Nancy Sue Keller, with whom Harold Jacobi, III and Jacobi &
Associates, were on brief, for appellants.
Thomas R. Donahue, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom
Elizabeth L. Bostwick, Assistant Corporation Counsel, was on brief,
for appellees.

June 12, 2007
 HOWARD, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal by prevailing

parties in civil rights litigation against the City of Boston,

Massachusetts. The appellants have raised several claims of error,

the most important of which concerns circumstances under which a

rejected offer of judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68, will

cut off a prevailing party's entitlement to attorney's fees.

Albertha Bogan and her three children1 brought an action

against the City, Mayor Thomas Menino, Commissioner of Inspectional

Services Kevin Joyce, three Inspectional Services employees,2 the

Neighborhood Development Corporation of Grove Hall (NDC), and one

of its founding members, Virginia Morrison, claiming violations of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various torts under Massachusetts law. The

plaintiffs alleged that Inspectional Services employees illegally

inspected the Bogans' property in the Dorchester section of Boston,

at the behest of Mayor Menino, to force them to sell their property

in favor of an economic development project spearheaded by the NDC.

The defendants claimed that the inspection was ordered because the

property was being operated as an illegal rooming house and was in

disrepair.

The inspection took place in March 1999 and resulted in

the issuance of fifty building code violation citations and a

rooming house violation. As a result of the inspection, the City

1
Tyla Bogan, Eryn Bogan and Chad Bogan.
2
Luis Arjona, James Holmes, and Regina Hanson.

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ordered the Bogans to vacate the property and that it be condemned.

A few days after the inspection, the City filed a complaint in the

Massachusetts Housing Court to enforce the condemnation order. The

Bogans resisted the Housing Court complaint and also litigated the

validity of the code violation citations before the Massachusetts

Building Code Appeals Board. In June 1999, the Housing Court found

that the inspection of the Bogans' home was an illegal regulatory

search and vacated virtually all of the code violations.

Almost three years later, on March 22, 2002, the Bogans

filed the instant federal action, claiming damages as a result of

the defendants' inspection and post-inspection conduct. The

complaint stated claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as trespass,

conversion of real and personal property, invasion of privacy,

harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In due course, the City and individual defendants moved

for partial summary judgment. The district judge granted summary

judgment for the individual defendants on the § 1983 claim because

they were sued only in their official capacities and their presence

was not necessary since the City was sued directly. The judge also

granted summary judgment for the City on the tort claims on the

basis of sovereign immunity. The judge did, however, permit most

of the tort claims to proceed against Joyce and the other

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Inspectional Services employees.3 As for the state law claims

against Mayor Menino, the judge granted summary judgment on the

trespass, conversion, and invasion of privacy claims because the

Mayor was not present during the inspection, and on the intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim because there was no

evidence that the Mayor ordered the inspection to cause the Bogans

distress.4

On March 10, 2005, the City made the Bogans an offer of

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 for $50,000, which they rejected.

The district judge then ordered the bifurcation of the remaining

claims so that the § 1983 claims against the City and the tort

claims against Joyce would be tried first. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

42(b).

In September 2005, the parties agreed to try the case to

a jury before a magistrate judge. After an eight-day trial, the

jury found in favor of the Bogans on the § 1983 claim against the

City, but found in favor of Joyce on the tort claims. The jury

awarded the Bogans a total of $30,000 in damages.5 The defendants

3
The judge dismissed the harassment claim against all
defendants because harassment is not a recognized tort under
Massachusetts law.
4
The judge also granted summary judgment to the NDC and
Morrison because there was no evidence that they were involved in
any wrongdoing.
5
Albertha Bogan was awarded $15,000 and her children were
awarded $5,000 each.

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then moved to dismiss the remaining tort claims on the ground that

any damages award at a second trial would be duplicative because

the § 1983 award against the City compensated the Bogans for their

entire injury. The magistrate judge agreed and dismissed the

remaining claims.

Thereafter, the Bogans moved for an award of $113,311.50

in attorney's fees and $13,389.33 in costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The magistrate judge reduced the fee award to $13,264.87 and the

cost award to $3,694.84. The judge then entered a final judgment

ordering the City to pay the Bogans a total of $46,959.71. The

Bogans filed this appeal, raising a series of challenges to rulings

made during the pretrial and trial proceedings and to various

reductions made in their request for fees and costs.

The Bogans first claim that they were prejudiced by the

improper issuance of a protective order preventing them from

deposing Mayor Menino. The district judge granted the protective

order on the ground that the Bogans had failed to demonstrate that

the information they sought from the Mayor was unavailable from

other sources. The Bogans contend that they should have been

allowed to depose the Mayor because they uncovered evidence that

the Mayor directly ordered the inspection of their property. They

hypothesize that, if they had been permitted to depose the Mayor,

they may have learned that he ordered the search to intimidate them

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into selling their property to make way for the NDC-sponsored

project.

The district court is empowered by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)

to grant a protective order from discovery for "good cause shown."

Appellate review of such orders is limited. "We will intervene in

[discovery] matters only upon a clear showing of manifest

injustice, that is, where the lower court's discovery order was

plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice to the

aggrieved party." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., 95

F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1996).

The need for limited access to high government officials

through the discovery process is well established. In United

States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941), the Supreme Court

indicated that the practice of calling high ranking government

officials as witnesses should be discouraged. Relying on Morgan,

other courts have concluded that top executive department officials

should not, absent extraordinary circumstances, be called to

testify or deposed regarding their reasons for taking official

action. Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 766 F.2d 575,

586 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also In re United States (Holder), 197

F.3d 310, 313 (8th Cir. 1999); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th

Cir. 1995); In re United States (Kessler), 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th

Cir. 1993). This rule is based on the notion that "[h]igh ranking

government officials have greater duties and time constraints than

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other witnesses" and that, without appropriate limitations, such

officials will spend an inordinate amount of time tending to

pending litigation. Kessler, 985 F.2d at 512.

But this limitation is not absolute. Depositions of high

ranking officials may be permitted where the official has first-

hand knowledge related to the claim being litigated. See Baine v.

Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 332, 335 (M.D. Ala. 1991); Church of

Scientology of Boston v. IRS, 138 F.R.D. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 1990);

Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 96 F.R.D.

619, 621 (D.D.C. 1983). However, even in such cases, discovery is

permitted only where it is shown that other persons cannot provide

the necessary information. Holder, 197 F.3d at 314.

The parties agree that Mayor Menino is a high ranking

government official and therefore is not subject to being deposed

absent a demonstrated need. See Marisol v. Giuliani, 1998 WL

132810, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1998) (treating a mayor as a high

ranking government official for purposes of a motion for a

protective order from discovery). The question therefore is

whether the Bogans established sufficient need to warrant discovery

directly from the Mayor. The Bogans rely on evidence that

defendant Hanson, one of the Inspectional Services employees, wrote

a note on the day of the inspection to the effect that the Mayor's

office had received complaints from neighbors about the Bogans'

property and that the Mayor had ordered the inspection as a result.

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They also rely on the fact that the inspection was ordered on the

heels of their disclosing to the NDC that the property was being

used as a rooming house. The Bogans assert that these strands of

evidence support an inference that the Mayor ordered the inspection

on a tip from the NDC because of their shared goal to force the

Bogans from the property.

The Bogans' argument founders because they did not pursue

other sources to obtain relevant information before turning to the

Mayor. Hanson testified that she did not recall why she had

written that the Mayor had ordered the inspection, and Joyce

testified that he ordered the inspection without a directive from

the Mayor. Thus, the identity of the City official who ordered the

inspection and the reason for the inspection were disputed issues

of fact. The Bogans nevertheless failed to purse discovery from

other City employees who could have shed light on the Mayor's

involvement. In particular, the Bogans did not seek discovery from

any of the Mayor's aides. It is certainly likely that at least one

of these employees was involved and could have clarified the

Mayor's role. It was therefore incumbent on the Bogans to seek

information from these individuals before turning to the Mayor.

See Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying a

request for discovery of a high ranking government official because

"there are other avenues of discovery that plaintiffs may purse to

establish their theory"); Marisol A., 1998 WL 132810, at *4

-8-
(granting the mayor a protective order where relevant discovery

could be obtained from other city employees). Accordingly, the

district judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing a protective

order for Mayor Menino because the Bogans had not exhausted other

available avenues of discovery.

The Bogans also claim that, even on the record as it

existed without the additional discovery, summary judgment was

improvidently granted on the intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim against the Mayor.6 We review the grant of summary

judgment de novo, construing the record in favor of the nonmoving

party. See Wolinetz v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 44, 47

(1st Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriately granted where

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

The district judge granted summary judgment for the Mayor

on the ground that there was no evidence that the Mayor ordered the

inspection of the Bogans' property for the purpose of inflicting

emotional distress. We agree. The note written by Hanson was

sufficient to permit a factfinder to conclude that the Mayor

ordered the inspection. But there is no evidence that would permit

a finding that the Mayor did so to inflict emotional distress on

6
There is no developed argument concerning the grant of
summary judgment for the Mayor on the other intentional tort claims
or against Morrison and the NDC on any of the claims. Therefore,
any challenges to these rulings are waived. See United States v.
Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

-9-
the Bogans. See Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 937 (Mass. App.

Ct. 2004) (stating that to prevail on an infliction of emotional

distress claim, the plaintiff must establish "that the defendant

intended to inflict emotional distress, or knew or should have

known that emotional distress was the likely result of [the]

conduct"). The note itself stated that the Mayor ordered the

inspection because of neighbor complaints about the Bogans'

property. The Bogans contend that this reason was false and that

the Mayor ordered the inspection because he wanted to force them

from the property. This is mere conjecture. See Podiatrist Ass'n,

Inc. v. La Cruz De P.R., Inc., 332 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2003)

(stating that a claim based on "unsupported conjecture . . . cannot

withstand summary judgment"). The Bogans have not identified

evidence of the Mayor's desire to promote the proposed development

project by evicting the Bogans or even that the NDC and the Mayor

discussed the status of the Bogans' property. Indeed, there is

nothing in the record to suggest that the rationale articulated in

Hanson's note was pretext. On this record, the district judge

correctly found that Mayor Menino was entitled to summary judgment

on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

The Bogans next contest a series of rulings by the

magistrate judge excluding the admission of various pieces of

evidence at trial, but they have not filed a trial transcript. The

party asserting a claim of error maintains the burden of procuring

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the transcript where a transcript is necessary to decide the

claims. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); Feliciano-Hill v. Principi, 439

F.3d 18, 23 n.3 (1st Cir. 2006).7 Because the review of

evidentiary rulings are typically fact-intensive and an erroneous

evidentiary ruling does not require a new trial if harmless,

see Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855 (1st

Cir. 1998), the relevant transcripts are essential to meaningful

appellate review. Accordingly, "[c]hallenges to the admission of

evidence will not be considered by the Court of Appeals in the

absence of a record containing those portions of the transcript on

which the appellant relies." United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479,

1482 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted); see Loren v.

Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the Bogans

have not provided an adequate record to review their evidentiary

challenges, we decline to consider them. See Faigin v. Kelly, 184

F.3d 67, 87 (1st Cir. 1999).

Finally, the Bogans challenge the magistrate judge's

ruling that it was not necessary to try the tort claims against the

remaining Inspectional Services employees. They argue that

permitting a second trial on these tort claims could result in an

award of damages for injuries that they suffered post-inspection,

7
In the alternative, a party can submit an agreed statement of
the record or a statement of proceedings approved by the district
court. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(c) & (d). The Bogans pursued
neither of these avenues.

-11-
which they contend were not encompassed in the § 1983 award against

the City. According to the Bogans, they presented two theories of

§ 1983 liability against the City, one based on the Fourth

Amendment and the other based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The

Fourth Amendment claim, they say, was limited to damages arising

from the inspection itself, while the Fourteenth Amendment claim

encompassed damages arising from the City's post-inspection

conduct. The Bogans interpret the modest amount awarded on the §

1983 claim to mean that the jury compensated them for injuries

sustained during the inspection but not for post-inspection

damages.

"[T]he law abhors duplicative recoveries"; thus double

awards for the same injury are impermissible. Dopp v. HTP Corp.,

947 F.2d 506, 517 (1st Cir. 1991). Compensatory damages in § 1983

cases remedy only actual injuries caused by the violation, and the

level of damages is ordinarily determined according to common law

tort principles. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477

U.S. 299, 313 (1986); Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 567-

68 (1st Cir. 2003). Thus, "[i]f a [§ 1983] claim and a state claim

arise from the same operative facts, and seek identical relief, an

award of damages under both theories will constitute double

recovery." Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1459 (10th

Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted).

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 The magistrate judge concluded that the Bogans' trial

presentation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment theories was

identical -- encompassing both the City's inspection and post-

inspection conduct and seeking all damages incurred as a result.

Because the Bogans have not provided us with a trial transcript, we

have no basis to question the magistrate judge's view of the

evidence. We note, however, that this view is consistent with the

Bogans' statement at the pretrial conference that all of their

claims were based on the same underlying facts. And it is also

consistent with the Bogans' acceptance of a verdict form on the §

1983 claim that did not require the jury to distinguish between the

Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment theories of liability.

In these circumstances, the magistrate judge correctly ruled that

the jury awarded full compensation to the Bogans, and therefore a

subsequent trial on the remaining claims was unwarranted. See

Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 864 F.2d 734, 740-41 (11th Cir. 1989)

(holding that the district court properly refused to award damages

for state-law tort claims where the jury had awarded damages on §

1983 claims based on identical facts).

We now turn to the Bogans' challenges to the award of

fees and costs. We first summarize the magistrate judge's ruling

and then consider the Bogans' specific challenges.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee-shifting statute under

which the Bogans were awarded fees for prevailing on their § 1983

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claim, a trial court generally should employ the lodestar method to

calculate fees. Under this method, a court usually should begin

with the attorneys' contemporaneous billing records. Gay Officers

Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2001).

The court should then subtract hours that are duplicative,

unproductive or excessive and multiply the reasonable hours billed

by the prevailing attorney rate in the community. Id.; Lipsett v.

Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992). The resulting amount

constitutes the lodestar. After calculating the lodestar, the

court may then adjust the award further for any of several reasons,

including the quantum of success achieved in the litigation.

Coutin v. Young & Rubicam P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 337 n.3 (1st

Cir. 1997).

The magistrate judge employed this method in determining

the appropriate fee award. The judge made several reductions from

the reasonable hours expended on the litigation, including time

accrued prior to the preparation of the Bogans' federal complaint

in December 2001, and time spent on claims dismissed at summary

judgment that were severable from the successful § 1983 claim. The

judge also reduced the billing rate of one of the Bogans'

attorneys, Harold Jacobi, from $350 to $300. After accounting for

these reductions, the judge calculated a lodestar figure -- not

including fees incurred after the Bogans rejected the defendants'

Rule 68 offer of judgment, see infra, -- of $26,529.74. The judge

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then reduced this figure by fifty percent because much of the trial

focused on the unsuccessful claims against Joyce, and the ultimate

damage award on the § 1983 claim was modest. After all reductions,

the judge determined that an award of $13,264.87 in pre-offer fees

was reasonable.

The magistrate judge then considered the Bogans' request

for $13,389.33 in costs. As with the award of pre-offer attorney's

fees, the judge excluded costs incurred prior to the preparation of

the federal complaint and costs related to the unsuccessful

severable claims dismissed at summary judgment. The judge also cut

otherwise collectable research costs in half in the absence of

sufficient information to determine whether these costs were

incurred for research related to the successful claims. After

making these reductions, the judge calculated that the Bogans were

entitled to pre-offer costs of $3,694.84.

Having concluded that the Bogans were entitled to a total

award of $16,959.71 in pre-offer fees and costs, the magistrate

judge considered whether the Bogans were entitled to recover post-

offer fees and costs. The judge observed that, under Rule 68, a

prevailing party may not receive fees and costs incurred after

receiving an offer of judgment, if the judgment finally obtained is

worth less than the offer. The judge further observed that, to

determine the size of the judgment finally obtained, the court must

add the jury verdict to the amount of pre-offer fees and costs

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awarded. Because the jury verdict of $30,000 plus the pre-offer

fees and costs award of $16,959.71 was less than the City's $50,000

offer of judgment, the judge determined that the Bogans were not

entitled to an award of post-offer fees and costs.

A fee award will be upheld unless it constitutes a

"manifest abuse of discretion." See Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d

1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 2002). The trial court has "extremely broad"

discretion in fashioning a fee award. Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 937.

"Because this is so, and because the determination of the extent of

a reasonable fee necessarily involves a series of judgment calls,

an appellate court is far more likely to defer to the trial court

in reviewing fee computations than in many other situations." Id.

The Bogans first claim that the magistrate judge abused

her discretion by excluding all fees incurred prior to the

preparation of their federal complaint in December 2001. From

March 1999 through December 2001, the Bogans' counsel litigated the

City's conduct in the Massachusetts Housing Court and before the

Massachusetts Building Code Appeals Board. The Bogans contend that

the time spent litigating before these state tribunals was

recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because the state proceedings

permitted the Bogans to mitigate the damages available to them in

their subsequent § 1983 action.

Section 1988 provides that attorney's fees may be

awarded "in any action or proceeding to enforce provisions of §

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1983." However, fees incurred in proceedings prior to the

preparation of the § 1983 complaint are not recoverable, unless the

pre-preparation time was "both useful and of a type ordinarily

necessary to advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it

reached." Webb v. Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). Under

this standard, fees incurred in ancillary state proceedings that

are necessary to pursue a federal civil rights action are

recoverable, e.g., N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54,

71 (1980); Exeter-West Greenwich Reg. Sch. Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788

F.2d 47, 51 (1st Cir. 1986), while fees incurred during proceedings

that are unnecessary for bringing the federal action are not,

Webb, 471 U.S. at 241.8

The Bogans were not required to pursue remedies in the

Massachusetts Housing Court or before the Massachusetts Building

Code Appeals Board to proceed against the City under § 1983.

Section 1983 contains no exhaustion requirement, and thus the

Bogans' federal claim ripened immediately following the City's

8
Sometimes a court may grant a partial award for work done
during an ancillary proceeding where a discrete portion of the work
was both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the
§ 1983 claim. E.g., Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459,
474 (3d Cir. 1992) (allowing fees where product of discovery in
ancillary proceeding was later used in federal action). The Bogans
have not attempted to identify a discrete portion of fees incurred
during the ancillary proceedings that were useful and necessary to
the § 1983 action. Rather, they seek an award of all fees incurred
during the ancillary proceedings. See Webb, 471 U.S. at 241
(denying the award of all fees incurred during pre-suit
administrative proceeding where the plaintiff argued only that all
time spent should be included in the § 1988 award).

-17-
wrongful conduct. See Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496

1982). The results obtained by the Bogans in these state

proceedings may have reduced their actual damages, thereby

mitigating the damages available to them in the subsequent § 1983

action. See Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115, 1119 (6th

Cir. 1994) (stating that a plaintiff has a duty under § 1983 to

mitigate damages). But commencing these proceedings was not

necessary to bringing their § 1983 claim. If ancillary state

proceedings brought to mitigate damages in an eventual § 1983 suit

were sufficient to bring all fees incurred in those proceedings

within the ambit of § 1988, the limitation established by Webb

would be virtually meaningless. After all, most ancillary

proceedings to obtain relief from the alleged wrong underlying a §

1983 suit will, if successful, mitigate the damages flowing from

that wrong.

Indeed, Webb itself involved a situation where the

ancillary proceeding could have mitigated the damages available to

the plaintiff in his subsequent § 1983 action. The Webb plaintiff

was terminated from his position as a school teacher and claimed

that the dismissal was racially motivated. 471 U.S. at 236. The

plaintiff pursued administrative remedies before the local school

board prior to commencing a § 1983 action in federal court. Id. at

236-37. If the plaintiff had been successful in obtaining relief

through the administrative proceeding, his actual damages from the

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termination would have been reduced. The Court nevertheless held

that the fees incurred during the administrative proceeding could

not be recovered under § 1988. Id. at 240. The same rationale

governs here.

The Bogans' second challenge to the fee award concerns

the exclusion of time spent litigating claims dismissed at summary

judgment which the magistrate judge determined were severable from

the § 1983 claim. The Bogans assert that this severability

conclusion was an abuse of discretion because all claims arose from

the same core of operative facts.

"[W]ork on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have

been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved . . . and

therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful

claim." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). This

rationale for discounting hours spent on unsuccessful claims does

not apply, however, where both the successful and unsuccessful

claims arose from the same common core of facts or were based on

related legal theories. Id. This is so because "[m]uch of

counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a

whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-

by-claim basis." Id. Thus, fees are appropriately excluded from

the lodestar only "when different claims for relief are not

interconnected, that is, when the claims rest on different facts

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and legal theories." Figueroa-Torres v. Toledo-Davila, 232 F.3d

270, 278 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Coutin, 124 F.3d at 339).

The magistrate judge excluded time spent on the claims

against the Mayor, the NDC, and Morrison premised on the theory

that these defendants acted in concert to intimidate the Bogans by

orchestrating the inspection to force them from the property. The

salient facts underlying these claims related to the pre-inspection

motives and conduct of these actors. In contrast, the award

against the City was premised on inspection and post-inspection

conduct. Thus, the unsuccessful claims excluded from the lodestar

were predicated on facts different from those underlying the

meritorious claim, and the magistrate judge did not abuse her

discretion in excluding time spent on these unsuccessful claims.9

See Figuero-Torres, 232 F.3d at 278-79 (holding that fees incurred

in litigating dismissed claims against a supervisor, who was not at

scene of arrest, were severable from fees incurred litigating

successful claim against the arresting officers).

The Bogans' final challenge to the lodestar calculation

concerns the reduction of Jacobi's billing rate from $350 to $300.

A "district court . . . is not bound by the hourly rate requested

by the victor's counsel." Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group,

Inc., 984 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1993). A court may reduce an

9
The Bogans have not claimed that any particular time entry
was incorrectly identified as related to one of the severable,
unsuccessful claims.

-20-
attorney's hourly rate based on the type of work that attorney

performed during the litigation. See Miles v. Sampson, 675 F.2d 5,

9 (1st Cir. 1982). In this regard, we have affirmed a reduction in

the billable rate of an attorney because the attorney, even though

a "partner," assumed "the role of an associate" at the trial by

performing less complex tasks. O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235

F.3d 713, 737 (1st Cir. 2001). The magistrate judge reduced

Jacobi's fee rate for similar reasons. Even though the Bogans

established that a rate of $350 per hour was generally appropriate

for an attorney at Jacobi's experience level, the magistrate judge

concluded that a $50 reduction was appropriate because Jacobi had

"limited involvement" in the case and "was not present at any time

during the eight day trial." We have no basis for upsetting this

assessment of Jacobi's participation nor for questioning the

resulting modest reduction in his billing rate.

In addition to challenging the lodestar calculation, the

Bogans object to the additional fifty percent reduction of the fee

award based on their limited success at trial. They assert that

the reduction for a lack of success was predicated on the same

failed claims that the magistrate judge excluded from the lodestar,

and therefore the magistrate judge impermissibly double counted the

time spent on these failed claims.

This argument misunderstands the basis for the further

reduction. This reduction was not, as the Bogans posit, to account

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for the lack of success on the severable claims that were dismissed

at summary judgment. The reduction was made to account for the

time spent on the failed common law claims against Joyce, which

were interconnected with the § 1983 claim (and therefore not

excluded from the lodestar) and to reflect the relatively meager

size of the jury verdict on the § 1983 claim. Consequently, the

Bogans' argument that the magistrate judge twice reduced the fee

award based on the severable claims that were dismissed at summary

judgment is without merit.

This leaves the Bogans' more general claim that, aside

from double counting, the fifty percent additional reduction was

excessive. The Supreme Court has held that a reduction of a fee

award beyond the lodestar may be appropriate where the plaintiff is

unsuccessful on interrelated claims and ultimately obtains only

limited success. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436; Andrade v.

Jamestown Hous. Auth., 82 F.3d 1179, 1191 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding

that where "multiple claims are interrelated and a plaintiff has

achieved only limited success . . . a court may . . . simply reduce

the award to account for the limited success"). A trial court's

determination to reduce a fee award to account for the plaintiff's

limited success is entitled to "great deference." Diaz-Rivera v.

Rivera-Rodriguez, 377 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir. 2004).

Much of our focus in reviewing a fee award is on assuring

that the trial court provides an adequate explanation for its

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actions. See Wennik v. Polygram Group Dist., Inc., 304 F.3d 123,

134 (1st Cir. 2002); Coutin, 124 F.3d at 337. Especially where, as

here, a fee award is substantially reduced, the trial court is

expected to provide a detailed explanation for its action. See

Rodriguez-Hernandez, 132 F.3d at 858. The magistrate judge

fulfilled this obligation; her careful order delineated in detail

the reasons for the fifty percent reduction.10 Even were we

inclined to be more generous "if writing on a pristine page," Diaz-

Rivera, 377 F.3d at 127, the Bogans have not demonstrated an abuse

of discretion in ordering a fifty percent reduction.11

10
We reject the Bogans' argument that the magistrate judge did
not adequately consider the societal importance of this litigation
in making the fifty-percent reduction. The Bogans contend that
this litigation resulted in a change in official policy, but the
record shows that this change took place before the federal action
even commenced.

11
The Bogans also raise three challenges to the reduction in
their request for costs, which we deal with summarily. First, they
claim that costs incurred in the taking of a deposition of a trial
witness, prior to the preparation of their federal complaint, was
improperly excluded because the witness provided testimony at trial
that was relevant to the § 1983 claim. Without a trial transcript,
we cannot ascertain the subject of the witness' testimony and
therefore cannot disturb the exclusion. Second, they contest the
exclusion of costs related to the severable, unsuccessful claims
dismissed at summary judgment. For the reasons stated above
concerning the exclusion of fees, there was also no abuse of
discretion in excluding these costs. Finally, they assert that it
was an abuse of discretion to reduce research costs by fifty
percent. We have reviewed the billing submissions and conclude
that there was no abuse of discretion in reducing these costs
because the bills do not indicate whether the costs were incurred
on research related to the successful claims. See Parker v. Town
of Swansea, 310 F. Supp. 2d 376, 400 (D. Mass. 2004).

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 The Bogans' last challenge to the award of fees and costs

concerns the denial of all fees and costs incurred after the City

made its Rule 68 offer of judgment. The parties correctly agree

that, under Rule 68, a prevailing party is not permitted to recover

fees or costs incurred after an offer of judgment, where the

judgment finally obtained is less than the offer. City of

Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 (1986). They disagree,

however, over the method for calculating the size of the judgment

finally obtained. The Bogans contend that the judgment finally

obtained includes the actual amount awarded by the jury ($30,000)

and the amount of pre-offer attorney's fees and costs that they

requested ($63,431.69). The City counters that the judgment

finally obtained includes only the jury award and the pre-offer

fees and costs actually awarded by the court ($16,959.71).

The cases support the City's position. Rule 68 provides,

in relevant part, that a party defending against a claim may make

an offer of judgment, which includes "costs then accrued." If the

offer of judgment is rejected and "the judgment finally obtained"

is less favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay costs

incurred after the making of the offer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. The

"judgment finally obtained" under Rule 68 includes the damage award

plus pre-offer fees and costs actually awarded. See Scheeler v.

Crane Co., 21 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 1994); Marryshow v. Flynn,

986 F.2d 689, 692 (4th Cir. 1993); Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d

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944, 948 (7th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Circuit has cogently

explained the rationale for this rule:

Rule 68 requires that a comparison be made
between an offer of judgment that includes
'costs then accrued' and the 'judgment finally
obtained'. . . . To make a proper comparison
between the offer of judgment and the judgment
obtained when determining, for Rule 68
purposes, which is the more favorable, like
'judgments' must be evaluated. Because the
offer includes costs then accrued, to determine
whether the judgment obtained is more
favorable . . . the judgment must be defined on
the same basis -- verdict plus
costs incurred as of the time of the offer of
judgment.

Marryshow, 986 F.2d at 692.

The Bogans' argument for crediting their request for pre-

offer fees and costs, instead of the amount actually awarded by the

court, is illogical. If this were the rule, a prevailing party

could always evade the Rule 68 bar simply by asking for a

sufficiently large fee award so that the judgment finally obtained

exceeds the offer. Not surprisingly, there is no caselaw to this

effect. See Scheeler, 21 F.3d at 793 (concluding that amount of

pre-offer fees and costs credited as part of the "judgment finally

obtained" included the reasonable fees and costs awarded by the

court); Marryshow, 986 F.2d at 692 (same). We therefore conclude

that, because the jury award plus the reasonable award of pre-offer

fees and costs did not exceed the offer of judgment, the magistrate

judge properly declined to award the Bogans post-offer fees and

costs.

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 The Bogans challenged nearly all adverse aspects of this

litigation, but, for the reasons discussed, their challenges lack

merit. This litigation was ably managed by the district judge and

the magistrate judge, from beginning to end.

Affirmed. Costs are awarded to appellees.

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