United States v. Jimenez

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 06-2044

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOSE JIMENEZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges,

and Delgado-Colón,* District Judge.

Jeffrey L. Baler for appellant.
B. Stephanie Siegmann, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on
brief, for appellee.

October 31, 2007

*
Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
 HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Jose Jimenez was convicted of

misappropriating the identities of two people long dead. He raises

two challenges, one relating to all the charges and the other only

to the two counts of aggravated identity theft. First, Jimenez

argues that certain evidence admitted at trial should have been

excluded for want of relevance or because it was unduly

prejudicial. Second, he claims that "person" in the statute

defining aggravated identity theft refers only to the living. In

the alternative, he argues that the statute is sufficiently

ambiguous to require reversal under the rule of lenity. We affirm.

I. Facts

In January, 2005, Jose Jimenez was stopped pursuant to a

warrant by Springfield, Massachusetts police. He identified

himself as Barry Abraham and provided a driver's license with that

name on it. Subsequent searches revealed many documents in the

name Barry Abraham, including a United States passport and Social

Security card, a tax return, a credit card statement, and bank

records. Mixed in with the correspondence addressed to Barry

Abraham were Verizon telephone bills addressed to David Davison,

although the real Davison was long deceased. The searches also

revealed the birth and death certificates of Michael Ian Figueroa,

who died in 1978, and a document from 2002 certifying a change of

name from Michael Ian Figueroa to Barry Abraham. The death

certificate of an unrelated Jared Figueroa was also found, as well

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as official responses to requests for his birth certificate.

Investigators discovered the high school and college transcripts of

many other individuals as well as handwritten lists of names and

biographical data, including the names and information of Davison

and Jared Figueroa. Another page of handwritten notes concerned

credit reporting agencies and the Orange County, California Clerk's

office, and on the reverse of this sheet were Michael Ian

Figueroa's name and Social Security number. Finally, a computer

disk seized during one search contained electronic documents

entitled "The Anarchist Cookbook 2000," "Ebay secrets/internet spy

toolkit," and "confidential info on anyone and credit." These

electronic documents detailed how to establish a false identity,

how to search the Social Security death database, and related

topics.

Jimenez was tried on nine counts relating to the

acquisition and use of the identities of Michael Ian Figueroa and

David Davison.1 He moved in limine to exclude evidence that did

1
Count One, under 18 U.S.C. § 1542, Passport Fraud, related to
false statements made on his passport application in the name of
Barry Abraham. Four of the five counts of Social Security Fraud,
18 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(b), arose from the use of Michael Ian
Figueroa's Social Security number on various applications; the
remaining count stemmed from the use of David Davison's Social
Security number to initiate telephone service with Verizon; these
counts were numbered Two through Six. Count Seven, Furnishing
False Information to Social Security Administration, 42 U.S.C. §
408(a)(6), concerned the application for a Social Security card in
the name Barry Abraham, seeking a card with that name and Michael
Ian Figueroa's Social Security number. Finally, Counts Eight and
Nine, the two counts of aggravated identity theft, took as

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not directly relate to the specific identities at issue, including

the high school transcripts, the lists of other names with

biographical data, and the electronic documents. He claimed both

that the evidence was not relevant and that prejudicial impact upon

the jury outweighed any probative value. The district court

admitted the evidence but restricted the use of the "Anarchist

Cookbook," preventing use of the title of the document and allowing

use only of the section entitled "How to Create a New Identity."

Jimenez was convicted by the jury on all nine counts.

II. The motion in limine

Jimenez makes three arguments relating to the following

five kinds of evidence: (i) documents on the computer disk; (ii)

handwritten lists of others' biographical data (names, Social

Security numbers, dates and places of birth and death); (iii) high

school and college transcripts; (iv) the death certificate, and

denials of requests for the birth certificate, of Jared Figueroa;

and (v) the handwritten sheet with information about the Orange

County Clerk's office and various credit reporting agencies.

First, he contends that such evidence should have been excluded

because it is irrelevant. Second, he claims that even if relevant,

the evidence should have been excluded because it is mere character

evidence with no "special probative value." Last, he claims that

predicate offenses the other seven counts.

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the evidence, even if otherwise admissible, should have been

excluded because it is too prejudicial. We disagree.

We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Turner, 2007 U.S. App LEXIS 20981, at *26 (1st

Cir. Aug. 31, 2007); United States v. Perez-Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 39,

47 (1st Cir. 2006). The district court made no written resolution

of the motion in limine, and at trial the treatment of the

objection was cursory. But defense counsel did raise the objection

and therefore is not relying solely on the motion in limine. See

United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 105 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]o

raise and preserve for review the claim of improperly constructing

the Rule 403 balance, a party must obtain the order admitting or

excluding the controversial evidence in the actual setting of the

trial.").

Jimenez first challenges the admission of the evidence on

the ground that it is not relevant. "Evidence which is not relevant

is not admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 402. "Relevant evidence means

evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that

is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable

or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R.

Evid. 401. We reject Jimenez's argument that none of this evidence

relates to any element of any of the charges brought.

In our view, the evidence supports the goverment's claim

that Jimenez was engaged in an effort to misappropriate identities,

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and that the specific acts he is charged with were the culmination

of that effort. The electronic documents show how he learned how

to commit the offenses. The fact, adduced at trial, that Jimenez's

modus operandi very closely mirrored that set forth in "How to

Create a New Identity" is directly relevant to this theory. The

handwritten lists of biographical information likewise present

evidence of a person in the process of committing identity theft.

The piles of high school and college transcripts, the information

and documents concerning Jared Figueroa, and the information about

credit reporting agencies and the Orange County Clerk's office all

flesh out the jury's sense of the crime, not just the man. They

therefore meet the initial threshold of relevance under Rule 401.

Jimenez also argues that, even if relevant, the evidence

is inadmissible under Rule 404. That rule excludes evidence of

prior "bad acts" when it is offered merely to prove the defendant's

character.2 Such evidence is admissible, however, to show

"preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We have interpreted Rule 404(b)

to require some "special relevance," that is, a "purpose other than

solely to prove that the defendant had a propensity to commit the

crime in question." United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 58 F.3d 796,

798 (1st Cir. 1995). With this as our guide we examine the evidence

2
Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith.").

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for "at least one permissible inference." United States v. Nickens,

955 F.2d 112, 125 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.

Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 1990)). The showing of

special relevance is not particularly demanding. In another

identity theft case, we held there was no abuse of discretion in

admitting evidence that the defendant was a resident in a federal

halfway house (and therefore necessarily a former inmate of a

federal prison), because the halfway house was convenient to the

ATMs used in the scheme, and this had special relevance to the

defendant's "opportunity" to commit the crime. United States v.

Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 47 (1st Cir. 2001).

Here, the evidence shows preparation and plan.3 The

handwritten lists demonstrate preparation for the act of misusing

the Social Security number of the late Mr. Davison in order to

obtain telephone service. Likewise, the handwritten information

3
The government urges us to consider some of this evidence as
relevant to the knowledge component of the crimes. In this case,
the jury was given specific instruction that it had to find that
Jimenez knew the means of identification belonged to an actual
person, living or dead. Therefore the government did have to
introduce evidence to prove it. We note, without comment, that
other courts have generally construed the knowledge requirement of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A to extend only to knowledge that one lacks the
lawful authority to use a means of identification, and not to
require knowledge that the means of identification belongs to
another. United States v. Hines, 472 F.3d 1038, 1039 (8th Cir.
2007); United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 366; United States v. Godin, 489 F. Supp.
2d 118, 120 (D. Me. 2007). But see United States v. Beachem, 399
F. Supp. 2d. 1156, 1158 (W.D. Wa. 2005) (requiring knowledge that
the means of identification used belonged to another person).

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regarding the Orange County Clerk's office tends to prove or

disprove specific steps Jimenez took to obtain information about

David Davison, whose death certificate was processed in Orange

County. Before using another's Social Security number, of course,

one must obtain it; the jury might reasonably think these were

illustrative of research and preparation. The computer documents

explain how to establish a new identity, likewise demonstrating

Jimenez planning and preparing to misuse identities. The documents

regarding Jared Figueroa's vital statistics show the jury how

Jimenez went about creating the false identities he was charged with

misusing; Jared Figueroa's information also appears on the

handwritten lists, strengthening the inference that all of this was

part of Jimenez's planning and preparation. Thus, even taking the

evidence as extrinsic to the offenses charged, we hold it was not

an abuse of discretion to admit it under Rule 404(b).

The government argues in this appeal that the handwritten

lists and the computer documents were intrinsic to the offense, part

and parcel of the crimes charged, or else tools of the trade of

identity thieves. Because we hold that the district court did not

abuse its discretion even if it admitted this as extrinsic evidence

under Rule 404(b), we need not, and do not, decide this issue.

Finally, Jimenez claims that the district court abused

its discretion in admitting the evidence because the danger of

unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value. See

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Fed. R. Evid. 403 ("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

. . . ."). We have long noted that all relevant evidence is in some

sense prejudicial because it leads the jury to find a material fact

more or less likely. See United States v. Pinillos-Prieto, 419 F.3d

61, 72 (1st Cir. 2005) ("'Virtually all evidence is prejudicial .

. . but it is only unfair prejudice against which the law

protects.'" (quoting United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 8 (1st

Cir. 1997))). For that reason the Rule 403 analysis is confined to

"unfair" prejudice, and the scales do not tip in favor of exclusion

unless the probative value is "substantially outweighed."

Evidence of past crimes or other bad acts carries an

especially strong risk of unfair prejudice, but here the district

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.4

While the evidence complained of might lead a jury to believe that

Jimenez was embarked on a systematic program to identify and exploit

the identities of others, this is not unfair prejudice. Indeed,

this evidence engages the critical faculties of the jury -- rather

than circumventing them -- by focusing attention on the way such

crimes are committed and by showing the government's theory of how

Jimenez approached such a task. Moreover, we are particularly

4
The court below showed, rather, sensitivity to the possibility of
unfair prejudice when it excluded references to the title of the
"Anarchist Cookbook 2000," and when it prohibited references to
other potentially inflammatory aspects of the case.

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reluctant to overturn a trial judge's Rule 403 determination. See

United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[O]nly

rarely -- and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances -- will

we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district

court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of

probative value and unfair effect." (internal quotation and citation

omitted)). Here the district court had the benefit of both

reflection and immediate response: It not only weighed the motion

in limine in the abstract before trial, but also made the final

determination in the midst of trial with all the benefit of

immediate experience of the trial as it unfolded. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence, even

when it is considered as extrinsic to the crimes charged.

III. Aggravated Identity Theft

Jimenez argues that he cannot be guilty of the two counts

of aggravated identity theft because the word "person" in the

definition of that offense excludes the deceased.5 The district

5
Jimenez was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1):

In general. Whoever, during and in relation to
any felony violation enumerated in subsection
(c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses,
without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such
felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of 2 years.
Section (c) lists, inter alia, passport offenses, see 18 U.S.C. §
1028A(c)(7), and false statements relating to programs under the
Social Security Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 1028(c)(11).

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court issued a Memorandum and Order denying a motion to dismiss on

this ground. The issue was preserved in an objection to the jury

instruction that explicitly defined "person" as "living or

deceased," as well as in a motion for a directed verdict. We review

matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Turner, 2007 U.S. App.

LEXIS, at *12; United States v. Frechette, 456 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.

2006).

"When interpreting a statute, we begin with its text."

United States v. Brown, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20061, at *24 (1st Cir.

Aug. 22, 2007) (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813,

818, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 143 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1999); Plumley v. S.

Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 2002)). Here, we first

consider the single word Jimenez questions. Certain definitions of

"person" do include only living persons. See American Heritage

Dictionary 1310 (4th Ed. 2000) (giving, as primary definition of

"person," "a living human"); 11 Oxford English Dictionary 597 (2d

ed. 1989) ("person" in the sense of the physical body of a living

human being). But others make no mention of the distinction. See,

e.g., Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 865 (10th ed. 2001)

(primary definition: "human, individual"); Webster's New Third

International Unabridged 1686 (1993) (primary definition: "an

individual human being"). Indeed, the word's meaning largely

depends on context -- person as distinguished from animal, person

as distinguished from mind or soul, person as distinguished from

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corpse. Some legal definitions of person include corporations and

similar business entities. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1. "As often

happens under close scrutiny, the plain text is not so plain."

United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2005) (en

banc). The word "person" in isolation admits of more than one

meaning.

When the plain meaning of a word is not clear, we

consider surrounding language and the statute's structure.

Aggravated identity theft has two variations, defined in consecutive

sections. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) & (2). The first ensnared

Jimenez and is set forth above. The second relates specifically to

terrorism and applies to those who " . . . possess[], or use[] . .

. without lawful authority . . . a means of identification of

another person or a false identification document" during or in

relation to the commission of one of the offenses enumerated in the

definition of "Federal crime of terrorism." 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(2)

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)). The phrase "means of

identification of another person" is identical in subsections (a)(1)

and (a)(2), strongly intimating that it has the same meaning in

both. See Comm'r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250, 116 S. Ct. 647, 133

L. Ed. 2d 611 (1996) ("close proximity" of two statutory provisions

"strengthen[s] the normal rule of statutory construction that

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identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended

to have the same meaning" (internal quotation omitted)).6

Section 1028A(a)(2) refers to "means of identification .

. . or a false identification document." "Means of identification"

includes "any name or number that may be used . . . to identify a

specific individual." 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). "False

identification document" comprises any false or falsified "document

of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purposes of

identification." 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) (emphasis added). The

meaning of "person" urged would not punish those using Social

Security Numbers identifying the dead unless the defendant happened

to possess the Social Security card or another "identification

document." To avoid this nonsensical result, "person" in subsection

(a)(2) must refer to persons both living and dead. And "person" in

subsection (a)(1) most likely has the same meaning as in (a)(2).

The structure of the statute resolves any initial ambiguity in the

6
Jimenez makes a similar, but opposing, structural argument that
the sentencing provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b) use the word
"person" and must mean only living persons. This argument is
without merit. Section 1028A(b) uses "person" three times, and
none of the uses require reading "person" as "living person":
first, "a court shall not place on probation any person"; second,
"no term of imprisonment imposed on a person"; and third, "a term
of imprisonment imposed on a person." But in each of these cases,
the rest of the phrase does the work of excluding the dead -- we do
not place dead persons on probation, nor impose terms of
imprisonment on them -- leaving "person" free to take on the larger
meaning.

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word "person"; we agree with the district court that the broader

definition is the correct one.7

The apparent purpose of the statute confirms this

interpretation. A false identity built on the bedrock foundation

of real means of identification -- that is to say, actual Social

Security numbers, real names and dates of birth -- provides better

cover for the wrongdoer than would one based on wholly fabricated

identities, regardless of whether the person whose means of

identification is used is alive.8 From a deterrence perspective, a

stiffer penalty is logically called for when the risk of detection

decreases. But a more commonsense analysis is just as persuasive.

The statute punishes two kinds of behavior: first, the use of false

identities that are less susceptible of detection in a broad class

of felonies, and second, the use of any false identity document in

the commission of a terrorism-related offense. The use of any

identity other than one's own in a terrorism offense merits

punishment. But the use of the means of identification of another

real person also qualifies for harsher punishment because this kind

7
We note that this conclusion comports with that of the district
court in United States v. Kowal, 486 F. Supp. 2d 923 (N.D. Iowa
2007).
8
A false identity created from the means of identification of the
deceased may even be superior to one stolen from the living. The
dead, after all, will not create conflicting paper trails or notice
strange activity on their credit reports. This is certainly the
opinion of the section of the "Anarchist Cookbook 2000" entitled
"How to Create a New Identity," which was seized from Jimenez and
introduced at trial.

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of identity theft is particularly potent and therefore a particular

threat. Because the structure and purpose of the statute dispel

any lingering ambiguity in the plain language, we decline to

consider legislative intent.

Nor does the rule of lenity avail Jimenez. The rule of

lenity requires that ambiguity in a criminal statute be resolved in

favor of the accused. Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25,

121 S. Ct. 365, 148 L. Ed. 2d 221 (2000) ("[A]mbiguity concerning

the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of

lenity."); Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422, 110 S. Ct.

1979, 109 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1990) ("[L]ongstanding principles of lenity

. . . demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor

of the defendant . . . ."). But genuine ambiguity requires more

than a possible alternative construction. See Caron v. United

States, 524 U.S. 308, 316, 118 S. Ct. 2007, 141 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1998)

("The rule of lenity is not invoked by a grammatical possibility.

It does not apply if the ambiguous reading relied on is an

implausible reading of the congressional purpose."); Muscarello v.

United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 141 L. Ed. 2d

111 (1998); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S. Ct.

461, 112 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1990) ("[W]e have always reserved lenity for

those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a

statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and

structure, legislative history and motivating policies of the

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statute." (internal quotation omitted)); McElroy v. United States,

455 U.S. 642, 658, 102 S. Ct. 1332, 71 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1982)

(declining to apply rule of lenity absent "significant questions of

ambiguity"). We recently wrote that the rule "only applies if there

is a grievous ambiguity in the statute." Councilman,418 F.3d at 83

(quoting Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139) (internal quotation marks

omitted). A brief review of two cases where we invoked the rule of

lenity will illuminate the nature and scope of the ambiguity

required.

United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985),

concerned a man charged with violating the Currency Transaction

Reporting Act ("CTRA") by failing to inform a bank of transactions

structured to avoid its requirements. The government brought

charges relating to schemes to conceal material facts from the

government, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and aiding and abetting criminal acts

against the government, 18 U.S.C. § 2. Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 679.

We applied the rule of lenity because "nothing on the face of either

the [CTRA] or its regulations, or in their legislative history

[supported] the proposition that a 'structured' transaction by a

customer constitutes an illegal evasion of any reporting duty of

that customer." Id. at 681. Hence, the statute was sufficiently

ambiguous to trigger the rule of lenity. We likewise disposed of

the government's charges under the CTRA itself, because the

Secretary of the Treasury required reporting by banks, not

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individuals. Because the regulations did not impose duties on Mr.

Anzalone directly, we applied the rule of lenity to the charges

under the statute because Mr. Anzalone did not have fair notice of

his liability. Id.

In United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir.

1992), the rule of lenity compelled us to vacate defendants'

convictions where the Clean Water Act was ambiguous as to whether

the conduct was criminal. The question in that case was whether,

in dumping waste into the municipal sewage system, a manufacturer

had "thereby" placed its own workers at risk. We applied the rule

of lenity because "thereby" was ambiguous and violating the Clean

Water Act was not a but-for cause of the risk.9 But mere ambiguity

9
The textual ambiguity in that case turned on whether the word
"thereby" had a causal component:
In one sense, it can be said that the knowing violation
"thereby" placed the employees in danger. After all, the
defendants knew that the sinks were connected to the
publicly-owned sewer and treatment works and that the
wastes would therefore illegally proceed without
interruption to the publicly-owned treatment works. They
also knew that the employees' actions in performing the
dumping as instructed placed them in imminent danger.
Arguably, therefore, through the knowing violation the
defendants "thereby" endangered the employees. On the
other hand, there could be no violation unless the wastes
ultimately ended up in a publicly-owned sewer and
treatment works. But the risks and dangers to these
employees would have been the same if the plugs had
always remained in the sinks so that no discharge to the
publicly-owned treatment works (and therefore no § 1317
violation) ever occurred. The danger to the employees was
inherent in their handling of the various chemical
solutions, solutions that were part of the [defendant
corporations'] manufacturing process. They would have
been subject to the identical hazards had they been

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in the language was not enough. We went on to note that the purpose

of the Clean Water Act is to protect the nation's waters, not

industrial workers. Id. at 31 ("One can read the entire statute in

vain for any protection mechanism for industrial employees who work

with wastes at the point of discharge.").

Each of these cases reveals deep ambiguity in the

underlying statute. In Anzalone, the statute made no mention of

treating several transactions as one. Further, the regulations

promulgated under the statute excluded the defendant altogether from

any positive duties. In Borowski, the ambiguity in the statute's

language was less obvious, but still palpable: "Thereby" does

connote causation. Moreover, the ambiguity was deepened, not

resolved, by the purpose of the statute as a whole because the

statute was not aimed at protecting industrial workers.

We have also applied the rule of lenity where no common

definition of a term exists and there is "insurmountable doubt" as

to the intent of Congress. United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 14

(1997) (applying rule of lenity when experts offered conflicting

definitions of "hashish oil" and district court found "no scientific

or universally accepted precise definition of the term"). Before

dumping the chemicals into drums or other containers for
appropriate treatment under the Act. In that respect,
therefore, although the defendants knew that their
employees were placed in imminent danger, that danger was
not caused by the knowing violation of § 1317.
Borowski, 977 F.2d at 30.

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applying the rule of lenity, we sometimes seek answers even beyond

the language and purpose of the statute. See United States v.

Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1994) (examining, in addition to

statute's meaning and Congress' purpose, "more recondite sources"

such as analogies from other areas of the law before applying rule

of lenity).

Viewed in light of these applications of the rule of

lenity, the case before us resolves itself. The language is not

sufficiently ambiguous -- the natural reading of the word "person"

in the phrase "means of identification of another person" includes

persons deceased. Were one presented with one's late father's

Social Security card, for example, and asked whether that was the

means of identification of a person, the natural response would be,

"Yes, it is my father's," rather than, "No, it is not the means of

identification of a person: It used to be the means of

identification of my father, but he is deceased." And even if

sufficient ambiguity were found in the language, we have already

pointed out that other methods of statutory interpretation resolve

the ambiguity. The structure of the statute weighs in favor of this

reading. Finally, the purpose of the statute is to create an

additional penalty for using false identities that are particularly

difficult to expose or that are used in conjunction with terrorism

offenses. This purpose arises from the need to identify accurately

those who claim the benefits and protections of citizenship.

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AFFIRMED.

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