United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2477
JOSEPH SLEEPER,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
LUIS S. SPENCER, Superintendent, M.C.I. Norfolk;
MARTHA COAKLEY, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts,
Respondents, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges
and Barbadoro,* District Judge
William C. Newman, with whom Richard L. Goldman was on the
brief, for appellant.
Eva M. Badway, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, with whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on
brief for appellee.
December 5, 2007
*
Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
BARBADORO, District Judge. Joseph Sleeper was convicted
of first degree murder in Massachusetts Superior Court. The
Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed Sleeper’s conviction,
Commonwealth v. Sleeper, 760 N.E.2d 693, 713 (Mass. 2002), and the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Sleeper v.
Spencer, 453 F. Supp. 2d 204, 223 (D. Mass. 2006). The sole ground
certified for appeal is Sleeper’s claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney promised in
his opening statement to present an insanity defense even though he
knew or should have known that the court would not allow the jury
to consider the defense. The SJC confronted this argument head on,
concluding that counsel’s alleged promise was a misstatement rather
than a broken promise and was, in any event, inconsequential.
Because the SJC’s determination that Sleeper suffered no prejudice
is reasonable in light of controlling Supreme Court precedent, we
affirm without resolving Sleeper’s contention that counsel’s
performance was deficient.
I.
A. The crime
Sleeper and his wife, Victoria, separated in March 1992.1
She filed for divorce several months later and obtained a
1
We set forth only the facts relevant to this appeal. The
SJC’s opinion, Commonwealth v. Sleeper, 760 N.E.2d 693, 697-99
(Mass. 2002), describes the background facts in greater detail.
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protective order barring Sleeper from the marital home. In August
1993, after 17 months of separation, Victoria began dating another
man. Sleeper soon became aware of this new relationship.
On September 2, 1993, Victoria and her male friend left
the area for a Labor Day weekend vacation. While they were away,
Sleeper made numerous telephone calls and entered Victoria’s home
in an effort to determine her whereabouts. Victoria returned,
alone, on September 6, 1993. That evening, sometime before 9:00
p.m., Sleeper confronted Victoria at home. After chasing her into
the bedroom, Sleeper stabbed her at least eight times with a knife.
Two of the stab wounds severed her ribs, and the deepest wound went
between six and one-half and seven inches into her chest. Sleeper
noticed that Victoria was still breathing but did not telephone for
an ambulance. She remained conscious for approximately four to
five minutes after being stabbed, and died a few minutes later.
Sleeper left Victoria’s home at about 9:30 p.m. Several
hours later, he entered a nearby State Police barracks and told the
trooper at the front desk that he had just killed his wife. In
explaining what had happened, Sleeper told the officers who
questioned him that he had gone to the home to confront Victoria
about her new relationship and that he had obtained the knife he
used to kill her from a toolbox in her home.
B. The trial
Sleeper’s counsel filed a motion seeking funds for a
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psychological examination on October 26, 1993. In support of the
motion, counsel asserted that “facts exist to substantiate a
defense of either partial or total mental defect of the Defendant.”
The court granted the motion and counsel retained Dr. Ronald Ebert,
a forensic psychologist, to examine Sleeper. Counsel filed Dr.
Ebert’s report with the court on April 19, 1994. On May 23, 1994,
counsel filed requests for jury instructions that included both
instructions on an insanity defense pursuant to Commonwealth v.
McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 1967), and instructions on mental
impairment negating the mens rea required for first-degree murder,
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Gould, 405 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1980).
The trial began on May 25, 1994. Sleeper’s counsel
delivered his opening statement immediately after the prosecutor’s
opening. He began by conceding that “Joseph Sleeper killed his
wife, he stabbed her at least eight times viciously in the chest
and other parts of her body.” He then explained that, “We are not
going to sit here and pretend, to play games as to who done it . .
. . You’re here to determine whether or not Joe Sleeper committed
first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, or was
insane at the time he did it.” Counsel then detailed Sleeper’s
early adult life, his marriage to Victoria, and how he began to
drink and feel that “things were coming apart in his heart” after
the first time he saw his wife “with another guy in a pickup
truck.” Counsel described the night of the killing from Sleeper’s
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perspective, describing Sleeper’s mental state as “insane” and
“absolutely frenzied.” Counsel ended his opening statement with
this request: “Put yourself in the real world, please, and then
make a determination as to whether this was a premeditated and
planned scheme, a first degree murder case, which it is not; or
something that built in this man and drove him crazy. That is what
happened.”
Sleeper testified at trial. He claimed that he went to
Victoria’s home on the night of the crime to borrow a car from one
of their sons. He also testified that he encountered Victoria
outside the home and that she invited him to come inside. He
admitted that they argued. When he followed Victoria into her
bedroom in an effort to stop her from calling the police, he
claimed he saw a condom and a knife in an open chest of drawers.
At that point, Sleeper said, “Everything just went crazy. I
started seeing a merry-go-round, a ferris wheel with the numbers on
it . . . I grabbed the knife and I had stabbed her.” After the
stabbing, “I was spinning all around, I remember spinning, I
remember I didn’t know what to do and I went down.” In short,
Sleeper claimed that he was unaware of what he was doing when he
killed Victoria.
Dr. Ebert testified as an expert witness for Sleeper.
Dr. Ebert opined that Sleeper was a long-time alcoholic and was
suffering from an acute state of depression with psychotic
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features. Although Dr. Ebert acknowledged that Sleeper was not
insane, he opined that Sleeper had a “diminished capacity” to act
with criminal intent when he killed Victoria.
Dr. Wesley Profit, then the director of forensic services
at Bridgewater State Hospital, offered expert rebuttal testimony.
Dr. Profit opined that Sleeper was not suffering from any major
mental illness, that he did not lack criminal responsibility at the
time of the killing, and that he had the ability to harbor malice.
On cross-examination, however, he conceded that he had not formed
an opinion as to whether Sleeper suffered from “a diminished
capacity.”
During the charge conference after the conclusion of the
evidence, the court agreed to provide instructions regarding
counsel’s mental impairment defense. Sleeper’s counsel requested
an insanity instruction notwithstanding the expert testimony, but
the court denied this request.
In his closing statement, Sleeper’s counsel began, “We
are not asking you to make a determination as to whether or not
Joseph Sleeper stabbed his wife eight times in the heart . . . what
you’re going to have to determine is the state of mind Joseph
Sleeper was in at the time.” Counsel emphasized, “this is not a
first degree murder case . . . . This is the act of someone that
was in a frenzy, that had a diminished capacity of intent.” He
contrasted the testimony of Dr. Ebert and Dr. Profit, emphasized
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Dr. Ebert’s opinion that “there was a diminished capacity in this
man’s intent to perform premeditation and his intent to perform
malice,” and noted that Dr. Profit had not contradicted Dr. Ebert’s
opinion on diminished capacity. After discussing Sleeper’s
relationship with Victoria and the events on the night he killed
her, counsel returned to the psychological testimony and again
repeated Dr. Ebert’s conclusions and credentials.
The court instructed the jury that it could convict
Sleeper of first degree murder if Sleeper committed either
premeditated murder or murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. It
also instructed on the lesser included offenses of second degree
murder and voluntary manslaughter. Over the Commonwealth’s
objection, the court informed the jury that it could consider
evidence of Sleeper’s mental state at the time of the offense in
determining whether he acted with the mens rea required for either
first or second degree murder. The court also instructed the jury
on Sleeper’s claim that he was at most guilty of manslaughter
because he committed the crime in the heat of passion with adequate
provocation.
The jury ultimately convicted Sleeper of first degree
murder because it determined that he acted with premeditation. It,
however, rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that Sleeper was
also guilty of committing the murder with extreme atrocity or
cruelty.
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C. The Appeal
Sleeper appealed his conviction directly to the SJC,
asserting twenty-nine assignments of error. As to ineffective
assistance, Sleeper argued that his trial counsel was ineffective
because counsel improperly promised that he would present an
insanity defense in his opening statement even though he knew or
should have known that no evidence would be introduced to support
that defense. The SJC reviewed his claim under the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard it uses on direct review of first
degree murder cases: “whether there was an error in the course of
the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and,
if there was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the
jury’s conclusion.” Sleeper, 760 N.E.2d at 710 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wright, 584 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Mass. 1992)). Using
this standard, the SJC held that Sleeper’s counsel was not
ineffective. Id. at 711. Although the court found that counsel
“no doubt misspoke” when he informed the jury that it would be
asked to consider whether Sleeper was “insane,” the court held that
the misstatements did not amount to a broken promise; counsel’s
references to insanity were consistent with his argument that
Sleeper suffered from mental impairments that negated the mens rea
required for a first degree murder conviction. Id. For similar
reasons, the court concluded both that “[i]n the context of the
entire trial, counsel’s statement was inconsequential” and “no
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reasonable juror would feel ‘disappointed’ by the defense.” Id.
D. The federal habeas corpus petition
Sleeper subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, asserting six different grounds for relief. As to
ineffective assistance, the district court rejected Sleeper’s
arguments that the SJC failed to fully adjudicate Sleeper’s federal
claim on the merits. Sleeper, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 219. Although
conceding that the question before the SJC was a close one, the
district court then dismissed Sleeper’s ineffective assistance
claim because it determined that the SJC’s analysis was not
objectively unreasonable. Id. at 222.
On November 30, 2006, the district court issued a Certificate
of Appealability (COA). The sole claim certified for appeal was
Sleeper’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
II.
A. AEDPA
This case is governed by the standards of review
established by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the well-established Strickland test
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We briefly review the
relevant law in both areas before turning to the merits of
Sleeper’s claim.
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Under AEDPA, if a state court has adjudicated a habeas
petitioner’s claim on the merits, a federal court may issue the
writ only if the state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision
that “was contrary to” clearly established federal law, involved an
“unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, or
was based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).
A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly
established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite from that reached by the U.S. Supreme Court on a question
of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than the
U.S. Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).
A state court’s decision unreasonably applies clearly
established federal law if the state court correctly identifies the
governing legal principles, but (i) applies those principles to the
facts of the case in an objectively unreasonable manner; (ii)
unreasonably extends clearly established legal principles to a new
context where they should not apply; or (iii) unreasonably refuses
to extend established principles to a new context where they should
apply. L’Abbe v. DiPaolo, 311 F.3d 93, 96 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing
Williams, 529 U.S. at 407). If the state court does not expressly
apply the federal standard but resolves the issue under a state law
standard that is more favorable to defendants than the federal
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standard, then the reviewing court “will presume the federal law
adjudication to be subsumed within the state law adjudication.”
Teti v. Bender, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 3293523, at *3 (1st Cir. Nov.
8, 2007) (quoting McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir.
2002)). To be unreasonable, the state court’s application of
existing legal principles must be more than merely erroneous or
incorrect. Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. “We agree with the Second
Circuit that ‘some increment of incorrectness beyond error is
required.’ Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
The increment need not necessarily be great, but it must be great
enough to make the decision unreasonable in the independent and
objective judgment of the federal court.” McCambridge, 303 F.3d at
36.
In reviewing a habeas corpus petition under AEDPA, a
federal court will presume that the state court’s findings of fact
are correct. For this purpose, the term “facts” refers to “basic,
primary, or historical facts,” such as witness credibility and
recitals of external events. Sanna v. DiPaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 2001) (quoting Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 1211 (10th Cir.
1999)). The habeas petitioner may defeat the presumption of
correctness only with clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Ouber v. Guarino, 293
F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002). The presumption of correctness is
equally applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a
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state trial court, makes the findings of fact. Norton v. Spencer,
351 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S.
591, 593 (1982)).
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel
The Supreme Court has explained that an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim requires both deficient performance and
prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
To establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, a
defendant must show that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances. Id. at 687-88. This is a
highly deferential review, making every effort to “eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at 689. As the Supreme
Court emphasized in Yarborough v. Gentry, the “Sixth Amendment
guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with
the benefit of hindsight.” 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). When examining
counsel’s conduct, the court considers the facts of the particular
case from counsel’s perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 690. Counsel has “wide latitude in deciding how best to
represent a client,” Gentry, 540 U.S. at 5-6, and benefits from a
strong presumption that he or she rendered adequate assistance and
exercised reasonable professional judgment in making all
significant decisions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional error, there is a reasonable
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probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (finding
prejudice where there was a “reasonable probability that at least
one juror would have struck a different balance”); Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694.
III.
Although Sleeper must prove both deficient performance
and prejudice to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a reviewing court need not address both requirements if the
evidence as to either is lacking. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we
expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. We take this path here and address
only Sleeper’s claim of unfair prejudice, leaving unresolved both
his argument that the SJC erred in finding that counsel’s
references to insanity were mere misstatements and his contention
that counsel’s performance was deficient. We begin by explaining
why the SJC’s no-prejudice ruling is entitled to AEDPA deference
and then turn to Sleeper’s specific challenges to the SJC’s ruling.
A. AEDPA Deference
Sleeper argues that the SJC’s no-prejudice ruling should
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be reviewed de novo for two related reasons. First, he asserts
that deference is unwarranted because the SJC analyzed his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under a state law standard
that fails to satisfy the requirements of federal law. In the
alternative, he argues that de novo review is required even if the
SJC used an acceptable legal standard because the court did not
engage in a fully developed prejudice analysis. Neither argument
has merit.
The SJC reviewed Sleeper’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim by asking “whether there was an error in the course
of the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge)
and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have influenced
the jury’s conclusion.” Sleeper, 760 N.E.2d at 710 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wright, 584 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Mass. 1992)). Because
this court has previously determined that the standard used by the
SJC in analyzing Sleeper’s claim is at least as protective of
defendants as the federal ineffective assistance of counsel
standard, see Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 (2005), “we will presume the federal
law adjudication to be subsumed within the state law adjudication.”
Teti, 2007 WL 3293523, at *4 (quoting McCambridge, 303 F.3d at 35).
Accordingly, there is no merit to Sleeper’s claim that the SJC
based its analysis of the prejudice question on an insufficiently
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protective legal standard.2
Sleeper’s alternative argument is also unavailing.
Although the SJC analyzed Sleeper’s claim by focusing primarily on
the adequacy of counsel’s performance, it also specifically
addressed the issue of prejudice, finding that “in the context of
the entire trial, counsel’s statement [that Sleeper was insane] was
inconsequential.” Sleeper, 760 N.E.2d at 710-11. The court
further explained its determination by noting that counsel’s
references to insanity were not problematic because they were
“reasonably predictive of the trial that unfolded.” Id. at 711.
This analysis is sufficiently developed to entitle the SJC’s no-
prejudice determination to AEDPA deference.
B. Prejudice
The Supreme Court has not identified the circumstances
under which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be
premised on a broken promise in an opening statement. This court,
however, has invalidated convictions because of broken promises in
2
Sleeper mistakenly relies on Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35
(1st Cir. 2006) for the proposition that the SJC based its no-
prejudice determination on a state law standard that is less
protective of defendants than the federal ineffective assistance of
counsel standard. Although the Lynch court reviewed the claim that
was before the court under a de novo standard of review, it did so
in part because “the SJC did not purport to do an ineffective
assistance analysis . . . .” Id. at 48. In this case, in
contrast, the SJC specifically analyzed Sleeper’s claim using an
ineffective assistance of counsel test that this court has
determined is at least as protective of defendants as the federal
standard. Horton, 370 F.3d at 86; Mello v. DiPaulo, 295 F.3d 137,
144 (1st Cir. 2002)
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Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1988), United States v.
Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997), and Ouber v.
Guarino, 293 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2002). Sleeper relies on all three
decisions in arguing that the SJC’s no-prejudice ruling represents
an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.3
In Anderson, counsel promised in his opening statement to
call two expert witnesses (a psychiatrist and a psychologist).
Anderson, 858 F.2d at 17. The experts, counsel stated, would opine
that the defendant was “walking unconsciously toward a
psychological no exit . . . like a robot programmed on
destruction,” when he killed his wife. Id. The next day, counsel
rested on the basis of lay witness testimony alone, without calling
the promised experts. Id. In concluding that counsel’s broken
promise had irreparably damaged the defense case, the court
reasoned that “[t]he first thing that the ultimately disappointed
jurors would believe, in the absence of some other explanation,
would be that the doctors were unwilling, viz., unable, to live up
to their billing. This they would not forget.” Id. at 17.
In Gonzalez-Maldonado, counsel relied on the trial
court’s pretrial ruling allowing a defense psychiatrist to testify
3
This court also considered the subject of broken promises in
United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223 (1st Cir. 1993) and Phoenix v.
Matesanz, 233 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2000). In both cases, however, the
court did not address the prejudice prong of the ineffective
assistance test because it determined that counsel’s conduct was
justified under the circumstances.
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when counsel promised the jury that he would produce psychiatric
testimony regarding the defendant’s mental illness. Gonzalez-
Maldonado, 115 F.3d at 14. During the presentation of the
defendant’s case, however, the court reconsidered its prior ruling
and decided that the psychiatrist would not be permitted to
testify. Id. On appeal, this court held that the trial court’s
whiplash-inducing series of rulings constituted reversible error.
Id. at 15. Although the case did not present an ineffective
assistance claim, this court relied on Anderson in holding that the
defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s broken promise to admit the
psychiatric evidence. Id. Explaining its conclusion, the court
noted, “[i]f the defense fails to produce promised expert testimony
that is critical to the defense strategy, a danger arises that the
jury will presume that the expert is unwilling to testify and the
defense is flawed.” Id. at 15.
In Ouber, counsel promised four times in his opening
statement that the defendant would testify, and he underscored the
importance of the anticipated testimony by stating that it was the
centerpiece of the case: “The case is going to come down to what
happened in that car and what your findings are as you listen to
the credibility and the testimony of Todd Shea versus what your
findings are as you listen to the testimony of [defendant] Barbara
Ouber.” Ouber, 293 F.3d at 22. On the evening of the first day of
trial, counsel persuaded the defendant not to testify. Id. at 24.
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In concluding that counsel’s broken promise was prejudicial, the
court reasoned that “counsel’s belated decision not to present the
petitioner’s testimony sabotaged the bulk of his efforts prior to
that time (and, in the process, undermined his own standing with
the jury, thereby further diminishing the petitioner’s chances of
success).” Id. at 34.
The present case differs materially from Anderson,
Gonzalez-Maldonado, and Ouber because Sleeper’s claim is premised
on counsel’s alleged breach of a promise to present an additional
defense rather than a promise to provide specific testimony from a
particular witness. A breached promise to present specific
evidence can injure because it invites speculation that the omitted
evidence would have harmed an otherwise viable defense. Anderson,
858 F.2d at 17. In contrast, an unfulfilled promise to present an
additional defense ordinarily will not impair counsel’s ability to
proceed with the remaining defenses. Id. at 19.
Sleeper nevertheless challenges the SJC’s no-prejudice
ruling because he claims that counsel’s promised insanity defense
was inconsistent with the defenses that ultimately were submitted
to the jury. We hold that the SJC did not act unreasonably in
concluding otherwise. Sleeper presented two defenses: mental
impairment negating the mens rea required for first degree murder4
4
Sleeper faults his counsel for presenting a “diminished
capacity defense” that he claims Massachusetts law does not
recognize. This criticism is unwarranted. Although the SJC
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and reasonable provocation preventing a conviction for either first
or second degree murder. Neither defense was significantly damaged
by counsel’s alleged promise of an insanity defense.
Every statement that counsel made in his opening
statement concerning Sleeper’s mental state at the time of the
crime was consistent with Sleeper’s mental impairment defense. At
most, jurors might have faulted counsel for overreaching. Such
overreaching, however, while generally inadvisable, will rarely
produce significant prejudice if it consists merely of a broken
promise to present a complete defense when only a consistent
partial defense is supportable. Accordingly, the SJC had
sufficient grounds for its conclusion that “no reasonable juror
would feel ‘disappointed’” by the mental impairment defense that
Sleeper actually presented. Sleeper, 760 N.E.2d at 711.
declines to use “diminished capacity” as a label for the state’s
mental impairment defense, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Candelario,
848 N.E.2d 769, 776 (Mass. 2006), it has consistently recognized
that mental impairment can prevent a defendant from acting with
premeditation, extreme atrocity and cruelty, intent, and knowledge.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murphy, 813 N.E.2d 820, 825 n.4 (Mass.
2004). See generally Katherine E. McMahon, Murder, Malice and
Mental State: A Review of Recent Precedent Recognizing Diminished
Capacity from Commonwealth v. Greg to Commonwealth v. Sama, 78
Mass. L. Rev. 40 (1993) (collecting cases). In the present case,
the trial court appropriately instructed the jury that it could
consider whether Sleeper suffered from a mental impairment that
prevented him from acting with the mens rea required for a murder
conviction. Further, it is clear from the record that counsel
merely used the term “diminished capacity” in his remarks to the
jury to refer to his mental impairment defense. Thus, counsel did
not ask the jury to consider a defense that Massachusetts law does
not recognize.
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Sleeper’s argument that counsel’s references to a
possible insanity defense undermined his reasonable provocation
defense fares no better. Sleeper bases his argument on case law
recognizing that provocation is a viable defense to murder only
when “a reasonable person would have become sufficiently provoked
and would not have ‘cooled off’ by the time of the homicide . . .
.” Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 845 N.E.2d 274, 283 (Mass. 2006)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Groome, 755 N.E.2d 1224, 1240 (Mass.
2001)). Working from this foundation, Sleeper argues that
counsel’s references to insanity conflicted with his provocation
defense because these references made it more difficult to
establish the objective prong of provocation (i.e., that a
reasonable person in Sleeper’s position would have been provoked).
This argument is flawed on two counts. First, Sleeper cannot show
that but for counsel’s references to insanity, he would not have
suffered the claimed prejudice. The claimed prejudice stems as
much from counsel’s reasonable strategic decision to present a
mental impairment defense as it does from his allegedly broken
promise of an insanity defense. In any event, Sleeper is simply
wrong in suggesting that an insanity defense is necessarily
incompatible with his provocation defense. Evidence that a
defendant is easily provoked because he suffers from a mental
illness does not prevent the defendant from arguing that a
reasonable person would have responded in the same way.
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In a last-ditch effort to prove prejudice, Sleeper argues
that counsel’s broken promise of an insanity defense harmed him
because it opened the door to otherwise inadmissible consciousness
of guilt evidence and adverse psychological opinion testimony from
the Commonwealth’s expert. This argument lacks merit. The SJC
reasonably determined that the consciousness of guilt evidence was
admissible to establish Sleeper’s identity as the killer. Sleeper,
760 N.E.2d at 707-08. We see no reason to question this
determination. Moreover, both the consciousness of guilt evidence
and the Commonwealth’s psychological evidence were independently
admissible in response to Sleeper’s mental impairment defense.
Thus, counsel’s references to insanity did not open the door to the
introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence.
IV.
Counsel faced a daunting task in defending Sleeper. His
client had confessed to a gruesome killing and his reasonable
provocation defense was problematic, both because its factual
predicate was undermined by Sleeper’s own statements to the police,
and because it is difficult to see how a reasonable person could
have been provoked into the heat of passion even if events unfolded
as Sleeper claimed at trial. Under these circumstances, Sleeper’s
best defense was to argue that his actions were the product of a
mental impairment. If counsel promised more than he could deliver
on that score, his promise did not undermine any viable defense or
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open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence. Accordingly, we
find no support in the record for Sleeper’s challenge to the SJC’s
no-prejudice ruling.
The district court’s ruling dismissing Sleeper’s habeas
corpus petition is affirmed.
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