United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1878
NORTHEASTERN LAND SERVICES, LTD.
d/b/a THE NLS GROUP,
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Richard D. Wayne with whom Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP was on
brief for petitioner.
Ruth E. Burdick, Attorney, with whom Ronald Meisburg, General
Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, John H.
Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy
Associate General Counsel, Meredith Jason, Supervising Attorney,
and Milakshmi V. Rajapakse, National Labor Relations Board, were on
brief for respondent.
March 13, 2009
LYNCH, Chief Judge. This case provides a cautionary tale
for employers about the risk of maintaining and enforcing a broad
confidentiality clause. Northeastern Land Services, Ltd. ("NLS")
petitions for review of the National Labor Relations Board's
finding that it violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), by maintaining an
overbroad confidentiality provision and by discharging its employee
Jamison Dupuy for violating it. Ne. Land Servs., Ltd., 352
N.L.R.B. No. 89, 2008-2009 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,110 (June 27,
2008). The Board has filed a cross-application to enforce the
order.
The case also raises an issue of first impression:
whether a two-member Board decision complied with the quorum
requirement of section 3(b) of the NLRA. We deny the petition and
grant the Board's cross-application for enforcement.
I.
Because "the Board is primarily responsible for
developing and applying a coherent national labor policy, we accord
its decisions considerable deference." NLRB v. Boston Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 80 F.3d 662, 665 (1st Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted). The Board's judgment stands when the choice is "between
two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before
it de novo." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488
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(1951). A Board order must be enforced if the Board correctly
applied the law and if its factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f);
Yesterday's Children, Inc. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir.
1997). Where, as here, "the board has reached a conclusion
opposite of that of the ALJ, our review is slightly less
deferential than it would be otherwise." C.E.K. Indus. Mech.
Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 355 (1st Cir. 1990).
II.
The facts are not in dispute. NLS is a temporary
employment agency located in East Providence, Rhode Island which
supplies workers to clients in the natural gas and
telecommunications industries, but pays its workers directly.
Dupuy was employed twice by NLS as a right-of-way agent for the
acquisition of land rights by clients, from February to November
2000, and from July to October 2001. Dupuy obtained the 2001
placement by contacting Rick Lopez, a project manager for NLS
client El Paso Energy, who had once worked with Dupuy at NLS.
Lopez directed Dupuy to contact NLS, which soon placed him with El
Paso at its Dracut Expansion Project in Massachusetts.
Before both of Dupuy's placements by NLS, NLS required
Dupuy to sign a temporary employment contract which said, in
relevant part:
Employee . . . understands that the terms of
this employment, including compensation, are
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confidential to Employee and the NLS Group.
Disclosure of these terms to other parties may
constitute grounds for dismissal.
This confidentiality provision is at the heart of this case.
Dupuy complained to NLS about repeated delays in
receiving his paycheck. He was particularly concerned because he
had to pay for expenses such as his hotel bills up front and later
seek reimbursement. After Dupuy tried to negotiate with NLS, and
even threatened to quit, Jesse Green, Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of NLS, agreed to call Lopez to see if El
Paso would either pay for Dupuy's hotel bill or provide a larger
per diem than NLS had offered to help with Dupuy's cash flow
problems. Although NLS ultimately billed most of Dupuy's expenses
to El Paso, NLS was responsible for reimbursing Dupuy. Green told
Dupuy that Lopez would not agree to any alternative arrangements.
In early October 2001, Dupuy raised two additional
concerns about his job. The first arose when Dupuy contacted Lopez
to tell him that Dupuy's cell phone was not working. Dupuy asked
Lopez whether he might be able to work for El Paso through a
different employment agency because Dupuy had not been paid in a
timely manner by NLS. Lopez refused Dupuy's request and gave Dupuy
the contact information of Norm Winters, an agent of NLS, to
resolve the pay issues.
The second concern was the reimbursement for Dupuy's
work-related use of his personal computer. Dupuy had initially
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arranged to receive a $15-per-day reimbursement for computer usage.
NLS treated this as a "pass-through" business expense for tax
purposes, which did not count as income to the employee, and on
which NLS did not pay Social Security taxes. On October 2,
however, Dupuy received an email from NLS's coordinator of human
resources, Susan Green, which referred to the computer usage
reimbursement rate as $12 per day. Dupuy replied that El Paso had
authorized, and he had been billing, $15 per day for computer
usage; he questioned the $12-per-day rate. Green told Dupuy that
NLS's accountants had determined that the computer usage cost
should be considered taxable compensation, rather than a pass-
through expense billed to El Paso. Green stated that the
reclassification of the tax status of the computer usage fee had
increased NLS's overhead costs, requiring an offsetting reduction
of $3 per day.
Dupuy sent a reply email to Green, copying Lopez,
stating, "By copy of this email to Rick Lopez, I am asking El Paso
to offset your surcharge and additional tax burden." He said that
if he did not receive the offset, "I will no longer be using my
computer for this job. El Paso will have to furnish me with a
digital camera, and I will no longer be available by email . . . .
After today and until the matter has been resolved, my equipment is
offline."
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On the evening of October 3, he sent an email to everyone
working with him on the El Paso project, including Rick Lopez,
saying, "Until further notice, my computer is offline and I will
not be accepting email. I can still be reached by the contact
telephone numbers that you have." Dupuy did not copy any NLS
managers on the email. Jesse Green testified that although he
tried to contact Dupuy numerous times by paging him, calling his
cell phone and leaving messages at his hotel and with other
employees, Dupuy did not call him back.
On October 11, 2001, Jesse Green spoke with Dupuy on the
phone. Green told Dupuy that NLS had tried to accommodate his
requests, but that it seemed that NLS could never make Dupuy happy
and, as a result, NLS thought it was best to terminate his
employment. Dupuy replied that he would sue NLS for retaliatory
discharge, alleging that it fired him because he had threatened to
file a complaint against the company with the Massachusetts
Attorney General alleging violations of state wage laws.1 When
Dupuy pressed Jesse Green for the reason for his termination, Green
replied that NLS had cause to terminate Dupuy's employment, as
Dupuy had "not lived up to [his] end of the bargain with [NLS]."
1
The alleged violations were NLS's failure to pay Dupuy
within six days of the end of the pay period and the deduction of
$3.00 from his compensation due to the change in the rate of
reimbursement for computer usage.
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Jesse Green later testified that his statement regarding
Dupuy's "failure to live up to his end of the bargain" was a
reference to Dupuy's failure to comply with the confidentiality
provision in the temporary employment agreement that required him
not to disclose the terms of his employment to outside parties.
Green, who had drafted the confidentiality provision, further
testified that in making the determination that Dupuy had violated
the confidentiality provision by contacting El Paso directly, Green
thought it was "inappropriate" for Dupuy to "approach a client with
[his] . . . problems [about salary], [because] then we're not
providing the services that we contracted to provide."
Dupuy filed an unfair labor practice charge on October
24, 2001, and filed an amended charge on December 17, 2001. The
complaint issued January 16, 2002, alleging that NLS violated
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by maintaining and enforcing an
unlawful confidentiality clause in its employment contract that
discouraged employees from engaging in protected concerted
activities, and by terminating Dupuy's employment on October 11 for
violating the terms of that clause.
The ALJ found that although the provision did restrict
the employees' right to discuss their terms and conditions of
employment with third parties, "there are different gradations in
how seriously employees' Section 7 rights are affected." Relying
on his reading of Board precedent, the ALJ found that the
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confidentiality provision did not violate section 8(a)(1),
explaining that "because [NLS] did not prohibit discussions of
terms and conditions of employment among fellow employees, I find
[NLS's] restriction a less serious infringement upon its employees'
Section 7 rights." Relying on language from Desert Palace Inc.,
336 N.L.R.B. 271 (2001), the ALJ explained that "[i]t is necessary
to strike a proper balance between employees' Section 7 rights and
an employer's business justifications." Noting the competitive
bidding process in NLS's industry, the ALJ found that NLS "had a
legitimate and substantial business justification for the rule
outweighing the restriction on the employees' Section 7 rights."
Dupuy appealed.
On June 27, 2008, the Board, by a two-member panel,
reversed the ALJ's decision, determining that, under Martin Luther
Mem'l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage), 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2004), the
confidentiality provision was unlawful because "employees
reasonably would construe it to prohibit activity protected by
Section 7." The Board explained, "The [confidentiality] provision,
by its clear terms, precludes employees from discussing
compensation and other terms of employment with 'other parties.'
Employees would reasonably understand that language as prohibiting
discussions of their compensation with union representatives." The
Board determined that the provision was overbroad and therefore in
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violation of section 8(a)(1), without relying on whether NLS had
actually enforced the rule.
As to the termination of Dupuy's employment for violating
the rule, the Board held, "Under extant Board precedent, an
employer's imposition of discipline pursuant to an unlawfully
overbroad . . . rule constitutes a violation of the Act." NLS had
conceded that it dismissed Dupuy because he violated the
confidentiality provision. The Board concluded that "[NLS]'s
termination of Dupuy pursuant to [the confidentiality] provision
violated Section 8(a)(1)." In a footnote to the unlawful discharge
analysis, the Board explained that one member, Chairman Schaumber:
[A]grees . . . that application of Double
Eagle Hotel & Casino dictates a finding that
Dupuy's termination violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of
the Act. However, he questions the theory
that an employer's imposition of discipline
pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule is
necessarily unlawful, such as in situations
where the discipline imposed is for a lawful
reason albeit under an overly broad, unlawful
rule. Nonetheless, he applies precedent for
institutional reasons for the purpose of
deciding this case.
Ne. Land Servs., 352 N.L.R.B. No. 89 at 3, n.9.
The Board ordered, inter alia, that NLS rescind the
provision; that NLS notify its current and former employees under
the temporary employment agreement of the decision; that Dupuy be
reinstated to his former position or a substantially similar
position; that Dupuy be made whole "for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the unlawful action taken
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against him"; and that NLS ensure that the references to the
unlawful discharge be deleted from NLS's files.
III.
We turn to NLS's challenge to the Board's decision. NLS
contends that the decision could not be properly issued because the
Board lacked a quorum under section 3 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(b), in that it cannot delegate all of its powers to a two-
person panel. On the merits, NLS argues that the Board erred in
finding that the confidentiality agreement violated section 7 and
in finding that Dupuy's termination violated the NLRA. These
arguments fail.
A. The Quorum Requirement
The first issue raised is one of statutory interpretation
of section 3(b). We owe some deference to the agency's view.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). By statute, the Board consists of five members, who
are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate and serve staggered terms of five years. 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(a). Section 3(b) of the NLRA states:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any
group of three or more members any or all of
the powers which it may itself exercise. . . .
A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the
right of the remaining members to exercise all
of the powers of the Board, and three members
of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a
quorum of the Board, except that two members
shall constitute a quorum of any group
designated pursuant to the first sentence
hereof.
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29 U.S.C. § 153(b).
Pursuant to that authority, the four members of the Board
who held office on December 28, 2007 delegated the Board's powers
to a three-member group. When the term of one member of that group
expired three days later, a two-member quorum remained.2
The Board's delegation of its institutional power to a
panel that ultimately consisted of a two-member quorum because of
a vacancy was lawful under the plain text of section 3(b). First,
section 3(b) allowed the Board to delegate all of its powers to a
three-member group. Second, the statute states that "[a] vacancy
in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to
exercise all of the powers of the Board." The vacancy, which left
the two-member quorum remaining, may not, under the terms of
section 3(b), impair the right of the two-member quorum to exercise
all powers of the Board. This is consistent with the conclusion of
2
The Board explained:
Effective midnight December 28, 2007,
Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and
Walsh delegated to Members Liebman, Schaumber,
and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of
the Board's powers in anticipation of the
expiration of the terms of Members Kirsanow
and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to
this delegation, Chairman Schaumber and Member
Liebman constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have
the authority to issue decisions and orders in
unfair labor practice and representation
cases. See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
Ne. Land Servs., 352 N.L.R.B. No. 89 at 1 n.2
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the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice which
has concluded, "In our view, if the Board delegated all of its
powers to a group of three members, that group could continue to
issue decisions and orders as long as a quorum of two members
remained." Quorum Requirements, Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan
III, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, (Mar. 4, 2003), available at 2003 WL 24166831. Moreover,
"[a]ny other general rule would impose an undue burden on the
administrative process." R.R. Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721
F.2d 1332, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Our conclusion is consistent with that of another
circuit. Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Photo-Sonics, a three-member panel of the Board heard the case,
but before the Board announced its decision, one member of the
panel submitted his resignation. The resignation became effective
on the same day the decision in the case issued, although all three
members concurred in the decision. The petitioner argued that the
decision was unenforceable because "it was not made by a properly
constituted three-member panel" because the resigning person, the
petitioner argued, could not have participated in the decision.
Id. at 122. Photo-Sonics reasoned that under section 3(b), "Even
if [the member who resigned] did not participate [in the decision],
a decision by two members of the panel would still be binding," id.
at 122, and analogized the quorum requirement in section 3(b) to
the quorum for the federal courts of appeals. Photo-Sonics stated,
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"[c]ourts have interpreted 'quorum' to mean the 'number of the
members of the court as may legally transact judicial business.'"
Id. (quoting Tobin v. Ramey, 206 F.2d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 1953)).
The court concluded that the participation of the two-member quorum
needed to conduct business was sufficient. Id. at 123.
Further, courts have upheld analogous approaches by other
administrative agencies. See Falcon Trading Group, Ltd. v. SEC,
102 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding SEC's promulgation of
a new quorum rule to allow it to continue to operate in the face of
multiple vacancies); Hunter v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 754 F.2d 1496,
1498-99 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (upholding decision by two
members of three-member panel of National Mediation Board allowing
two-member quorum where almost all of the preliminary work had been
performed by one member); R.R. Yardmasters of Am., 721 F.2d at 1340
n.26 (upholding the National Mediation Board's delegation of its
authority to a single member expected to remain in office).
B. Overbreadth of the Confidentiality Provision
Section 8 of the NLRA prohibits employers from
"interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in" section 7 of the NLRA. 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 7 guarantees employees the right to
"self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
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purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157.
Section 8(a)(1) has been read to bar employer
interference with employees' right to discuss the terms and
conditions of their employment with others under section 7 of the
NLRA. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978)
("[T]he right of employees to self-organize and bargain
collectively established by § 7 . . . necessarily encompasses the
right effectively to communicate with one another regarding
self-organization at the jobsite."); Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB,
407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972) ("[O]rganization rights are not viable in
a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some measure on the
ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of
organization from others.").
An employer violates section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a
work rule that "would reasonably tend to chill employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights." Lafayette Park Hotel, 326
N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998). Under the Board's caselaw, if the rule
is "likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, the Board
may conclude that [its] maintenance is an unfair labor practice,
even absent evidence of enforcement." Id.; see also Guardsmark,
LLC v. NLRB 475 F.3d 369, 374-80 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining and
applying Lafayette Park "mere maintenance" rule).
NLS contends that the confidentiality provision did not
violate the NLRA because, as a factual matter, it did not prohibit
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employees from discussing terms of employment among themselves and,
although it was enforced, it was not enforced in the face of union
activity. NLS asserts that mere broad wording, without evidence of
actual chilling of union activity, is insufficient to violate
section 8(a)(1).
NLS then makes a qualitatively different argument: that
the Board must engage in a balancing test. Here, NLS contends the
Board failed to consider the legitimate justification it had for
the confidentiality provision: labor costs were a key component of
its bids to clients, and NLS did not want its employees
jeopardizing its bids. NLS's arguments, however, are at odds with
current Board precedent.
After the ALJ ruling and before the Board rendered its
decision here, the Board decided Lutheran Heritage, 343 N.L.R.B.
646 (2004). Lutheran Heritage clarified the nature of the Board's
inquiry and confirmed the Board's prior caselaw that "mere
maintenance" of a rule that "would reasonably tend to chill
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights" is unlawful
under Board caselaw, Lafayette Park, 326 N.L.R.B. at 825, and that
there need not be any evidence of actual chilling of union activity
as NLS claims.
In Lutheran Heritage, the Board articulated a two-step
framework for determining whether an employer's maintenance of a
work rule violates section 8(a)(1). First, if the rule explicitly
restricts section 7 activity, it is unlawful. Id. at 646. Second,
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even if the rule does not explicitly restrict section 7 activity,
it is nonetheless unlawful if "(1) employees would reasonably
construe the language [of the rule] to prohibit Section 7 activity;
(2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3)
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7
rights." Id. at 647.
Here, the Board relied on the first prong of the second
part of the test. It found that although the NLS rule did not
explicitly restrict section 7 activity, employees would reasonably
construe the language of the rule to prohibit section 7 activity
under Lutheran Heritage. The plain language of the confidentiality
provision provides: "Disclosure of these terms [of employment] to
other parties may constitute grounds for dismissal." The Board's
finding that this language could be fairly read to extend to
disclosure of terms of employment to union representatives is
supportable. The precise subject matter of the forbidden
disclosure -- terms of employment, including compensation -- went
to a prime area of concern under section 7.3
3
NLS asserts that the confidentiality provision is lawful
because the plain text of the provision did not forbid employees
from talking to each other or to union organizers. This argument
fails to address the Board's Lutheran Heritage analysis, which
holds that a provision is unlawful if employees would reasonably
believe it forbids such communication.
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The Board's interpretation was consistent with its prior
caselaw.4 See Cintas Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 943, 943 (2005) (finding
overbroad a confidentiality provision prohibiting "the release of
'any information' regarding '[the company's] partners' [because it]
could be reasonably construed by employees to restrict discussion
of wages and other terms and conditions of employment with their
fellow employees and with the Union"), enforced, 482 F.3d 463 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
NLS argues that the Board should have considered that the
confidentiality provision was justified by legitimate business
reasons, citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
4
NLS alludes to but does not develop an argument that the
Board's result is inconsistent with the prior caselaw, as
demonstrated by the ALJ's reading of the caselaw. We set aside
NLS's waiver and consider the point. We find no such
inconsistency.
In interpreting NLS's provision as a "less serious
infringement on its employees' Section 7 rights," the ALJ relied on
cases involving more narrowly drafted confidentiality provisions
than the one at issue here. See, e.g., K-Mart, 330 N.L.R.B. 263
(1999) (prohibition on disclosing "company business and documents"
did not by its terms include employee wages or working conditions
and made no reference to employee information); Lafayette Park
Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. at 826 (rule banning discussion of
"hotel-private" information that did not on its face cover employee
wage discussion). Furthermore, under Lafayette Park and Lutheran
Heritage's "mere maintenance" rule, the Board did not need to
consider the employer's reasons for the rule. Cf. Desert Palace,
Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 271, 272 (2001), (upholding employer's policy of
confidentiality on matters relating to its investigation of an
allegation that an employee was dealing drugs). Furthermore, since
its 1990 decision in Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 299 N.L.R.B.
1171 (1990), the Board has consistently held that when a rule's
plain language restricts employees' ability to communicate their
conditions of employment to third parties it violates section
8(a)(1). Id. at 1172 (finding ban on "parent communication"
unlawful).
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(1945). See id. at 798 (noting that in section 7 analysis
"[o]pportunity to organize and proper discipline are both essential
elements in a balanced society"); see also Tex. Instruments, Inc.
v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1981). Nothing in Republic
Aviation compelled the Board to apply a balancing test here. While
the Board could have chosen to structure its rule differently and
engage in a balancing analysis, we owe deference to its decision
not to do so. Further, as a practical matter, a more narrowly
drafted provision would be sufficient to accomplish NLS's goal in
maintaining confidentiality in bidding for contracts. See, e.g.,
Cintas Corp., 482 F.3d at 470 ("A more narrowly tailored rule that
does not interfere with protected employee activity would be
sufficient to accomplish the Company's presumed interest in
protecting confidential information."). We cannot say the Board's
interpretation was unreasonable. Some may think this result
unattractive, but the Board's rule is intended to be prophylactic
and in any event is subject to deference.
C. The Termination of Dupuy's Employment
NLS has conceded that Dupuy was dismissed for violating
the confidentiality provision. "[W]here discipline is imposed
pursuant to an overbroad rule, that discipline is unlawful
regardless of whether the conduct could have been prohibited by a
lawful rule." Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 112, 112
n.3 (2004), enforced, 414 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2005); see also
Opryland Hotel, 323 N.L.R.B. 723, 728 (1997). While Chairman
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Schaumber indicated he might question the rule, he conceded he was
bound by the precedent set in Double Eagle Hotel, 341 N.L.R.B.
112.5
NLS claims that the discharge was lawful, relying on
Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980),
enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981) to argue that NLS can avoid
liability if it demonstrates that it would have discharged Dupuy
even in the absence of an unlawful reason. NLS contends that it
would have terminated Dupuy even in the absence of the
confidentiality provision because he was "insubordinate and
disruptive." These arguments misconstrue the Board's precedent.
It also argues that even if its confidentiality provision was
unlawful, Dupuy's dismissal did not violate the act because he was
not engaged in union or concerted protected activity.
Wright Line sets forth the test for assessing cases where
the dispute turns on employer motive: whether the employer
discharged an employee because of the employee's union affiliation,
or whether he acted because of some factor unrelated to the
employee's union status. 662 F.2d at 901. Wright Line, however,
does not govern here. Under the Board's precedent, where the Board
finds an employer rule is invalid, discharge for violating that
5
To attack this principle, NLS cites only an ALJ's
decision in Electronic Data Systems Corp., No. 36-CA-7434, 1996 WL
33321516 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 11, 1996), where the ALJ did
not find an employee's dismissal pursuant to an overbroad
confidentiality rule unlawful. The ALJ's unreviewed opinion is not
binding on the Board or on this court.
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rule is invalid. See Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B.
784, 785 (2001) ("Because [the employee] was disciplined for
violating the [employer]'s unlawful overly broad . . . rule, that
discipline itself constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1), without consideration of Wright Line's dual-motivation
analysis.").
The Board did not err in not considering that Dupuy would
have been discharged in the absence of a violation of the
confidentiality provision. The Board supportably relied on its own
precedents to determine that any discharge pursuant to an unlawful
rule is itself unlawful. "The fact that one reason for [an
employee's] reprimand was lawful in no way diminishes the fact that
the other reason was unlawful." A.T. & S.F. Mem'l Hosps., Inc.,
234 N.L.R.B. 436, 436 (1978).
We deny NLS's petition for review and enter judgment
enforcing the order of the Board.
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