PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-5161
DAVID DESHAWN FOSTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.
(5:08-cr-00340-BO-1)
Argued: December 10, 2010
Decided: March 2, 2011
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Reversed, vacated, and remanded by published opinion. Judge
Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge
Wynn joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Curtis Scott Holmes, BROCK, PAYNE &
MEECE, PA, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Eric
David Goulian, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON
2 UNITED STATES v. FOSTER
BRIEF: George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne
M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Caro-
lina, for Appellee.
OPINION
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
David Foster was indicted on one count of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Police officers discovered cocaine and drug para-
phernalia on his person during the course of an investigative
stop. Foster filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing
that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
After ruling that the underlying circumstances provided the
officers with the requisite level of suspicion, the district court
denied his suppression motion. Thereafter, Foster entered into
a conditional plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to the
charge, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his sup-
pression motion.
On appeal, we hold that the officers lacked a reasonable,
articulable factual basis for seizing Foster. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the district court and remand.
I.
On August 8, 2008, at approximately 1:00 P.M., Detective
J. Ragland, a seventeen-year veteran of the Henderson Police
Department, exited a restaurant after eating lunch with his
wife. As Detective Ragland, in plain clothes, walked towards
his unmarked police vehicle, he noticed a young black male
sitting in the driver’s seat of an SUV with his hands on the
steering wheel. Detective Ragland saw the man’s mouth
move, but could not make out what he was saying. He then
UNITED STATES v. FOSTER 3
witnessed a second black male sit up in the passenger seat
from a crouching position. The detective recognized the sec-
ond individual as David Foster, Defendant-Appellant. Detec-
tive Ragland knew Foster because he had previously dated
Foster’s cousin, and he had arrested Foster in the past for
driving with a revoked license. He was also aware that Foster
had been arrested at one point for a marijuana-related crime.
Detective Ragland believed that Foster recognized him as a
police officer.
The moment the two saw one another, the detective
observed Foster’s arms "shifting" and "going haywire." Joint
Appendix ("J.A.") 47, 69. However, Detective Ragland never
saw Foster’s actual hands, only his upper body and arms
above the elbow. While continuing on his way towards the
police vehicle, the detective walked past the SUV and asked
its occupants "What are ya’ll doing?" J.A. 56-57. Foster
replied that they were "just chilling." J.A. 47. From his point
of view, the detective could not tell whether Foster appeared
nervous or otherwise apprehensive to speak. Detective Rag-
land then responded either "Knowing you, you are doing
something else," J.A. 48, or "Knowing you, you are up to
something," J.A. 60. Detective Ragland then entered his own
vehicle and left the parking lot.
Detective Ragland drove across the street to a bank parking
lot and continued to observe the SUV. He did not see anyone
get into or approach the vehicle. He did not see anyone leave
the vehicle. He called Sergeant Darnell, the drug unit supervi-
sor, and was informed that Foster was under investigation.
Detective Ragland understood this comment to mean that Fos-
ter was under investigation for a drug related offense. He also
called Officer Macialek for assistance with a possible drug
arrest. Approximately fifteen minutes after first encountering
Foster, Detective Ragland returned to the still parked SUV
with Officer Macialek.
The officers used their respective vehicles to block the
SUV in, got out of their cars, and separately approached either
4 UNITED STATES v. FOSTER
side of the SUV. Officer Macialek approached the passenger
side of the vehicle with his gun drawn. The officers asked
Foster and the driver to show their hands, and they complied.
Detective Ragland asked the driver for identification, and the
driver informed him that his license was in his back pocket.
While the driver and Foster remained in the car, Detective
Ragland performed a pat-down search. He then allowed the
driver to retrieve his license. Detective Ragland asked for the
vehicle registration, and Foster opened the glove compartment
to retrieve it. The moment the glove compartment opened,
Detective Ragland saw a plastic bag containing a white pow-
dery substance that he believed to be cocaine, these suspicions
were ultimately confirmed. Detective Ragland immediately
ordered the driver and Foster to put their hands up and placed
them under arrest. A later search of the SUV revealed a set of
digital scales in the glove compartment, and a small travel bag
tucked under the passenger’s seat containing both $6,570 in
cash and more cocaine. The total amount of cocaine seized
was 350.5 grams.
II.
Here, we must determine whether the stop of the defendant
was supported by reasonable suspicion;1 and, therefore,
whether the district court properly denied the defendant’s
motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the stop.
We review de novo the legal conclusions of the district court,
but review for clear error the district court’s underlying fac-
tual findings. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996). We also construe the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the Government, the prevailing party below. United
States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998) (cita-
tions omitted).
1
Both parties agree that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the officers
seized Foster.
UNITED STATES v. FOSTER 5
The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to make an
investigative detention or stop only if supported "by a reason-
able and articulable suspicion that the person seized is
engaged in criminal activity." Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,
440 (1980). "And in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Thus, a court must look to the totality
of the circumstances in determining whether the officer had
a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal
activity. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
"While such a detention does not require probable cause, it
does require something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticu-
larized suspicion or hunch.’" United States v. Sprinkle, 106
F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
Relying on the decision of the district court, the Govern-
ment maintains that three factors, taken together, reasonably
led Detective Ragland to initiate the stop: (1) his prior knowl-
edge of Foster’s criminal record;2 (2) Foster’s sudden appear-
ance from a crouched position in a parked car, immediately
after the driver had apparently said something to him after
seeing the detective walking towards them; and (3) Foster’s
frenzied arm movements, including the movement of his arms
down toward the floor of the car. We therefore will separately
address each of these factors before evaluating them in total.
2
The district court clearly erred in finding that Detective Ragland had
"prior knowledge that Defendant was a drug-trafficker." J.A. 87C. Detec-
tive Ragland himself stated only that he knew Foster had been arrested for
a marijuana-related offense, and was under some form of investigation.
Because there was no factual basis for the court’s conclusion that Foster
was an actual trafficker, we will not consider this factor in our analysis.
See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699 ("[A] reviewing court should take care both
to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due
weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local
law enforcement officers.").
6 UNITED STATES v. FOSTER
Although Ragland was acquainted with Foster, and had
some specific knowledge about Foster’s history of
automobile-related traffic offenses, he lacked any explicit
familiarity with Foster’s prior marijuana arrest or that arrest’s
ultimate disposition. "A prior criminal record ‘is not, standing
alone, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.’" Sprinkle,
106 F.3d at 617 (quoting United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d
1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1996)). Ragland was required to pair
his prior knowledge of Foster’s criminal record with some
more "concrete factors" to demonstrate that there was a rea-
sonable suspicion of current criminal activity. Id. (citing
United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994)).
The Government then points to Detective Ragland’s con-
versation with Sergeant Darnell, which seemed to confirm
that Foster was under investigation for drug trafficking, to
show that a reasonable officer would have had some grounds
to believe that Foster was engaged in drug activity. However,
a person’s Fourth Amendment rights cannot be lessened sim-
ply because he or she is "under investigation" by the police.
Just as an officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s past arrests or
convictions is inadequate to furnish reasonable suspicion; so
too is knowledge that a suspect is merely under investigation,
which is an even more tentative, potentially innocuous step
towards determining criminal activity. Cf. Sandoval, 29 F.3d
at 542 ("[E]ven knowledge of a person’s prior criminal
involvement (to say nothing of a mere arrest) is alone insuffi-
cient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion.").
Next, Detective Ragland testified that his primary basis for
stopping the SUV was the "suspicious behavior" of seeing
"one fellow by himself appear to be talking to somebody, and
all of a sudden, another man pops up and his arms going [sic]
haywire." J.A. 69. Ragland stated that this was the "only rea-
son [he] investigated that vehicle, the driver, and the passen-
ger who happened to be . . . David Foster." Id. However, as
discussed at length by the district court at the suppression
hearing, there are an infinite number of reasonable explana-
UNITED STATES v. FOSTER 7
tions, unrelated to any criminal behavior, to explain why a
passenger would not immediately be visible in a car. For
example, he may have simply been bending over to retrieve
a dropped item from the floor of the car. We therefore are
extremely wary of accepting the Government’s argument that
an officer may acquire a reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing simply because a person suddenly becomes
observable.
Finally, the Government argues that the arm shifting was
suspicious because Foster knew that Ragland was a police
officer and, thus, Detective Ragland could have reasonably
inferred that Foster was trying to hide something. Although
"[e]vasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining rea-
sonable suspicion," Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124
(2000), here, Foster did not try to evade Detective Ragland.
Instead, Foster acknowledged the officer, was not noticeably
nervous, and did not hastily flee the area. The men also
remained parked in the SUV for at least fifteen minutes after
the exchange with the detective. Cf. United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 683 n.3 (1985) (using the fact that the defen-
dant "started speeding as soon as [police] began following" to
find that police had reasonable suspicion).
Indeed, these circumstances are surprisingly similar to
those in Sprinkle. There, we held that officers had unlawfully
seized a driver, with a known criminal record, and his passen-
ger, where the two were in a car parked in a high crime area
with their hands huddled together toward the center of the car.
106 F.3d at 617-19. Here, like in Sprinkle, the encounter
occurred in the middle of the day, and Detective Ragland did
not see Foster in the possession of any drugs, money, weap-
ons or paraphernalia. The detective never even saw Foster’s
hands above the elbow, and, unlike Sprinkle, Detective Rag-
land never wholly approached the car. In fact, he was never
close enough to see whether Foster was nervous. Cf. id. at 617
(noting that the officer never saw anything in the defendant’s
8 UNITED STATES v. FOSTER
hands, nor saw either defendant attempt to conceal any
object).
Additionally, here, unlike in Sprinkle, the encounter
occurred in a low crime area. Detective Ragland had only a
passing knowledge of a few robberies in the area. He had no
knowledge of any drug related activity occurring nearby.
Indeed, we find it edifying that Detective Ragland was in the
area having lunch with his wife. Thus, we cannot say that this
situation would have led a reasonable officer to believe that
Foster was attempting to hide something.
We also note our concern about the inclination of the Gov-
ernment toward using whatever facts are present, no matter
how innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity. We recognize
that we must look to the totality of the circumstances when
evaluating the reasonableness of a stop. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
273. However, an officer and the Government must do more
than simply label a behavior as "suspicious" to make it so.
The Government must also be able to either articulate why a
particular behavior is suspicious or logically demonstrate,
given the surrounding circumstances, that the behavior is
likely to be indicative of some more sinister activity than may
appear at first glance. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695 (defining
reasonable suspicion as a "commonsense, nontechnical con-
ception[ ] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical consider-
ations of everyday life’" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 231 (1983)); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981) ("[I]nvestigatory stop must be justified by some objec-
tive manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,
engaged in criminal activity."). Given these well-established
criteria, we find it particularly disingenuous of the Govern-
ment to attempt to portray these arm movements as ominous.
As in Sprinkle, we are convinced that—without some
stronger indication of criminal activity –- the articulated facts,
collectively, could not have supplied an officer with the
appropriate amount of suspicion necessary for a Terry stop.
UNITED STATES v. FOSTER 9
The detective was surprised to see Foster rise from the pas-
senger seat, and, based on his knowledge of Foster’s past
criminal record, he found Foster’s sudden arm movements
peculiar. Nevertheless, even relying upon the "experience and
specialized training" of the officer, United States v. Johnson,
599 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 2010), the totality of the circum-
stances were not enough to validate the stop. The encounter
occurred in a low crime area, there was nothing exceptional
about Foster’s actions in the car, and the detective’s actual
interaction with Foster failed to add any certainty to his
instinctive concerns. Further, Detective Ragland never saw
any suspicious items or contraband pass between the hands of
the passengers of the vehicle. Foster did not flee, and
remained in the parked vehicle for at least fifteen minutes,
giving Detective Ragland time to call for the backup neces-
sary to effectuate the stop. Whether considered alone or
together these factors would have afforded the detective with
little more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion"
that criminal behavior was afoot. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
Moreover, we are deeply troubled by the way in which the
Government attempts to spin these largely mundane acts into
a web of deception. Although these matters generally only
come before this Court where a police seizure uncovers some
wrongdoing, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge
that the exclusionary rule is our sole means of ensuring that
police refrain from engaging in the unwarranted harassment
or unlawful seizure of anyone—whether he or she is one of
the most affluent or most vulnerable members of our commu-
nity. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-13 ("Courts which sit under
our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such inva-
sions."). We appreciate that police are often called upon to
make very difficult decisions about when to conduct Terry
stops, and, for that reason, we give them leeway to make these
determinations. Nonetheless, the Government cannot rely
upon post hoc rationalizations to validate those seizures that
10 UNITED STATES v. FOSTER
happen to turn up contraband. See United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976) (noting that a purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to "prevent hindsight from coloring the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure").
In fact, although the reasonable suspicion standard is an
objective test, Detective Ragland’s initial comments to Foster,
"Knowing you, you are up to something," clearly belie his
stated reasons for initiating the stop. Accordingly, we apply
the exclusionary rule here to continue to deter police from
engaging in these types of unconstitutional seizures. We
reverse the district court because, to do otherwise, would "in-
vite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based
on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches." Terry,
392 U.S. at 22.
III.
The stop of Foster by Detective Ragland was not supported
by articulable facts sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion.
We therefore find that the district court erred in denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result
of the stop. The district court order is reversed, Foster’s con-
viction is vacated, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED