Pharmasterm Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

05-1490, -1551

PHARMASTEM THERAPEUTICS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VIACELL, INC.,

Defendant-Cross Appellant,

and

CRYO-CELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., CORCELL, INC.,

Defendants-Cross Appellants,

and

CBR SYSTEMS, INC. (formerly known as Cord Blood Registry, Inc.),

Defendant-Cross Appellant,

and

BIRTHCELLS TECHNOLOGY, INC. and BIO-CELL, INC.,

Defendants.

Paul J. Andre, Perkins Coie, LLP, of Menlo Park, California, argued for plaintiff-
appellant Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. With him on the brief was Lisa Kobialka.

John C. Englander, Goodwin Procter LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts, argued for
defendant-cross appellant ViaCell, Inc. With him on the brief were Paul F. Ware, Jr.
and Elaine Herrmann Blais. Of counsel on the brief was Richard M. Wyner, of
Washington, DC.

James J. Rodgers, Dilworth Paxson LLP, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, argued
for defendants-cross appellants Cryo-Cell International, Inc., et al. Of counsel was
Evelyn H. McConathy, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
 2

Thomas F. Chaffin, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, of Palo Alto,
California, argued for defendant-cross appellant CBR Systems, Inc. With him on the
brief was William F. Abrams. Of counsel on the brief were Guillermo E. Baeza, of
McLean, Virginia, and Kevin M. Fong, of San Francisco, California.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Delaware

Chief Judge Gregory M. Sleet
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

05-1490,-1551

PHARMASTEM THERAPEUTICS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VIACELL, INC.,

Defendant-Cross Appellant,

and

CRYO-CELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., CORCELL, INC.,

Defendants-Cross Appellants,

and

CBR SYSTEMS, INC. (formerly known as Cord Blood Registry, Inc.),

Defendant-Cross Appellant,

and

BIRTHCELLS TECHNOLOGY, INC. and BIO-CELL, INC.,

Defendants.

___________________________

DECIDED: July 9, 2007
___________________________

Before NEWMAN, BRYSON, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit
Judge NEWMAN.
BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

This patent infringement action was brought by appellant PharmaStem

Therapeutics, Inc., in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

PharmaStem sued six defendants (four of which are appellees before us in this appeal),

alleging that the defendants had infringed two patents owned by PharmaStem, U.S.

Patent No. B1 5,004,681 (“the ’681 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 5,192,553 (“the ’553

patent”), a continuation-in-part of the ’681 patent. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury

returned verdicts for PharmaStem on both patents, finding both patents infringed and

not invalid. The jury also rejected the defendants’ counterclaims of inequitable conduct

and violation of the antitrust laws.

The defendants filed motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) and a

new trial. In response, the district court initially entered an order granting a new trial on

the issue of infringement of the ’681 patent and JMOL of noninfringement as to the ’553

patent. Subsequently, however, the court vacated the new trial order as to the ’681

patent and instead entered JMOL of noninfringement as to that patent. The court

denied the defendants’ JMOL motions with respect to various asserted grounds of

patent invalidity. PharmaStem now appeals from the JMOL orders on infringement, and

the defendants cross-appeal from the court’s refusal to grant JMOL on invalidity. We

affirm the district court’s judgment as to the infringement issues. With respect to the

counterclaim of invalidity for obviousness, however, we reverse the judgment and direct

the entry of judgment for the defendants.

05-1490,-1551 2
 I

The two patents in suit recite compositions and methods relating to a medical

procedure for treating persons with compromised blood and immune systems. The

treatment is based on the discovery that blood from a newborn infant’s umbilical cord is

a rich source of a type of stem cells useful for rebuilding an individual’s blood and

immune system after that system has been compromised by disease or a medical

treatment such as chemotherapy.

Stem cells are fundamental (or “immature,” or “primitive”) cells from which

specialized (or “mature”) cells derive. Hematopoietic stem cells are stem cells that are

ultimately responsible for producing the various specialized cells of the blood and

immune (or “hematopoietic”) system. Hematopoietic stem cells produce progenitor cells

and more hematopoietic stem cells. The progenitor cells, which are less primitive than

the stem cells, in turn give rise to the variety of specialized cells that constitute the blood

and immune system.

Although hematopoietic stem cells are present in various types of human tissue,

they are found in unusually high concentration and potency in umbilical cord blood. The

’681 and ’553 patents describe a process for collecting a newborn infant’s umbilical cord

blood at the time of birth, testing it for suitability for later use, preserving it through

cryopreservation, and infusing it into an individual (either the donor or another person,

preferably one with a closely matched blood type) whose hematopoietic stem cells have

been destroyed. The object of such transplantations is to effect grafting. A successful

graft results when the donor’s stem cells migrate into the recipient’s bone marrow,

05-1490,-1551 3
resulting in the renewed production of normal, specialized blood cells and ultimately the

reconstitution of the recipient’s entire blood and immune system.

As issued, the ’681 patent contained very broad claims. Claim 1 recited a

composition comprising “a plurality of viable human neonatal or fetal hematopoietic

stem cells derived from the blood [and a] cryopreservative.” In reexamination, several

of the original claims were cancelled. Claim 1 was amended to read as follows:

A cryopreserved therapeutic composition comprising viable human
neonatal or fetal hematopoietic stem cells derived from the umbilical cord
blood or placental blood of a single human collected at the birth of said
human, in which said cells are present in an amount sufficient to effect
hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult; and an amount of
cryopreservative sufficient for cryopreservation of said cells.

Claim 2, which is dependent on claim 1, was amended to recite the composition of claim

1 “which further comprises viable human neonatal or fetal hematopoietic progenitor

cells.”

Each of the defendants offers a service to families of newborn infants in which

blood from the infant’s umbilical cord is collected and cryopreserved for possible later

use. The defendants represent in their promotional literature that the preserved cord

blood may be useful for reconstituting the donor’s hematopoietic system in the event

that system is damaged or destroyed as a result of disease or other causes. Some of

the promotional literature advises that the preserved cord blood may also be useful for

treating closely related members of the infant’s family.

In the infringement action brought against all six defendants, PharmaStem

asserted claims 1 and 2 of the ’681 patent, as amended in reexamination, and claims

13, 19, 47, 53, and 57 of the ’553 patent. Claims 13, 47, and 57 of the ’553 patent are

independent claims. Claim 13 provides as follows:

05-1490,-1551 4
 A method for hematopoietic or immune reconstitution of a human
comprising:
(a) isolating human neonatal or fetal blood components containing
hematopoietic stem cells;
(b) cryopreserving the blood components;
(c) thawing the blood components; and
(d) introducing the blood components into a suitable human host,
such that the hematopoietic stem cells are viable and can proliferate with
the host.

Claim 47 is similar except that it refers to the blood components “containing

hematopoietic stem and progenitor cells.” Dependent claims 19 and 53 add that the

blood components are isolated by collection from an umbilical cord. Independent claim

57 provides as follows:

A method for hematopoietic or immune reconstitution of a human
comprising introducing into the human a composition comprising human
neonatal or fetal hematopoietic stem cells derived from the blood, in which
the stem cells have been previously cryopreserved.

II

Following the jury’s verdict finding infringement of both patents by all four

appellants, the district court granted the defendants’ JMOL motions and entered a

judgment of noninfringement with respect to both patents. The court agreed with the

defendants that, in light of the legal theories pressed by PharmaStem at trial, the

evidence failed to show that any of the defendants had infringed any of the asserted

claims of either patent in suit.

As to infringement of the asserted ’681 patent claims, the district court focused

on the requirement that the recited compositions contain stem cells “in an amount

sufficient to effect hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult.” To prove

infringement, the court explained, PharmaStem was required to adduce evidence that

the defendants’ cord blood units contained a sufficient supply of stem cells to effect

05-1490,-1551 5
successful reconstitution of an adult. The court concluded that PharmaStem had failed

to do so.

In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence on that issue, the trial court first

ruled that it should have excluded the trial testimony of Dr. Mary Hendrix,

PharmaStem’s expert witness on infringement. The court noted that although Dr.

Hendrix was “an accomplished stem cell biologist,” she based her infringement opinion

“entirely on an analysis of the defendants’ marketing materials, without ever considering

any data regarding the composition of the defendants’ cord blood units.” The court

explained that Dr. Hendrix was not qualified as an expert in marketing or advertising

and, in any event, “her so-called analysis of the defendants’ marketing materials was

well within the jury’s common knowledge, common sense and common experience.”

The court pointed out that Dr. Hendrix’s opinion that all of the defendants’ cord blood

units infringe was based on her conclusion that the defendants’ promotional materials

“promise stem cells for pediatric and adult transplantation.” In that respect, according to

the court, “her opinion of infringement is no more than a lay-person’s interpretation of

the defendants’ marketing materials.” The court therefore ruled that her testimony

should have been excluded and that “permitting PharmaStem to couch its presentation

of this evidence in the form of an expert opinion was an error.”

The district court then pointed out that the evidence at trial overwhelmingly

indicated that not all units of cord blood obtained from a single individual at birth contain

enough stem cells to reconstitute an adult. The court explained that PharmaStem did

not attempt to prove by testing or by reference to data collected by the defendants that

at least some of the cord blood samples preserved by the defendants satisfied that

05-1490,-1551 6
requirement. Instead, the court noted, PharmaStem adopted the strategy of trying to

prove, principally through representations made by the defendants in their marketing

materials and other documents, that all of the preserved cord blood samples infringed.

As a consequence, the court explained, PharmaStem “presented no evidence to the

jury from which it could conclude that any specific cord blood unit or units stored by any

of the defendants contained stem cells in a sufficient amount to reconstitute a human

adult.” Because there was “no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury

to find that all, or any specific number, of the defendants’ cord blood units infringe the

’681 patent,” the court granted the defendants’ motion for JMOL as to the ’681 patent

claims.

As to infringement of the ’553 patent, the district court granted the defendants’

motions for JMOL because it concluded that PharmaStem had failed to prove that the

defendants were guilty of contributory infringement, which was PharmaStem’s theory of

liability. Under the court’s instructions, the jury was required to answer three questions

in the affirmative in order to find that any of the defendants contributorily infringed the

’553 patent. Specifically, the jury was required to find (1) that cryopreserved cord blood

has no substantial noninfringing uses; (2) that the defendants and transplant physicians

were acting in concert or working together to complete the process of infringement of

the asserted claims of the ’553 patent; and (3) that the defendants contributorily

infringed “by selling or offering to sell cryopreserved cord blood that was actually used

by a third party in the direct infringement” of the asserted claims. The court held that

there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s affirmative answers to the first

two questions. With respect to the third question, however, the court held that there

05-1490,-1551 7
was no evidence in the record to support the jury’s affirmative answer. The court

explained its ruling as follows:

It is undisputed that the defendants do not own the cord blood units.
Rather the units are owned by the clients, or families, and the defendants
in turn provide services with respect to the processing and storing of the
compositions. Although the defendants charge enrollment, processing,
and banking fees with respect to their storage services, they do not sell or
offer to sell the cord blood units. Indeed, the record evidence on this issue
is clear that the defendants sell a service, not cord blood units.

Because the court ruled that liability for contributory infringement “is clearly dependent

upon the accused infringer’s selling or offering to sell a component of the patented

process, here cord blood units,” the court held that the jury’s verdict could not stand.

The court therefore granted JMOL as to the asserted claims of the ’553 patent.

Although granting the defendants’ motions for JMOL as to infringement, the

district court denied their motions for JMOL of invalidity with respect to the asserted

claims. As to obviousness, the court ruled that the evidence at trial showed that there

were problems associated with the use of other transplant tissues, such as bone

marrow and adult blood, and that there was “tremendous skepticism in the transplant

field regarding the use of cord blood as a transplant tissue.” Although the court stated

that a jury could have found from the evidence that the asserted claims would have

been obvious, the court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to entitle the jury to

conclude that “prior to the inventions of the Patents-In-Suit, those in the field of

hematopoietic reconstitution would not have expected cord blood to be a successful

transplant tissue.”

As to anticipation, the district court again ruled that the evidence was sufficient to

support the jury’s verdict that the prior art reference on which the defendants relied did

05-1490,-1551 8
not anticipate the asserted claims. The court explained that the jury was entitled to find

that the prior art reference did not prove that there were stem cells in umbilical cord

blood, and that the jury could reasonably have concluded that the suggestion of

introducing stem cells into a human host was not “a sufficiently enabling disclosure to

warrant a finding of anticipation.”

Finally, the district court rejected the defendants’ argument that the ’681 patent

was invalid for indefiniteness. The court acknowledged that claim 1 of the ’681 patent

does not specify a particular number of cells or volume of blood that is required to

infringe. Nonetheless, the court concluded that “the record supports that the ’681

Patent’s claim language is as precise as the subject matter permits.” Moreover, the

court ruled that the record contained evidence establishing that “a person of skill in the

art would have understood what an amount of cord blood stem cells sufficient to effect

hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult means.”

PharmaStem has appealed from the portion of the district court’s judgment

granting JMOL of noninfringement with respect to both patents. The defendants have

cross-appealed from the portion of the judgment upholding the jury’s verdict that the two

patents are not invalid on grounds of anticipation, obviousness, or (in the case of the

’681 patent) indefiniteness.

III

With respect to infringement of the ’681 patent, the dispute on appeal is a narrow

one. The only contested limitation of the asserted claims is the limitation requiring that

the claimed composition contain neonatal or fetal hematopoietic stem cells “in an

amount sufficient to effect hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult.” PharmaStem

05-1490,-1551 9
contends that all of the cord blood samples the defendants have preserved infringe

claim 1 of the ’681 patent because the evidence at trial was sufficient to show that all

those cord blood units contained enough stem cells to effect the hematopoietic

reconstitution of a human adult. The defendants contend that PharmaStem failed to

prove that any of their cryopreserved samples satisfy that limitation.

As the district court noted, PharmaStem did not attempt to use direct testing or

other scientific evidence to prove that any particular cord blood sample or group of

samples preserved by any of the defendants contained enough stem cells to

reconstitute a human adult. Instead, PharmaStem relied on indirect evidence in the

form of advertising and other materials generated by the defendants, scientific evidence

relating to stem cell research in general, testimony from representatives of the

defendants, and testimony by their own expert witness, Dr. Hendrix. The district court,

however, concluded that PharmaStem’s evidence did not constitute substantial

evidence in support of PharmaStem’s theory of infringement.

A

The trial court was correct in ruling that the evidence of the defendants’

advertising and other materials did not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of

infringement. That evidence consisted of various statements by each of the defendants

that the cord blood samples they preserved could be potentially useful not only for the

donor but also for the donor’s relatives, including adult relatives.

To be sure, there is no prohibition against using the admissions of a party,

whether in the form of marketing materials or otherwise, as evidence in an infringement

action; such admissions are entitled to weight along with all other evidence of

05-1490,-1551 10
infringement. In this case, however, while the defendants’ statements touted the

possible therapeutic uses the cord blood might have for the child and members of the

child’s family in the future, none of the statements represented that the stem cells in any

of the cryopreserved cord blood samples were sufficient in number to effect

hematopoietic reconstitution of an adult, as is required by claim 1 of the reexamined

’681 patent. Instead, the defendants’ statements emphasized the potential therapeutic

usefulness of the cord blood in general and referred to future uses of stored blood in

adult transplants only as possibilities.

For example, PharmaStem introduced a statement from a website maintained by

defendant CBR Systems, Inc., which referred to the number and character of cord blood

transplants worldwide as of that time. The statement recited that “umbilical cord blood

has been used in more than 2,500 transplants by children and adults. In many cases,

the cord blood was used by the baby’s sibling. Other transplants have occurred for the

newborn himself, the newborn’s mother, father, and the newborn’s cousin.” With

respect to its own preserved cord blood units, CBR stated that it had provided “over two

dozen samples for use in transplantation,” that most have been used for siblings, but

that in one instance the newborn’s “cord blood stem cells were transplanted to her

mother to treat chronic myelogenous leukemia.”

Those statements fall short of proving that any (much less all) of CBR’s cord

blood samples contained enough stem cells to reconstitute an adult. The first statement

simply recited that among the 2500 world-wide transplants, some had been conducted

on adults. The second statement reflected that one such adult transfer was attempted

with a CBR cord blood sample. Neither statement made any representation whether or

05-1490,-1551 11
to what extent the particular transplants had succeeded in reconstituting the adults’

hematopoietic systems. Nor did the specific reference to the one adult transplant

represent that the transplant was successful or that only a single unit of cord blood was

used in the transplant. Those gaps in the proof are significant, because the evidence

showed that as of the time of trial the great majority of all cord blood transplants

worldwide had been for the treatment of children. In addition, the evidence showed that

in most cases involving adult transplantations, the transplant physicians had used two

units of cord blood, not the one unit obtained at the time of a single birth.

Uncontradicted evidence at trial showed that two units were used because in most

cases the physicians regarded a single unit as insufficient for an adult transplantation.

PharmaStem introduced similar statements from defendant CorCell, Inc. In

particular, PharmaStem pointed to a statement in CorCell’s promotional literature that if

cord blood could be saved, “it would be a perfect match for the donor, but could also

provide life saving benefits for siblings, and other family members.” Several other

statements by CorCell were to the same effect—that cord blood could potentially be of

benefit not only to the child but also to other members of the child’s family. As in the

case of CBR, however, those statements did not constitute representations that single

units of CorCell’s preserved cord blood would contain a sufficient number of stem cells

to reconstitute an adult. PharmaStem notes in passing that one sample of CorCell’s

preserved cord blood was used in an adult transplantation, but the evidence at trial

showed that the adult transplant did not graft and the patient died. Accordingly, that

evidence provides no support at all for PharmaStem’s theory of infringement.

05-1490,-1551 12
 With respect to defendant Cryo-Cell International, Inc., PharmaStem again

introduced statements from the company’s website that cord blood is a source of stem

cells for the child or “possibly” other family members. PharmaStem’s expert witness,

Dr. Hendrix, interpreted that statement to refer to adult family members and to constitute

a representation that each unit of cord blood preserved by Cryo-Cell contains enough

stem cells to reconstitute an adult. The statements about possible use for other family

members, however, do not amount to representations that any single stored unit would

be sufficient by itself to reconstitute an adult, much less that all of the samples have that

capacity.

Similarly, PharmaStem introduced evidence that defendant ViaCell, Inc., had

advertised that cord blood could be stored “for potential use by a sibling, parent, first

cousin or the newborn itself.” While ViaCell’s promotional materials stated that cord

blood had been used in adult transplantation efforts, PharmaStem points to no

representation by ViaCell that a single unit of its stored cord blood had ever been

successfully used to effect hematopoietic reconstitution of an adult.

B

In addition to the evidence of the defendants’ statements, PharmaStem also

relied on evidence that each of the defendants tested their cord blood samples before

cryopreserving them. Like the defendants’ statements, however, that evidence also

failed to establish that the preserved samples contained sufficient numbers of stem cells

to effect hematopoietic reconstitution of an adult. The testing evidence showed that the

defendants used various means to screen the cord blood samples before submitting

them for cryopreservation. Those tests included determining whether the samples

05-1490,-1551 13
contained more than a minimum volume of blood, whether the samples were free of

contamination, and whether they contained a minimum number of viable nucleated

cells. Each of those testing measures was designed to increase the likelihood that the

cord blood units contained viable stem cells and could be therapeutically useful. That

evidence did not show, however, that the testing excluded all samples that lacked the

capacity to reconstitute an adult, because there was no showing that the defendants

chose to preserve only those samples that contained sufficient stem cells for adult

reconstitution, much less that their testing procedures had that effect. Nor did

PharmaStem argue that the defendants’ tests could be used to show that some subset

of all of the preserved samples contained enough stem cells to reconstitute an adult. To

the contrary, the evidence showed that the defendants saved cord blood samples when

the defendants thought the samples might be of some potential therapeutic use, which

would include transplantation of an infant or a young child.

C

In its brief on appeal, PharmaStem refers to two pieces of scientific evidence

introduced at trial that PharmaStem contends support its claim of infringement of the

’681 patent. The first is a paper published in 2001 in the New England Journal of

Medicine regarding the use of umbilical cord blood in adult transplantations. That paper

was cited in promotional materials of CBR and CorCell. Although the paper showed

that cord blood could have restorative effects for adults, it did not disclose whether any

or all of the transplantations consisted of only a single cord blood unit. The paper

therefore did nothing to prove how often a single cord blood unit from a single infant is

sufficient for adult reconstitution. For that reason, the 2001 paper provided no

05-1490,-1551 14
evidentiary basis from which to infer that the particular cord blood samples preserved by

any of the defendants contained a sufficient quantity of stem cells for adult

reconstitution.

A second piece of scientific evidence featured by PharmaStem is a 2003

publication by the federal Food and Drug Administration reporting that an advisory

committee studying cord blood transplantations had recommended that physicians be

permitted to conduct adult transplantations “as long as the stem cell dose is adequate.”

That evidence is likewise not probative of infringement because the report makes no

reference to whether a single unit of cord blood would be used in such transplantations.

In fact, the transplant physician who made the presentation that led to the advisory

committee’s recommendation explained at trial that his recommendation against limiting

transplants by age was “[b]ecause we could do cord blood transplants using two cord

blood transplant [units].”

Thus, neither of the scientific exhibits cited by PharmaStem addresses whether a

single cord blood unit from a single infant is sufficient to reconstitute an adult’s

hematopoietic system. Moreover, and significantly, neither addresses the critical

question whether the particular samples preserved by the defendants contained

sufficient stem cells for that purpose. Those two pieces of scientific evidence therefore

do not overcome the problem with PharmaStem’s evidence that the district court

pointed out—that while PharmaStem may have demonstrated that the preserved cord

blood units had significant therapeutic uses, and while cord blood in some amounts

could be used to treat adults, the evidence was not sufficient to show that the particular

05-1490,-1551 15
cord blood units stored by the defendants contained sufficient numbers of stem cells to

reconstitute the hematopoietic system of a human adult.

D

PharmaStem’s failure to establish that any of the preserved cord blood samples

contained sufficient stem cells to reconstitute an adult was not merely a technical flaw in

its proof. The evidence at trial showed that the great majority of cord blood

transplantations between the first successful transplantation in 1988 and the time of trial

had been in children. Indeed, it was not until 1995 that a cord blood transplant was

even attempted in an adult. The evidence also showed that more than a single unit of

cord blood was used for most cord blood transplants performed on adults; the single

unit collected at an individual’s birth was frequently regarded as insufficient to effect

hematopoietic reconstitution of an adult.

In support of its infringement claim, PharmaStem points out that each of the

defendants provided a small number of cord blood units to transplant physicians for use

in transplantation procedures. The evidence shows that the four defendants had

provided a total of 33 units of cord blood to transplanters by the time of trial. For the

most part, however, that evidence did not distinguish between transplantations of

children and transplantations of adults. To the extent that the evidence distinguished

between the two, it showed that most of the supplied samples were used for

transplantations of children. Moreover, with respect to the adult transplantations,

PharmaStem has not pointed to any evidence that even a single transplanted cord

blood unit from one of the defendants resulted in the successful reconstitution of the

hematopoietic system of an adult. Thus, the evidence regarding the transplants

05-1490,-1551 16
generally, and the defendants’ experience with transplants in particular, provides no

basis from which to infer that some or all of the cord blood units preserved by the

defendants must have contained a sufficient number of stem cells for adult

reconstitution. For that reason, the district court was correct to hold that the evidence

was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of infringement of the ’681 patent.

Contrary to PharmaStem’s contention, the district court’s ruling did not convert a

determination as to damages into a ruling on liability. Because of the manner in which

PharmaStem sought to prove infringement, it committed itself to a course that had “all-

or-nothing” consequences. The district court was correct to conclude that, having

chosen not to try to prove that particular cord blood samples or categories of samples

contained sufficient stem cells to effect hematopoietic reconstitution of an adult,

PharmaStem took the risk that the court would conclude that it had failed to prove that

any of the defendants’ cryopreserved samples infringed. The district court’s narrow

disposition of the JMOL issue simply held PharmaStem to the consequences of the

strategy it adopted at trial.

E

In reaching this conclusion, we reject PharmaStem’s contention that the district

court abused its discretion when it determined, following the trial, that the infringement

opinion of PharmaStem’s expert witness Dr. Hendrix should have been struck. The

district court found her testimony unhelpful to the jury, and not an appropriate subject for

expert evidence, because it consisted almost entirely of her quoting from the

promotional information and other materials in which the defendants described their

business operations for potential customers and investors, and drawing inferences from

05-1490,-1551 17
those materials. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the jury

was fully capable of understanding those materials without expert assistance and that

Dr. Hendrix’s testimony should have been excluded. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner,

522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (abuse of discretion standard applies to district court’s

decision to exclude expert testimony).

Dr. Hendrix concluded from those materials that the defendants had in effect

admitted that all of the cord blood samples that the defendants preserved contained a

sufficient quantity of stem cells to reconstitute an adult. In particular, Dr. Hendrix

interpreted the defendants’ statements about their processes for preserving cord blood

samples to mean that each of them tested the samples “to determine if there is a

sufficient amount of cells for reconstitution for an adult. And then after that time, they

cryopreserve it for storage.” She admitted that she did not examine the data obtained

by the defendants from their testing of the samples; that she did not know how many, if

any, successful adult transplantations had been done with cord blood samples

preserved by any of the defendants; and that she did not know whether, when the

defendants tested the samples, they determined whether the samples were “sufficient

for an adult or sufficient for a child or sufficient for any purpose.” In sum, Dr. Hendrix

admitted that a particular company’s decision to store a particular sample did not

necessarily mean the sample was sufficient to reconstitute an adult. Nonetheless, she

maintained that “[i]f the cord bloods are being stored, and the companies promise that—

I mean they state in their websites that there are sufficient cells that they make available

for transplantation, pediatric, sibling, older and adults, then I believe that there is the

05-1490,-1551 18
potential in all of those samples that are stored in frozen sanctuary to provide that

service.”

There are two problems with Dr. Hendrix’s testimony, as the district court pointed

out. First, because her testimony was almost entirely based on an interpretation of the

defendants’ marketing materials and materials directed to investors, any expertise on

Dr. Hendrix’s part as a cell biologist was of no apparent help to the jury. Whether or not

the materials constituted admissions by the defendants that some or all of the preserved

samples contained enough stem cells to reconstitute an adult was not a matter as to

which Dr. Hendrix’s expertise was of any apparent use. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (admission of expert testimony “is premised on

an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and

experience of his discipline”). Second, not only was her expertise not necessary or

useful to interpret the defendants’ materials, but her interpretation was not a reasonable

one. Nowhere did the defendants represent that any of the preserved cord blood

samples (much less all of them) contained a sufficient number of stem cells to

reconstitute an adult. The representations that the cord blood was of potential use not

only for infants and children but also for adults falls significantly short of a

representation that the individual cryopreserved cord blood samples each contained

enough stem cells to reconstitute an adult.

To be sure, Dr. Hendrix stated in conclusory terms that she relied for her opinion

not only on the defendants’ materials, but also on scientific literature, testimony of

experts, and the depositions of representatives of the defendants. She made clear,

however, that her opinion was based principally on the assertions by the defendants

05-1490,-1551 19
that the preserved cord blood had potential uses for adults as well as for children.

Moreover, Dr. Hendrix did not explain how her reliance on any of the other sources of

information supported her inference about whether the defendants’ preserved samples

contained an infringing quantity of stem cells.

In short, we agree with the trial court that the defendants’ materials did not

constitute sufficient proof of infringement of the ’681 patent and that those materials did

not become proof of infringement when Dr. Hendrix read those materials back to the

jury from the witness stand. There was therefore nothing in Dr. Hendrix’s testimony that

sufficed to remedy the insufficiency that the district court pointed out in PharmaStem’s

other evidence of infringement of the ’681 patent.

IV

With respect to infringement of the ’553 patent, the issue presented to us is again

a narrow one. There is no dispute that in the 33 instances in which the defendants’ cord

blood samples were used in transplant procedures, samples of cord blood containing

stem cells were collected, cryopreserved, thawed, and introduced into the patient’s

body. In no case, however, were all those steps performed by the same party. Instead,

the defendants were typically responsible for collecting and cryopreserving the cord

blood samples, while transplant physicians unrelated to the defendants thawed the cord

blood and used it for transplanting.

In light of the fact that the defendants did not perform all the steps of the

patented method, PharmaStem based its claim of infringement of the ’553 patent on the

theory of contributory infringement. The district court instructed the jury on contributory

05-1490,-1551 20
infringement and gave the jury special verdict questions that directed the jury’s inquiry

to the requirements of that theory.

The court instructed the jury that in order to prove contributory infringement,

PharmaStem was required to prove, inter alia, (1) that the defendants “sold or offered to

sell cryopreserved cord blood to a transplanter” and (2) that the cryopreserved cord

blood that was “sold or offered for sale by the defendant was used by a single entity, or

alternatively, by a group of entities that are acting in concert or working together to

complete the process of infringement.” The pertinent special verdict questions

corresponding to those instructions required the jury to find that “the defendants and the

transplant physicians are acting in concert or working together to complete the process

of infringement” of the asserted claims of the ’553 patent (special verdict question 4)

and that the defendants “contributorily infringed the ’553 patent by selling or offering to

sell cryopreserved cord blood that was actually used by a third party in the direct

infringement” of any of the asserted claims (special verdict question 5).

PharmaStem’s theory of contributory infringement was based on the contributory

infringement section of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), which provides: “Whoever

offers to sell or sells . . . a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination

or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,

constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or

especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent” shall be liable as a

contributory infringer. The jury found in PharmaStem’s favor on each of the special

verdict questions pertaining to contributory infringement and accordingly returned a

verdict of liability against all of the defendants on the ’553 patent.

05-1490,-1551 21
 The issue on appeal is whether there was substantial evidence to support the

jury’s finding, in response to special verdict question 5, that each of the defendants

“contributorily infringed the ’553 patent by selling or offering to sell cryopreserved cord

blood that was actually used by a third party in . . . direct infringement” of that patent.

The district court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendants sold

a service to families of newborn infants (collection, processing, and cryopreservation of

the newborn’s umbilical cord blood), but not to show that they sold the cord blood units

themselves, which belonged to the families throughout, and certainly not to show that

the defendants sold the cord blood units to the transplanters.

The district court construed the contributory infringement statute to require a sale

or an offer of sale of a product; the statute is not satisfied, the court ruled, by the

provision of a service for compensation. Because liability under section 271(c) “is

clearly dependent upon the accused infringer’s selling or offering to sell a component of

the patented process, here cord blood units,” the court held that the jury’s verdict on

contributory infringement could not stand, and it therefore granted the defendants’

JMOL motions with respect to the ’553 patent.

In challenging the district court’s ruling, PharmaStem first argues that the jury

could properly characterize as a “sale” the transaction in which the defendants obtained

unprocessed umbilical cord blood, converted it into a therapeutically useful,

cryopreserved cord blood product, and later provided it to transplant physicians at the

behest of the client family. While cord blood is certainly a product, the transaction

between the defendants and their clients is plainly not the sale of “a material or

apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,” as is required by section 271(c)

05-1490,-1551 22
with respect to method patents. The evidence at trial showed that the cord blood

remained the property of the families throughout the period in which the defendants

stored it. The defendants were never owners of the blood, but instead were merely

bailees; they were not free to dispose of the blood as they chose, but were contractually

obligated to preserve it pending the families’ need for it at some point in the future. On

those occasions when the cord blood was needed, the defendants provided the blood to

transplanters in satisfaction of their contractual obligation to ship the families’ cord blood

samples to a transplanter upon direction. Neither that transaction nor any earlier

transaction between the families and the defendants constituted a “sale” of the cord

blood. See Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 329–30 (1893) (“The recognized distinction

between bailment and sale is that, when the identical article is to be returned in the

same or in some altered form, the contract is one of bailment, and the title to the

property is not changed. On the other hand, when there is no obligation to return the

specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of value, he becomes

a debtor to make the return, and the title to the property is changed.”). Rather, as the

trial court held, the transaction between the families and the defendants constituted the

provision of a service for a fee.

In the alternative, PharmaStem argues that even if the district court was correct

to characterize the defendants’ activities as providing a service rather than selling a

product, the court still should have upheld the jury’s verdict of contributory infringement.

In this regard, PharmaStem argues that section 271(c) is not limited to the sale of a

product, but extends to the sale of a service.

05-1490,-1551 23
 PharmaStem’s argument is contrary to both the language and the legislative

history of section 271(c). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that a contributory

infringer is one who “offers to sell or sells within the United States a patented machine,

manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in

practicing a patented process.” Although that language describes in various different

ways the items that may be sold for purposes of creating liability for contributory

infringement, all of the descriptions refer to the sale of a product of some sort; none of

them refer to the provision of a service. Under the plain language of the statute, a

person who provides a service that assists another in committing patent infringement

may be subject to liability under section 271(b) for active inducement of infringement,

but not under section 271(c) for contributory infringement.

The legislative background of section 271(c) makes clear that the district court

was correct to construe that statute as confined to its plain terms. Prior to the 1952

Patent Act, no statute defined contributory infringement. Instead, as a result of court

decisions, infringement was divided into two categories: “direct infringement,” which was

the unauthorized making, using, or selling of the patented invention, and “contributory

infringement,” which was “any other activity where, although not technically making,

using, or selling, the defendant displayed sufficient culpability to be held liable as an

infringer.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.

1990). The 1952 Act did not make a substantive change in the law of contributory

infringement, but it divided the judicially created category of contributory infringement

into two statutory subsections, section 271(b) (inducement of infringement) and section

271(c) (contributory infringement). The most common type of pre-1952 contributory

05-1490,-1551 24
infringement cases were those in which “a seller would sell a component that was not

covered by the claims of a patent but which had no other use except the claimed

product or process.” Id. That form of contributory infringement was codified in section

271(c). Id.

The Senate Report on the 1952 Act confirms that section 271(c) was intended to

deal with a particular subset of what had previously been considered contributory

infringement, consisting of cases in which a party sells a particular component that is

known to be intended for an infringing use and is useful only for infringement. The

Senate Report states that section 271(b) recites “in broad terms that one who aids and

abets an infringement is likewise an infringer” whereas section 271(c) deals specifically

with the most common form of contributory infringement and “is much more restricted

than many proponents of contributory infringement believe should be the case.” S. Rep.

No. 89-1959, at 8, 28 (1952) (characterizing section 271(c) as applying to “one who

sells a component part of a patented invention or material or apparatus for use therein”),

reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402, 2421; see also Jones v. Radio Corp. of

Am., 131 F. Supp. 83, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (in light of legislative history of 1952 Act,

section 271(c) does not apply if the defendant did not sell a component of the patented

combination).

In summary, the district court correctly concluded that the defendants did not sell

a product and that what they provided to customers was a service for compensation.

The evidence showed that the cord blood the defendants collected and preserved was

never their property; instead, it remained the property of the families who engaged their

services. The defendants were never the owners of the blood and thus never “sold” the

05-1490,-1551 25
blood to the families when it was needed. The district court therefore properly held that

the defendants could not be found liable for contributory infringement under section

271(c). 1

There is another reason why the jury’s verdict in this case cannot stand. The

court instructed the jury, without objection from PharmaStem, that it was necessary for

the sale in question to be made “to a transplanter.” Yet even if a sale of a service were

deemed sufficient to constitute a “sale” for purposes of section 271(c), there was no

evidence that any of the defendants made a sale of either products or services to the

transplanters. To the contrary, the evidence showed that the service the defendants

provided was a service to the donor families, for which the families paid a fee, and that

1
The parties and the district court discussed the issue of joint infringement in
the context of determining whether there was infringing conduct sufficient to serve as a
predicate for a finding of contributory infringement. PharmaStem did not argue before
the district court, and does not argue here, that liability could be premised on a theory of
“joint” or “divided” infringement, even in the absence of a finding of contributory
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Under that theory, two related parties are both
deemed liable for direct infringement of a method patent when each performs some
steps of the claimed method. The viability and scope of that theory of liability is a
subject of considerable debate; it has been addressed in a number of district court
cases, adverted to in a few of this court’s cases, and discussed at some length by
commentators. See On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424
F.3d 1293, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Kristin E. Gerdelman, Subsequent Performance of
Process Steps by Different Entities: Time to Close Another Loophole in U.S. Patent
Law, 53 Emory L.J. 1987 (2004); Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33
AIPLA Q.J. 255 (2005); Sriranga Veeraraghavan, Joint Infringement of Patent Claims:
Advice for Patentees, 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L.J. 211 (2006). That
issue is squarely presented in a case now pending before this court, BMC Resources,
Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 2006-1503. In this case, PharmaStem’s theory of liability
was that the defendants were liable under section 271(c) for contributory infringement,
not under section 271(a) for direct infringement, and PharmaStem has continued to
press that theory on appeal. We therefore are not presented with the question whether
the defendants could have been held liable under section 271(a) under a theory of joint
direct infringement through their activities in conjunction with the transplanters.
05-1490,-1551 26
there was no sale of any sort by the defendants to the transplanters or any fee paid by

the transplanters to the defendants. The defendants simply transferred the cord blood

units to designated transplanters upon direction from the families. Such a transaction

does not constitute a “sale” to a transplanter under any definition of the term “sale.”

Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that the jury’s verdict was legally

insufficient to establish infringement under the law of the case as given by the court to

the jury and accepted by the parties. We therefore uphold the portion of the court’s

judgment granting the defendants’ JMOL motions with respect to the ’553 patent.

V

The jury returned verdicts in favor of PharmaStem on the defendants’

counterclaims challenging the validity of the two patents in suit. In its opinion on the

defendants’ JMOL motions, the district court held that the jury’s verdicts on the validity

issues were supported by substantial evidence. In their cross-appeal, the defendants

contest the portions of the trial court’s judgment rejecting their challenges to the patents

on grounds of anticipation, obviousness, and (in the case of the ’681 patent)

indefiniteness. Each of those issues presents a close question. Because we hold that

the district court should have granted the defendants’ motion for JMOL on the issue of

obviousness, it is not necessary for us to address the defendants’ arguments with

respect to the issues of indefiniteness and anticipation.

A

Obviousness is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. The statutory

standard requires us to decide whether the subject matter of the claimed invention

“would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person of ordinary

05-1490,-1551 27
skill in the art to which [the subject matter of the invention] pertains.” 35 U.S.C.

§ 103(a); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir.

2006); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d

1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Underpinning that legal issue are factual questions

relating to the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art

and the claimed invention, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and any relevant

secondary considerations, such as commercial success, long-felt need, and the failure

of others. See Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1377; DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1360; Medichem, S.A. v.

Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Under Third Circuit law, which in

this case dictates the standard for reviewing the denial of the motion for JMOL, we

review the district court’s action “de novo by reapplying the JMOL standard” applied by

the district court. Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir.

2005). Thus, in reviewing the denial of the JMOL motion on the issue of obviousness,

we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine

whether a reasonable jury could have found all the facts necessary to support the

verdict of nonobviousness, i.e., whether substantial evidence supports the verdict. See

Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2005); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

B

The defendants contend that the two patents in suit are invalid for obviousness

based on a combination of several prior art references. In such a case, the burden falls

on the patent challenger to show by clear and convincing evidence that a person of

ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to attempt to make the composition or

05-1490,-1551 28
device, or carry out the claimed process, and would have had a reasonable expectation

of success in doing so. See Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1164; Noelle v. Lederman, 355

F.3d 1343, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris,

Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127

S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007) (a combination of elements “must do more than yield a

predictable result”; combining elements that work together “in an unexpected and fruitful

manner” would not have been obvious).

In view of the prior art references, the first part of that test is plainly satisfied

here. The idea of using cryopreserved cord blood to effect hematopoietic reconstitution

was not new at the time the inventors filed the applications that matured into the ’681

and ’553 patents. Two of the prior art references—articles by Ende and Knudtzon—

suggest using cord blood for that purpose. Two others—an article by Koike and a

doctoral dissertation by Vidal—suggest cryopreservation and storage of the cord blood

until needed. Accordingly, this is not a case in which there is any serious question

whether there was a suggestion or motivation to devise the patented composition or

process.

The more difficult question is whether the prior art would have given rise to a

reasonable expectation of success in creating the process claimed in the ’553 patent

and the composition claimed in the ’681 patent. In addressing that question, the parties

focus on whether the inventors had a reasonable expectation that cord blood could be

successfully used in transplants for hematopoietic reconstitution.

On the question whether the inventors had a reasonable expectation of success,

the district court relied principally on testimony by PharmaStem’s expert, Dr. Irwin

05-1490,-1551 29
Bernstein. In testimony cited by the court, Dr. Bernstein explained that there were

problems with transplant tissues that had been used previously, including bone marrow

and adult blood; that those working in the transplant field did not believe blood would be

suitable as a transplant tissue; and that researchers in his group were surprised at the

successful result of the first transplant of cord blood into a human. That evidence,

according to the court, justified the jury in finding that persons of skill in the field of

hematopoietic reconstitution “would not have expected cord blood to be a successful

transplant tissue.” In light of that evidence and the evidence of secondary

considerations such as long-felt need and commercial success, and in light of the PTO’s

issuance of the patents over several of the prior art references that were in issue at trial,

the court concluded that “there is no basis to overturn the jury’s verdict that the Patents-

In-Suit are not obvious.”

The defendants argue that the prior art suggested using cryopreserved cord

blood for hematopoietic reconstitution and showed that persons of skill in the field would

have had a reasonable expectation that the use of cord blood in transplants would be

successful. For that reason, according to the defendants, the asserted claims were

obvious as a matter of law.

Like the district court, PharmaStem relies principally on Dr. Bernstein’s testimony

to support its argument that the asserted claims of the ’681 and ’553 patents were not

invalid for obviousness. Citing his testimony, PharmaStem argues that those skilled in

the art at the time of the inventions “did not even yet know of the presence of stem cells

in cord blood.” PharmaStem argues that Dr. Bernstein’s assertion that it was not known

that cord blood contained stem cells, combined with his testimony regarding problems

05-1490,-1551 30
with transplant tissues used prior to the ’681 and ’553 patents, shows that those in the

field of hematopoietic reconstitution “would not have expected cord blood to be a

successful transplant tissue.”

The cornerstone of Dr. Bernstein’s testimony at trial was that none of the prior art

showed that cord blood contains stem cells. According to Dr. Bernstein, the presence

of stem cells in cord blood was not conclusively established before the mouse studies

described in the joint specification and the 1988 human cord blood transplant referred to

in the specification of the ’553 patent.

The problem with Dr. Bernstein’s testimony about the prior art references is that it

cannot be reconciled with statements made by the inventors in the joint specification

and with the prior art references themselves. Dr. Bernstein distinguished each of the

prior art references on the ground that none of them disclosed the presence of stem

cells in cord blood. Even though some of the references referred to stem cells as being

present in cord blood, Dr. Bernstein took the position that those statements in the prior

art references reflected flawed nomenclature and that the most the data underlying the

prior art references showed was that cord blood contained progenitor cells. Progenitor

cells are the cells that generate several different types of cells that make up the blood

and immune system but are less primitive than hematopoietic stem cells. According to

Dr. Bernstein, it was not proved that stem cells, as opposed to the less primitive

progenitor cells, are present in cord blood until the patentees performed the mouse

experiments reported in the joint specification. Those experiments showed that

relatively small amounts of fetal blood were sufficient to effect hematopoietic

reconstitution in lethally irradiated mice. Dr. Bernstein added that in light of the poor

05-1490,-1551 31
results obtained with transplantations of adult blood “it had to take a leap of thinking that

cord blood was different.”

The joint specification, however, tells a different story. There, the inventors

acknowledged that it was previously known that the properties of cord blood are quite

different from those of adult blood and that hematopoietic stem cells had been found in

cord blood in much greater concentrations than in adult blood. Citing a number of

references, the inventors stated the following:

A human hematopoietic colony-forming cell with the ability to
generate progenitors for secondary colonies has been identified in human
umbilical cord blood. In addition, hematopoietic stem cells have been
demonstrated in human umbilical cord blood, by colony formation, to occur
at a much higher level than that found in the adult. The presence of
circulating hematopoietic progenitor cells in human fetal blood has also
been shown. Human fetal and neonatal blood has been reported to
contain megakaryocyte and burst erythroblast progenitors with increased
numbers of erythroid progenitors in human cord blood or fetal liver relative
to adult blood.

’681 patent, col. 4, ll. 15–34 (citations omitted); ’553 patent, col. 4, ll. 21–42 (citations

omitted).

That excerpt from the specification cannot be squared with Dr. Bernstein’s

characterization of the prior art. Contrary to Dr. Bernstein’s contention that the prior art

did not disclose the presence of stem cells in cord blood, the inventors cited several

prior art references and stated flatly that “hematopoietic stem cells have been

demonstrated in human umbilical cord blood.” Moreover, the inventors noted that the

prior art references showed that the concentration of stem cells in cord blood was “at a

much higher level than in the adult.” Nor can those statements in the specification be

dismissed as reflecting a careless use of the term “hematopoietic stem cell,” i.e., the

use of that term when the inventors meant to refer to progenitor cells. That is made

05-1490,-1551 32
clear by context, as the sentence that immediately follows the reference to

“hematopoietic stem cells” states that “the presence of hematopoietic progenitor cells in

human fetal blood has also been shown.”

Accordingly, PharmaStem’s argument that stem cells had not been proved to

exist in cord blood prior to the experiments described in the patents is contrary to the

representation in the specification that the prior art disclosed stem cells in cord blood.

Admissions in the specification regarding the prior art are binding on the patentee for

purposes of a later inquiry into obviousness. See Constant v. Advanced Micro Devices,

Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“A statement in the patent that something is

in the prior art is binding on the applicant and patentee for determinations of anticipation

and obviousness.”); Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1577–79 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

(patent specification admitted that certain matter was prior art, and thus “the jury was

not free to disregard [that matter]” and “must have accepted [it] as prior art, as a matter

of law”); In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 300 (CCPA 1982); In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 571

(CCPA 1975).

Nor is there any unfairness in holding the inventors to the consequences of their

admissions, as their characterization of the prior art as showing the presence of stem

cells in cord blood is hardly unreasonable. At trial, the defendants’ expert

acknowledged that, prior to the time of the first successful cord blood transplant, stem

cells could not be conclusively proved to be present in cord blood. He explained,

however, that in light of the discovery of substantial numbers of progenitor cells in cord

blood—roughly equivalent to the number of such cells in bone marrow—it was

05-1490,-1551 33
appropriate for the authors of the prior art references to infer the presence of stem cells

in cord blood, even though positive proof of their presence was not available.

The prior art references provide strong support for that interpretation. Mouse

studies reported by Barnes in a 1964 article showed that the blood of fetal and neonatal

mice contained a much greater concentration of colony-forming units (i.e., progenitor

cells) than adult blood. Barnes identified the colonies in question as containing stem

cells. A 1974 article by Knudtzon similarly noted that an “increased concentration of

hemopoietic stem cells has been found in the blood of mouse embryos when compared

to the concentration after birth.” Knudtzon also conducted tests on human umbilical

cord blood, determining that the concentration of in vitro colony-forming cells in cord

blood is likewise much greater than in human adult blood and that the concentration is

comparable to the concentration in bone marrow tissue. Knudtzon concluded that “the

finding of an increased concentration of colony-forming cells in human cord blood

comparable in number with human bone marrow cultures indicates that cord blood

might be used as a source of hemopoietic stem cells for the restoration of bone marrow

function in humans.” Two years later, a case study by Ende reported a transfusion of

45 milliliters of human cord blood into a human patient, which resulted in a temporary

hematopoietic graft that lasted for five weeks. Ende cited other research indicating that

a similar or even larger amount of bone marrow would be needed to achieve a

successful permanent graft.

A 1978 article by Prindull noted that animal experiments showed that fetal blood

contains more than 100 times as many stem cells as are present in adult blood and

suggested that because the fetal hematopoietic system is in a state of physiologic

05-1490,-1551 34
proliferation, human cord blood could constitute a source of hematopoietic stem cells.

An article by Koike, in 1982, described the results of freezing and thawing cells derived

from bone marrow and cord blood. It showed that even immature progenitor cells can

survive cryopreservation and concluded that because cord blood contains “many

pluripotent and nearby progenitor cells comparable to marrow cells,” cord blood or other

fetal tissue could be a useful source of hematopoietic progenitor cells for

transplantation. In 1985, a doctoral dissertation by Vidal concluded, based on various

studies, that “cord blood contains sufficient hematopoietic stem cells to effect a

transplant,” that “cord blood can be used for this purpose,” and that “cryopreserved cord

blood banks might exist.”

That collection of prior art shows (1) that bone marrow transplants can result in

hematopoietic reconstitution; (2) that cord blood, like bone marrow but unlike adult

blood, contains large numbers of progenitor cells; and (3) that the high concentration of

primitive progenitor cells in cord blood suggests that in humans, as in mice, the cells

responsible for hematopoiesis migrate at about the time of birth from fetal organs to the

bone marrow. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for the inventors of the

patent, like the authors of the prior art references, to infer the presence of high

concentrations of stem cells in cord blood, even though the prior art studies did not offer

conclusive proof of their presence.

C

Given that the jury was legally required to find that that those of skill in the art

would believe that cord blood contained hematopoietic stem cells, the question before

us is whether a reasonable jury could nonetheless have found the invention

05-1490,-1551 35
nonobvious. We conclude a reasonable jury could not have done so. While the

inventors may have proved conclusively what was strongly suspected before—that

umbilical cord blood is capable of hematopoietic reconstitution—and while their work

may have significantly advanced the state of the science of hematopoietic

transplantations by eliminating any doubt as to the presence of stem cells in cord blood,

the mouse experiments and the conclusions drawn from them were not inventive in

nature. Instead, the inventors merely used routine research methods to prove what was

already believed to be the case. Scientific confirmation of what was already believed to

be true may be a valuable contribution, but it does not give rise to a patentable

invention. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1732 (“Granting patent protection to advances that

would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress . . . .”);

Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1367–69 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (simply because

the formation and properties of a new compound must be verified through testing does

not mean that the compound satisfies the test for patentability “since the expectation of

success need only be reasonable, not absolute”); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091,

1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Obviousness does not require absolute predictability.”). Good

science and useful contributions do not necessarily result in patentability.

This court’s decision in In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988),

provides useful guidance for determining whether the expectation of success from a

particular line of inquiry is great enough to render a resulting invention obvious. The

court noted that obviousness “does not require absolute predictability of success.

Indeed, for many inventions that seem quite obvious, there is no absolute predictability

of success until the invention is reduced to practice.” 853 F.2d at 903. On the other

05-1490,-1551 36
hand, the court explained, an invention would not be invalid for obviousness if the

inventor would have been motivated “to vary all parameters or try each of numerous

possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art

gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of

many possible choices is likely to be successful.” Id. Likewise, an invention would not

be deemed obvious if all that was suggested “was to explore a new technology or

general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the

prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or

how to achieve it.” Id.; see also Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1166–

67 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

This case is not one in which “the prior art gave either no indication of which

parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to

be successful,” nor is it one in which the prior art “gave only general guidance as to the

particular form of the invention or how to achieve it.” O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903. The

prior art suggested cryopreserving cord blood from a single infant and transplanting that

blood into a patient to achieve hematopoietic reconstitution. PharmaStem does not

suggest, and Dr. Bernstein’s testimony did not reveal, that there was an array of

possible choices as to how to achieve that objective or that there were problems to be

solved in implementing the prior art suggestion that were not adumbrated in the prior

art. To the contrary, the joint specification indicates that each step of the

cryopreservation and transplantation procedure had been spelled out in the prior art.

PharmaStem does not claim that there was anything novel about the method by which it

proposed to collect, cryopreserve, and transplant the cord blood. Instead, in responding

05-1490,-1551 37
to the defendants’ obviousness challenge, PharmaStem focuses entirely on the

purported novelty of its proof that stem cells are present in fetal blood, a demonstration

that Dr. Bernstein testified was necessary to give transplant physicians sufficient

confidence in the use of cord blood for hematopoietic reconstitution to try the procedure

on humans. As we have explained, however, providing proof sufficient to justify

conducting in vivo procedures on humans, while useful, is not a test of patentability.

The evidence at trial demonstrated that the patentees did not invent a new procedure or

a new composition; instead, they simply provided experimental proof that the cord blood

could be used to effect hematopoietic reconstitution of mice and, by extrapolation, could

be expected to work in humans as well.

D

In addition to its reliance on Dr. Bernstein’s testimony about the prior art

references, PharmaStem invokes various secondary considerations that it contends

support the jury’s verdict on obviousness. In particular, PharmaStem points to evidence

that the inventors were widely recognized as pioneers in the use of cord blood for

hematopoietic reconstitution, including statements by the defendants and their

representatives. Defendant ViaCord’s business plan praised the inventors as

“trailblazers,” and a founder of defendant Cryo-Cell wrote to the inventors’ company and

stated: “[N]o one will ever dispute that you, as the pioneers in the medical technology

. . . will be the frontrunners in the field of utilizing the blood from the umbilical cord for

restoring hematopoietic [sic] through marrow transplants.” Even the defendants’ expert

had previously referred to the inventors as the first to suggest the use of human

umbilical cord blood as a source of transplantable hematopoietic stem cells, although he

05-1490,-1551 38
disclaimed those statements at trial on the ground that he had subsequently determined

that it was incorrect to give the inventors credit for conceiving the invention. The

problem with that evidence is that there was no indication that the praise for the

inventors’ work was based on any inventive contribution they made, as opposed to their

proof, through laboratory work, that fetal blood contains large numbers of stem cells. As

noted, the former is a basis for patentability; the latter is not.

PharmaStem also points to Dr. Bernstein’s testimony that researchers in his

group in Seattle were “surprised” at the successful human cord blood transplantation in

1988. There are two problems with that evidence. First, there was no indication that

either Dr. Bernstein or members of his research group were previously aware of the

prior art references that laid the groundwork for the inventors’ experiments. Dr.

Bernstein stated that his surprise at the successful use of cord blood was based on the

poor results obtained with transplants of adult blood; he did not state that the success of

the human transplant would have been surprising to one familiar with the prior art

references introduced at trial, including those references that featured the important

differences between adult blood and cord blood as potential transplant tissues.

Second, Dr. Bernstein tied the “surprise” of his research group to the success of

the 1988 human cord blood transplant, not to the results reported in the patents.

Although the transplant was based on work done by the inventors, it took place long

after the filing of the application for the ’681 patent and shortly before the filing of the

application for the ’553 patent. As a result, the specification of the ’681 patent does not

refer to the 1988 transplant at all, and the specification of the ’553 patent does not

contain any account of the results of that transplant. At the time of the application for

05-1490,-1551 39
the ’553 patent, all that was known and disclosed about the 1988 transplant was that it

had been attempted.

Moreover, although it is true, as PharmaStem argued, that physicians began

performing human transplants only after the inventors conducted their mouse

experiments, the evidence at trial showed that physicians were reluctant to try a new

procedure such as a cord blood transplant on humans without a very strong scientific

basis for concluding that it was likely to work. The prior art already indicated that cord

blood was likely to be a valuable source of hematopoietic stem cells; the mouse studies

merely provided supporting evidence for that conclusion, evidence that the transplant

physicians regarded as sufficient to justify trying the procedure on a human child.

E

Finally, PharmaStem argues that the jury’s verdict is supported by the decision of

the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to issue the ’681 and ’553 patents, and to

confirm the ’681 patent following reexamination, over some of the same references that

the defendants cited at trial. When the party asserting invalidity relies on references

that were considered during examination or reexamination, that party “bears the added

burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government agency

presumed to have done its job.” Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556,

1560 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323

(Fed. Cir. 1999).

The examiner who issued the reexamination certificate for the ’681 patent

summarized her analysis of the prior art by stating that none of the cited references

“addresses the presence of hematopoietic stem cells in umbilical cord or placental

05-1490,-1551 40
blood, that these cells may successfully be cryopreserved, or that, as a collection from a

single human at birth, these cells may comprise an amount that is sufficient to effect

hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult.” That explanation is flawed for three

reasons. First, as we have explained, the prior art references and the admissions in the

specification address the presence of hematopoietic stem cells in cord blood, even

though the references may not conclusively prove their presence. Second, Koike

established that cord blood could be cryopreserved without substantial losses in the

population of progenitor cells; the inventors contributed nothing more with respect to

cryopreservation, as their mouse experiments were not performed with cryopreserved

blood. Third, while the joint specification states that the amount of cord blood obtained

at the time of birth would often be sufficient to transplant an adult, the inventors reached

that conclusion simply by comparing the known properties of bone marrow against the

results of routine testing of their own cord blood samples.

The specification explains that, because of the inability to determine the number

of stem cells present in a particular composition, researchers and transplanters use

surrogate assays from which they can infer that stem cells are present and in roughly

what numbers. One of the surrogate assays that the joint specification describes in

detail and that was the subject of testimony at trial is the assay for CFU-GM (colony-

forming units for granulyte and macrophage cells), i.e., progenitor cells that produce the

more specialized granulyte and macrophage cells. The inventors compared the results

of conventional CFU-GM assays of cord blood samples with published reports of the

number of CFU-GM in bone marrow samples sufficient for successful hematopoietic

reconstitution. ’681 patent, col. 50, line 64, to col. 51, line 15; ’553 patent, col. 51, ll.

05-1490,-1551 41
44–68. Thus, the inventors reported that prior art studies showed that in cases

involving autologous bone marrow transplants, “rapid repopulation of hematopoiesis in

patients with acute leukemia was associated with as few as 0.25 million progenitor cells

[CFU-GM].” ’681 patent, col. 13, ll. 49–54. The inventors’ assays of cord blood

samples, confirmed by prior art studies, showed that 50 milliliters of cord blood would

contain up to more than 0.5 million CFU-GM. Id., col. 13, ll. 55–63. Thus, the inventors’

conclusion that a single unit of cord blood can result in hematopoietic reconstitution of

an adult was simply the result of a comparison between the well-known properties of

bone marrow and their own conventional assays of a number of samples of cord blood.

In sum, while the issue of obviousness in this case presents us with a difficult

question in light of the standards of proof and review that are applied to an appellate

challenge to a jury verdict of nonobviousness, we are persuaded that there was clear

and convincing evidence that the asserted claims of the ’681 and ’553 patents would

have been obvious and that it was unreasonable for the jury to reach the opposite

conclusion. We therefore reverse the denial of JMOL on that issue and remand to the

district court for entry of judgment in the defendants’ favor.

VI

This was a closely contested case both at trial and on appeal, and the JMOL

motions presented the district court with an unusually difficult set of challenges. We are

satisfied that the district court correctly resolved each of the issues that the parties have

raised and we have addressed on appeal, with the sole exception of the cross-appeal

on the issue of obviousness. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court with

respect to the appeal but reverse the judgment on the cross-appeal with respect to the

05-1490,-1551 42
issue of obviousness. As to that issue, we reverse and remand to the district court for

entry of judgment in the defendants’ favor.

Each party shall bear its own costs for this appeal and cross-appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

05-1490,-1551 43
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

05-1490, -1551

PHARMASTEM THERAPEUTICS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

VIACELL, INC.,
Defendant-Cross Appellant,
and

CRYO-CELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., CORCELL, INC.,
Defendants-Cross Appellants,
and

CBR SYSTEMS, INC.
(formerly known as Cord Blood Registry, Inc.),
Defendant-Cross Appellant,

v.

BIRTHCELLS TECHNOLOGY, INC. and BIO-CELL, INC.,
Defendants.

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. After a three week trial the jury sustained the validity of these

patents, the district court in a thorough opinion upheld the verdicts of validity, and validity

was confirmed in three reexaminations by the Patent and Trademark Office. Today my

colleagues on this panel hold that the inventions in the '681 patent and its continuation-in-

part the '553 patent are obvious to them, and not infringed.
 The undisputed evidence at trial was that these long-sought life-saving inventions

were achieved amid general scientific skepticism, despite the extensive research that was

being conducted by many scientists in this field, as set forth in the patents in suit. The

discoveries of these inventors were met with universal acclaim and widespread utilization,

including the founding of many commercial enterprises, all of which are reported to have

licensed the patents except for these defendants. Unimpressed by these considerations,

my colleagues on this panel now reconstruct these inventions by selection and inference,

with perfect hindsight of the discoveries. The evidence at trial was that this achievement

eluded persons working in the field, despite speculation concerning its potential and

recognition of its value if it could actually be achieved; despite the powerful interest in such

a life-saving advance. Instead, my colleagues simply reweigh selectively extracted

evidence, ignore the actual peer response and acclaim at the time these inventions were

made, and decide that this long-sought advance would have been obvious to this court.

Inventors Edward A. Boyse, Hal E. Broxmeyer, and Gordon W. Douglas made

possible a new industry with PharmaStem's predecessor Biocyte, Inc., founded by the

inventors. The record contains many publications reporting the work of these inventors,

and the evidence was undisputed that they were the first to achieve the transplantation of

umbilical cord stem cells for reconstitution of the human hematopoietic system. Although

my colleagues manage to reconstruct this extensive scientific effort as simple routine that is

obvious to judges, the processes of discovery in complex science make it particularly

necessary to view the achievement in the context of the knowledge at the time the invention

was made, and to judge it as it was judged by scientific peers at that time, with the

assistance of the hard fact of commercial success in a field in which the need was great

05-1490, -1551 2
and success had long been eluded. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18

(1966) ("Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved

needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding

the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.") (quoted in KSR International Co. v.

Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007)).

The panel majority scours the prior art for clues that could fit the eventual

achievement, and then rules that the achievement was obvious, no matter that it eluded the

others whose work is now compiled by this court so as to invalidate these patents. The

"prior art" selected by my colleagues spans many years of scientific interest and effort, yet

the ultimate discovery of the presence of stem cells along with or instead of progenitor

cells, the successful preservation of these cells, the extensive experimentation with

transplantation into animal models and ultimately into humans, and the successful

hematopoietic reconstitution of blood that has been destroyed by disease or radiation, was

not achieved in the prior art. The judicial determination of "obviousness" should be made in

the context of the state of knowledge at the time these inventions were made. Nor should

the courts lose sight of the powerful policy that underlies the patent law, whereby

recognition and protection of technological and scientific advance is legally established in

order to serve the public interest in having the benefit of such advance through economic

enterprise.

My colleagues ignore not only the scientific experts who testified at the trial, but also

the PTO examiners who conducted the three reexaminations. In Dickinson v. Zurko, 527

U.S. 150 (1999) this court was reminded of its obligation to give appropriate deference to

agency expertise, including that of the PTO. The references that are analyzed by the panel

05-1490, -1551 3
majority, in its sua sponte finding of obviousness, were before the PTO for examination and

multiple reexaminations. My colleagues do not explain where the PTO went wrong;

instead, they rearrange the past, criticize the acclaim heaped on these inventors, and

propose that if the people in this field knew what this court knows, they would not have

been so impressed.

To the contrary: the acclaim sounded by even these defendants is a powerful

testament to how this invention was viewed. From my colleagues' invalidation of these

patents on the ground of obviousness, reversing the jury verdict, I respectfully dissent. I

must also dissent from the rejection of the jury verdict of infringement, for the district court

applied a new and incorrect evidentiary standard that does not warrant ratification.

THE VALIDITY ISSUES

The jury's special verdicts upholding patent validity were sustained by the district

court on post-trial motions. The defendants raised the ever-present multiple grounds of

attack that appear in patent cases, and cross-appeal the jury verdicts on the issues of

anticipation, indefiniteness, and obviousness, but do not appeal the verdicts for the plaintiff

on the issues of inventorship, inequitable conduct, and antitrust violation. My colleagues

reverse the jury verdict of unobviousness, and decline to reach the verdicts upholding

validity on the issues of anticipation and indefiniteness. The district court sustained each of

these verdicts. These issues were also raised for multiple reexaminations, and the PTO

upheld patent validity on these grounds.

The teaching of Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 97

(1993) ("[T]he Federal Circuit is not a court of last resort. If that court had jurisdiction while

the case was pending before it, the case remains alive (barring other changes) when it

05-1490, -1551 4
comes to us. The Federal Circuit's determination that the patents were not infringed is

subject to review in this Court, and if we reverse that determination, we are not prevented

from considering the question of validity merely because a lower court thought it

superfluous."), strongly encourages our appellate review of the major issues that were

decided and appealed, if such issues would be relevant to patent validity upon further

proceedings in the Court. Review of the issues of validity that were litigated sheds further

light on the nature of the invention; leaving these issues in silent limbo, despite the

elaborate trial and appellate briefing and argument of these issues, distorts the context of

the jury verdicts as well as the reexaminations. In this context I discuss the several issues

of validity that are appealed, and explain why their judgment also warrants affirmance.

Anticipation

The jury found that the patents had not been proven invalid on the ground of

anticipation. "Anticipation" means lack of novelty; that is, that the invention was already

known. It is a factual question whose finding, when tried to a jury, is reviewed for support

by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor Danek

Group, Inc., 253 F.3d 1371, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State

Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

A patent claim is deemed anticipated when every element and limitation of the claim

is found in a single prior art reference, either explicitly or inherently. Dayco Products, Inc.

v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In order to anticipate, the

reference must place a person who has ordinary skill in the field of the invention, in

possession of the invention. See Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d

05-1490, -1551 5
1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("anticipation requires that each and every element of the

claimed invention be disclosed in a prior art reference. In addition, the prior art reference

must be enabling, thus placing the allegedly disclosed matter in the possession of the

public.")

The reference on which the defendants rely for anticipation is an article by Kenichi

Koike entitled "Cryopreservation of Pluripotent and Committed Hemopoietic Progenitor

Cells from Human Bone Marrow and Cord Blood," 25 Acta Paediatrica Japonica 275

(1983). Koike describes the preservation, by freezing in liquid nitrogen, of pluripotent and

progenitor cells of bone marrow and umbilical cord blood, and shows that these cells retain

much of their progenitor activity upon thawing. Koike does not mention stem cells, and

states that "hematopoietic progenitor cells, especially pluripotent progenitor cells are the

most important to repopulate the bone marrow." Id. at 276. Koike concludes with the

suggestion that fetal cells or organs may be a source of progenitor cells for marrow

transplantation, in the following statement:

[T]he results that cord blood cells contain many pluripotent and nearby
progenitor cells comparable to marrow cells, indicate that fetal hematopoietic
cells or organs may be useful as one of the sources of hematopoietic
progenitor cells for marrow transplantation.

Koike at 281.

The defendants argued at trial, and repeat on this appeal, that even if stem cells

were not known or shown by Koike to be present in umbilical cord blood, the claims are

"inherently" anticipated by Koike because stem cells were present even if unknown.

PharmaStem responded that inherent anticipation is avoided by lack of recognition, by lack

of enablement, and by the limitations in the claims, including for the '681 claims the

05-1490, -1551 6
limitations to therapeutic compositions and the requirements that the cryopreserved cord

blood units contain sufficient stem cells to reconstitute an adult. These aspects were

extensively probed at the trial, and witnesses explained the various claim limitations and

the prior art.

The district court, on post-trial motions, held that the jury verdict that the claims are

not anticipated was supported by substantial evidence. The court referred to testimony of

the expert witnesses for both sides, who agreed that Koike did not show hematopoietic

reconstitution using cord blood, and that Koike did not enable transplantation. The

defendant's expert witness testified (on cross-examination) that Koike's small samples

could not contain a therapeutic amount of stem cells, and that the Koike article does not

reflect knowledge of stem cells or indicate their presence to persons of skill in the field or

show how to achieve transplantation of cord blood cells. As explained in In re Donohue,

766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985), possession of the invention adequate to show

anticipation requires that a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention would discern

every element of the invention in the allegedly anticipating reference, and know how to

carry it out based on the state of knowledge at the time of the reference. See, e.g., Elan

Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found., 346 F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (a claim "cannot be

anticipated by a prior art reference if the allegedly anticipatory disclosures cited as prior art

are not enabled"). There was substantial evidence that Koike did not establish that there

were stem cells in umbilical cord blood nor teach a therapeutic composition for use in

hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult.

The '681 patent describes the prior art in detail, including the following with respect

to stem cells in human umbilical cord blood:

05-1490, -1551 7
 A human hematopoietic colony-forming cell with the ability to generate progenitors
for secondary colonies has been identified in human umbilical cord blood (Nakahata,
T. and Ogawa, M., 1982, J. Clin. Invest. 70:1324-1328). In addition, hematopoietic
stem cells have been demonstrated in human umbilical cord blood, by colony
formation, to occur at a much higher level than that found in the adult (Prindull, G.,
et al., 1978, Acta Paediatr. Scand. 67:413-416; Knudtzon, S., 1974, Blood
43(3):357-361).

'681 patent, col. 4, lines 15-24. The '681 patent explains that the differences between stem

and progenitor cells are operational and depend on functional rather than on morphological

criteria. Col. 3, lines 4-39. In functional assays, stem cells can be identified by spleen

colony forming units (CFU-S), whereas multipotent progenitor cells can be identified

through colony-forming unit-granulocyte, erythrocyte, monocyte/macrophage,

megakaryocyte (CFU-GEMM) relatively differentiated progenitor cells through

colony-forming unit-granulocyte, macrophage (CFU-GM) and burst-forming unit-erythroid

(BFU-E). Id. at col. 26, lines 1-16. Koike, in determining the viability of the cryopreserved

fetal bone marrow and cord blood, employed CFU-GM and BFU-E assays to measure

progenitor cells, not stem cells.

The patent examiner concluded, and witnesses at trial testified, that the Koike

reference is directed to progenitor cells, not stem cells. The reexamination record was in

evidence, wherein the examiner stated:

The remaining references that recited umbilical cord blood, specifically the
Koike and Vidal references, recited the cryopreservation of a Ficoll-Hypaque
fraction of umbilical cord blood and did not provide any evidence that viable
human neonatal or fetal hematopoietic stem cells were present in the thawed
samples.

Notice of Intent to Issue Reexamination Certificate at 4 (Jan. 11, 2000). The examiner

observed that Koike did not mention stem cells and did not show or enable transplantation

to an adult, and that although Koike postulated that cord blood may be a source of

05-1490, -1551 8
hematopoietic progenitor cells, Koike did not show how or if such use could be achieved.

The examiner's reasons for allowance included the following:

. . . Since hematopoietic stem cells engage in both replication and
differentiation, the presence of progenitors (differentiated stem cells) is not
predictive of the presence of stem cells. All of the prior art references which
taught the cryopreservation of a Ficoli-Hypaque fraction of umbilical cord
blood assayed for the presence of progenitor cells and merely theorized on
the presence of stem cells. None of the prior art references demonstrated
the presence of stem cells in the umbilical cord blood.

Id. When the reference relied on at trial was before the patent examiner, a reasonable jury

may give weight to the examiner's view of the reference when deciding whether invalidity

has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch &

Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (referring to the particularly heavy burden

in establishing invalidity on the same prior art that was examined in the PTO).

The defendants argue that it is irrelevant whether Koike described or recognized the

presence of stem cells in cord blood, because they were inherently there. However, as

discussed in Turbo Care Div. Of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General Electric

Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2001), "[i]n order for a disclosure to be inherent,'the

missing descriptive matter must necessarily be present in the [original] applicant's

specification such that one skilled in the art could recognize such a disclosure," (quoting

Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). As the district court pointed

out and as the expert witnesses testified, Koike does not show the claim limitations to

therapeutic compositions or that the cryopreserved blood units must be from a single

human or that stem cells must be present in an amount sufficient for hematopoietic

reconstitution of a human adult, or suggest how to conduct a successful transplantation.

Witnesses testified that persons in this field of science did not have the knowledge to

05-1490, -1551 9
routinely fill these omissions, and reinforce the examiner's statement that "the presence of

progenitors (differentiated stem cells) is not predictive of the presence of stem cells." See

Reexamination Notice of Intent, supra; see also Elan Pharmaceuticals, 346 F.3d at 1057

(discussing the need for evidence on the question of whether the reference placed a person

of ordinary skill in possession of the invention as claimed); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co.,

304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Under the doctrine of inherency, if an element is not

expressly disclosed in a prior art reference, the reference will still be deemed to anticipate a

subsequent claim if the missing element 'is necessarily present in the thing described in the

reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.'") Particularly

when the science or technology is new or complex, a bare suggestion or hope that requires

significant experimentation for implementation or verification is not an invalidating

"anticipation" of that which is ultimately achieved.

These aspects were explored at the trial, with witnesses for both sides agreeing that

it was not known, at the time of the Koike reference, how to use cord blood for marrow

transplantation and human reconstitution. The district court concluded that a reasonable

jury could have found that no single reference described all of the '681 patent claim

limitations, explicitly or inherently. The panel should review this issue in the interest of

finality, and rule that the verdict that anticipation of the '681 claimed invention had not been

established was supported by substantial evidence, and was properly sustained by the

district court.

The '553 claims are directed to method steps, including the step of introducing the

stem cells into a human host. The district court summarized the evidence as follows:

05-1490, -1551 10
 It is undisputed that Koike did not introduce cord blood into a human, which is
a necessary limitation of the '553 Patent. The defendants claim that Koike's
suggestion that introducing the stem cells into a human host should be done
is a sufficiently enabling disclosure to warrant a finding of anticipation. Even
so, the record contains substantial evidence from which a jury could find that
a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been so enabled.

PharmaStem, 2004 WL 2898061 at *4.

The defendants argue that Koike is as enabling as the patents in suit -- an argument

that could well have been rejected by the jury, for the '681 patent describes extensive

animal transplantation experiments and shows surrogate assays of over one hundred cord

blood units, and the '553 patent includes details of the transplantation of cryopreserved

fetal cord stem cells to reconstitute the blood of a five-year-old child who was suffering from

Fanconi's Anemia; in contrast with the absence of any such information in the Koike

reference. The district court held that there was substantial evidence whereby a

reasonable jury could have found that the Koike reference did not anticipate the '553

claims. I agree. The panel should review and resolve this issue, which was fully appealed,

in the interest of finality.

Indefiniteness

A similar obligation applies to the cross-appeal of validity on the ground of

indefiniteness. The matter was fully presented on the appeal to this court, and warrants

resolution.

The defendants challenged both patents under 35 U.S.C. '112, arguing that the

claims are indefinite because, at the time the patent applications were filed, stem cells in

umbilical cord and placental blood could not be identified and the stem cell content could

not be measured. The defendants' position is that measurement of stem cell content

05-1490, -1551 11
required actually transplanting the blood into a host and observing its effect, and that since

the '681 composition claims require stem cells "in an amount sufficient to effect

hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult," the defendants could not know if they were

infringing the claims. PharmaStem's position is that surrogate animal tests, as shown in its

patents, adequately measure stem cell content. PharmaStem points out that the

defendants all test the cord blood before placing it in storage and when releasing it for

transplant. The jury found that the claims were not invalid on this ground, answering

Question No. 10:

Question No. 10
Have the Defendants proven by clear and convincing evidence that
the '681 patent is indefinite in that on November 12, 1987, a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not have been able to determine from the patent
what the claimed invention covers?
YES NO X

Witnesses explained at the trial that the '681 specification describes the conduct of

surrogate assays and their use to test for stem cells, and correlates the surrogate assays

with therapeutic stem cell effect. Reviewing the evidence, the district court referred to the

expert testimony of Dr. Malcolm Moore, a cell biologist, that the patents provide "ample

information to determine the amount of cord blood needed for transplant in adults and

children, and that the scientific community has in fact performed numerous transplants into

adults. Moore Tr. at 340-348." PharmaStem, 2004 WL 2898061 at *5.

Section 112 requires that the claims point out "the subject matter which the applicant

regards as his invention," implementing the purpose of claims to identify what has been

invented and found patentable, so that "one skilled in the art would understand the bounds

of the claim when read in light of the specification." Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon,

05-1490, -1551 12
Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("If the claims read in light of the specification

reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention, '112 demands no

more.")

The courts have recognized, particularly in fields of new and evolving knowledge,

that the claims can be no more precise than the knowledge in the field permits. See

Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("'if the

claims, read in light of the specification, reasonably apprise those skilled in the art both of

the utilization and scope of the invention, and if the language is as precise as the subject

matter permits, the courts can demand no more'") (quoting Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.

Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). See also, e.g., Marley

Mouldings, Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., 417 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (when a claim "is

not insolubly ambiguous, it is not invalid for indefiniteness"); Exxon Research & Eng'g Co.

v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("if the meaning of the claim is

discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over

which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid

invalidity on indefiniteness grounds"). The defendants argue that even if this criterion is

met, it is inadequate to satisfy '112 in this case because the defendants had no way of

being certain whether any unit of cord blood infringed the claims. The defendants argue

that even if the science later evolved so that stem cell content could be directly measured,

such information did not exist when the '681 application was filed.

To patent an invention when the science or technology to which it is directed is

incompletely developed or understood, requires that it be described and claimed in terms

adequate to communicate, to persons experienced in the field of the invention, what has

05-1490, -1551 13
been discovered. The '681 patent states that "any of numerous assays for hematopoietic

stem or progenitor cells may be used." Col. 25, lines 49-50. For example:

[A]n item cell assay for CFU-S (colony forming unit-spleen) can be done. In
this assay, cells considered to be multipotential stem cells with self-renewal
capacity can be measured by counting the number of colonies (nodules) on
the spleen(s) of lethally-irradiated mice that have been inoculated with a
composition containing the cells.

Col. 26, lines 1-7. The CFU-S assay is done essentially the same way as progenitor cell

assays such as BFU-E/CFU-GEMM and CFU-GM assays. Col. 48, lines 42-43. The

specification states:

A survey of published reports indicates that the number of CFU-GM infused
for autologous bone marrow reconstitution in human patients, can be relied
on as an indicator of the potential for successful hematopoietic reconstitution
(Spitzer, G., et al., 1980, Blood 55(2): 317-323; Douay et al., 1986, Exp.
Hematol. 14:358-365). By standardizing published data by patient weight,
and assuming a patient weight of 150 pounds (67.5 kilograms), the calculated
number of CFU-GM needed for successful hematopoietic reconstitution using
autologous bone marrow cells ranges from 2-425x104, with faster recovery
noted using greater than 10x104 CFU-GM.

Col. 50, line 64 to col. 51, line 8. The expert testimony at trial explained this and other

descriptive text, whereby a reasonable jury could have concluded that the assays described

in the patent serve to ascertain whether sufficient amounts of stem cells are present in the

preserved cord blood to reconstitute the host.

It was not disputed that the information in the specification is as definite as the state

of scientific knowledge at the time of filing. It has been recognized that the "existence of an

inescapable area of uncertainty is not sufficient justification for denying to the patentee the

fruits of his invention." Ga. Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir.

1958) ("the policy of the patent statute contemplates granting protection to valid inventions,

and this policy would be defeated if protection were to be accorded only to those patents

05-1490, -1551 14
which were capable of precise definition. The judicial function requires a balancing of these

competing considerations in the individual case.") The district court fulfilled this judicial

function, stating, in denying the defendants' motion for JMOL, that: "Given that there is no

determinate or determinable minimum amount of cord blood for therapeutic usefulness in

humans, the record supports that the '681 claim language is as precise as the subject

matter permits." PharmaStem, 2004 WL 2898061 at *5 (citing Hybritech, supra). As the

district court ruled, there was substantial evidence whereby the jury could have found that

the claims of the '681 and '553 patents would be understood by persons in the field of the

invention. The verdict that the claims are not invalid for indefiniteness should be sustained,

and should be reviewed, not left dangling on appeal.

Obviousness

The ultimate solution of a previously intractable problem can indeed appear to

become apparent in hindsight after the final successful step is taken. Yet that final step in

this case was not taken by those who came before, and was clearly not "obvious" to

contemporaries, who acclaimed the achievement. Even the defendants' expert witness

acknowledged that before the work of these inventors "stem cells could not be conclusively

proved to be present in cord blood." Maj. op. at 42. Nonetheless this court rejects the

testimony and admissions of the defendants, and uses present knowledge of the inventors'

success to find that it was obvious all along.

When trial is to a jury, the court instructs the jury as to the applicable law, and the

jury applies the law to the facts as it finds them. Appellate review is on the standard of

determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury's express or

05-1490, -1551 15
presumed factual findings, and whether the jury applied the correct law to those findings.

See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("We

review a jury verdict of obviousness to determine whether substantial evidence supports

the factual findings predicate to the legal conclusion of obviousness and whether such

findings can support the verdict, with appropriate consideration of the presumption of

validity and the requirement that obviousness be proved by clear and convincing evidence;

factual inferences are drawn and credibility determinations are accepted in favor of the

verdict winner.") The question is whether the jury's verdict is sustainable on the evidence

presented, not whether we could have or would have gone the other way on the evidence

presented.

The jury answered "NO" to the question whether the '681 and '553 claimed

inventions "would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the field of the

invention." Responding to the defendants' challenge to the verdict, PharmaStem points to

the evidence of the extensive research in this field of science -- much of which is set forth in

the patent specifications -- and to the specific claim limitations. The broadest composition

claim (the '681 patent) is as follows:

1. A cryopreserved therapeutic composition comprising:
viable human neonatal or fetal hematopoietic stem cells derived from
the umbilical cord blood or placental blood of a single human collected at the
birth of said human,
in which said cells are present in an amount sufficient to effect
hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult;
and an amount of cryopreservative sufficient for cryopreservation of
said cells.

05-1490, -1551 16
This claim was the subject of two reexaminations, one preceding this litigation, the second

completed during the past year. For the first reexamination, the examiner's reasons for

allowance included the following:

The claims as amended now avoid the prior art for the following reasons.
First, it was noted that the only piece of prior art which taught a composition
which could have combined an amount of viable human neonatal or fetal
hematopoietic stem cells sufficient to effect hematopoietic reconstitution of a
human adult was the reference of Ende. The Ende reference, published in
1972, recited the treatment of an individual undergoing treatment for
leukemia who received a series of cord blood infusions from multiple donors
and showed a transient change in red blood cell phenotype. Even though the
authors of the Ende article describe the procedure as "transplantation," it is
clear that such treatment did not result in hematopoietic reconstitution.
Further, since no HLA typing was performed, and multiple infusions were
performed, one of ordinary skill in the art would have taken the disclosure of
Ende to be equivalent to blood transfusions and would have had no
expectation that the hematopoietic reconstitution of a human adult could have
been performed. As a transfusion composition, one of ordinary skill would
have had no motivation to cryopreserve the cord blood, since whole blood for
transfusion is not frozen, but stored st 4"C and Ende further points out that
any hospital with a maternity ward would provide sufficient aliquots of fresh
cord blood.

Notice of Intent to Issue Reexamination Certificate at 3-4 (Jan. 11, 2000). The examiner

discussed the state of the science, the content of the prior art, the known sensitivity of fetal

liver and thymus stem cells to freezing, and the unpredictability of this field, and concluded:

This disclosure combined with the acknowledged sensitivity of hematopoietic
stem cells from fetal liver and thymus to cryopreservation and the fact that
DMSO is toxic to fetal liver progenitor cells at concentrations nontoxic to bone
marrow cells provides an unpredictability in the art of cryopreservation of
stem cells from different sources that renders the suggestions of the prior art
references as to the therapeutic uses of umbilical cord blood (whether
cryopreserved or not) as a course of hematopoietic stem cells a situation of
"obvious to try," which fails to provide a prima facie finding of obviousness . .
..

Id. at 4.

05-1490, -1551 17
 For the second reexamination, the examiner discussed additional arguments

involving the same references on which this court now relies to invalidate the patent:

At the time of the instant invention the use of cord blood for hematopoietic
reconstitution had never been accomplished. Additionally, in vitro expansion
of cord-blood stem cells prior to patient implantation had not been
successfully employed, and indeed is not in use as of today as indicated by
the Dr. Zander declaration. Accordingly, determination of a pharmaceutically
efficacious and safe dosage that results in human adult hematopoietic
reconstitution would necessarily require undue experimentation, thus
precluding enablement. In this respect, it was patentee's in vitro progenitor
assays taken in conjunction with in vitro mice testing showing hematopoietic
reconstitution with a relatively small amount of neonatal blood, that provided
the necessary teaching to enable the obtaining of effective hematopoietic
reconstituting dosages in children (extrapolatable to adults) by utilizing cord
blood volumes (50-100 ml) derived from a single adult. Thus, neither the
Koike reference taken alone anticipates, nor a combination of references
render obvious, the instantly claimed invention.

Reexamination -- Reasons for Patentability/Confirmation (Dec. 29, 2006). No error has

been shown in this analysis, which warrants deference in accordance with the strictures of

the Administrative Procedure Act. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 164 ("A reviewing

court reviews an agency's reasoning to determine whether it is "arbitrary" or "capricious,"

or, if bound up with a record-based factual conclusion, to determine whether it is supported

by "substantial evidence."), citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 89-93 (1943).

The record contains testimony that scientists working in the field of hematopoietic

reconstitution did not expect cord blood to be a successful transplant tissue or a useful

source of hematopoietic stem cells. There was testimony that earlier efforts at using cord

blood had encountered problems, and that there was skepticism and surprise at the

inventors' achievement. The reaction of scientific peers after the achievement is relevant to

whether the invention would indeed have been obvious at the time it was made. See

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

05-1490, -1551 18
(evidence of skepticism that the multi-mode treatment of the invention could be achieved

supported the jury verdict of nonobviousness); Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory

Corp. of America Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (evidence that skilled

artisans were initially skeptical about the invention supported the jury's verdict of

nonobviousness).

The significance of the inventors' work was in evidence, including their founding of

Biocyte and spawning of the industry of collecting and cryofreezing umbilical cord blood. In

evidence was defendant ViaCord's "business plan" which identified these inventors as "the

trailblazers":

The founding scientists are core researchers in this field and have published
many related articles. Biocyte's time, energies, and financial resources have
been spent doing much education and development in this field. They are
the trailblazers.

A communication to these inventors from the founder of defendant Cryo-Cell stated:

[N]o one will ever dispute that you, as the pioneers in the medical technology
. . . will be the frontrunners in the field of utilizing of the blood from the
umbilical cord for restoring hematopoietic through marrow transplants.

Such evidence assists in replacing judicial hindsight with objective determination as of the

time of the invention. See Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir.

1984) (in "determining the question of obviousness, inquiry should always be made into

whatever objective evidence of nonobviousness there may be"). In Graham v. John Deere

Co, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 36 (1966) the Court counseled that "Such secondary considerations

as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., "serve to guard

against slipping into use of hindsight and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art

the teachings of the invention in issue," cited in KSR v. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.

05-1490, -1551 19
 PharmaStem's expert, Dr. Bernstein, testified that no prior art showed that cord

blood contains stem cells, and that persons of skill in this field would not have had a

reasonable expectation of success in carrying out the claimed process. Dr. Bernstein also

discussed the early uncertainties and mistaken understanding concerning stem and

progenitor cells. His testimony is now disputed by this court, denying it the weight that a

reasonable jury could have given it. Dr. Bernstein had explained at the trial that at the time

of filing the patent application the differences between stem cells and progenitor cells could

not be measured and were not well understood. The jury could have accepted this

testimony, and indeed the defendants did not refute it; but the panel majority now holds that

the inventors' apparently inconsistent use of stem and progenitor terminology constitutes an

"admission[] in the specification regarding the prior art" which is then "binding on the

patentee for purposes of a later inquiry into obviousness." Maj. op. at 42. This is not a

simple issue, but the jury could reasonably have concluded, as did the district court, that

the prior art did not show that there were stem cells in cord blood, and that one of ordinary

skill in this field would not have had a reasonable expectation of successful use of cord

blood to reconstitute a human adult.

A reasonable jury could have found that these inventors were not simply conducting

a routine optimization, as my colleagues now rule on what they describe as the "more

difficult question [of] whether the prior art would have given rise to a reasonable expectation

of success in creating the [claimed inventions]." My colleagues state that they are "plainly

satisfied" that "a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to attempt to

make [the claimed inventions]." I agree that there was reason to seek a cure for destroyed

blood cells, and that scientists have been seeking such a cure for a long time, including

05-1490, -1551 20
those scientists whose work is the cited prior art. There has been much hopeful

speculation about the potential of stem cells, although this remedy eluded those who came

before.

It is often far easier to recognize the problem than to find and demonstrate the

solution. The patent law recognizes that advances of great power may be based as much

on persistent and skilled investigation as on the flash of creative genius, for both serve to

transcend that which was previously achieved. See 35 U.S.C. '103 ("Patentability shall not

be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.") My colleagues go too far

in limiting the patent system to the serendipitous and the unexpected. Maj. op. at 35

("while their work may have significantly advanced the state of the science of hematopoietic

transplantations by eliminating any doubt as to the presence of stem cells in cord blood,"

they "merely used routine research methods to prove what was already believed to be the

case"). Further, these scientists not only established the presence of stem cells, but also

enabled their development for preservation and hematopoietic reconstitution.

The court's approach reflects misperception of the scientific process as well as the

patent purpose. Scientific methodology usually starts with a hypothesis based on what is

already known; the record shows that several scientists mentioned the idea of rebuilding

destroyed blood cells. However, none achieved this long-sought goal, and the record

shows the extreme skepticism concerning even the possibility of this achievement. The

district court found that there was "tremendous skepticism in the transplant field regarding

the use of cord blood as a transplant tissue," and that the jury could have found that "prior

to the inventions of the Patents-in-suit, those in the field of hematopoietic reconstitution

would not have expected cord blood to be a successful transplant tissue."

05-1490, -1551 21
 Nonetheless, my colleagues deny the value of this long-sought result, whereby for

the first time umbilical blood was preserved and recovered and used to reconstitute the

hematopoietic systems in mammals, demonstrated with the mice experiments reported in

the '681 patent, and the human transplant in the '553 patent. Not even the defendants

denigrate the inventors' achievement as "merely supporting evidence" for an "expected"

result, as in the maj. op. at 39. Even if this court were not required to recognize the

substantial evidence in support of the jury verdict, even if APA deference were not required

to the three PTO reexaminations, one must pause at the powerful evidence of the acclaim

that was accorded to this achievement, by these defendants as well as by scientific peers.

There was substantial evidence whereby the jury could have sustained the

unobviousness of the '681 and '553 inventions. I must, respectfully, dissent from the panel

majority's invalidation of these patents on this ground.

INFRINGEMENT

The jury found infringement of the '681 and '553 patents. In determining whether

substantial evidence supported the verdict, the evidence before the jury and all reasonable

inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light that is favorable to the verdict, without

substituting the court's view of the evidence for that of the jury. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986); see SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp.,

225 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("In reviewing the record, we must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party, and not make credibility

determinations or substitute our view of the conflicting evidence for that of the jury.") My

colleagues, like the district court, grant JMOL on a ruling of law and evidence that was not

presented to the jury, and that in all events does not support reversal of the verdict.

05-1490, -1551 22
 My colleagues appear to hold that infringement cannot be found because the

cryopreserved cord blood "relates only as possibilities" for "future use in adult transplants."

Indeed, this entire system is designed for possible future needs of the infant itself or family

members. The defendants' testimony was uniformly to the effect that this "possibility" was

the purpose of their preservation service (the record also describes a case in which the

cord blood was used to treat the mother's existing disease). The evidence was that most

but not all of the cryopreserved cord blood that has been transplanted was to children, with

about ten percent transplanted to adults. PharmaStem is correct that this ratio relates to

damages, and does not simply serve to negate all liability for infringement.

The district court ruled that PharmaStem had not proved infringement because

PharmaStem did not separately analyze the stem cell content of each sample of cord

blood. PharmaStem presented evidence that separate analysis was unnecessary because

each defendant had analyzed each sample before accepting it for storage. Every

defendant testified that the blood it collected and stored was analyzed for cell content at the

time of collection. The jury was not instructed that such evidence was inadequate and

inadmissible -- as the district court ruled post-trial. On the evidence presented, this is not a

sound basis for rejecting the jury's verdict. The tardy rejection of the testimony of

PharmaStem's expert witness, Dr. Hendrix, is an inappropriate application of Daubert and

its succeeding cases, on which the panel majority relies, for there was no criticism of the

expert's scientific credentials or her analysis of the prior art and the state of the science.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (for a scientific assertion to

"qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific

05-1490, -1551 23
method"); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (the principles of Daubert

apply broadly to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge").

The district court's ground of exclusion was not that Dr. Hendrix made an error of law

or of scientific fact, but simply that she also stated her opinion concerning the defendants'

marketing statements that they test and preserve cord and neonatal blood for possible

future child and adult use -- testimony that the district court criticized because it did not

require scientific expertise. Whatever the virtue of that criticism, it is clear that the district

court's (and my colleagues') exclusion of the entire testimony of this eminent scientist on

this ground is not what the Daubert ruling is about. There was no testimony contrary to the

view of Dr. Hendrix of the scope of the representations made in the marketing materials,

and no challenge to the accuracy of her statements. Presentation of expert testimony was

in compliance with the general rule that "typically expert testimony will be necessary in

cases involving complex technology," Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361,

1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and this expert's testimony did not cross the boundaries of

admissibility.

The '681 Patent

The district court granted JMOL of noninfringement of the '681 patent on the ground

that PharmaStem had not proved that 100% of the defendants' preserved cord and

neonatal blood contained sufficient stem cells to reconstitute an adult. The district court

reasoned that since PharmaStem took the litigation position that it was entitled to damages

measured as a royalty based on 100% of the preserved blood, to prove infringement

PharmaStem had to prove that 100% of the preserved blood contained sufficient stem cells

05-1490, -1551 24
to provide adult reconstitution, by analyzing 100% of the preserved blood. As I have

mentioned, PharmaStem complains that this criterion differed from that on which the jury

was instructed, and also states that even this criterion was met by substantial evidence

presented at the trial.

My colleagues, overturning the jury verdict, hold that there is no infringement of the

'681 patent because PharmaStem did not retest every unit of stored blood to determine its

stem cell content. They ignore the evidence that every unit was tested by each defendant

before being placed into cryogenic storage; every defendant so testified. It was not

disputed that retesting of every unit could use up a significant amount of the precious

preserved blood. No defendant asserted that it routinely cryogenically preserved cord

blood that did not contain sufficient stem cells to be potentially useful for hematopoetic

reconstitution. A reasonable jury could have considered this evidence to find that each

element of the claims was met. Instead, my colleagues simply rule that without testing of

the stored units there can be no liability at all. That evidentiary theory was not presented

to the jury; it is too late to criticize as legally inadequate the testimony that was based on

the defendants' own representations concerning the content of the stored umbilical and

neonatal blood.

The verdict of infringement was supported by the defendants' own testimony setting

forth their requirements for stem cell content before accepting cord blood for

cryopreservation. For example, defendant CBR's Scientific Director testified that every unit

of cord blood presented to CBR for storage is tested to see if it contains a sufficient amount

of stem cells to have "a good probability of being useful in the clinical setting." In evidence

were CBR's website statements that "transplants have occurred for the newborn himself,

05-1490, -1551 25
the newborn's mother, father, and the newborn's cousin," and "umbilical cord blood from

unrelated donors can restore hematopoiesis in adults who receive myeloablative therapy

and associated with acceptable rates of severe acute and chronic GVHD [Graft vs. Host

Disease]."

The President of defendant CorCell testified that "what our marketing materials state

[is] that it may be used to treat the donor or siblings or potentially parents," and that

although only one CorCell stored cord blood unit had thus far been transplanted, that

transplant was to an adult. There was testimony that CorCell's cord blood samples are

tested for "total nucleated, CD-34+ and viability cell counts before and after processing,"

and "a colony-forming assay is conducted to evaluate the quality and quantity of umbilical

stem cells," and that a sample is usually not preserved if its stem cell content is determined

to be unsuitable for possible future use. The jury was shown CorCell's representation to

investors that "a recent study of twenty-five (25) patients, published in the New England

Journal of Medicine, similarly indicates that cryopreserved umbilical cord blood stem cells

can be successfully engrafted in children and adults with a variety of hematologic or

immunologic disorders." The jury saw evidence that CorCell defines potential recipients of

the stored stem cells as "the family members of the newborn, mother, father, siblings and

possibly grandparents."

Defendant ViaCell's founder testified that each cord blood sample was tested to

ensure that there is a sufficient amount of stem cell content to be therapeutically useful, as

determined by ViaCell's Scientific Advisory Board. ViaCell's Senior Vice President testified

that ViaCell counts the cells in every collected sample, and that its standard procedure

states: "A minimum total NC count of 3.0 x 108 is required to proceed with processing." A

05-1490, -1551 26
ViaCell memorandum to investors stated that about 10% of all cord blood transplants were

in adults, and a ViaCell witness testified that ViaCell informs the public about adult use.

At the trial none of the defendants denied the stem cell content of the blood they

cryopreserved, other than to state that for the few cases where their analysis at collection

showed weak stem cell content they would consult with the infant's family before accepting

and freezing the blood. The jury heard the defendants' testimony and unqualified

representations concerning their screening of every stored sample of cord blood for stem

cell content, and that they did not distinguish between potential child and adult use of the

stem cells. The jury could have relied on the defendants' testimony that their minimum

threshold for cryopreservation is sufficient stem cells for transplantation, and that all of the

defendants included possible adult use in their publicly-stated reasons for storing fetal cord

and neonatal blood. PharmaStem points out that it was neither necessary nor prudent to

test each unit of the defendants' stored blood for stem cell content, when each defendant

had already done so.

The jury was instructed: "A defendant is liable for directly infringing PharmaStem's

patents if you find that PharmaStem has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that

they have made, used, offered for sale or sold a composition that includes each and every

element of at least one of the asserted claims of the '681 patent." The theory that each

stored sample had to be separately analyzed by PharmaStem to show infringement was

not presented as law to the jury. This was a new standard for infringement, for the jury was

not told that the defendants' analyses of stem cell content could not provide evidence of

stem cell content.

05-1490, -1551 27
 When there is substantial evidence in support of the jury's verdict, it is irrelevant

whether the appellate court would have preferred different or additional evidence. "When

the jury is supplied with sufficient valid factual information to support the verdict it reaches,

that is the end of a matter . . . . the jury's factual conclusion may not be set aside by a

JMOL order." McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The

district court erred in holding that it was necessary for PharmaStem to analyze, or provide

detailed analysis results, for the individual blood units in order to find infringement. My

colleagues commit the same error, reweighing the evidence to reach their preferred result,

rather than considering whether substantial evidence as presented at the trial supports the

verdict that was reached by the jury.

The '553 Patent

It was agreed at trial that the claims of the '553 patent are not infringed until the step

of transplanting the stem cells takes place. Since relatively few transplants of stored blood

had been done, the royalties awarded by the jury were modest, and were not appealed.

However, the verdict of infringement is supported by substantial evidence, and should

stand. There was substantial evidence that each step of the claimed invention is performed

by the defendants followed by a transplant surgeon. Referring to claim 13, the defendants

isolate the umbilical cord and placental blood containing stem cells and cryopreserve it in

liquid nitrogen; claim clauses (a) and (b). When instructed on behalf of the donor or family

members, the blood is delivered to a surgical environment where it is thawed, claim clause

(c), and transplanted into the human host, claim clause (d):

05-1490, -1551 28
 13. A method for hematopoietic or immune reconstitution of a human
comprising:
(a) isolating human neonatal or fetal blood components containing
hematopoietic stem cells;
(b) cryopreserving the blood components;
(c) thawing the blood components; and
(d) introducing the blood components into a suitable human host,
such that the hematopoietic stem cells are viable and can proliferate within
the host.

The jury found the defendants liable for "acting in concert or working together" with the

transplant physicians, or contributing to the infringement of the '553 patent, upon answering

the following questions:

Question No. 3: Substantial Non-Infringing Use
Has PharmaStem proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that
cryopreserved cord blood has no substantial
noninfringing use?
YES X NO

Question No. 4: Direct Infringement
Has PharmaStem proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendants
and the transplant physicians are acting in
concert or working together to complete the
process of infringement of claims 13, 19, 47, 53,
or 57 of the '553 patent by performing each and
every one of the steps in any of those claims?
YES X NO

Question No. 5: Contributory Infringement
Has PharmaStem proven that a defendant
has contributorily infringed the '553 patent by
selling or offering to sell cryopreserved cord
blood that was actually used by a third party in
the direct infringement of any of claims 13, 19,
47, 53, or 57 of the '553 patent?
Answer separately for each defendant.
ViaCell YES X NO _____
CBR YES X NO _____
Cryo-Cell YES X NO _____
CorCell YES X NO _____

05-1490, -1551 29
PharmaStem thus received special verdicts of both direct joint infringement and

contributory infringement. My colleagues grant JMOL on the ground that since the

defendants are providing a service, not selling a product, they can not meet the "sale"

requirement of contributory infringement, 35 U.S.C. '271(c). 1 PharmaStem points out that

a reasonable jury could have found that the defendants sell (rent) their blood-storage

facilities to the donor's family, and that the defendants either contribute to or act in concert

with the transplanting surgeon to practice the claimed method.

The principles of patent infringement are not negated when the steps of a method

claim are performed by more than one entity. There was no instruction as to legal

impossibility of liability as to the '553 patent, and no objection was raised to the verdict

questions. We are not told whether the legal theory of sale or rent was aired at the trial, but

it is apparent that the jury was fully apprised of the nature of the accused activities, as

reflected in the jury questions. The processes of litigation require appellate review on the

premises of the jury trial, lest invited error dominate trial tactics.

1 '271(c). Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.

05-1490, -1551 30
 No objection was raised to the jury instructions. The distinction relied on by the

panel majority, that the defendants were bailees, not sellers, does not negate the principles

of infringement, whether viewed as joint infringement or contributory infringement. See,

e.g., On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir.

2006) (approving instruction that "It is not necessary for the acts that constitute

infringement to be performed by one person or entity.") PharmaStem is correct that the

issue to which this evidence applies relates to damages, not infringement, and points to the

small amount of damages awarded for infringement of the '553 patent (damages for the

'553 patent were not appealed by the defendants).

It is irrelevant whether any steps of a method claim can be viewed as a "service;"

infringement requires only that the steps be performed. As discussed in Dawson Chemical

Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980), the purpose of the contributory

infringement statute is "to protect patent rights from subversion by those who, without

directly infringing the patent themselves, engage in acts designed to facilitate infringement

by others," a criterion that the jury could have found was met by the facts and relationships

of this case. On the instructions to the jury, the verdict of liability for contributory or joint

infringement of the '553 patent is supported by substantial evidence, and should be

sustained.

From the court's departure from the procedures of appellate review of jury verdicts,

and from the flawed law that is propounded, I must, respectfully, dissent.

05-1490, -1551 31