Motionless Keyboard Company v. Microsoft Corporation

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2005-1497

MOTIONLESS KEYBOARD COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

NOKIA INC.,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

SAITEK INDUSTRIES LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee.

James L. Buchal, Murphy & Buchal LLP, of Portland, Oregon, argued for plaintiff-
appellant.

J. Christopher Carraway, Klarquist Sparkman, LLP, of Portland Oregon, argued for
defendant-appellee, Microsoft Corporation. With him on the brief was Jared S. Goff. Of
counsel on the brief was Stephen P. McGrath, Microsoft Corporation, of Redmond,
Washington.

Kenneth R. Adamo, Jones Day, of Dallas Texas, argued for defendant-appellee,
Nokia Inc. With him on the brief were Michael J. Newton and Daniel T. Conrad. Also on
the brief was Lawrense D. Rosenberg, of Washington, DC.

Joseph W. Price, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., of Costa Mesa, California, argued for
defendant-appellee, Saitek Industries Ltd.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Oregon

Judge Ann L. Aiken
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2005-1497

MOTIONLESS KEYBOARD COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

NOKIA INC.,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

SAITEK INDUSTRIES LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________

DECIDED: May 29, 2007
___________________________

Before RADER, DYK, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

RADER, Circuit Judge.

On summary judgment, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon

determined that Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”); Nokia, Inc. (“Nokia”); and

Saitek Industries, Ltd. (“Saitek”) did not infringe, literally or under the doctrine of

equivalents, Motionless Keyboard Company's (“MKC's”) U.S. Patent Nos.

5,178,477 (the '477 patent) and 5,332,322 (the '322 patent). Motionless
Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ. 04-180-AA, 2005 WL 1113818 (D. Or.

May 6, 2005). Also on summary judgment, the district court determined that the

'477 and '322 patents were invalid based on public use under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

The district court also found the '322 patent invalid based on obviousness due to

the patentee's terminal disclaimer in light of the '477 patent. Because the district

court correctly construed the claim limitation "a concavity in said housing at said

key actuation position, and a thumb-associable cluster of keys forming a

keyboard within said concavity," this court affirms the ruling of no infringement.

Because the trial court misapplied the concept of public use and incorrectly found

obviousness due to a terminal disclaimer, this court reverses its invalidity rulings.

I

MKC owns the '477 and '322 patents. The '477 patent, entitled

"Ergonomic Keyboard Input Device," claims an ergonomic keyboard designed to

accommodate the architecture of the human hand. According to the invention,

the keyboard requires only slight finger gestures to actuate the keys. '477 Patent

Abstract. The '322 patent, entitled "Ergonomic Thumb-Actuable Keyboard for

Hand-Grippable Device," issued as a continuation-in-part of the '477 patent. This

patent claims a hand-held device that frees the thumb to actuate the keys in

multiple and differentiated ways. '322 Patent Abstract.

Thomas L. Gambaro is the sole inventor of both the '477 and the '322

patents. Mr. Gambaro invented the novel ergonomic keyboard technology on a

part-time basis while also working in other jobs such as graphic artist and

dishwasher. In fact, Mr. Gambaro developed some of the ergonomic keyboard

2005-1497 2
technology while he lived in a friend's attic. As an independent inventor, Mr.

Gambaro developed his technology advances without the benefit of a well-

funded laboratory and then traversed the patent system on a limited budget.

During his inventive work, Mr. Gambaro developed different prototype

models of his keyboard technology. Eventually, on February 22, 1987, Mr.

Gambaro developed the Cherry Model 5. Motionless Keyboard, 2005 WL

1113818, at *26. Shortly after developing the Cherry Model 5, Mr. Gambaro

entered into a business partnership with Mr. Keith Coulter. Thereafter, Mr.

Gambaro and Mr. Coulter set out to gain financial support to further develop and

patent the keyboard technology.

Thus, Mr. Gambaro began to demonstrate the Cherry Model 5 to potential

investors. He also demonstrated the device to a friend, Ms. Kathie Roberts.

While the potential investors signed two-year non-disclosure agreements

(NDAs), Ms. Roberts did not. Mr. Gambaro entered into some of the NDAs with

potential investors in 1987, meaning those agreements expired in 1989. Id. at

*26-27. Additionally, Mr. Gambaro disclosed the Cherry Model 5 to Ms. Sheila

Lanier on June 25, 1990 to conduct typing tests. While Mr. Gambaro showed the

Cherry Model 5 to his business partner, numerous potential investors, a friend

and a typing tester, according to the record, only Ms. Lanier used the device to

transmit data to a computer. In due course, Mr. Gambaro assigned both patents

to MKC.

MKC sued Microsoft, Nokia, and Saitek for infringement of the '477 and

'322 patents in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. Specifically,

2005-1497 3
MKC alleged that Microsoft's "Strategic Commander" game controller infringed

claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8 of the '477 patent. MKC also alleged that Microsoft's

"Sidewinder Precision 2," "Sidewinder Force Feedback 2," and various Saitek

game joysticks infringed claims 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the '322 patent. MKC alleged

that Nokia phone models 3560, 3595, 6200, and 6820 infringed claims 1, 2, 3,

and 4 of the '322 patent.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. MKC moved for

summary judgment of infringement against all three defendants. The defendants

collectively moved for summary judgment of invalidity of both patents based on

public use under 35 U.S.C § 102(b). The District Court entered summary

judgment construing the claims of the '477 and '322 patents. Based on its

reading of the patents, the trial court found no infringement as a matter of law. In

addition, the District Court invalidated the '477 and '322 patents based on public

use under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The trial court also declared the '322 patent

invalid for obviousness in light of a terminal disclaimer.

MKC appeals the invalidity ruling on the '477 patent, but does not appeal

the court's claim construction for the '477 patent. MKC appeals the District

Court's claim construction and infringement ruling on the '322 patent. MKC also

appeals the court's invalidity rulings on the '322 patent. This court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1).

II

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment without

deference drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.

2005-1497 4
Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Claim

construction is a matter of law that this court reviews without deference. Cybor

Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc);

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d,

517 U.S. 370 (1996). The meaning of the statutory terms "on sale" or "public

use" within section 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is a question of law that this court reviews

without deference. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng’g Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574

(Fed. Cir. 1990); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266

(Fed. Cir. 1986). In reviewing summary judgment rulings on infringement and

invalidity, this court "need[s] to determine de novo whether the evidence in the

record raises any genuine disputes about material facts. An evidentiary dispute

is genuine if a jury could decide the issue either way, and its verdict would

survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law." General Elec. Co. v. Nintendo

Co., Ltd., 179 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

III

The district court's determination of no infringement of the '322 patent

rested on claim construction. Claim 1 of the '322 patent is the only independent

claim and all the asserted claims contain the limitations of claim 1. Claim 1 of the

'322 patent shows the pertinent limitation in the context of the entire claim:

1. A hand-held device for entering information into an electronic system
via a keyboard, the device comprising:
a housing having a grippable portion which permits the device to be
held in one hand with the thumb free to move at least temporarily to
a predetermined key-actuation position while the device is held,
a concavity in said housing at said key-actuation position, and
a thumb-associable cluster of keys forming a keyboard within said
concavity, each of the plurality of keys in said cluster being

2005-1497 5
 selectively actuable via mixed lateral and slight endo, translation of
a thumb within said concavity, whereby information is entered into
an electronic system.

'322 Patent col.8 ll.16-31 (emphases added). The district court construed "a

concavity in said housing at said key-actuation position, and a thumb-associable

cluster of keys forming a keyboard within said concavity" to mean "that the

concavity must be formed by a depression in the housing of the device, and that

all keys comprising the keyboard must be contained entirely within the concave

area and sunk below the surface of the housing, so that the thumb movement

occurs within the concave area." Motionless Keyboard, 2005 WL 1113818, at

*19.

On appeal, MKC argues that "a concavity in said housing at said key-

actuation position, and a thumb-associable cluster of keys forming a keyboard

within said concavity" means that the tops of the keys themselves can form the

concavity. Thus, under MKC's proposed construction of the claims, the keys or

portions thereof themselves can form a concavity within the housing. MKC wants

a broad construction of the concavity. Appellees, to the contrary, agree with the

district court's narrower construction.

The claim language "a concavity in said housing at said key-actuation

position, and a thumb-associable cluster of keys forming a keyboard within said

concavity" defines well the limitation. '322 Patent col.8 ll.21-23 (emphases

added). By using the terms "concavity in said housing" and "keyboard within said

concavity," the patentee defined a depression within the housing of the device

2005-1497 6
and set the keyboard entirely within that depression. The district court correctly

grasped and conveyed this meaning.

The specification underscores the correctness of the trial court's

construction: a "keyboard is positioned in a concavity or depression in the

housing." '322 Patent col.4 ll.58-59 (emphasis added). To confirm this reading,

all keyboard renderings in Figures 1, 3-5, 7, and 8 in the '322 patent show a

concavity in the housing of the device with the keyboard totally within the

concavity. '322 Patent Fig. 1, 3-5, 7, and 8. Figure 4, for instance, shows the

concavity:

'322 Patent Fig. 4. Thus, this court agrees with the district court's claim

construction of this limitation.

With respect to the infringement analysis, the accused Microsoft

Sidewinder joysticks, the Saitek joysticks, and the Nokia cellular phones do not

literally infringe the '322 patent because the joysticks and cellular phones lack a

2005-1497 7
concavity in the housing and a keyboard within the cavity. The Microsoft

joysticks do not contain a concavity in a housing as shown by the side view of the

top portion of a Sidewinder joystick. The Microsoft joysticks do not contain a

concavity as construed as a depression in the housing. Furthermore and in

addition to the lack of a concavity, the keys of the Microsoft joysticks extend

beyond the limits of the devices (see figure below) and therefore the keys are not

contained entirely within a concave area and thereby sunk below the surface of

the housing.

Side View of Top Portion of Microsoft Joystick

Therefore, the district court properly found summary judgment of no literal

infringement.

Similar to the Microsoft joysticks, the Saitek joysticks contain neither a

concavity in a housing nor keys contained entirely within a concave area and

thereby sunk below the surface of the housing. An example of two Saitek

joysticks shows a lack of a concavity and a lack of keys sunk completely within

the concavity and below the housing.

2005-1497 8
 Lack of concavity and
keys below housing

Therefore, as with the Microsoft joysticks, the district court properly found

summary judgment of no literal infringement.

The accused Nokia phones have keys that are placed onto a flat surface

with the keys protruding through an opening in the housing of each phone. While

some of the phones contain keys with slight depressions, these keys do not

constitute a concavity in the housing according to the '322 patent. The following

picture of an accused phone shows no concavity within the housing. In fact, the

keys protrude through an opening in the housing.

Keys protrude from
opening in housing

2005-1497 9
Thus, because there were no genuine issues of material fact as to any of the

Microsoft, Saitek or Nokia products, the district court properly found summary

judgment of no literal infringement.

As for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, MKC only presented

the district court with conclusory statements about equivalents. Motionless

Keyboard, 2005 WL 1113818, at *13, *24. To avoid a grant of summary

judgment of non-infringement by equivalents, the patentee must present

"particularized evidence and linking argument as to the 'insubstantiality of the

differences' between the claimed invention and the accused device, or with

respect to the 'function, way, result' test." PC Connector Solutions LLC v.

SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Texas Instruments

Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

Thus, the patentee has the burden to present particularized evidence that links

the accused products to the patent on a limitation by limitation basis. General

Elec. v. Nintendo Co., 179 F.3d 1350, 1359 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

With respect to the accused joysticks, MKC contends that the patents, the

joysticks, and the claim charts show substantial similarities of form, function, and

result. Based on only the information in the claim charts, MKC contends that

inputting data with the hand-held controller with the thumb translates to

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, as the district court

properly noted, "[MKC] presents no evidence that the differences between the

joysticks and the claimed elements are insubstantial, or that the joysticks perform

'substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same

2005-1497 10
result.'" Motionless Keyboard, 2005 WL 1113818, at *21 (citing Warner-

Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 (1997)). Because

MKC did not provide any particularized testimony to show infringement under the

doctrine of equivalents, this court does not need determine the applicability of the

limitations on the doctrine of equivalents.

Similarly with the Nokia cellular phones, MKC does not provide any

evidence that the accused phones perform substantially the same function in

substantially the same way to obtain the same result. The keys on the Nokia

phones do not permit thumb movement to actuate the keys within the concavity.

While the patentee's invention points to actuation of the keys by thumb

movement within the concavity, a user would actuate the Nokia keys by pressing

them downward. In other words, the invention and the Nokia phone actuate the

keys in different ways. As MKC did not provide any particularized testimony to

specifically show that the keys work in the same way, the trial court properly

granted summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents.

IV

MKC appeals the district court grant of summary judgment that the '477

and '322 patents are invalid for public use under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b):

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added). Because the applicant filed the '477

patent on June 6, 1991, the critical date for the invalidity analysis is June 6, 1990.

2005-1497 11
The critical date for the '322 patent is January 11, 1992. To sustain the invalidity

determination, the record must show that an embodiment of the patented

invention was in public use as defined by the statute before the critical date.

The district court found that MKC admitted that the Cherry Model 5

embodied the '477 patent and the '322 patent as of February 22, 1987. Even

assuming that MKC admitted that the Cherry Model 5 embodied each claim of

the '477 and '322 patents—a question this court need not decide—this court

concludes that there was no "public use" under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Therefore,

the district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity for public use was

improper.

The record shows that the inventor disclosed the Cherry Model 5 to his

business partner, potential investors, a friend, and a typing tester before the

critical date. While the potential investors signed NDAs, some of the NDAs

expired in 1989—again prior to the critical dates for each patent. Thus, this court

must examine, in the context of the district court's summary judgment ruling of

invalidity, whether these disclosures and demonstrations were public uses within

the meaning of the statutory bar.

Public use includes “any [public] use of [the claimed] invention by a person

other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of

secrecy to the inventor.” In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983)

(citing Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881)). In Pfaff v. Wells Elecs.,

Inc., the Supreme Court noted that both the "on sale" and "public use" bars were

based on the same policy considerations. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S.

2005-1497 12
55, 64 (1998). Specifically, "[t]he [Supreme] Court noted that both the on sale

and public use bars of § 102(b) stem from the same 'reluctance to allow an

inventor to remove existing knowledge from public use.'" Invitrogen Corp. v.

Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quote from

Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64).

The district court found that Mr. Gambaro had disclosed the Cherry Model

5 to potential investors in order to obtain capital. As such, the district court

reasoned that these disclosures showed the invention entered the public domain

prior to the critical date because Mr. Gambaro's business partner was under no

obligation to keep the Cherry Model 5 secret. Motionless Keyboard, 2005 WL

1113818, at *28. Further, the disclosures to potential investors showed that Mr.

Gambaro attempted to obtain capital to develop his invention. Id. The district

court found the NDAs inconsequential because "a confidentiality agreement will

not preclude application of the public use doctrine, if the device was disclosed for

commercial purposes." Id. (citing Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390

(Fed. Cir. 1984)). MKC admits to a series of limited disclosures to potential

investors to raise capital to develop the invention and prosecute the patent

application. However, MKC further contends that the disclosures did not involve

the Cherry Model 5 or its use as claimed in the '477 or '322 patents.

"The classical standard for assessing the public nature of a use was

established in [Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333 (1881)]. In Egbert, the inventor

of a corset spring gave two samples of the invention to a lady friend, who used

them for more than two years before the inventor applied for a patent."

2005-1497 13
Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1382. Although the inventor in Egbert did not obtain any

commercial advantage, the Court determined that the invention had been used

for its intended purpose for over a decade without limitation or confidentiality

requirements. Thus, even though not in public view, the invention was in public

use. Id. In Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5 (1939), the

Court found "the ordinary use of a machine or the practice of a process in a

factory in the usual course of producing articles for commercial purposes is a

public use." Id. at 20. On the other hand, in TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional

Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984), this court found that premature

installation of an inventive orthodontic appliance in several patients without a

written confidentiality agreement was not a public use due to the expectation of

confidentiality inherent in the dentist-patient relationship. This case again

presents the question of the meaning of public use under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

In this case, Mr. Gambaro disclosed his Cherry Model 5 to his business

partner, a friend, potential investors, and a typing tester (Ms. Lanier). In all these

disclosures, except in the case of Ms. Lanier, however, the Cherry Model 5 was

not connected to a computer or any other device. In the case of Ms. Lanier, the

Cherry Model 5 was used to conduct typing tests on July 25, 1990, and thereby

connected to a computer for its intended purpose. With respect to the '477

patent, the typing test occurred after the critical date of June 6, 1990. With

respect to the '322 patent, Ms. Lanier appears to have performed a one-time

typing test to assess typing speed. The typing test by Ms. Lanier was allegedly

performed on July 25, 1990 and, according to a synopsis of NDAs in the record,

2005-1497 14
Ms. Lanier signed an NDA on the same day. The critical date for the '322 patent

is January 11, 1992. In this case, the one time typing test coupled with a signed

NDA and no record of continued use of the Cherry Model 5 by Ms. Lanier after

July 25, 1990 did not elevate to the level of public use. Thus, the Cherry Model 5

was never in public use. All disclosures, except for the one-time typing test, only

provided a visual view of the new keyboard design without any disclosure of the

Cherry Model 5's ability to translate finger movements into actuation of keys to

transmit data. In essence, these disclosures visually displayed the keyboard

design without putting it into use. In short, the Cherry Model 5 was not in public

use as the term is used in section 102(b) because the device, although visually

disclosed and only tested one time with a NDA signed by the typing tester, was

never connected to be used in the normal course of business to enter data into a

system.

Unlike the situations in Egbert and Electric Storage Battery, where the

inventions were used for their intended purpose, neither the inventor nor anyone

else ever used the Cherry Model 5 to transmit data in the normal course of

business. The entry of data did not ever occur outside of testing and the tester

signed an NDA. The Cherry Model 5 was not used in public, for its intended

purpose, nor was the Cherry Model 5 ever given to anyone for such public use.

Thus, the disclosures in this record do not rise to the level of public use.

On another issue, the district court determined that Mr. Gambaro had

admitted that the '322 patent was invalid for obviousness by filing a terminal

disclaimer to make the '322 coterminous with the '477 patent. The district court

2005-1497 15
reasoned that this filing conceded that the '322 patent was obvious in light of the

'477 patent. Motionless Keyboard, 2005 WL 1113818, at *29. A terminal

disclaimer simply is not an admission that a later-filed invention is obvious. Quad

Envtl. Tech. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

Thus, the trial court erred on this point and the '322 patent is not invalid due to

obviousness.

V

This court affirms the district court's claim construction and the summary

judgment of no infringement. However, this court reverses the district court's

summary judgment ruling of invalidity of the '477 and '322 patents. This court

also reverses the district court's finding that the '322 patent is invalid for

obviousness due to patentee's terminal disclaimer.

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART and REVERSED-IN-PART.

2005-1497 16