PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 09-4579
_____________
CHARLES ILES
v.
GOVERNOR JOHN P. DE JONGH, JR., in his official and
individual capacity, and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS
(D.C. No. 1-07-cv-00094)
CLAUDE S.M. GERARD
v.
GOVERNOR JOHN P. DE JONGH, JR., in his official and
individual capacity, and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS
(D.C. Nos. 1-07-cv-00019 & 1-07-cv-00053)
John P. de Jongh, Jr., in his official capacity,
and the Government of the Virgin Islands,
Appellants
1
_____________________
On Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands
District Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch
___________________
Argued December 14, 2010
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, SMITH, Circuit
Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 19, 2011)
Pamela R. Tepper, Esq. [ARGUED]
Vincent F. Frazer, Esq.
Elliott M. Davis, Esq.
Richard S. Davis, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General of Virgin Islands
Department of Justice
34-38 Kronprindsens Gade,
GERS Building, 2nd Floor
Charlotte Amalie,
St. Thomas, USVI 00802
Counsel for Appellants
Jeffrey B.C. Moorhead, Esq. [ARGUED]
CRT Brow Building
No. 1132 King Street, Suite #3
Christiansted,
St. Croix, USVI 00820-5076
2
Counsel for Appellees
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Shortly after commencing his first term in office, U.S.
Virgin Islands Governor John P. de Jongh, Jr., fired Claude
S.M. Gerard and Charles Iles, two public employees in the
Department of Planning and Natural Resources. Both
employees sued the Governor and the Government of the
Virgin Islands, claiming that their terminations deprived them
of their property interests in public employment without due
process of law. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District
Court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction directing
that Gerard and Iles be reinstated and that they be
compensated for lost wages. Governor de Jongh and the
Government of the Virgin Islands appeal the order granting
the preliminary injunction. We will reverse.
I.
In June 2004, then Governor Charles W. Turnbull
signed two Notices of Personnel Action (“NOPA”) relevant
to this case. In one notice, he transferred Appellee Charles
Iles from his previous government position to that of Permits
Coordinator for the Division of Coastal Zone Management,
within the Department of Planning and Natural Resources.
The NOPA listed Iles’ new position as “exempt.” Thereafter,
Iles signed a letter addressed to the Acting Director, Division
3
of Personnel, which stated:
In accordance with Act 5336, Section
6(c) and Section 8(a), I am electing to be placed
in the EXEMPT SERVICE of the Government
of the Virgin Islands by accepting the position
of Permits Coordinator, Division of Coastal
Zone Management at $43,000.00 per annum, in
the DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND
NATURAL RESOURCES.
This request is voluntary as certified by
witness.
In the other notice, Governor Turnbull transferred
Appellee Claude S.M. Gerard from his previous position to
that of Assistant Director for the Division of Coastal Zone
Management, within the Department of Planning and Natural
Resources. The NOPA also stated that Gerard’s position was
“exempt.” Gerard then signed a letter to the Acting Director,
Division of Personnel that was identical to the one signed by
Iles, except for its statement that Gerard’s new position was
“Assistant Director, Division of Coastal Zone Management at
$50,000.00 per annum.”
In January 2007, de Jongh succeeded Turnbull as
Governor of the Virgin Islands. Shortly after taking office,
and without prior notice or a hearing, Governor de Jongh
terminated both Gerard and Iles from further government
service. In a letter to Iles, he said:
You are hereby advised that your services as
Permits Coordinator of the Coastal Zone
Management in the Department of Planning and
4
Natural Resources will no longer be necessary.
Therefore, your employment with the
Government of the Virgin Islands is terminated
effective February 9, 2007.
On behalf of the people of the Virgin Islands, I
would like to thank you for your service. I wish
you the best in all your future endeavors.
Governor de Jongh also terminated Gerard, writing
him the same letter he wrote to Iles, except for substituting
the position of “Assistant Director” for “Permits
Coordinator.”
Gerard and Iles filed complaints in the District Court
for the Virgin Islands, alleging, among other things, that
Governor de Jongh and the Government of the Virgin Islands
had deprived them of their property interests in public
employment without due process of law. Thereafter, Gerard
and Iles moved for a preliminary injunction seeking
immediate reinstatement and back pay. After an evidentiary
hearing, the District Court granted Gerard’s and Iles’ motions
for preliminary injunctions and ordered that Governor de
Jongh reinstate Gerard and Iles to their prior positions. The
District Court also ordered that Gerard and Iles be
compensated for the wages they would have otherwise
received from the date of their termination to the date of their
reinstatement. Governor de Jongh and the Government filed
appeals from the preliminary injunction. 1
1
We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of a grant
of a preliminary injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1).
5
II.
A.
To determine whether to grant a preliminary
injunction, “a district court must consider: (1) whether the
movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the
merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by
denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief
will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and
(4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the
public interest.” McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521,
526 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d
474, 478 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Although this case comes to us from the appeal of the
grant of a preliminary injunction, Governor de Jongh only
challenges the District Court’s ruling as to the first element of
the preliminary injunction standard—the likelihood of
success on the merits of Gerard and Iles’ procedural due
process claim.
We have explained that to establish a procedural due
process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he was
deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or
property, and (2) the procedures available to him did not
provide due process of law.” Biliski v. Red Clay Consol.
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 574 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d
6
Cir. 2006)). 2 “The question of whether an employee has a
property right in continued employment is a question of state
[or territorial] law.” McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 458
(3d Cir. 1995) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). However, before
determining whether Gerard and Iles have a property right in
their employment under Virgin Islands law, it is helpful to
examine the various statutory provisions governing public
employment in the Virgin Islands. Employee classifications
contained in the statutory provisions are important because
they determine which employees are entitled to due process
protection before termination.
B.
Beginning with the two broadest categories under
Virgin Islands law, public employees are divided into (1)
“career service” and (2) “exempt service” employees. See
Martinez-Sanes v. Turnbull, 318 F.3d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“Thus, employees of the Virgin Islands are divided into two
categories, the ‘[Career] Service’ entitled to Civil Service
protection, and the ‘Exempt Service’ not so entitled.”). The
division between these two categories is set forth in 3 V.I.C. §
451a(c), which provides that “[a]ll positions in the Executive
Branch of the United States Virgin Islands Government not
exempted under subsection (b) of this section shall be in the
2
In order to comport with due process, in cases where it is
possible to conduct a pre-termination hearing, “[t]he tenured
public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”
Biliski, 574 F.3d at 220.
7
career service.” In other words, an employee is in the career
service unless the employee holds an exempt position
described in 3 V.I.C. § 451a(b)(1)-(8). Because the parties
agree that subsections (1) through (7) of § 451a(b) are not
applicable here, we focus our analysis on subsection (8).
Under subsection (8), an employee is exempt if he or she is:
an officer or employee in a position of a policy-
determining nature when the position is so
designated by the Governor and submitted to
the Legislature; and an employee who is a
special assistant, or who is on special
assignment to, or whose position requires a
confidential relationship with a policy-making
official when the position is so designated by
the Governor and submitted to the Legislature.
(emphasis added). Thus, a position is exempt and not in the
career service category when the Governor designates it as a
position of a “policy-determining nature” and it is submitted
to the Legislature. The exempt designation is important
because employees in that category can be terminated without
cause. Employees who are not “exempt” are then considered
“career service” employees.
The career service category is further divided by § 451
into two subcategories: employees who are “regular” and
those who are “not regular,” respectively. Thus, the
categories of career service employees and regular employees
are not interchangeable. Richardson v. Felix, 856 F.2d 505,
509 (3d Cir. 1988). As we explained in Richardson, a
“regular” employee is one “who has been appointed to a
position in the [career] service in accordance with this chapter
8
[relating to the Personnel Merit System] after completing his
working test period.” Richardson, 856 F.2d at 509 (citing 3
V.I.C. § 451 (1967)) (alterations in Richardson). Therefore, a
“career service” employee is also a “regular” employee only
if he has been appointed to his position in accordance with the
Personnel Merit System and has completed his probationary
period.
Further, in interpreting Virgin Islands law, we have
previously held that under the employee termination
procedures of § 530, employees who are “regular employees”
may be terminated only for cause, thus granting them “a
property interest in continued employment.” Id.; see also
Martinez-Sanes, 318 F.3d at 489 (stating, in interpreting
Virgin Islands law, that “[o]nly ‘regular’ employees had Civil
Service Protection” and vacating injunction based on
procedural due process claim, because plaintiff had not
completed his probationary period as required by the
definition of “regular” employee.) (emphasis added);
Richardson, 856 F.2d at 511 n.8 (“As noted earlier in our
discussion, section 530, the provision that makes regular
employees terminable only for cause, also sets forth
procedures for the termination of such employees.”)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, not all “career service”
employees have due process protection, but rather, only those
who also meet the definition of “regular” employees.
C.
In the case before us, the District Court explained that
under § 451a(b)(8), regardless of whether Gerard and Iles
were in positions designated as policy-determining in nature,
the Governor had not submitted those designated positions to
9
the Legislature, as required for any “exempt” employee under
§ 451a(b)(8).
Governor de Jongh argues that the District Court
incorrectly concluded that the Governor must submit these
designations to the Legislature before employees in those
positions can become “exempt.” It is true that in Martinez-
Sanes, when determining whether an employee was in the
“exempt service” under § 451a(b)(8), we focused exclusively
on the fact-intensive question of whether a given employee
was in a position of a policy-determining nature. 318 F.3d at
488-90. We did not analyze whether the employee’s position
had been designated as “exempt” by the Governor and
submitted to the Legislature. However, in 1999 when the
suits in Martinez-Sanes were filed, § 451a(b)(8) did not
include the current language requiring that a “position of a
policy-determining nature” be “so designated by the
Governor and submitted to the Legislature” before it could
become an “exempt” position. In Martinez-Sanes, this Court
relied on the pre-2000 version of § 451a(b)(8), which stated
that “exempt” employees include:
[a]n officer or employee in a position of a
policy-determining nature; employee who is a
special assistant, or who is on special
assignment to, or whose position requires a
confidential relationship with a policy-making
official when the position is so designated by
the Governor and submitted to the Legislature.
318 F.3d at 487 (quoting the pre-2000 version of §
451a(b)(8)). Notably, the first clause regarding “position[s]
of a policy-determining nature” is separated from the rest of
10
the subsection by a semicolon, thus indicating that the later
modifier “when the position is so designated by the Governor
and submitted to the Legislature” does not modify this first
clause, as it does the remaining clauses in the subsection. The
current language, however, makes “exempt”:
an officer or employee in a position of a policy-
determining nature when the position is so
designated by the Governor and submitted to
the Legislature; and an employee who is a
special assistant, or who is on special
assignment to, or whose position requires a
confidential relationship with a policy-making
official when the position is so designated by
the Governor and submitted to the Legislature.
(emphasis added). This change in the language of §
451a(b)(8), which extends the designation and submission
requirements to those employees in positions of a policy-
determining nature, was created by a 2000 amendment to §
451a. In light of this intervening change in the language of §
451a, Martinez-Sanes can no longer be relied on to support
the position that Governor de Jongh advocates.
Governor de Jongh argues that even if § 451a(b)(8)
does require that all positions of a policy-determining nature
be designated as such and “submitted to the Legislature,”
testimony at the District Court hearing established that both
Gerard’s and Iles’ designated positions were submitted to the
Legislature. However, we have reviewed the pages in the
Joint Appendix where this testimony allegedly occurred and
find no evidence to support the claims made by Governor de
Jongh. (De Jongh Brief, at 14-15, citing JA, at 157-204). On
11
page 15, in footnote 2 of his brief, de Jongh also cites to
Gerard’s “trial” transcript to support his claim of evidence
that the designations were submitted to the Legislature.
Although this transcript was not included in the Joint
Appendix, we have obtained a copy and have considered it.
After reviewing the testimony of Milton E. Potter, Assistant
Director for the Division of Personnel for the Virgin Islands
Government, we agree with the District Court that de Jongh
has not shown that Gerard and Iles were “designated [as
being in a position of a policy-determining nature] by the
Governor and submitted to the Legislature.” 3 V.I.C. §
451a(b)(8).
The Governor further argues that the District Court
broke off the evidentiary hearing despite his insistence that he
be permitted to present additional evidence. Again, however,
nowhere in the record is there any indication that Governor de
Jongh’s counsel wished to continue the hearing or proffer
additional evidence. Indeed, just before the hearing ended,
Governor de Jongh’s counsel told the District Court: “Your
Honor, [the] Government rests.” (JA, at 202).
Accordingly, after determining that there was no
evidence to suggest that Gerard or Iles’ designated positions
had been submitted to the Legislature, the District Court did
not err when it found that neither Gerard nor Iles occupied an
exempt position. Thus, because by definition “[a]ll positions
in the Executive Branch of the United States Virgin Islands
Government not exempted . . . shall be in the career
service[,]” 3 V.I.C. § 451a(c), the District Court correctly
found that Gerard and Iles were career service employees.
D.
12
As previously noted, merely because a Virgin Islands
public employee is part of the “career service” does not
necessarily mean that he is also a “regular” employee with a
property interest entitled to due process protection. In this
regard, the District Court erred by conflating “career service”
employees with “regular” employees. To be a “regular”
employee and thus gain a property interest in employment, an
employee must have been “appointed to a position in the
[career] service in accordance with this chapter after
completing his working test period.” 3 V.I.C.§ 451. “[T]his
chapter” refers to Title 3, Chapter 25 of the Virgin Islands
Code, which in addition to §§ 451 and 451a, also includes
Sections 521 through 535. These sections set forth the
standards and requirements for “tests, appointments,
promotions, and dismissals” of “regular” public employees.
Under Section 521, to have been “appointed to a position in
the [career] service in accordance with this chapter” requires
that an employee have been appointed “on the basis of merit
and fitness, to be ascertained by competitive examinations.” 3
V.I.C. § 521.
Here, the District Court found that neither Gerard nor
Iles had shown that they were appointed “on the basis of
merit and fitness, . . . [as] ascertained by competitive
examination.” (JA, at 11) (quoting 3 V.I.C. § 521). Nor is
there anything in the record to suggest that Gerard or Iles was
ever appointed in accordance with Chapter 25 as is required
to become a “regular” employee. Thus, although Gerard and
Iles were “career service” employees, they were not “regular”
employees under the plain language of 3 V.I.C.§ 451. 3
3
Although, when interpreting identical statutory language in
13
Gerard and Iles also contend, however, that a 2010
amendment to § 530 applies in this case, and that the
amendment removes the requirement that a “regular”
employee have been appointed in accordance with the
requirements of Chapter 25 of the Virgin Islands Code,
including the competitive merit provisions. Whether the
amended definition of a “regular” employee applies to Gerard
and Iles depends on an analysis under Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994), which sets forth the following
two-part test for determining whether a statute enacted after
the events of a suit nevertheless applies to that suit:
When a case implicates a federal statute
enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first
task is to determine whether Congress has
expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.
If Congress has done so, of course, there is no
need to resort to judicial default rules. When,
however, the statute contains no such express
command, the court must determine whether the
new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e.,
whether it would impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, increase a party's liability for
past conduct, or impose new duties with respect
to transactions already completed. If the statute
Richardson, we found that the plaintiff was a regular
employee merely by virtue of having been employed for more
than a year, the majority opinion in that case simply did not
address the additional requirement of § 451 that the employee
have been appointed in accordance with the requirements of
the Personnel Merit System.
14
would operate retroactively, our traditional
presumption teaches that it does not govern
absent clear congressional intent favoring such
a result.
Id. at 280.
At the first step, we determine that there is nothing in
the language of the 2010 amendment that indicates that the
Virgin Islands Legislature “expressly prescribed” that its new
definition of a “regular” employee should apply to cases
pending at the time of its enactment. Because we discern no
such express command, we next determine whether the
amendment would have a “retroactive effect” if applied to
Gerard and Iles. If it would have such a retroactive effect,
then the traditional presumption directs that it would not
govern Gerard and Iles’s claims, given the absence of clear
congressional intent to the contrary.
Landgraf teaches that a statute has “retroactive effect”
when “it would impair rights a party possessed when he
acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose
new duties with respect to transactions already completed.”
Id. Here, applying the new definition of a “regular”
employee to Gerard and Iles would both expand de Jongh’s
liability for past conduct and impose new duties on de Jongh
with respect to completed transactions by requiring him to
reinstate Gerard and Iles, provide them with notice and a
hearing, and make a showing of cause before terminating
them. Moreover, applying the new definition of a “regular”
employee to Gerard and Iles would conflict with
“considerations of fair notice [to de Jongh]” and frustrate de
Jongh’s “reasonable reliance [on the existing statute], and
15
settled expectations . . .” that he was permitted to terminate
Gerard and Iles without cause or a hearing. Id. at 270. All of
these considerations “offer sound guidance” that the
amendment, if applied to Gerard and Iles, would have a
retroactive effect. Id. Because the Virgin Islands Legislature
has not expressly stated that the amendment to § 530 should
apply to suits arising before it was enacted, and because we
find that that the amendment would have a “retroactive
effect” under Landgraf, the traditional presumption that the
amendment does not govern applies. Instead, we review the
claims of Gerard and Iles under the definition of a “regular”
employee that existed at the time their suit arose.
Accordingly, because Gerard and Iles are not “regular”
employees under that definition, as we previously explained,
they lack a due process property interest in their employment.
E.
Although we vacate the preliminary injunction, we
nevertheless find that, even had we affirmed the injunction,
the District Court’s award of back pay to Gerard and Iles
would have been erroneous as a matter of law. The District
Court concluded that under § 1983, Governor de Jongh could
be sued in his official capacity for back pay. In reaching this
conclusion, it relied on our previous statement that the
remedy of reinstatement and the accompanying restoration of
back pay generally constitutes a form of injunctive relief.
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1122 (3d Cir. 1980).
It also relied on language in Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, which provided that “a state official in his or her
official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a
person under § 1983 . . .” 491 U.S. 58, 71 & n.10 (1989).
16
The District Court appears to have taken the language
in Will to permit a public official to be sued in his official
capacity under § 1983 for all injunctive relief, rather than
merely for prospective injunctive relief. However, Will
makes clear that a state employee may be sued in his official
capacity only for “prospective” injunctive relief, because
“official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated
as actions against the State.” Id. at n.10. (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). We have previously upheld this
key distinction, affirming the dismissal of § 1983 claims for
past wages even when presented as claims for “injunctive
relief,” because those claims were retrospective rather than
prospective. See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin
Islands, 618 F.3d 232, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that,
under § 1983, plaintiffs “cannot seek money damages” but
can “seek prospective injunctive relief” against University of
the Virgin Islands personnel in their official capacities); Brow
v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1037 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1993)
(upholding dismissal of claim for “injunctive” relief,
including past wages and benefits, because it “was essentially
a claim for retrospective damages . . . and thus not actionable
against territorial officials in their official capacities under 42
U.S.C. § 1983”).
Accordingly, the District Court’s award of back pay,
although injunctive in nature, is impermissible retrospective
relief and would be reversed even had we affirmed the
preliminary injunction.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of
17
the District Court, vacate the preliminary injunction, and
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
18