United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 18, 2011 Decided July 1, 2011
No. 10-7094
ANGEL MEDINA,
APPELLEE
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:97-cv-00594)
Mary L. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,
argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were
Irvin B. Nathan, Acting Attorney General, Todd S. Kim,
Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor
General. Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General,
entered an appearance.
H. Vincent McKnight argued the cause and filed the briefs
for appellee.
Before: ROGERS, BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.
2
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.
BROWN, Circuit Judge: Angel Medina is a captain with the
Metropolitan Police Department (―MPD‖ or ―Department‖).
Medina filed a ten-count complaint in the district court
charging the District of Columbia with racial and ethnic
discrimination, and retaliation against him because of a series
of discrimination complaints he filed against MPD. Although
the jury heard five of Medina‘s claims, it found for Medina on
only one; it concluded MPD had unlawfully retaliated against
him. The jury awarded Medina $90,000 on each of two theories
of liability—one based on federal law and one based on the
D.C. Human Rights Act. Because these dual awards amount to
impermissible double recovery, we reverse the magistrate
judge‘s order denying the District‘s motion for judgment as a
matter of law.
I
As the facts underlying Medina‘s lawsuit are of little
significance to our disposition, we give them only brief
attention. Angel Medina, a Hispanic male, began serving as an
MPD officer in 1985. After Medina applied for a promotion to
lieutenant and was passed over, he filed discrimination charges
with the D.C. Office of Human Rights alleging that MPD had
promoted non-Hispanic officers whose performances on a
promotion competency examination were inferior to his own.
While the outcome of those charges has no relevance to this
case, the charges are significant because they represent the first
in a string of complaints filed by Medina with the Office of
Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and—he alleges—the motive behind the
District‘s later retaliation against him.
3
Medina rose through the ranks, ultimately becoming a
captain. But Medina claimed that on three separate occasions
he was the victim of further racial and ethnic discrimination
and retaliation. First, Medina alleged that in 1994, shortly after
his promotion to lieutenant, he was transferred from his post at
Internal Affairs to street duties although another newly
promoted officer—an African-American—was not similarly
transferred.
Second, Medina alleged that between late 1997 and early
1998, MPD selected two Caucasian officers to serve in the
Office of Internal Affairs instead of granting his request to be
transferred back to that office.
Finally, in 2001, MPD suspended Medina without pay
pending the resolution of unrelated criminal charges brought
against him. According to Medina, MPD discriminated against
him both in imposing an unnecessarily severe suspension and
in failing to reinstate him to active duty within thirty days after
his acquittal of criminal wrongdoing, as Department policy
required.
As a result of these incidents, in 1997 Medina filed a
complaint in the district court, alleging MPD violated the U.S.
Constitution; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C.
Code § 2-1401.01 et seq., by discriminating and retaliating
against him. Medina amended his complaint in 2002 to add the
later incidents of alleged discrimination and retaliation. The
District then moved to dismiss all ten counts of Medina‘s
amended complaint.
The district court granted the District‘s motion to dismiss
five of the ten counts and part of a sixth. The parties then
consented to trial before a magistrate judge, and in the summer
4
of 2008, Medina‘s remaining claims finally reached a jury. At
trial, Medina‘s evidence centered on the three specific
incidents discussed above. The jury found for Medina on only
one of his remaining five claims: Count V, which alleged the
Department unlawfully retaliated against Medina when it
failed to transfer him to Internal Affairs in 1997–98. The jury
awarded Medina $90,000 on each of his liability theories, for a
total award of $180,000. Specifically, the jury concluded MPD
violated Medina‘s rights both under federal law and under the
D.C. Human Rights Act.
After the entry of judgment in favor of Medina, the
District moved for judgment as a matter of law, or
alternatively, remittitur, claiming the jury improperly awarded
Medina double recovery for the same injury. The magistrate
judge denied the District‘s motion, explaining in pertinent part
that there was no double recovery because Medina‘s federal
law claims ―spoke . . . to [his] rights under the United States
Constitution to equal protection under the laws,‖ while
Medina‘s D.C. law claims protected his right ―not [to] be
subjected to retaliation for making complaints of
discrimination.‖ Medina v. District of Columbia, 718 F. Supp.
2d 34, 58 (D.D.C. 2010). The District now appeals.
II
We review the magistrate judge‘s denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law de novo, but we acknowledge
―‗[w]e do not . . . lightly disturb a jury verdict.‘‖ Novak v.
Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 570 F.3d 305, 311 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (quoting Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 165
(D.C. Cir. 2007)). We also review the underlying double
recovery question de novo because the magistrate judge
concluded double recovery was permissible as a matter of law.
5
See Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(―[O]ur review of legal issues is de novo.‖).
The doctrine of double recovery dictates that ―in the
absence of punitive damages a plaintiff can recover no more
than the loss actually suffered.‖ Kassman v. American Univ.,
546 F.2d 1029, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Snowden v.
D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 454 F.2d 1047, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
The animating principle is simple: when a plaintiff seeks
compensation for wrongs committed against him, he should be
made whole for his injuries, not enriched. Id. For practical
purposes, this means a party ―cannot recover the same damages
twice, even though the recovery is based on two different
theories.‖ Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 34 (5th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co.,
808 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1987)). Thus, ―[i]f a federal claim
and a state claim arise from the same operative facts, and seek
identical relief, an award of damages under both theories will
constitute double recovery.‖ Mason v. Okla. Turnpike Auth.,
115 F.3d 1442, 1459 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. Indus., Inc.
v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988)).
That said, a jury is not prohibited from allocating a single
damages award between two distinct theories of liability. See,
e.g., Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490, 497 (2d
Cir. 1995) (upholding a jury award that apportioned damages
between two causes of action).
In light of these principles, the question is whether
Medina‘s damages award constituted impermissible double
recovery, represented compensation for two distinct injuries,
or reflected a single award apportioned between two theories
of liability. But before we turn to the merits, we must address
two preliminary inquiries. Both the parties and the magistrate
judge had difficulty deciding which federal theory served as
6
the basis for Medina‘s award and defining the nature of the
injury Medina suffered.
We begin with Medina‘s theories of recovery. In its
opinion considering the District‘s post-trial motions, the
magistrate judge states: ―[T]he jury awarded plaintiff $90,000
[because the District] . . . violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.‖ Medina, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 58. But in that same
paragraph, the judge explains the jury question (Question 13)
relating to that award, ―was based on plaintiff‘s claim under the
federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.‖ Id. And in a subsequent
paragraph, the judge indicates Medina prevailed on his § 1983
theory, referring to Jury Question 13 as a question that
―spoke . . . to plaintiff‘s right under the United States
Constitution to equal protection under the law.‖ Id. Thus, on an
initial read, it is entirely unclear whether Medina prevailed
under § 1983, which provides a cause of action for
constitutional violations, or Title VII.
But careful examination of the jury‘s verdict sheet
confirms Questions 13–15 (relating to the federal claim on
which Medina prevailed) implicate § 1983, not Title VII.
Question 13 asks whether the District ―denied [Medina] equal
protection of the laws,‖ which is consistent with Medina‘s
§ 1983 claim. Compare Jury Verdict Form, reprinted in
Medina, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 54, with Dist. Ct. Docket No. 62, at
18–19 (Second Amended Complaint). And Question 14 asks
whether the unlawful retaliation was caused by ―a custom or
practice‖ of the District, Jury Verdict Form, reprinted in
Medina, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 54, an inquiry relevant to a § 1983
claim, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978) (―policy or custom‖); see also Baker v. District of
Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003). By contrast,
Questions 10 and 11 ask whether the selection of a Caucasian
officer instead of Medina was ―an adverse employment action‖
7
that was ―substantially motivated‖ by Medina‘s national
origin—classic Title VII terminology. Jury Verdict Form,
reprinted in Medina, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 53–54; see, e.g.,
Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Moreover, Count V of Medina‘s amended complaint is entitled
―Retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 198[3] and the D.C.
Human Rights Act for Failing to Transfer Plaintiff to [the
Office of Internal Affairs].‖1 Dist. Ct. Docket No. 62, at 18
(Second Amended Complaint). Thus, it is evident from
Medina‘s pleadings that he too considered his federal claim as
one arising under § 1983. In light of the jury verdict form and
Medina‘s amended complaint, we conclude the jury predicated
Medina‘s federal law recovery on § 1983.2 Because Medina
recovered on two theories of liability, however, it is necessary
to determine what injury or injuries each theory compensated.
Apparently, the magistrate judge believed Medina‘s
injuries were synonymous with the deprivation of his rights,
see, e.g., Medina, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (―[Questions 16–18]
1
Medina‘s complaint actually alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
but prior to trial, both parties stipulated that the proper authority for
Medina‘s claim is § 1983.
2
For purposes of this appeal only we assume without deciding that
Medina could have recovered on a § 1983 claim alleging retaliation
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. But see Teigen v.
Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1085–86 (10th Cir. 2007); Thomas v.
Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 298 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); R.S.W.W.,
Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 440 (6th Cir. 2005);
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250 (4th Cir. 1999);
Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 1997);
Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d
1287, 1296 n.8 (7th Cir. 1996); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323
(2d Cir. 1996). Because the District did not raise this issue, it is not
properly before us on its merits.
8
were based on the D.C. Human Rights Act and spoke not to
plaintiff‘s right under the United States Constitution to equal
protection under the law, as did Question 13, but to his rights
under District of Columbia Human Rights Act not be subjected
to retaliation for making complaints of discrimination.‖), a
theory Medina himself adopted on appeal, see Appellee‘s Br.
at 11–13. But we think the simplest way to pinpoint the injury
Medina suffered is by looking at his complaint. In Count V,
which alleged both federal and D.C. law theories of liability,
Medina claims that as a result of the District‘s legal violations,
he suffered ―emotional distress and humiliation.‖ Dist. Ct.
Docket No. 62, at 19, ¶ 114 (Second Amended Complaint).
Leaving aside the question of whether—as the magistrate
judge assumed—Medina could have characterized his injuries
as the denial of equal protection and the denial of his right to be
free from retaliation, we note that Medina did not do so. In
other words, Medina did not claim the denial of federal and
D.C. law rights was, in and of itself, his injury. Rather, he
claimed it was the denial of these rights that caused his single
injury of ―emotional distress and humiliation.‖ Id. Moreover,
the magistrate judge instructed the jury to compensate Medina
under § 1983 for any ―actual pain, suffering and emotional
distress . . . he endured as the direct result of any constitutional
deprivation he may have suffered,‖ Trial Tr. at 95 (July 24,
2008), reprinted at Joint Appendix (―J.A.‖) 368, but similarly
instructed the jury to compensate Medina under the D.C.
Human Rights Act ―for emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience and mental anguish . . . caused by the
[District‘s] retaliation,‖ id. at 104, reprinted at J.A. 377. Thus,
it is clear Medina alleged only one injury.
With these two questions answered, our task is markedly
simplified. The only question remaining is whether Medina
recovered twice for the same injury. We conclude he did. The
magistrate judge held as a matter of law Medina could recover
9
under both D.C. law and federal law theories. Id. at 96,
reprinted at J.A. 369 (―I have concluded as a matter of law that
[Medina] may [succeed under both the D.C. law and federal
law theories] and you [the jury] are not to concern yourself
with that question at all or worry about double recovery.‖). It
seems the magistrate judge believed the double recovery
inquiry turned not on the injuries Medina suffered but on the
source of law giving rise to the cause of action. See Medina,
718 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (―Thus, contrary to defendant‘s claim
that plaintiff recovered twice upon the same theory of
retaliation, plaintiff actually recovered once under a federal
statute and once under a District of Columbia statute.‖). But
this is incorrect. As we explained earlier, ―[i]f a federal claim
and a state claim arise from the same operative facts, and seek
identical relief, an award of damages under both theories will
constitute double recovery.‖ Mason, 115 F.3d at 1459 (quoting
U.S. Indus., 854 F.2d at 1259). Medina‘s D.C. law and federal
law theories of retaliation arose from the same facts (MPD‘s
failure to transfer him to Internal Affairs) and sought identical
relief (compensation for emotional distress and humiliation).
That Medina presented both D.C. law and federal law theories
to prove his case does not alter this conclusion.
Medina can prevail under these facts only if the jury
intended to award him $180,000 for a single injury and
allocated that amount between Medina‘s two theories of
liability. Although Medina failed to make this argument, even
if he had, it would be unsuccessful. The magistrate judge
explicitly instructed the jury not to concern itself with double
recovery because he had concluded ―as a matter of law‖ that
Medina could recover under both his federal law and D.C. law
theories. Trial Tr. at 96 (July 24, 2008), reprinted at J.A. 369.
In light of this statement, we cannot presume the jury intended
to compensate Medina $180,000 for a single injury without
regard to the multiplicity of theories pled.
10
Nor can Medina rely on Martini v. Federal National
Mortgage Association, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In
Martini, Elizabeth Martini sued her employer, Fannie Mae, for
sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII and
the D.C. Human Rights Act. Based on violations of both
statutes, the jury awarded Martini more than $6 million dollars,
with punitive damages comprising a substantial portion of that
award. Id. at 1339. Fannie Mae then filed a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, remittitur and a
motion to amend judgment. The district court reduced the
damages award, but Fannie Mae nonetheless appealed. Martini
cross-appealed, raising several arguments to preserve her
award. Id. at 1340. In considering whether Martini‘s damages
were in excess of Title VII‘s statutory cap, we concluded the
district court should have reallocated the excess damages to
Martini‘s award under District of Columbia law. Id. at
1349–50. We reasoned that because the jury had no legal basis
for distinguishing between the two theories, Title VII‘s cap did
not bar reallocation of the excess award under the D.C. Human
Right Act. Id. In so holding, we recognized that Title VII does
not relieve an employer of liability for its state-law violations.
Id.
At first blush, Martini might suggest that a plaintiff may
recover twice for the same injury under both state law and
federal law theories. But Martini is distinguishable.
Significantly, Martini involved an award of both compensatory
and punitive damages, while Medina received compensatory
damages only. Punitive damages, unlike compensatory
damages, are not aimed at making a plaintiff whole; thus the
rule against double recovery is inapplicable when the damages
awarded are punitive. Cf. Kassman, 546 F.2d at 1033 (―[A]
cardinal principle of law is that in the absence of punitive
damages a plaintiff can recover no more than the loss actually
11
suffered.‖ (quoting Snowden, 454 F.2d at 1048)). Compare
Mason, 115 F.3d at 1460 (―[M]ultiple punitive damage awards
on overlapping theories of recovery may not be duplicative at
all, but may instead represent the jury‘s proper effort to punish
and deter all the improper conduct underlying the verdict.‖),
with Dopp v. HTP Corp., 947 F.2d 506, 517 (1st Cir. 1991)
(―[T]he law abhors duplicative recoveries. That is to say, a
plaintiff who is injured by reason of a defendant‘s behavior is,
for the most part, entitled to be made whole—not to be
enriched.‖). Furthermore, unlike with Medina‘s case, there is
no indication the Martini jury intended Martini to recover
twice for the same injury. It is just as plausible the jury
intended to apportion a single damages award between both
D.C. law and federal law theories. See 178 F.3d at 1349.
III
Because the jury‘s award amounted to impermissible
double recovery, we reverse the magistrate judge‘s order
denying the District‘s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
We remand with instructions that the magistrate judge require
Medina to accept a remittitur of $90,000, or in the alternative, a
new trial.
So ordered.