Benuzzi v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-3021

JESSICA B ENUZZI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

B OARD OF E DUCATION OF THE
C ITY OF C HICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 CV 3510—Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge.

A RGUED M ARCH 30, 2011—D ECIDED JULY 21, 2011

Before F LAUM, W OOD , and T INDER, Circuit Judges.
T INDER, Circuit Judge. Jessica Benuzzi, one of the first
female custodians hired by the Chicago Public Schools,
has spent more than twenty years climbing the ranks of
the maintenance staff. In 2004, she reached the Grade V-II
Engineer level, which qualified her to oversee custodial
operations at large school buildings. With this promotion
came a new job, building engineer-in-charge, at a newly
2 No. 10-3021

opened school on Chicago’s south side, John J. Pershing
West Magnet School. The promotion also put Benuzzi
under the command of a new boss with whom she im-
mediately clashed, principal Cheryl Watkins. Watkins
declined Benuzzi’s repeated requests to work the
morning shift, and suspended her without pay three
times. Benuzzi responded by filing four complaints
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), alleging gender, race, age, and disability
discrimination and retaliation. When she received
her right-to-sue letter, Benuzzi sued Watkins and the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago on all of the
grounds she asserted before the EEOC. Watkins and
the Board moved for summary judgment. Benuzzi sub-
mitted a statement of additional facts in opposition to
summary judgment, which the district court largely
ignored because its “excessively lengthy paragraphs”
violated Local Rule 56.1. The district court, relying
mainly on Watkins’ and the Board’s factual submissions,
granted summary judgment in their favor on all Benuzzi’s
claims. Benuzzi challenges the grant only as to her
gender discrimination and retaliation claims. She also
challenges the district court’s application of Local
Rule 56.1. For the reasons explained below, we affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Local Rule 56.1
We first address Benuzzi’s contention regarding Local
Rule 56.1, for our resolution of this issue has the potential
to significantly impact the scope of this appeal.
No. 10-3021 3

Like most, if not all, federal judicial districts, the North-
ern District of Illinois has promulgated local procedural
rules to aid it in managing its docket effectively and
efficiently. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 (authorizing district courts
to “adopt and amend rules” consistent with federal rules
of civil procedure); A. Bauer Mech., Inc. v. Joint Arbitration
Bd. of the Plumbing Contractors’ Ass’n & Chi. Journeymen
Plumbers’ Local Union 130, U.A., 562 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir.
2009) (explaining the purpose of local rules). “[W]e
have emphasized the importance of local rules and have
consistently and repeatedly upheld a district court’s
discretion to require strict compliance with its local rules
governing summary judgment.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation omit-
ted); see also Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 385
F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004).
The rule at issue here is Local Rule 56.1, which governs
summary judgment and provides in relevant part,
Each party opposing a motion filed pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 shall serve and file—
....
(3) a concise response to the movant’s statement
[of material facts] that shall contain: . . .
(C) a statement, consisting of short numbered
paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the
denial of summary judgment, including references
to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting materials relied upon. Absent prior
leave of Court, a respondent to a summary judg-
4 No. 10-3021

ment motion shall not file more than 40 separately-
numbered statements of additional facts.
N.D. Ill. Civ. R. 56.1 (b)(3). Benuzzi attempted to comply
with LR 56.1 by filing a statement consisting of forty
numbered paragraphs that included citations to the
record. The paragraphs in her statement ranged in
length from two to eighteen lines. On average, each
paragraph contained about 8.5 lines. Benuzzi moved to
strike portions of defendants’ joint statement of facts,
but the defendants voiced no opposition to hers. To
the contrary, they filed a formal response to Benuzzi’s
LR 56.1 statement, indicating which additional facts
they disputed.
The district court was not as amenable. It explained in
its memorandum and opinion and order granting the
defendants’ summary judgment motions that it had
disregarded much of Benuzzi’s LR 56.1 statement. Citing
the portion of LR 56.1 excerpted above, the district court
explained that it declined to consider much of Benuzzi’s
statement of additional facts because most of her para-
graphs were “excessively lengthy.” The district court
refused to “wade through Benuzzi’s convoluted narra-
tives” and to that end declined to “consider factual state-
ments that fail to comply with Local Rule 56.1.” Benuzzi v.
Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., No. 09 CV 3510, 2010
WL 2169488, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2010). Without clari-
fying which statements those might be, it looked pre-
dominantly to the defendants’ factual statements and
determined that summary judgment was warranted. (The
longest paragraph in the defendants’ statement of facts
No. 10-3021 5

contained eight lines.) From the citations in the opinion, it
appears that the district court expressly considered only
four paragraphs from Benuzzi’s statement; those para-
graphs ranged in length from four to seven lines.
District courts have broad discretion to enforce and
require strict compliance with their local rules. See Elustra
v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 710 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We defer to the
district court’s understanding of its own rules.”). The
district judge in this case has expressed, through her
publicly available standing case management procedures,
that she strictly enforces LR 56.1’s forty-paragraph limit.
She is well within her authority to require such compli-
ance, and we commend her for clearly communicating
her high expectations to litigants appearing before her.
The lack of similar transparency with respect to her
interpretation of LR 56.1’s requirement of “short . . .
paragraphs” for the purposes of this case gives us
some pause, however. “Short” is, after all, a somewhat
subjective term; what is “short” to one judge may be
long to another, and a single judge’s definition might
reasonably vary from case to case. It appears that
Benuzzi and the court had different ideas about what
“short” meant in this fact-intensive case. Some of the
paragraphs in Benuzzi’s statement of additional facts
were objectively not short; most people would probably
agree that an eighteen-line paragraph is not a short para-
graph. But many of Benuzzi’s statements fell into a
grayer zone: is an eight-line paragraph “short”? What
about a ten-line or twelve-line paragraph? We do not
expect district courts to provide litigants with a concrete
cutoff; such a requirement would improperly cabin the
6 No. 10-3021

district courts’ discretion. But district courts might
prevent disputes like this one by giving litigants a brief
opportunity to revise their offending statements before
striking them, or at the very least clarifying which para-
graphs fail to meet the rule’s requirements. Here, we
are not sure what facts the district court considered or
disregarded; there are several paragraphs shorter than
or equal in length to the ones it cited that it apparently
declined to consider.
It seems that the parties are similarly vexed. Benuzzi’s
appellate briefing relies heavily on citations to her state-
ment of additional facts, which may or may not have
been considered by the district court, and the defendants’
briefing provides us with facts that were clearly not
considered below, see Benuzzi, 2010 WL 2169488, at *1 n.2,
as well as lengthy recitations of the very facts it claims
were properly stricken. At oral argument, we asked both
sides to clarify which facts were properly before us.
Benuzzi urged us to consider the entirety of her state-
ment of additional facts. The defendants agreed that
“everything in the record is available to this court for
review.” So while we decline to hold that the district
court abused its discretion here, largely because of
Benuzzi’s failure to seek clarification or leave to file a
lengthier statement, see N.D. Ill. Civ. R. 56.1 Committee
Comment (“A party may seek leave to file more asserted
statements of . . . additional fact, upon a showing that the
complexity of the case requires a relaxation of the . . .
40 statement limit.”), we will accede to the parties’ request
to consider facts that the district court may have disre-
garded.
No. 10-3021 7

II. Factual Background
With the antecedent procedural question resolved, we
proceed to the facts the parties have presented. We
view the facts in the light most favorable to Benuzzi, the
nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in
her favor. E.g., Groesch v. City of Springfield, Ill., 635
F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2011).
Benuzzi is a white woman in her early fifties. She has
been working for the Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”) since
1981, when she became one of its first female custodial
assistants. She worked her way up to the position of
building engineer by the late 1980s, and currently holds
one of the highest seniority rankings, 13 of 723. The next-
most-senior females hold numbers 86 and 127. In 2004,
Benuzzi attained the rank of Grade V-II engineer, which
qualified her to serve as the engineer-in-charge at a large
school. Shortly after attaining this rank, Benuzzi applied
for and was granted a transfer from Thorp Academy
to Douglas Academy, which was closed for major renova-
tions and was slated to reopen under new administra-
tion during the 2005-2006 school year. Benuzzi was the
only CPS worker on site and was tasked with supervising
the renovation crews.
In March 2005, the Board hired Cheryl Watkins, an
African American woman in her forties, to be the
principal of the new school replacing Douglas Academy,
John J. Pershing West Magnet School (“Pershing”). The
Board told Watkins that she could personally select all
her staff members except for custodial employees, who
were subject to special union contracts. Watkins toured
8 No. 10-3021

Pershing in late May 2005, while construction was on-
going. She had her first encounter with Benuzzi at
this time. Both sides agree the women got off on the
wrong foot; Watkins believed she misplaced her ring
during the visit and Benuzzi felt that Watkins was
accusing her of stealing it. (Watkins later found the ring
at home.) At some point during the summer, Watkins
questioned why Benuzzi was permitted to be in the
building during construction.
In June 2005, CPS sent a lower-ranked male engineer,
Osvaldo Alverado, to assist Benuzzi in getting Pershing
ready to open by September. Both Benuzzi and Alverado
worked overtime to get the building ready. Benuzzi
testified that at some point during the summer, Watkins
told Benuzzi that she (Watkins) would be closing
Benuzzi’s position because she only needed one
engineer and Alverado was better for the job. Watkins
learned she could not do so, however, because the union
contract required the assignment of two engineers in
buildings the size of Pershing. Thus, around that same
time, Watkins assigned Alverado to work the 6 a.m. to
2 p.m. shift during the school year, and gave Benuzzi the
10 a.m. to 6 p.m. shift. According to Benuzzi, the union
contract permitted the chief engineer to set the engi-
neers’ schedule subject to the principal’s approval,
but Watkins ignored her preferences. Benuzzi none-
theless conceded during her deposition that “Ms. Watkins
had complete authority to do all the scheduling.”
Alverado failed to show up over Labor Day weekend, the
last weekend before the start of the school year, so Be-
nuzzi wound up working thirty-six hours straight. Benuzzi
No. 10-3021 9

testified that Watkins was the only other person she
saw there on the holiday. A CPS consultant, John
DeSimone, testified that he walked through the building
sometime that weekend to make sure it was sufficiently
safe and clean to allow students to enter it the following
Tuesday. DeSimone testified that “there was [sic] some
issues between the engineer and the principal,” but “the
building was clean and safe for the students to come
into.” Pershing opened on time. Two weeks later, on
September 16, 2005, Watkins, who believed the building
was unacceptably dirty on the first day of school, issued
Benuzzi a cautionary notice (a written warning) alleging
she incompetently or inefficiently performed her duties.
The notice provided, “Several members of the Opera-
tions Department, including Mr. John DiSimone [sic] . . .
visited the building and noticed the unsatisfactory state
of the building the day before students were to arrive.
The amount of dust on the floors, from the construction
work being completed, imposed undue health issues
on students with asthma . . . and those who have aller-
gies. The building could have been cleaned properly
before students were to be in the building.” Benuzzi
refused to sign this cautionary notice, as well as a
second one Watkins gave her that same day for allegedly
raising her voice and initiating “private conversation . . .
in the presence of visitors and workmen” on Labor Day.
At some point, Alverado left Pershing and CPS replaced
him with Jeff Vaughn, a male Grade II engineer. Watkins
assigned Vaughn to work the 6-2 shift and kept Benuzzi
on the 10-6 shift. In March or April 2006, the Board visited
10 No. 10-3021

Pershing to assess its cleanliness. The Board assigned
Pershing a score of 97.1 out of a possible 100.
In May 2006, Benuzzi injured her hand on a patio door.
When she arrived at work on May 15, she saw that a
“blood clot or puddle” had formed in her hand and
decided it would be prudent to seek medical attention.
Benuzzi went to the office to seek permission to leave
the building. Neither Watkins nor assistant principal
Durrell Anderson was available. Benuzzi waited for
about forty-five minutes to no avail. Eventually, Benuzzi
told the school clerk that she had to get to the doctor.
The school clerk told Benuzzi that she would tell
Watkins that Benuzzi was at the doctor. Benuzzi tried to
reach Watkins by phone from the doctor’s office, but
was again only able to reach the school clerk. Watkins
testified that she did not know that Benuzzi had left
and spent time looking for her because a construction
worker had a question. Watkins testified that if Benuzzi’s
injury had been an emergency, the school clerk would
have told her; otherwise, notifying Watkins of her
absence was Benuzzi’s responsibility.
On or about June 9, 2006, Pershing held its end-of-
year awards ceremony. A school aide asked Benuzzi if
she could arrange for the custodians to carry some bever-
ages upstairs for the evening event. Benuzzi explained
that because the custodians’ shifts ended at 6:30, they
would have to bring the beverages up no later than 6:15.
The aide balked, as the beverages were not needed until
later in the evening. Benuzzi asked the aide if the people
who would be consuming the sodas were going to get
No. 10-3021 11

overtime pay; she hoped the custodians might be able
to get some overtime for helping with the beverages. It is
unclear whether or how the aide answered the question.
Benuzzi herself had previously agreed to work until
6:30 p.m. to ensure that an engineer was present at the
start of the evening ceremony; Vaughn was scheduled
to come in at 7:00. (It is not clear whether she or Vaughn
received overtime pay.) Vaughn refused to help Benuzzi
set up and instead sat at her desk with his feet up while
she worked.
On June 12, Watkins called Benuzzi into her office and
told her that “overtime was none of [her] business.”
Benuzzi testified that Watkins said “some terribly
mean things” to her during this meeting, including that
Pershing was “her territory” and that she didn’t want
Benuzzi in the building. Benuzzi, who suffers from
anxiety and irritable bowel syndrome, found the
meeting very stressful. She felt her heart racing and
developed a sharp pain and cramping in her stomach.
She “doubled over” and “let out an ‘ow,’ ” which
Watkins described as a “guttural scream.” Benuzzi, still
bent over, then stood up and told Watkins she had to
leave to see a doctor. Watkins told her to take her things
because she was going to make sure Benuzzi was not
allowed back. On June 16, Watkins drafted a memorial of
the June 12 meeting in which she expressed concern
about Benuzzi’s “erratic, unpredictable behavior” and
fear that Benuzzi “will do something to the custodians,
the assistant engineer, one of the students, or myself.”
Watkins also formally requested that Benuzzi submit to
a fitness for duty examination. Benuzzi was deemed fit
12 No. 10-3021

but did not return to Pershing until July 13. While
Benuzzi was gone, Vaughn told Watkins that one of the
custodians, Willie Rush, was spending inordinate
amounts of time in the restroom, sleeping on the job, and
using profane language; Watkins investigated and sus-
pended Rush for two days.
On July 17, another custodian, Charles Armour, told
Benuzzi that he had asked Vaughn to help him take
apart a table, but Vaughn had refused. Benuzzi found
Vaughn and asked him to help her take apart the table.
Vaughn told her that he did not have to listen to her and
refused to help. He then turned on a vacuum and said
he couldn’t hear her. Benuzzi returned to her office.
Before she could do anything, the phone rang. Watkins,
who was out of town at a conference, was on the other
end. Benuzzi told Watkins she was glad she had called
because there was a situation with Vaughn. Watkins
responded that she was actually calling because Vaughn
had called her to report that Benuzzi had just confronted
him, accused him of defacing a photograph of custodian
Rush she displayed on her desk, and called him “a
pussy, a liar, and a snitch.” Benuzzi denied the accusa-
tions. Then, according to Benuzzi, the phone inexplicably
went dead. Watkins called back and she and Benuzzi
discussed whether Benuzzi would be able to come in
early the next day. On July 21, Benuzzi emailed Watkins
to request a change in her work schedule. She asked
Watkins to put her on the 6-2 shift because she had
more experience than Vaughn and felt the scheduling
change “would be beneficial for the moral [sic] of the
custodial staff.” Watkins denied Benuzzi’s request by
No. 10-3021 13

letter dated July 25, explaining that she “fe[lt] it is best”
that Benuzzi keep the 10-6 shift.
On July 22, Watkins issued Benuzzi a Notice of Dis-
ciplinary Action, which is more serious than a cau-
tionary notice; it is a harbinger of formal disciplinary pro-
ceedings. In the notice, Watkins cited Benuzzi for
leaving Pershing without permission on May 15 (for her
doctor’s appointment). The notice also addressed the
alleged July 17 incident with Vaughn. The description
of the incident was “per Mr. Jeff Vaughn” and outlined
his view of the encounter. Vaughn claimed in the notice
that Benuzzi “has seemed very angry” and “complained
to several people including myself about not receiving
thank you notes from the kids in the school.” He
stated that he “feared for his safety.” The notice also
alleged that Benuzzi hung up on Watkins while Watkins
was still speaking to her on July 17, and stated that
several conference attendees had heard Watkins
exclaim that Benuzzi hung up on her at the time.
Benuzzi and her union representative contested the
charges. The union rep testified that Benuzzi had not
used a curse word in years and that she did not say
“those things” to Vaughn. Benuzzi testified that she
hung up because she thought Watkins was not on the
phone anymore. Watkins nevertheless found the charges
to be substantiated and recommended that Benuzzi
be suspended without pay for fifteen days. Benuzzi
appealed the suspension to the Board. A hearing officer
heard testimony from Watkins, Benuzzi, and her union
rep. He credited Watkins’ testimony and upheld the
14 No. 10-3021

suspension. Benuzzi testified that she has no evidence
that the hearing officer was influenced by her gender,
but she believes he inappropriately placed the burden
of proof on her rather than Watkins.
Benuzzi served her suspension in September. On
October 3, 2006, she filed a gender discrimination com-
plaint with the EEOC. In November, she sent Watkins
an unsolicited email in which she stated her willingness
to “work any hours assigned to [her].” In December,
Vaughn transferred out of Pershing and was replaced by
a male Grade II engineer, Sabian Haynes. Watkins sched-
uled Haynes to work the 6-2 shift and kept Benuzzi on
the 10-6 shift. On January 17, 2007, Benuzzi added allega-
tions of age, race, and disability discrimination as well
as retaliation to her EEOC claim.
On January 29, 2007, Benuzzi sent Watkins a one-sen-
tence email in which she asked to work the 6-2 shift
because Haynes was only a substitute. Watkins denied
the request via email the next day. Watkins stated that
she never “consider[ed] the rank of the individual in the
Grade II position, nor the position, as it relates to
the morning shift.” She also claimed that Benuzzi had
recently told her that she worked better in the evenings
and that she would “need to be off on many days
because of [her] stomach condition.” Watkins asked, “If
you are not able to come to work, who would open the
building?”
In late February or early March 2007, Benuzzi became
concerned about receipts that had gone missing from her
desk during her extended absence the previous June.
No. 10-3021 15

She believed that Vaughn took the receipts and had
been inappropriately reimbursed for the expenditures
they detailed. After emailing back and forth with
Watkins and assistant principal Anderson, Benuzzi
approached Anderson in person on the afternoon of
March 16, 2007, to ask how long the school retained
receipt records. Anderson led Benuzzi over to Watkins,
who was standing in the hallway having a conversation
with a member of the local school council. Benuzzi
asked Watkins her question, and Watkins raised her
voice and told Benuzzi the budget was closed and that
she would not look into the matter. Benuzzi attempted
to explain that she believed Vaughn had misappro-
priated school funds, and Watkins told her to call the
union. As Benuzzi walked away, she saw a student
sitting on a nearby bench. She testified that she told him,
“Sorry about that, we were a little loud.” She then heard
Watkins say to the school council member, “Do you see
how she talks to me?”
A few days later, Benuzzi met with Watkins, Vaughn,
and some union representatives to discuss the alleged
misappropriations. Vaughn was not disciplined. On
March 21, 2007, however, Benuzzi received a Notice of
Disciplinary Action. The notice did not mention the
receipt controversy. It alleged only that Benuzzi had
approached a student on March 16 (the day of the
receipt incident) and stated, “Do you see how your princi-
pal acts? You shouldn’t even go to this school. It’s a
disease.” Benuzzi denied the allegations, which Watkins
attributed to a note purportedly submitted by the
student who had been on the bench at the time of Benuzzi
16 No. 10-3021

and Watkins’ hallway dispute. Watkins recommended
that Benuzzi serve another fifteen-day suspension.
Benuzzi appealed to the Board, but the suspension was
upheld.
On May 4, 2007, several custodians were absent.
Watkins asked Benuzzi about the appropriate protocol
to ensure that necessary tasks were still completed.
Benuzzi outlined a plan and suggested that Watkins
assign overtime to the custodians who would have to
pick up the slack. Watkins claimed that no overtime
funds were available and sent Benuzzi an email later
that afternoon instructing her to have a custodian
empty the garbage on the second floor before he left for
the day. Benuzzi claims she did not receive the email; the
custodian left without completing the requested task.
According to Watkins, Benuzzi later approached her
while she (Watkins) was emptying the trash on the
second floor and offered to help. Watkins said, “Jessica,
you do this all the time,” to which Benuzzi loudly re-
sponded, “You lie, you lie, you lie.” Benuzzi denies ever
saying that and offers testimony from custodian
Osceola Tines that she never heard a conversation “in
which Ms. Watkins’ truthfulness was called into ques-
tion.” Watkins detailed the incident in a Notice of Disci-
plinary Action, however, and later found the charges
substantiated. Watkins recommended that Benuzzi serve
a third fifteen-day unpaid suspension. Benuzzi appealed
the suspension. Like the others, it was upheld. Benuzzi
updated her EEOC charges on June 6.
The 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years were rela-
tively uneventful compared to the 2006-2007 school year.
No. 10-3021 17

In July 2007, Benuzzi again asked Watkins if she could
switch to the 6-2 shift. Watkins denied Benuzzi’s
request, though she eventually changed Benuzzi’s hours
in January 2009. In December 2007, the Board evaluated
Pershing’s cleanliness and awarded it a near-perfect
score. In March, Benuzzi updated her EEOC charges
again. Sometime during the summer of 2008, Watkins
gave Benuzzi her first formal evaluation. (The defendants
claim that a computer glitch listing Benuzzi as an em-
ployee of Douglas Academy prevented them from
formally evaluating Benuzzi earlier.) Benuzzi scored
96.2/100 overall and received a 95 in “personal relations.”
On five occasions ranging from July 2008 to June 2009,
Benuzzi asked Watkins to discipline custodian Tines for
insubordination. Watkins investigated but never disci-
plined Tines. She emailed Benuzzi and said “[t]here is
nothing to discuss regarding Ms. Tines. She has com-
pleted the work you asked her to do. . . . I stated this to
you in previous meetings, it is the tone you take with
certain members of the custodial staff that you could
work to improve relations with your team.”
In March 2009, the EEOC issued Benuzzi a right-to-sue
letter. She filed suit against Watkins and the Board on
June 9, 2009. In her complaint, she alleged that the defen-
dants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by discriminating against her
on the basis of her gender and race and by retaliating
against her for filing charges with the EEOC. She also
alleged that they violated the Equal Protection clause, U.S.
Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the
18 No. 10-3021

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq.
Three days after Benuzzi filed her complaint, Watkins
and Anderson conducted annual employee evaluations.
Benuzzi requested an evaluation, and Watkins refused
to give her one. Watkins also refused to give Benuzzi
a Pershing hat, which employees received along with
their evaluations.
A few days later, Watkins waived service of the com-
plaint. A few days after that, on June 23, she presented
Benuzzi with a cautionary notice (relating to the June 12
evaluation incident, of which the defendants provide
a markedly different account) and held out a pen so
Benuzzi could sign it. Benuzzi took the pen from Watkins’
hand and wrote “RTS,” meaning “Refuses to Sign,” on
the notice. Watkins allegedly felt threatened by the
manner in which Benuzzi took the pen and notice from
her, which she described as “snatching.” She filed a
formal request with the Board to have Benuzzi removed
from the school because she feared for her safety. The
Board initially agreed to remove Benuzzi, but determined
the next day that Benuzzi’s union contract prevented
such an action. There is no evidence indicating that
Benuzzi was aware of Watkins’ request or the Board’s
willingness to accede to it at the time.
Benuzzi initially sat for her deposition on December 17,
2009. Her testimony was cut short, however, when Watkins
had to leave to attend to a family emergency. Benuzzi
resumed and completed her deposition on February 25,
2010. Watkins was present. The next day, Watkins
issued Benuzzi a memorandum restricting her presence
at Pershing to the hours of 5:45 a.m. to 2:15 p.m., even
No. 10-3021 19

in the event of an emergency, unless she obtained per-
mission from Watkins or the new assistant principal,
Tamara King. Watkins also issued a lengthy Notice of
Disciplinary Action that referenced nine separate
incidents dating back to October 2009. The notice enumer-
ated various transgressions, all of which Benuzzi
disputes or denies entirely, such as failure to answer a
walkie-talkie, failure to turn on the heat, failure to
remove tables from the lunchroom, failure to complete
agendas for custodial staff meetings, the falsification
of information to discipline a subordinate, and the
physical assault of custodian Armour. The most recent
(and most serious) incident, the alleged assault of Armour,
occurred on February 2, 2010, three weeks prior to the
issuance of the notice.
After Watkins moved to dismiss the suit, Benuzzi
conceded that all but her § 1983 claims against Watkins
were coterminous with those naming the Board, in
whose official capacity Watkins was undisputedly act-
ing. Benuzzi consented to dismissal with prejudice of the
non-§ 1983 claims against Watkins. Watkins and the Board
then moved for summary judgment on Benuzzi’s remain-
ing claims. The district court granted their motion in full
and later denied Benuzzi’s Rule 59 motion for recon-
sideration. Benuzzi appeals only the grant of summary
judgment on her Title VII gender discrimination
and retaliation claims.

III. Discussion
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
20 No. 10-3021

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To survive
summary judgment, a nonmovant must be able to show
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor;
if she is unable to “establish the existence of an element
essential to [her] case, and on which [she] will bear the
burden of proof at trial,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986), summary judgment must be granted.
We review de novo the district court’s determination
that the requirements of Rule 56(a) have been met. Ellis
v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, ___ F.3d ___, No. 10-2768, 2011 WL
2247384, at *4 (7th Cir. June 9, 2011).

A. Gender Discrimination
Benuzzi contends that the Board, acting through
Watkins, discriminated against her on the basis of her
gender. She relies exclusively on the indirect method, see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802 (1973),
to argue that genuine issues of material fact preclude
summary judgment for the defendants. To survive sum-
mary judgment under the indirect method, Benuzzi must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing evidence of the following elements: (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her
employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated
individuals outside the protected class were treated
more favorably than she. Farr v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health
Care Ctrs., 570 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2009). If Benuzzi
can make that showing, the Board must then provide a
No. 10-3021 21

nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. If
it does, the burden shifts back to Benuzzi, who must
show that a jury could find that proffered reason is
pretextual. See id. “Although intermediate burdens shift
back and forth under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the defendant
intentionally discriminated always remains with the
plaintiff.” Hudson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552, 561
(7th Cir. 2004); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“[I]t is not enough . . . to
dis believe the employer; the factfinder must believe the
plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.”
(quotation omitted)).
Benuzzi argues that the district court erred in its evalua-
tion of the latter three elements of the prima facie case.
She contends that her “outstanding” 2007-2008 evalua-
tion, coupled with the Board’s two glowing reviews
of Pershing’s cleanliness, establishes that she was
meeting the Board’s legitimate expectations. She also
argues that Watkins’ failure to evaluate her as regularly
as required by the Illinois School Code, 105 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/34-8.1, “preclude[s] her from disputing that
Plaintiff met the Defendants’ legitimate performance
expectations,” and, moreover, that Watkins’ asserted
reasons for suspending her were false and pretextual.
Benuzzi claims that pretext is also suggested by the
Board’s appeals process. Benuzzi next avers that the
district court inappropriately confined its analysis of
adverse employment actions to her suspensions, which
in her view are a mere portion of a discriminatory “course
of action.” Finally, she challenges the district court’s
22 No. 10-3021

determination that she failed to identify a better-
treated comparator. The district court found that
Benuzzi’s status as a supervisor and her failure to
identify any coworkers who engaged in similar conduct
without being similarly disciplined precluded her from
satisfying this element. Benuzzi asserts that Vaughn and
other Grade II engineers are comparable to Grade V-II
engineers. She further asserts that she never engaged
in inappropriate conduct and that even if she did,
the record establishes that Vaughn engaged in similar
conduct.
We need not get bogged down by most of these argu-
ments. “The prima facie case and pretext inquiries often
overlap; we may skip the analysis of a plaintiff’s prima
facie case and proceed directly to the evaluation of
pretext if the defendant offers a nondiscriminatory ex-
planation for its employment decision.” Adelman-Reyes
v. St. Xavier Univ., 500 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2007); see also
Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 477-78
(7th Cir. 2010). The defendants offered facially nondis-
criminatory reasons for Benuzzi’s three suspensions, the
only relevant employment decisions for purposes of
Benuzzi’s discrimination claim. See Whittaker v. N. Ill.
Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2005). Benuzzi would
prefer that we broaden the scope of our review to
include, essentially, the “cumulative effect of individual
acts,” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115
(2002), or, as she calls it, Watkins’ “course of action”
against her, but she has raised a discrimination claim, not
a hostile work environment one, see Vance v. Ball State
Univ., ___ F.3d ___, No. 08-3568, 2011 WL 2162900 at *4 (7th
No. 10-3021 23

Cir. June 3, 2011). Moreover, she has failed to demonstrate
that those actions, namely the cautionary notices and
disfavored scheduling, had any tangible job consequences
such that they constitute independent bases of liability
under Title VII. See Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325
F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003) (“At the very least, [plaintiff]
must show some quantitative or qualitative change in
the terms or conditions of his employment that is
more than a mere subjective preference.”); see also Lloyd
v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[W]ritten reprimands without any changes in the
terms or conditions of . . . employment are not adverse
employment actions.”); Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d
723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Lau’s decision to change Grube’s
working hours certainly does not rise to the level of an
adverse employment action. Grube’s pay and job title
remained the same, and she suffered no significantly
diminished job responsibilities.”).
The question before us therefore becomes whether a
reasonable jury could conclude that the Board’s asserted
reasons for suspending Benuzzi were pretextual. To show
pretext, Benuzzi must show not only that the Board’s
stated reasons for suspending her were dishonest or
phony, but also that the true reason was based on pro-
hibited discriminatory animus. McGowan v. Deere & Co.,
581 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). She “must do more than
simply allege that an employer’s stated reasons are inac-
curate; [s]he must still have some circumstances to
support an inference that there was an improper motiva-
tion proscribed by law.” Id. This is where her discrimina-
tion claim falters. No reasonable jury could find that
24 No. 10-3021

Benuzzi has made the requisite showing of gender-based
discriminatory animus. Even if we assume that Watkins
cut her accounts of every incident for which she dis-
ciplined Benuzzi from whole cloth, which is essentially
what Benuzzi contends, there is nothing in the record
that so much as hints that she did so because of Benuzzi’s
gender. It is clear even from the cold record that Benuzzi
and Watkins harbored a heated dislike for one another,
but Benuzzi has not presented evidence supporting
the inference that Watkins’ antipathy toward her
stemmed from her sex. Cf. Uhl v. Zalk Josephs Fabricators,
Inc., 121 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A personality
conflict doesn’t ripen into an ADA claim simply because
one of the parties has a disability.”). And to the extent
that the hearing officer’s evaluation of her appeals is
relevant, Benuzzi testified expressly that she had no
basis from which to conclude that his rulings were in-
fluenced in any way by her gender. Without some sem-
blance of a link between her gender and the adverse
employment actions she experienced, Benuzzi’s discrimi-
nation claim is destined to fail. The district court correctly
granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.

B. Retaliation
Benuzzi also contends that the Board, again through
Watkins, impermissibly retaliated against her after she
filed (and continually updated) charges of discrimination
with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). She further
claims that she experienced retaliation in connection
with her prosecution of this related lawsuit. She points
specifically to her receipt of a cautionary notice less than
No. 10-3021 25

a week after Watkins waived service of the complaint
and a lengthy Notice of Disciplinary Action the day
after she gave her deposition. Benuzzi did not seek to
amend her complaint to include these latter incidents,
but plaintiffs in federal court are not required to
plead with precision legal theories or detailed facts. See
Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir.
2010) (finding waiver inappropriate even though retalia-
tion plaintiff failed to plead “participation clause” of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision). In any event, neither
the defendants nor the district court sought to prohibit
Benuzzi from relying on these new facts, which she
presented for the first time in the statement of additional
facts accompanying her summary judgment response.
To the contrary, the only four paragraphs of her state-
ment that the district court explicitly considered were
the paragraphs presenting these very facts, which the
district court directly addressed near the conclusion of
its order and opinion. See Benuzzi, 2010 WL 2169488, at *9.
We likewise consider these litigation-related facts in
our evaluation of Benuzzi’s retaliation claim.
As with her discrimination claims, Benuzzi may prove
her Title VII retaliation claims by using either the direct or
indirect methods. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 637
F.3d 729, 740 (7th Cir. 2011). Benuzzi attempts to make
her case under both methods. We need only look to her
showing under the direct method, however, to conclude
that she has presented sufficient evidence of retaliation
to proceed to trial.
To avoid summary judgment on a retaliation claim
under the direct method, Benuzzi must produce evi-
26 No. 10-3021

dence from which a jury could conclude: “(1) that she
engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) that she
suffered a materially adverse action by her employer; and
(3) there was a causal link between the two.” Id. There is
no real dispute that Benuzzi has satisfied the first ele-
ment. Filing charges with the EEOC and pursuing a
lawsuit in an attempt to vindicate those charges are
“the most obvious form[s] of statutorily protected activ-
ity.” Id.
The next query is whether Benuzzi has demonstrated
that she suffered a materially adverse action as a conse-
quence of her protected behavior. “Materially adverse
actions” are those that might dissuade a reasonable
employee from engaging in protected activity, Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); this
category sweeps more broadly than the “adverse employ-
ment actions” required to sustain a discrimination claim,
see Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868
(2011). Benuzzi’s suspensions without pay, the second of
which she alleges was retaliatory, undoubtedly satisfy
the materially adverse standard. See, e.g., Ellis, 2011 WL
2247384, at *7 (“There is no question that the suspension
could qualify as an adverse employment action.”). Equally
clear is that Watkins’ request to have Benuzzi removed
from Pershing (which Benuzzi characterizes as a “demo-
tion”) does not. Benuzzi was never in fact removed or
demoted, even temporarily; an empty threat that quickly
dissipates before the employee becomes aware of it does
not constitute a materially adverse action.
Whether the Notice of Disciplinary Action and hours
restriction memorandum she received the day after she
No. 10-3021 27

gave her deposition were materially adverse present
much closer questions that will be best resolved by a jury.
Generally, written warnings, standing alone, do not
constitute materially adverse actions, see Lloyd, 552 F.3d
at 602; Johnson, 325 F.3d at 902.; the post-complaint cau-
tionary notice does not trouble us. But context is a
crucial consideration in Title VII retaliation actions,
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69, and in this context, we agree
with Benuzzi that the sweeping Notice of Disciplinary
Action citing petty misdeeds that allegedly occurred
months ago, coupled with the unexplained memorandum
restricting her access to Pershing, “could constitute an
adverse action within the meaning of the direct method of
proving retaliation,” Silverman, 637 F.3d at 741. A reason-
able employee could be deterred from filing a discrim-
ination complaint or participating in a deposition if
doing so would be followed by the (highly probable)
possibility of discipline for activities he may have long
forgotten and the limitation of his ability to be present at
his workplace without first obtaining permission from his
boss. Cf. Lang v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 361
F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Lang’s evidence raises
the inference that Beckelman was setting him up to
fail . . . .”).We leave that question for a jury to assess in the
first instance, since we also find that Benuzzi has pre-
sented evidence from which a jury could infer that her
statutorily protected activities precipitated these actions.
Causality is typically one of the highest hurdles retalia-
tion plaintiffs must clear. Plaintiffs often look to timing
alone to make the jump, and Benuzzi is no exception.
She contends that because her second suspension was
28 No. 10-3021

subsequent and relatively proximate to the filing of her
first amended EEOC charge, the former must have
caused the latter two months later. (She does not mention
her third suspension, which came about two months
after the second and preceded her next round of EEOC
charges.) She makes the same contention with respect to
her deposition and the omnibus Notice of Disciplinary
Action and hours-restricting memo, which were
separated by only a day.
“The closer two events are, the more likely that the first
caused the second.” Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d
312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). Indeed, adverse actions occasion-
ally “come[ ] so close on the heels of a protected act that
an inference of causation is sensible.” Id. The incredibly
short span of time separating Benuzzi’s deposition, at
which Watkins was present, from her receipt of two
arguably adverse documents authored by Watkins might
reasonably give rise to the inference that the events were
linked. See id. (inference of causality reasonable where
employee discharged immediately after handing his
supervisor a note detailing allegations of discrimination);
Casna v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 427 (7th Cir. 2009)
(inference of causality reasonable where supervisor
recommended termination the day after an employee
made a protected statement and employee was terminated
three days later); McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d
789, 797 (7th Cir. 1997) (inference of causality reasonable
when two to three days separated employee’s protected
statement and termination). “A jury, not a judge, should
decide whether the inference is appropriate” here,
Loudermilk, 636 F.3d at 315, at least with respect to the
No. 10-3021 29

events that occurred after Benuzzi’s deposition, particu-
larly because no alleged intervening events might reason-
ably have justified the reprimands, see Davis v. Time Warner
Cable of Se. Wis., L.P., ___ F.3d ___, No. 10-1423, 2011
WL 2611303, at *9 (7th Cir. July 5, 2011). The two-month
time frame separating Benuzzi’s first amended EEOC
complaint and her second suspension is, without more,
insufficient to give rise to a similar inference. See, e.g.,
Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir.
2008) (“The approximate seven-week interval between
[plaintiff’s] sexual harassment complaint and her subse-
quent arrest/termination does not represent that rare
case where suspicious timing, without more, will carry
the day.”).

IV. Conclusion
Benuzzi has failed to demonstrate that the district court
abused its discretion in handling her Local Rule 56.1
submission or erred in dismissing her gender discrimina-
tion complaint at the summary judgment stage. We
A FFIRM those aspects of the district court’s judgment.
But there are genuine issues of material fact as to the
adverse nature of the actions the defendants took against
Benuzzi in the wake of her deposition, and whether
those actions were causally linked to Benuzzi’s partic-
ipation in this case. We therefore V ACATE the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on Benuzzi’s retal-
iation claim and R EMAND for trial.

7-21-11