FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 5, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-3180
JUDAH PRINCE, also known as Rex
A. Lutes,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. NO. 6:09-CR-10008-1-JTM)
Timothy J. Henry, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender
Office, Wichita, Kansas, for Appellant.
James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney (Barry R. Grissom, United
States Attorney, and Matt Treaster, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on
the brief) United States Attorney’s Office, Wichita, Kansas, for Appellee.
Before TYMKOVICH, SEYMOUR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Appealing his drug convictions, Judah Prince asks us to decide two
questions of first impression in our circuit. First, does the Constitution bar the
government from peremptorily striking prospective jurors because of their views
on marijuana legalization? On this question, we find no constitutional protection.
Given the posture of Prince’s case, the Constitution does not prohibit parties from
striking jurors on this basis.
The second question is whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(A), which criminalizes making false statements to federally licensed
firearms dealers, requires a defendant to know that his false statement will be
kept in the firearm dealer’s written records, as mandated by federal law. Because
the records-keeping requirement is purely a jurisdictional element, we hold there
is no such mens rea requirement.
Accordingly, we reject Prince’s arguments on these two points. And, after
a careful consideration of the record, we also reject Prince’s challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. Therefore, exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we AFFIRM Prince’s conviction
and sentence.
I. Background
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) originally
identified Prince in connection with an investigation into illegal sales of firearm
parts. The ATF suspected an individual had been manufacturing and illegally
selling AK-47 “flats” on GunBroker.com, and it traced one of the sales to Prince.
Investigating further, ATF agents ultimately discovered that Prince had made
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more than 150 purchases from GunBroker.com, including AK-47 assault rifles,
fully automatic trigger parts, demilled fully automatic weapons, and Uzis. [R.,
Vol. II at 354–55.] In connection with their inquiries, ATF agents questioned a
firearms dealer who handled transactions for Prince. The dealer alerted Prince to
the investigation.
When ATF agents located Prince, he admitted to buying the guns and gun
parts and agreed to show the agents his purchases, which he kept in his garage.
At Prince’s Newton, Kansas residence, the agents saw various gun parts and
ammunition, and they obtained a warrant to search the house. Soon thereafter, the
agents encountered Prince’s adult children, who often stayed at the residence.
Upon searching the house, the agents found 54 firearms and approximately 10,000
rounds of ammunition. But that was not all. They also found more than 200
marijuana plants in the basement and evidence that suggested Prince was involved
in their cultivation. 1 Finally, the ATF discovered Prince had repeatedly given a
false address to federally licensed firearms dealers.
The government charged Prince with one count of manufacturing marijuana
plants, 25 counts of making false statements to a federally licensed firearms
dealer, and one count of unlawful use of a controlled substance while possessing a
firearm. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (count 1); 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) (counts
1
When officers first uncovered evidence of the marijuana in the house,
they obtained a second search warrant for the marijuana growing operation.
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2–26); 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(3), 924(a)(2) (count 27). Prince pleaded not guilty.
Before trial, the district court granted Prince’s motion to suppress evidence seized
by the government during a search of his residence, and the court also sua sponte
ordered suppression of all evidence obtained by the government from the
inception of its investigation of Prince. The government appealed, and we
reversed the district court and remanded for trial. See United States v. Prince,
593 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3429 (2010).
After trial, the jury convicted Prince of the marijuana manufacturing count
and the twenty-five false statement counts. He was acquitted of unlawfully using
a controlled substance while possessing a firearm. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B), Prince was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years’ imprisonment; this included a mandatory five-year enhancement tied to a
prior felony drug conviction for growing marijuana. Accordingly, the district
court sentenced Prince to the mandatory minimum ten years’ imprisonment.
II. Discussion
Prince contends (1) the district court erred in allowing the government to
strike jurors for their belief that marijuana should be legalized, (2) the jury
instructions were based on a misinterpretation of § 924(a)(1)(A), (3) the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction, and (4) the district court issued an
improper sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude these
arguments lack merit.
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A. Jury Selection
Prince raises two challenges to the district court’s administration of jury
selection. First, relying on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), he contends
the government’s peremptory challenges, which eliminated jurors who favored
legalization of marijuana, infringed his rights under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, he argues his Sixth Amendment rights
were violated because the empaneled jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section
of the community. 2 Neither assertion is persuasive.
1. Batson Challenge
During jury selection, the government asked potential jurors whether they
believed marijuana should be legalized. Four prospective jurors answered “yes.”
Later, over Prince’s objection, the government used peremptory strikes to remove
each of these prospective jurors.
Prince contends this was an equal protection violation under Batson. He
says that because the government may not strike jurors on the basis of their race,
it also may not strike jurors on the basis of political or ideological beliefs.
Specifically, Prince asks us to extend Batson—which traditionally has been
2
Prince also challenges jury selection on Fifth Amendment grounds and on
the theory that he did not receive a fair trial. We need not consider these
arguments at length. Prince’s Fifth Amendment claim relies entirely on his
Batson equal protection claim and has no independent merit. Similarly, Prince’s
contention he was deprived of the right to a fair trial restates his Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section claim.
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applied only to peremptory strikes based on race and other protected classes under
the Fourteenth Amendment—to prohibit exclusions of prospective jurors based on
their views of marijuana legalization.
We resist this invitation. Prince’s Batson challenge fails because, as a
matter of law, Batson does not extend to the exclusion of jurors based on their
beliefs regarding marijuana legalization. A brief review of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning explains why. In Batson, the Supreme Court held the “Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of
their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable
impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.” 476 U.S. at
89. Lodging a successful Batson challenge requires three steps:
First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing
that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose. Second, once the defendant has made
out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to explain
adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-
neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, [i]f a race-neutral
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . .
whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial
discrimination.
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (citations and quotations
omitted). In assessing an equal protection claim under this test, we review “for
clear error the district court’s finding of whether the striking party had
discriminatory intent.” United States v. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d 916, 927
(10th Cir. 2002). In doing so, we “afford[] great deference to [the district
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court’s] decision on discriminatory intent, which represents a finding of fact.” Id.
We review de novo whether the government’s proffered explanation for striking
the jurors was appropriate. United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th
Cir. 2008). “[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion,” however, “regarding
[improper] motivation rests with, and never shifts from” the party opposing the
strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam).
Prince cannot get past the first step of the Batson analysis. Batson
originally addressed only peremptory strikes based on race, but the principle has
subsequently been extended to other groups receiving heightened protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127, 143 (1994) (applying Batson to sex); Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351 (9th
Cir. 2006) (applying Batson to strikes against Native Americans); United States v.
Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 666 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying Batson to religious
affiliation); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying Batson
to strikes against Hispanics). There is no precedent, however, for extending
Batson to exclusions based on the beliefs of prospective jurors. And in fact,
every court we could find has expressly refused to extend Batson beyond these
traditional limits. See, e.g., United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 511 (3d Cir.
2003) (“The distinction drawn by the District Court between a strike motivated by
religious beliefs and one motivated by religious affiliation is valid and proper.”);
United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (“It would be
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improper and perhaps unconstitutional to strike a juror on the basis of his being a
Catholic, a Jew, [or] a Muslim,” but it would be “proper to strike him on the basis
of a belief that would prevent him from basing his decision on the evidence and
instructions, even if the belief had a religious backing.”); United States v.
Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Political belief is not the overt and
immutable characteristic that race is, and we decline to extend the Batson line of
cases to this case.”).
This position makes sense. Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence dictates
that jurors should not be stricken solely on account of race, ethnicity, or sex.
Allowing status-based strikes of jurors in classes receiving heightened protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment interferes inextricably with a defendant’s
constitutional right to an impartial jury. The fact that a prospective juror is a
certain race or sex is not determinative of his ability to be a dispassionate fact-
finder. On the other hand, a person’s policy views or ideological perspectives on
a particular issue may introduce bias and impair a juror’s ability to be impartial.
In this vein, there are times when striking jurors based on their prejudicial beliefs
facilitates disinterested factfinding.
We also note that under Batson, a significant part of the harm we seek to
avoid by prohibiting certain discriminatory strikes is the harm to the community
at large and to the excluded jurors. It is not only the defendant who is harmed by
unconstitutional discrimination during voir dire. Excluding certain persons from
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jury service “solely by reason of their race . . . forecloses a significant
opportunity to participate in civic life.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409
(1991); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 (“Discrimination in jury selection . . .
causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are
wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process.”).
Hence, there is a sharp distinction between one’s status in a protected class
and one’s views on marijuana legalization. As the Supreme Court has explained
in a different context, it may be appropriate for a party to “use peremptory
challenges to eliminate prospective jurors belonging to groups it believes would
unduly favor the other side.” Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481 (1990). The
Court emphasized that the use of peremptory challenges is “a means of
eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides, thereby assuring the selection
of a qualified and unbiased jury.” 3 Id. at 484 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 91)
3
In United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 511, the Third Circuit
highlighted this principle when it held that a district court’s differentiation
“between a strike motivated by religious beliefs and one motivated by religious
affiliation [was] valid and proper.” The court explained that a prosecutor “may
undoubtedly strike a juror for being unwilling to sit in judgment of another human
being,” but he may not “infer solely from a prospective juror’s race, gender or
religion that he will be unwilling to sit in judgment of another, and then offer that
unwillingness as a permissible basis for a peremptory challenge.” Id. at 514; see
also Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 22.3(d) (2010) (“Lower
courts have divided over whether the Batson principle prohibits challenges based
on religion, with the better view banning challenges based on membership alone
but allowing challenges based on activities or articulated beliefs.”). We need not
decide here whether peremptory strikes on the basis of religious affiliation are
constitutionally improper, but we agree with the principle that striking a juror for
(continued...)
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(quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, we agree with those courts that
decline to expand Batson to cover discrimination based on political or ideological
viewpoints. See generally Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 22.3(d)
(2010).
Prince’s citation to other authority is unpersuasive. Prince cites both
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980), for the proposition that prospective jurors cannot be excluded solely on
the basis their beliefs. Both of these cases, however, “dealt with the special
context of capital sentencing, where the range of jury discretion necessarily gave
rise to far greater concern over the possible effects of an ‘imbalanced’ jury.”
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 182 (1986).
In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held narrowly that the death penalty
cannot be imposed by a jury where prospective jurors were excluded “simply
because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” 391 U.S. at 522. The
Court has never extended this doctrine beyond the death penalty context.
Moreover, the Court expressly rejected the notion that “the exclusion of jurors
opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of
guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction.” Id. at 518. It is therefore
3
(...continued)
his beliefs is categorically different from striking him because of his status in a
protected class.
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apparent that the Witherspoon restriction applies only to the sentencing phase of a
trial—and not the guilt phase.
The story was the same in Adams v. Texas, where the Supreme Court struck
down a Texas statute that required jurors in capital cases to swear that the
prospect of a mandatory death penalty “would not affect their deliberations on
any issue of fact.” 448 U.S. at 42. The Court reasoned that “a juror may not be
challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties . . . .”
Id. at 45.
Since these cases, the Supreme Court has squarely limited the doctrine set
forth in Witherspoon and Adams by expressly rejecting the “suggestion that [the
two cases] have broad applicability outside the special context of capital
sentencing . . . .” Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 183. Accordingly, they are inapplicable
here. In the Batson context, death is indeed different. For these reasons, Prince’s
Batson challenge is meritless.
2. Fair Cross-Section Challenge
Prince’s Sixth Amendment argument parallels his equal protection claim.
He contends the exclusion of pro-marijuana-legalization jurors from the petit jury
violated his right to have an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community. This claim also fails.
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First, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury representative of a fair cross-
section of the community applies only to the jury pool—not to the petit jury. This
alone is fatal to Prince’s argument, because he challenges only the composition of
the petit jury. In general, criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to
“object to a venire that is not designed to represent a fair cross section of the
community, whether or not the systematically excluded groups are groups to
which he himself belongs.” Holland, 493 U.S. at 477. In Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. at 173–74, the Supreme Court held that this fair-cross-section
requirement does not extend to petit juries—as opposed to jury panels or
venires—and therefore does not prohibit the appropriate use of for-cause and
peremptory challenges against prospective jurors. The court noted the “practical
impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly ‘representative’
petit jury.” Id. at 174. Further, even if we were to assume the fair-cross-section
requirement could apply to petit juries, it certainly would not apply to non-
distinctive groups identified only in terms of shared beliefs, such as support for
marijuana legalization. As the Court stated in Lockhart, any requirement that
jurors should hold a discrete mix of viewpoints is “both illogical and hopelessly
impractical.” 476 U.S. at 178. The use of peremptory challenges to eliminate
jurors belonging to groups that might unduly favor one side or the other is a long
and accepted practice in common-law jurisdictions.
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Prince’s claim fails for another reason as well: the fair-cross-section
principle does not apply to peremptory strikes. In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. at
478, the Supreme Court held that “[a] prohibition upon the exclusion of
cognizable groups through peremptory challenges has no conceivable basis in the
text of the Sixth Amendment, is without support in our prior decisions, and would
undermine rather than further the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.”
The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment assured the prospect of an
impartial jury but not necessarily a representative jury. Id. at 480; see also
House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1026 (10th Cir. 2008).
Ultimately, the fair-cross-section doctrine does not suggest that an
impartial jury must be composed of individuals with diverse opinions or
ideologies. The Supreme Court has held that “any [] group[s] defined solely in
terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as
jurors in a particular case . . . may be excluded from jury service without
contravening any basic objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement.”
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176–77. This is because “[t]he Constitution presupposes
that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community is impartial,
regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so
long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to
apply the law to the facts of the particular case.” Id. at 184.
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Thus, Prince suffered no Sixth Amendment violation. He cannot escape the
fact that the fair-cross-section doctrine applies neither to petit juries nor to
peremptory strikes. It was therefore constitutionally appropriate for the district
court to empanel a jury devoid of jurors who favor legalization of marijuana.
B. Jury Instructions
Prince also argues his conviction under § 924(a)(1) for making false
statements in connection with purchasing firearms should be overturned because
the district court failed to instruct the jury about the proper mens rea of an
element of the crime. 4 Specifically, he asserts the government had to prove not
only that he knowingly made false statements on ATF forms, but also that he
knew the false information would be kept in the records of a federally licensed
firearms dealer. He is incorrect.
We “review de novo the jury instructions as a whole and view them in the
context of the entire trial to determine if they accurately state the governing law
and provide the jury with an accurate understanding of the relevant legal
standards and factual issues in the case.” United States v. Bedford, 536 F.3d
4
In his opening brief, Prince advanced an additional mens rea argument,
which addressed the statutory construction of the marijuana manufacturing
statute. He contended the government had to prove he not only knowingly or
intentionally manufactured marijuana plants, but also that he knew the amount he
manufactured exceeded 100 plants. See § 841(a)(1). Prince subsequently
withdrew this argument, because in Jury Instruction Number 11, the Court
required the jury to find that Prince “knew the amount of the controlled substance
he manufactured was at least 100 plants.” R., Vol. 1 at 105. Therefore, we need
not address this issue.
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1148, 1152 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). We “review the district court’s
decision to give or to refuse a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion.”
Id. Ordinarily, “[f]ailure to instruct on such an essential element as intent or
knowledge requires reversal.” United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1527
(10th Cir. 1994).
Section 924(a)(1) provides that “whoever—(A) knowingly makes any false
statement or representation with respect to the information required by this
chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this chapter . . . shall
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” Under
this statute, it is self-evident that a defendant may not be convicted unless the
government shows he knowingly made a false statement. An unwitting
misrepresentation does not suffice. The question is whether the “knowingly”
mens rea term also modifies § 924(a)(1)(A)’s object: “to be kept in the records of
a person licensed under this chapter.” In other words, to be criminally liable,
must a defendant making a knowing misrepresentation also know that the firearms
dealer will keep the statement in his records, as required by federal law? The
district court thought not, and we agree.
In Jury Instruction Number 12, the court explained the elements of
§ 924(a)(1)(A) but, over Prince’s objection, did not state that Prince’s conviction
depended on his knowledge of the statute’s records provision. Instruction
Number 12 required the jury to find:
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First: the person named in the indictment was a
Federally licensed firearms dealer at the time the
alleged offense occurred;
Second: the defendant made a false statement or
representation in the firearm records that the
licensed firearms dealer was required by federal
law to maintain; and
Third the defendant made the false statement or
representation with knowledge of the falsity.
Prince claims this instruction was erroneous in light of Flores-Figueroa v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009), which addresses the grammatical construction of
the term “knowingly” in an aggravated identity-theft prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1). Prince argues the logic in Flores-Figueroa applies to § 924(a)(1)
and requires us to reverse the district court.
In Flores-Figueroa, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1028A(a)(1)—a
statute unrelated to the one at issue in the present case—which criminalizes
“knowingly transfer[ing], possess[ing], or us[ing], without lawful authority, a
means of identification of another person.” The Court considered whether the
“knowingly” mens rea element modified the sentence’s direct object: “a means of
identification of another person.” 129 S. Ct. at 1894. The question was whether
a defendant could be convicted of aggravated identity theft regardless of whether
he actually knew his fake documentation belonged to someone else. 5
5
The facts of Flores-Figueroa illustrate the crux of the issue. Flores-
Figueroa was a Mexican citizen who obtained counterfeit identification
(continued...)
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According to the Court, “[a]s a matter of ordinary English grammar,” the
word “knowingly” in § 1028A(a)(1) applies to each subsequently listed element in
the crime. Id. at 1890. Under this interpretation, “knowingly” modifies not only
the verbs of the sentence, but also the direct object. Relying on this logic, Prince
contends we should apply the “knowingly” mens rea term to all elements of
§ 924(a)(1)(A), including the direct object: “to be kept in the records of a person
licensed under this chapter.” This argument has some force. Just like in Flores-
Figueroa, here we have only a single sentence, in a single subsection, addressing
a single subject matter. Nevertheless, we find the argument unconvincing.
Unlike the direct object at issue in Flores-Figueroa, § 924(a)(1)(A)’s
records requirement is simply a jurisdictional hook. It provides authority for the
United States to criminalize false statements made to firearms dealers. Indeed,
although it affects the consequences of knowingly lying to firearms dealers—the
conduct Congress sought to punish—it does not bear on the nefariousness of the
conduct itself. Accordingly, the status of firearms dealers and the forms they
must keep on file are not separate knowledge elements under § 924(a)(1)(A) but
5
(...continued)
documents for employment purposes. He initially received documents reflecting
fabricated Social Security numbers and alien registration numbers. Later,
however, he received new documents with new numbers that, unlike his initial
documentation, actually belonged to other people. At trial, the government
successfully argued it was of no consequence whether Flores-Figueroa knew that
his second set of documents was a “a means of identification of another person.”
129 S. Ct. at 1888–89. The Supreme Court disagreed and applied § 1028A(a)(1)’s
“knowingly” requirement to each term of the provision.
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rather objective facts that must be established before the statute can apply. In the
absence of clear language, we therefore decline to read a mens rea requirement
into § 924(a)(1)(A)’s record-keeping provision.
This holding accords with our consistent instruction that “knowledge of []
jurisdictional facts is not generally an element of the required intent under federal
statutes.” 6 United States v. Speir, 564 F.2d 934, 938 (10th Cir. 1977); see also
United States v. Ransom, 642 F.3d 1285, 1289 n.3 (10th Cir. 2011) (under 18
U.S.C. § 641); United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 673–74 (10th Cir. 2002)
(under 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a)); United States v. Levine, 41 F.3d 607, 617 n.12
(10th Cir. 1994) (under 18 U.S.C. § 1365(b)); United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d
1340 (10th Cir. 1983) (under 18 U.S.C. § 287); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d
624, 630 (10th Cir. 1979) (“We do not require the government to prove the
defendant’s knowledge of jurisdictional elements.”).
Our approach here is not inconsistent with Flores-Figueroa or other
relevant precedents. Most importantly, neither Flores-Figueroa nor United States
v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)—the other main case Prince relies
on—involved purely jurisdictional direct objects. For example, in the statute at
6
Our approach accords with that of other circuits. See, e.g., United States
v. Rehak, 589 F.3d 965, 974 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he government is not required to
prove a defendant knew the property he stole was owned by the United States
because the United States’ ownership merely provides the basis for federal
jurisdiction.”); United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 425–27 (1st Cir. 1994) (in
a similarly constructed statute, the “knowingly” mens rea term did not apply to a
jurisdictional direct object).
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issue in Flores-Figueroa, the focus was on whether the means of identification
belonged to another person. 129 S. Ct. at 1890–92. In that context, no doubt
exists that absconding with someone else’s identity—and in doing so,
impersonating an innocent and unaware citizen, most likely to his detriment—
implicates additional harm beyond the crime of simply using a falsified
identification document. 7
Similarly, in the statute at issue in X-Citement Video, the object of the mens
rea term involves the age of the subject of a pornographic image. 513 U.S. at
67–69; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252. In that context, knowingly distributing child
pornography is certainly worse than distributing obscene images depicting
someone assumed (albeit mistakenly) to be over the age of 18. In contrast, in no
way is making a false statement to a gun seller rendered more condemnable if the
defendant knew the misrepresentation was required by law to be kept in the
records of a federally licensed firearms dealer. In this sense, declining to apply
§ 924(a)(1)(A)’s “knowingly” modifier to the sentence’s direct object creates no
danger of criminalizing otherwise innocent conduct. See Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (noting mens rea terms are “particularly
appropriate where . . . to interpret the statute [more broadly] would be to
7
This is likely why Congress chose to define separate offenses and
punishments for identity theft (§ 1028A), on the one hand, and identity fraud (18
U.S.C. § 1028), on the other. See Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1893
(recognizing the distinction between these two statutes).
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criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct”); see also X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 73 (“[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement
should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct.”). Indeed, the direct object of § 924(a)(1)(A) is purely jurisdictional and
involves no conduct at all.
For these reasons, the jury instructions accurately stated the governing law.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, Prince argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
Specifically, he contends the jury heard insufficient evidence that he knowingly
gave false information to a federally licensed firearms dealer, and that the record
does not reflect his personal involvement in the marijuana cultivation enterprise.
After a thorough review of the record, we disagree on both points.
We review sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Parker,
553 F.3d 1309, 1316 (10th Cir. 2009). Under due process principles, evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier
of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see also Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “We will not weigh conflicting evidence or
second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury.” United States v. Summers,
414 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 2005).
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1. False Statements to Firearms Dealers
The facts underlying this issue are simple. Despite apparently residing at
one residence in Newton at all relevant times to the crimes charged, Prince
routinely purchased firearms using a different address—in another part of
town—that was listed on his driver’s license. This was a problem for Prince
because ATF inquiries revealed he had never lived at the driver’s license address.
As explained above, to prove liability under § 924(a)(1)(A), the
government had to establish three elements: (1) the dealers named in the
indictment were federally licensed firearms dealers at the time the offenses
occurred; (2) Prince made a false statement or representation in the records that
the licensed firearm dealer was required by federal law to maintain; and (3) he
made the false statement with knowledge of the falsity. See Jury Instruction No.
12. Prince argues the address information was immaterial, and therefore
irrelevant, to the requirements of § 924(a)(1)(A), and that in any event, the
government did not prove he used a false address when buying firearms. The
voluminous evidence in the record belies Prince’s contentions.
As an initial matter, we hold that knowingly giving a false address when
filling out ATF forms violates § 924(a)(1)(A). ATF Form 4473, which federally
licensed firearms dealers must keep on file, requires a firearm purchaser to
provide his “current residence address”—an out-of-date address listed on a
driver’s license would not suffice—and warns that the buyer’s current residential
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address cannot be a post office box. See, e.g., Supp. R., Gov’t Ex. 2F; see also
United States v. Nelson, 221 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2000) (18 U.S.C.
§ 922(b)(5) requires licensed firearms dealers to keep records containing
information about purchasers, including name, age, and place of residence; as a
result, false statements relating to this information are prohibited under
§ 924(a)(1)(A)). Additionally, when he signed the ATF Form, Prince certified
that he “underst[ood] that making any false oral or written statement, or
exhibiting any false or misrepresented identification with respect to this
transaction, is a crime punishable as a felony.” See, e.g., Supp. R., Gov’t Ex. 2F.
Accordingly, Prince was well aware that submitting false address information was
a criminal act.
Further, the evidence presented at trial gave the jury ample reason to
conclude Prince knowingly lied about his address on ATF forms. First, the
government established Prince never lived at the driver’s license address—the
address he repeatedly provided when purchasing firearms. Detectives showed
Prince’s photo to the neighbors there, all of whom reported that Prince did not
live at the apartment complex. Further, the property manager for the apartment
complex scoured her records and found that since at least 2004, no one named
Judah Prince or Rex Lutes (Prince’s former name) had lived in any of the
apartments. Witness testimony supported this evidence.
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In contrast, the evidence showed Prince resided full-time at the other
residence, where the marijuana and firearms were found. Not only did Prince tell
officers that this was his home address, they also discovered the deed and title for
the home were in Prince’s name, records showed he took out a mortgage on the
home, and an employee of the power company testified that Prince had been
paying the house’s electric bills since January 2006. Moreover, during a search
of Prince’s house, an ATF agent found a mortgage document addressed to Prince
at the home’s address, and another ATF agent testified that the house bore indicia
of active habitation, including clothing and personal items.
Prince’s neighbors corroborated this evidence. For example, one neighbor
testified that Prince had moved to the house approximately three years before his
arrest, that she saw Prince nearly every day and had regular conversations with
him, and that she observed him working in his yard. Another neighbor told the
jury he regularly saw Prince mowing his lawn and clearing his driveway. And a
third neighbor recounted his occasional conversations with Prince and testified
that Prince moved into the house years before the search and seizure.
Thus, the jury heard ample evidence that Prince did not live at the address
listed on his driver’s license at any relevant time—and that he nevertheless listed
that address on ATF forms when purchasing guns from federally licensed firearms
dealers. We have no basis on which to overturn the jury’s verdict.
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2. Marijuana Cultivation
The jury also heard voluminous evidence that Prince was personally
involved in growing the more than 200 marijuana plants found at his house in
Newton, Kansas. To convict Prince for manufacturing at least 100 plants of
marijuana, the jury had to find Prince (1) knowingly or intentionally
manufactured marijuana plants, and (2) he knew the amount of the controlled
substance he manufactured was at least 100 plants. Jury Instruction No. 20; see
also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Prince advances several arguments that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of this charge. First, Prince argues it would have been illogical for
him to store his valuable gun collection in the same place as a large marijuana
growing operation, given that he knew ahead of time about the ATF investigation.
Next, Prince contends it was his sons—not him—who lived in the house and grew
the marijuana. 8 Prince denies living in the house at the time of the search, and he
says that a latched and locked door, combined with a sophisticated ventilation
system, prevented him from detecting the illicit activities in the basement. In
short, Prince asserts that his adult children were solely responsible for the
marijuana cultivation, and that even if he suspected illegal activity in the
8
The parties stipulated that in December 2009, one of Prince’s sons had
been traveling in a vehicle that was transporting three pounds of marijuana.
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basement, his mere suspicion does not amount to aiding and abetting under
§ 841(a)(1).
Whether it was logical for Prince to cultivate cannabis where he stored his
guns is fundamentally a question of credibility—and therefore a question for the
jury. At trial, Prince’s attorney repeatedly argued that it made no sense for
Prince, who knew he was under investigation, to store his firearms in a house with
more than 200 marijuana plants. This was an appeal to logic unsupported by
evidence. The jury apparently did not accept Prince’s story, and we cannot
question the jury’s credibility determination unless it exceeds the bounds of
rationality. It does not: none of the evidence supports Prince’s contention that he
sought to store his firearms in a neutral location devoid of criminal activity.
Rather, he asks us to reevaluate the jury’s inferences and concoct a different
narrative furthering his theory of the case. This we cannot do.
Similarly, Prince’s argument that he was either unaware of the marijuana
grow operation, or perhaps merely suspicious of criminal activity, does not
withstand scrutiny. The record shows that the marijuana plants in the Newton
house basement generated a pungent stench of marijuana that wafted throughout
the house. In addition to rebutting Prince’s contention that the house’s
ventilation system masked the marijuana odor, this evidence shows that it would
simply have been impossible for Prince to live at the home—which the evidence
shows he did—without being aware of the illicit enterprise in his basement.
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Moreover, in contrast to Prince’s gloss on the evidence, the record shows that
access to the basement was barely restricted at all. In fact, the basement door was
not even locked, but was rather closed with a child-safety mechanism that was
easily disabled. This is only the beginning of what the jury heard.
In addition, evidence of the marijuana enterprise was strewn throughout the
house. In the basement, law enforcement officers found a sophisticated marijuana
cultivation operation, which included a planting bed, grow lights, fertilizers,
chemicals, gardening tools, drug paraphernalia, and 204 marijuana plants.
Authorities also seized literature with instructions for maintaining a marijuana
grow operation, composition books chronicling the progress of the plants, and
writings suggesting multiple people were involved in the grow operation. Indicia
of the marijuana operation were found upstairs as well, in Prince’s living quarters.
For example, one composition book, which contained notes about the marijuana
operation, was found upstairs alongside copies of Prince’s passport and driver’s
license—and containers of marijuana were found in an upstairs freezer.
Finally, the jury had the opportunity to match Prince’s handwriting with
notes in composition books found in the house. The government, without the aid
of a handwriting expert, invited the jury to compare the way that the number
“four” was written on Prince’s ATF forms with the way it was sometimes written
in the composition books found around the house. The government argued that
Prince wrote the number with a distinct “pennant” shape (e.g., as it appears in
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Times New Roman font—“4”), while his sons did not, and that this distinction
should lead the jury to infer that Prince’s handwriting appears inside the
composition books. Such an inference would not have been improper.
Ultimately, there is no doubt that a reasonable jury could have found Prince
guilty of manufacturing marijuana plants. Prince owned the Newton house, he
lived there, and he kept personal items there. Although the marijuana grow
operation was in the basement, its odor permeated the house, and it was easily
accessible by anyone who could open a simple child lock. Indicators of the grow
operation abounded in the house.
In sum, sufficient evidence supports the drug count.
D. Sentencing
Finally, Prince contends the district court should not have enhanced his
sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(B), Prince was subject
to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment for the marijuana
manufacturing offense. He also was subject to a mandatory five-year
enhancement if he had a prior felony drug conviction on his record. The district
court took notice of Prince’s prior felony marijuana conviction and sentenced him
to the mandatory minimum ten years’ imprisonment.
Prince argues the district court’s approach to sentencing ran afoul of the
rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which provides that under
the Sixth Amendment, the government must “submit to a jury facts which
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increase a crime’s penalty beyond the statutory maximum.” United States v.
Holyfield, 481 F.3d 1260, 1261 (10th Cir. 2007). More specifically, Prince claims
that before he could be liable for § 841’s five-year enhancement, the jury had to
find that he had been convicted of a prior drug-related felony. This argument
runs contrary to clear precedents in our circuit.
We have held repeatedly that despite Apprendi, the “fact” of a prior
conviction may be found by a sentencing judge rather than a jury. 9 See, e.g.,
Holyfield, 481 F.3d at 1261; United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th
Cir. 2005). Our precedents are so clear, in fact, that Prince concedes their
existence in his submissions and admittedly raises this argument only to preserve
the issue for Supreme Court review. Therefore, we affirm his sentence.
III. Conclusion
The Constitution does not prohibit the government from peremptorily
striking jurors based on their views about the legalization of marijuana.
Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A)’s record-keeping provision is not subject to
9
Indeed, we have consistently enunciated a prior-conviction exception to
Apprendi. This rule provides that when a prior conviction increases the
mandatory minimum sentence, the judge, rather than the jury, may find the fact of
conviction, typically by examining “the language of the statute of conviction, the
terms of the charging document, the terms of the plea agreement or transcript of
colloquy between judge and defendant . . ., or to some comparable judicial record
of this information.” Holyfield, 481 F.3d at 1262 (quotation omitted) (ellipsis in
original).
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any mens rea term. For these reasons, and for all others discussed above, we
AFFIRM Prince’s conviction and sentence.
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United States v. Prince
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2011-08-05
Citations: 647 F.3d 1257
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion