UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60878
JESSE ODEN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
OKTIBBEHA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; DOLPH BRYAN,
Individually and in his official capacity as sheriff,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi, Aberdeen
March 27, 2001
Before POLITZ, SMITH and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Defendants Oktibbeha County, Sheriff Dolph Bryan in his
official capacity, and Dolph Bryan individually appeal from the
judgment of the district court in which a jury awarded plaintiff
Jesse Oden compensatory and punitive damages for Sheriff Bryan’s
failure to promote Oden to chief deputy. We reverse the punitive
and compensatory damages against Oktibbeha County and Dolph Bryan
individually and affirm the jury’s compensatory damage award
against Sheriff Bryan in his official capacity.
1
I.
In September of 1976, Jesse Oden and George Carrithers joined
the Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s Department. Oden worked as a part
time radio operator, while Carrithers served as a part time jailer.
The Department promoted Oden to full time road deputy in 1979.
Carrithers received the same rank in 1980.
Sheriff Dolph Bryan dismissed his former chief deputy in 1986.
Deputy Oden inquired about the job, but Sheriff Bryan informed him
that he would not fill the vacant position. At the same time,
Sheriff Bryan assigned Deputy Carrithers to office duties and gave
him the title “administrative assistant.” Deputy Oden remained
working in the field. In 1997, Sheriff Bryan promoted Deputy
Carrithers to chief deputy.
Deputy Oden filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, claiming age and race discrimination. Oden
then sued Oktibbeha County, Sheriff Dolph Bryan in his official
capacity, and Sheriff Dolph Bryan individually, asserting causes of
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985.1
Oden presented evidence at trial showing his seniority,
superior law enforcement training, and background in business
1
Neither the parties nor the district court contemplated the
application of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to this case. Because Oden failed
to present evidence of a conspiracy to discriminate, this Court’s
analysis is limited to the plaintiff’s causes of action under Title
VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
2
management. According to Oden, these assets should have ensured
his promotion to chief deputy. The defendants argued that the
chief deputy position was not a promotion in favor of Deputy
Carrithers; rather, the assignment of the chief deputy rank was
merely a change in job title. The defendants also claimed that
Deputy Oden was unqualified. At the close of the plaintiff’s case,
the district judge entered a directed verdict for the defendants
dismissing Oden’s age discrimination claim. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Deputy Oden for race discrimination and
assessed compensatory and punitive damages against all three
defendants.
I. Proper Defendants Under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Oktibbeha County and Sheriff Bryan (“Appellants”) argue that
the district court erred by denying their motion to dismiss the
County and the Sheriff in his individual capacity. This Court
recognizes that Title VII does not provide the exclusive remedy for
discrimination by employers. See Hernandez v. Hill Country Tel.
Coop., Inc., 849 F.2d 139, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1988). Courts may not,
however, indiscriminately assess damage awards against persons and
entities that are not responsible for an employer’s unlawful
discriminatory conduct. See Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 241
(5th Cir. 1998) (holding that only employers are liable for
unlawful conduct under Title VII). Because the remedies against
the defendants under Title VII and § 1981 were not separated, we
3
must determine whether the district court erred by assessing
compensatory and punitive damages against Oktibbeha County and the
Sheriff in his official and individual capacities.
A. Defendants and Remedies under § 1981
Plaintiffs may plead causes of action under both Title VII and
§ 1981 against private employers to remedy discrimination in
private employment contracts. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
174 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 412 U.S. 454,
459 (1975). Plaintiffs may also pursue a § 1983 cause of action
against persons acting under color of state law in order to assert
their substantive rights under § 1981. We must determine whether
Oden can assert an independent cause of action under § 1981 against
Oktibbeha County and the Sheriff in his official and individual
capacities.
1. The County and the Sheriff in His Official Capacity
In 1989, the Supreme Court held in Jett v. Dallas Independent
School District, 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989), that § 1981 did not
provide a separate cause of action against local government
entities. The Court concluded that plaintiffs must assert a cause
of action against state actors under § 1983 to remedy violations of
civil rights under § 1981. See id. Several courts have addressed
the continuing significance of the Court’s plurality decision after
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Act amended §
1981 by adding subsection (c), which states that the rights
4
protected by § 1981 “are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of state
law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c).2 In order to determine whether Oden
could pursue a separate cause of action under § 1981 against
Oktibbeha County and the Sheriff in his official capacity, we must
address whether the 1991 amendment abrogated the Court’s holding in
Jett and created a separate cause of action against local
government entities.
Subsection (c) does not expressly create a remedial cause of
action against local government entities, and we are not persuaded
that such a remedy should be implied. In Jett, the Court held that
Congress intended § 1983 to be the sole remedy for discrimination
by persons acting under color of state law. See Jett, 491 U.S. at
731. The Court reasoned that §1981 implicitly created an
independent cause of action against private actors because no other
statute created such a remedy. See id. at 732. Because § 1983
provided a remedy against persons acting under color of state law,
the Court declined to imply a cause of action under § 1981
2
The circuit courts are split as to the effect of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 upon the Court’s holding in Jett. The Fourth
Circuit and Eleventh Circuit concluded that the 1991 amendment had
no affect on the Court’s opinion. See Butts v. County of Volusia,
222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2000); Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55
F.3d 151, 156 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit, however,
concluded that the 1991 amendment implicitly created a cause of
action against local government entities. See Federation of
African American Contractors v. Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir.
1996).
5
independent of § 1983. We are persuaded that the conclusion in
Jett remains the same after Congress enacted the 1991 amendments.
Subsection (c) addresses only substantive rights. Section 1983
remains the only provision to expressly create a remedy against
persons acting under color of state law. The addition of
subsection (c) creates no more of a need for the judiciary to imply
a cause of action under § 1981 against state actors than existed
when the Supreme Court decided Jett.
The legislative history of the 1991 amendment is supportive of
our conclusion. By enacting subsection (c), Congress stated that
it intended to codify the Supreme Court’s decision in Runyon v.
McCrary. See Butts, 222 F.3d at 894 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-
40(I), at 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630; H.R.
Rep. No. 102-40(II), at 37 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694, 731). See also Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 179 (2d Cir.
1998). In Runyon, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that § 1981 implies
a right of action based on racial discrimination against private
actors. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 174-75. There is no
congressional statement of intent to overrule Jett. By codifying
Runyon, Congress confirmed that § 1981 implies a cause of action
against private actors.
The question follows then why, if Congress only intended to
codify Runyon, does subsection (c) include language referring to
persons acting under color of state law? The Ninth Circuit
6
reasoned that this allusion to persons acting under color of state
law implies Congressional intent to create a remedy in addition to
§ 1983. See Oakland, 96 F.3d at 1213. We disagree. “[T]he
judicial power to imply or create remedies . . . should not be
exercised in the face of an express decision by Congress concerning
the scope of remedies available under a particular statute.” Jett,
491 U.S. at 732 (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). Because
Congress neither expressed its intent to overrule Jett, nor
explicitly created a remedy against state actors in addition to §
1983, we are not willing to deviate from the Supreme Court’s
analysis of § 1981 in Jett. Accordingly, Deputy Oden could not
maintain an independent cause of action under § 1981 against
Oktibbeha County and Sheriff Dolph Bryan in his official capacity.3
2. The Sheriff in His Individual Capacity
Sheriff Dolph Bryan claims that the district court erred by
failing to dismiss Oden’s claims against him in his individual
capacity. The Sheriff does not dispute that § 1981 provides an
implicit cause of action against private actors in private
3
In any event, there is no evidence in the record that the
promotion to chief deputy was in accordance with any custom or
policy of the County. Rather, Sheriff Bryan’s employment decision
represented the policy of the Sheriff’s Department, a separate
government entity. Therefore, the judgment against the County
cannot be imposed on the basis of respondeat superior. See Board
of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415
(1997); Jett, 491 U.S. at 737.
7
employment discrimination cases. See Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 412 U.S. 454, 459 (1975); Adams v. McDougal, 695 F.2d
104, 108 (5th Cir. 1983). Rather, he argues that he is not a
proper party in this suit because he was acting in his official
capacity.4
While the Supreme Court has extended § 1981 liability to
cases involving private employment contracts, it has not imposed
personal liability on elected officials for discrimination in the
terms and conditions of local government employment contracts. Cf.
Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (holding
that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for seeking money damages
against the federal government). In Huckabay v. Moore, this Court
concluded that an individual was not an employer for purposes of
Title VII when acting in his official capacity. See 142 F.3d at
241. Only officials should be responsible for discriminatory
decisions concerning government employment contracts. See id. See
also Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“Only ‘employers,’ not individuals acting in their individual
capacity who do not otherwise meet the definition of ‘employers,’
can be liable under Title VII.”); Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226,
227 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that an elected official should not
4
“Racial discrimination claims brought under § 1981 are subject
to the defense of qualified immunity.” Todd v. Hawk, 72 F.3d 443,
445 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995). However, Sheriff Bryan did not raise
qualified immunity in the district court.
8
be liable for official acts). Likewise, when a plaintiff asserts
a cause of action under § 1981 for discrimination in the terms and
conditions of a municipal employment contract, the proper defendant
is the government employer in his official capacity. Because
Sheriff Bryan’s choice to promote Deputy Carrithers to chief deputy
was an official decision, he is not personally liable under §
1981.5 We therefore dismiss the district court’s judgment against
Sheriff Bryan in his individual capacity.
B. Title VII Defendants
Title VII allows employees to sue their employers for
discriminatory employment decisions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),
2000e-5. An “employer” under Title VII is a “person in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . ..” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b). A person “includes one or more individuals,
governments, governmental agencies, [or] political subdivisions .
. ..” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). The trial court failed to designate
which of the three defendants was Deputy Oden’s employer.6
5
In other contexts, § 1981 serves as an independent cause of
action against individuals for discriminatory acts performed in
their official capacities. See, e.g., Todd, 72 F.3d at 446
(allowing a prisoner to sue prison officials under § 1981 for
discriminatory conduct concerning the “punishment, pains, [and]
penalties” provision in § 1981). Our decision regarding personal
liability under § 1981 only applies to the liability of local
government officials for their decisions affecting municipal
employment contracts.
6
Oktibbeha County and Sheriff Bryan in his official capacity are
eligible employers under Title VII. Sheriff Bryan is not
personally liable for the performance of wrongful acts in his
9
Federal law controls whether a person is an employer under
Title VII, but courts can look to state law to understand the
nature of the employment relationship. See, e.g., Calderon v.
Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 273 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)
(determining whether plaintiff constituted an employee under Title
VII). Mississippi law allows a sheriff to appoint, remove, and fix
the compensation of his deputies, subject to the county board of
supervisor’s approval of the sheriff’s budget. See Miss. Code Ann.
§ 19-25-19. Sheriff Bryan was solely responsible for hiring,
promoting, and establishing the deputies’ wages. The County’s only
responsibility was to approve the Sheriff’s budget and allocate the
necessary funds. Because Sheriff Bryan was the elected official
who made all decisions concerning promotions within the Sheriff’s
Department, he was Deputy Oden’s employer for purposes of Title
VII.7 We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment against
Oktibbeha County and Sheriff Dolph Bryan individually under Title
official capacity. See Huckabay, 142 F.3d at 241.
7
See Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 270 (5th Cir. 1984); Ryals
v. Mobile County Sheriff’s Dept., 839 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Ala. 1993).
See also Lee v. Coahoma County, 937, F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1991),
amended in part, 37 F.3d 1068 (1993) (holding that a Mississippi
sheriff was an “employer” under the Fair Labor Standards Act). Cf.
Spencer v. Byrd, 899 F. Supp. 1439, 1441 (M.D.N.C. 1995)
(concluding that the county, rather than the sheriff, was an
employer under Title VII because the county limited the number of
the sheriff’s deputies and provided the deputies’ compensation);
Johnson v. Board of County Comm’rs for County of Freemont, 859 F.
Supp. 438, 442 (D. Col. 1994) (holding that the economic ties
between the Board of Commissioners and the sheriff demonstrated
that the Board was the Title VII employer).
10
VII.
B. Punitive Damages Under Title VII
Appellants argue that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 limits
Sheriff Bryan’s liability in his official capacity to compensatory
damages. The Act allows plaintiffs asserting a Title VII claim to
recover compensatory and punitive damages, provided that recovery
is unavailable under § 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1).8 The Act
precludes plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages against
governments, government agencies, and political subdivisions. See
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b); Baker v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 335 (1998).
Oden does not dispute the applicability of § 1981a to the
Sheriff in his official capacity. Oden contends that the
appellants forfeited their argument on appeal because the
objections to the district court’s jury instructions were not
specific. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. We agree that the appellants
8
Section 1981a states:
In an action brought by a complaining party under section
706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5)
. . . against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful
because of disparate impact) prohibited under section 703,
704, or 717 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3) . . .,
and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under
section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b)
of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . ., from
respondent.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).
11
failed to properly preserve their objection.
If a litigant forfeits a point of error on appeal, we review
the district court’s decision under the plain error standard. See
Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n,79 F.3d 1415, 1427 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc). For this Court to correct an error not raised at
trial, “there must be (1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3)
that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’” Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732 (1993)). If plain error exists, this Court should not exercise
its discretion to correct the error unless “the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id.
The district court committed “plain error” by assessing
punitive damages against the Sheriff. Section 1981a prohibits
punitive damage awards against governments and political
subdivisions. Subjecting the Sheriff to an $80,000 punitive damage
award is inapposite to Congress’s intent to preclude local
government entities from paying such judgments. We find it
appropriate even under a plain error standard to correct judgments
that are contrary to the express limits federal law imposes on
judicial authority, and therefore reverse the punitive damage award
against Sheriff Bryan in his official capacity.
C. The Personal Staff Exception
Title VII relieves employers from liability for decisions
12
affecting members of a personal staff. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).9
The exception includes appointments to a staff position. See
Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 150-53 (5th Cir. 1985).
Appellants maintain that the district court erred in denying their
motion for judgment as a matter of law because the chief deputy
position is part of Sheriff Bryan’s personal staff. Oden claims
that the Appellants waived the personal staff exception by
asserting it for the first time in their motion for post-trial
relief.
Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lists
nineteen affirmative defenses that must be set forth in a
responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). In addition to
these nineteen defenses, Rule 8(c) includes “any other matter
constituting an avoidance or an affirmative defense.” Id. To
9
Title VII states:
The term “employee” means an individual employed by
an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not
include any person elected to public office in any State
or political subdivision of any State by the qualified
voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to
be on such officer’s personal staff or an appointee on
the policy making level or an immediate adviser with
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal
powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the
preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to
the civil service laws of a State government,
governmental agency or political subdivision. With
respect to employment in a foreign country, such term
includes an individual who is a citizen of the United
States.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
13
qualify as a defense under Rule 8(c)’s residuary clause, we look to
the logical relationship between the defense and the cause of
action and assess whether failure to timely plead the defense will
result in unfair surprise. See Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d
1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987). “A defendant should not be permitted
to ‘lie behind a log’ and ambush a plaintiff with an unexpected
defense.” See id. at 1079. The personal staff exception allows
the defendant to avoid liability even if the plaintiff meets his
burden of proof under Title VII. See id. The defendant bears
the initial burden of demonstrating that the personal staff
exception applies. See Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1111
(10th Cir. 1990); Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 152 (5th
Cir. 1985).
The Appellants raised the personal staff exception for the
first time in their motion for judgment as a matter of law, which
was filed after the jury returned its verdict and the district
court entered its judgment. Oden was denied the opportunity to
present evidence at trial concerning the applicability of the
personal staff exception. “‘Affirmative defenses . . . will defeat
an otherwise legitimate claim for relief [and] must be set forth to
avoid surprise and give the opposing party an opportunity to
respond.’” 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.07[1], at
8-35 (3d ed. 2000) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)). Allowing the Appellants to
14
wait until after the jury verdict to assert the personal staff
exception was an unfair surprise to Oden. The personal staff
exception is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded under Rule
8(c).10 Appellants waived the personal staff exception by failing
to raise it in a responsive pleading.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellants also argue that the trial court erred by denying
their motion for judgment as a matter of law because the record
contained insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We
review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law de novo. See Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture,
235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). “Judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate if ‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.’” Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)). After reviewing the evidence in
the record, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, disregarding evidence favorable to the moving
party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct.
10
This Court’s holding is consistent with cases concluding that
statutory exemptions should be pleaded as affirmative defenses.
See Donovan v. Hamm’s Drive Inn, 661 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir. Unit
A 1981) (concluding that an exemption under the Fair Labor
Standards Act is an affirmative defense that is waived if not
pleaded); Brennan v. Valley Towing Co., 515 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.
1975) (holding that an exception under the Fair Labor Standards Act
must be pleaded as an affirmative defense); WRIGHT & MILLER: FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1271 (1990); 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 8.07[5] (3d ed. 2000).
15
2097, 2110 (2000).
To prove a claim of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case. See id. at 2106;
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Oden can
demonstrate a prima facie case by showing that (1) the plaintiff
was within a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position
sought; (3) he was not promoted; and (4) the position was filled by
someone outside the protected class. See Blow v. City of San
Antonio, Texas, 236 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53). The record
shows that Oden, an African-American, was a member of a protected
class, that he inquired about the chief deputy position, that he
was not promoted to the higher rank, and that George Carrithers, a
white male, was appointed to the position.
The Appellants contend that Oden cannot establish a prima
facie case of race discrimination because the chief deputy
appointment was not a promotion. Appellants claim that the
analysis in § 1981 promotion cases should apply to support their
argument under Title VII. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 175-77 (1989), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
must show that the failure to receive a promotion amounts to a
denial of the opportunity to form a new and distinct employment
relationship. See also National Ass’n of Gov. Employees v. City
Public Serv. Board of San Antonio, Texas, 40 F.3d 698, 714 (1994).
16
In Patterson, the Court restricted claims under § 1981 to redress
discriminatory conduct “at the initial formation of the contract”
or “conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract obligations
through legal process.” Patterson, 491 U.S. at 179. See also
Johnson v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1370 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Court reasoned that § 1981 was restricted to the contractual
relationship between an employer and employee, while Title VII
addresses a more expansive scope of conduct. See id. at 180. The
contract analysis for promotion claims under § 1981 therefore does
not necessarily apply to Title VII suits.11
Title VII “is not limited to economic or tangible
discrimination, . . . and it covers more than terms and conditions
in the narrow contractual sense.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (citations ommitted). To establish a
prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII, Oden must show
that, at the very least, the alleged discriminatory conduct tended
to adversely affect him. See Mattern V. Eastman Kodak Co., 104
F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the discrimination
11
In any event, the Patterson decision was legislatively reversed
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Harrington v. Harris, 118
F.3d 359, 367 n.8 (5th Cir 1997). Section 1981 now states that,
“[f]or purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce
contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”
42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Both § 1981 and Title VII now apply to the
terms and conditions of the employment relationship, rendering the
Patterson analysis inapplicable.
17
provision in Title VII is “much broader” than the retaliation
provision and applies to activity that tends to adversely affect
the employee). At most, Oden must demonstrate that Sheriff Bryan
made an ultimate employment decision. See Shackelford v. Deloitte
& Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the “ultimate employment decision” standard applied in retaliation
cases may not apply to claims of race discrimination). Regardless
of which standard applies, Sheriff Bryan’s appointment was an
ultimate employment decision. The Sheriff testified that only one
person could fill the chief deputy position. By appointing Deputy
Carrithers to the higher rank, Sheriff Bryan precluded Deputy Oden
from becoming second in command. Sheriff Bryan’s appointment was
an employment decision that could subject him to Title VII
liability.
Appellants further contend that Oden failed to establish a
prima facie case because he was not qualified for the job. Sheriff
Bryan testified that the chief deputy position required
administration skills and an understanding of the office computer
system. Deputy Carrithers was the only person in the Sheriff’s
Department who acquired these skills. Oden claims that, because
the Sheriff never posted the qualifications for chief deputy before
appointing Carrithers, the Sheriff’s stated qualifications were
pretext.
A plaintiff must demonstrate that he meets objective promotion
18
criteria at the prima facie stage of his case. See Medina v.
Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2001); Lindsey v.
Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993). Whether an
employer’s subjective hiring criteria serves as pretext for
discrimination is an issue for the trier of fact to decide in the
later stages of the burden-shifting analysis. See id. Oden was a
road deputy with almost twenty years of experience at the time the
Sheriff appointed Deputy Carrithers to the chief deputy position.
Oden had seniority over every other officer in the Department.
Other deputies testified that Oden was much better at working with
the general public than Deputy Carrithers. In addition, Oden
possessed managerial skills that he developed before working for
the Sheriff’s Department. On the basis of this evidence, Oden
satisfied objective hiring criteria and established his prima facie
case.
Once a plaintiff satisfies his prima facie case, the employer
must assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his
decision. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If an employer
alleges a nondiscriminatory explanation, the factfinder must
determine the “‘ultimate question: whether [the] plaintiff has
proven [intentional discrimination].’” Russell, 235 F.3d at 222
(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511-12
(1993). “It is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the
factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional
19
discrmination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519. “Thus, plaintiff’s prima
facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the
employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of
fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.”
Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2109.
The Sheriff’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason for promoting
Deputy Carrithers over Deputy Oden was that Carrithers met the
qualifications for the job. The Sheriff claimed that a chief
deputy must be familiar with the administration of the Sheriff’s
Department and the Department’s computer system. Oden argues that
Sheriff Bryan’s stated qualifications were pretext. Our task then
is to determine whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s
verdict in Oden’s favor, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Oden, the nonmovant. See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2110.
In addition to the evidence supporting his prima facie case,
Oden established that he completed more law enforcement training
than Deputy Carrithers and that he was proficient in some office
skills, such as reviewing the other deputies’ paperwork. Sheriff
Bryan gave Deputy Carrithers the opportunity to improve his
administrative skills without giving Oden the same chance. Deputy
Oden could clearly meet most of the Sheriff’s qualifications, but
for the Sheriff’s decision to groom someone else for the position.
To further refute the Sheriff’s subjective qualifications,
Oden presented evidence that Sheriff Bryan previously overlooked
20
qualified African-American applicants for deputy positions in favor
of white applicants with less experience. Sheriff Bryan also
stated that, if he could have filled two chief deputy positions,
then he would have appointed both Oden and Carrithers. The Sheriff
therefore admitted that computer skills and an acute knowledge of
the office’s administrative needs were not the primary
qualifications for chief deputy. In fact, the transcript shows
that the former chief deputy, like Deputy Oden, worked as a road
deputy instead of an administrative assistant. After reviewing the
record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the
record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding
of intentional discrimination.12
III. Compensatory Damages
The jury awarded Oden $20,000 in compensatory damages for
mental anguish and emotional stress that he suffered as a result of
Sheriff Bryan’s conduct. Section 1981a allows juries to award
compensatory damages for mental anguish and suffering. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).13 Appellants claim that the award of
12
The Appellants further claim that the jury was biased and
prejudiced by irrelevant testimony. Appellants neither specified
any instances in the record as to when the alleged irrelevant
testimony occurred nor supported their argument with adequate legal
authority. Because we do not consider issues that are inadequately
briefed, we do not address this contention. See Rutherford v.
Harris County, Texas, 197 F.3d 173, 193 (5th Cir, 1999).
13
Section 1981a excludes backpay or any other relief under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Compensatory damages include awards for
“future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
21
compensatory damages was not supported by the evidence. We review
the award of mental anguish damages for abuse of discretion. See
Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 940 (5th Cir.
1996).
In many cases, “a claimant’s testimony alone may not be
sufficient to support anything more than a nominal damage award.”
Id. at 938. Plaintiffs are required to prove damages for mental
anguish and suffering to a “degree of specificity which may include
corroborating testimony or medical or psychological evidence . .
..” Id. (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978)). We
however have not required corroborating testimony and medical
evidence in every case involving nonpecuniary compensatory damages.
See Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1046 (1998);
Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir.
1996). In Migis, the district court relied solely on the
plaintiff’s testimony. The plaintiff stated that her employer’s
discrimination caused her low self-esteem, serious financial
hardships in relation to her newborn child, anxiety attacks,
stress, and sleeplessness. See Migis, 135 F.3d at 1046. We
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding compensatory damages because Migis’ testimony was
sufficiently detailed to support the award. See id. at 1047.
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary
losses . . ..” 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3).
22
We have reviewed the evidence presented by Oden, which
included his testimony concerning stress, sleeplessness, betrayal,
and shame, and find that there is sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s award.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, we reverse the district court’s judgment against
Oktibbeha County. Oden could not assert an independent cause of
action against a local government entity under § 1981, and the
County is not an employer for purposes of Title VII. We also
reverse the district court’s judgment against the Sheriff in his
individual capacity because the Sheriff is not personally liable
for his official employment decisions under Title VII and § 1981.
We reverse the district court’s judgment as to the punitive damage
award against the Sheriff in his official capacity because § 1981a
prohibits punitive damages against government entities. Finally,
we affirm the district court’s judgment assessing compensatory
damages against the Sheriff in his official capacity.
REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART
23
POLITZ, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I specially concur, but conclude that the more appropriate
disposition of the 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) issue presented herein would
be as that accorded by our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit in
Federation of African American Contractors v. Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204
(9th Cir. 1996).
24