UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 00-50006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee
VERSUS
WAYNE BURBRIDGE, also known as Edward Cabral,
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
May 28, 2001
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge:
A single jury convicted the defendant-appellant, Mr. Wayne
Burbridge, of two crimes committed on separate occasions:
possession of a firearm by a previously-convicted felon and bank
robbery.1 He appeals both convictions on the ground that the
district court failed to suppress evidence obtained in violation of
1
Mr. Burbridge committed the firearm offense, was released on
bond, then committed the bank robbery one month later.
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the Constitution. For the following reasons, we reject Mr.
Burbridge’s constitutional challenges to the evidence used to
convict him and AFFIRM his convictions.
I. Standard of Review
We apply a two-pronged standard of review to a district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress: factual findings are
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, and legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo. United States v. Chavez-
Villareal, 3 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1993). The evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing on the
motion to suppress in the district court, the Government. United
States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1999).
II. The Firearm Conviction
A. Facts
On October 6, 1998, a husband and wife, Mr. and Mrs. Andrew
Celovsky, were in a store parking lot when they witnessed Burbridge
carrying a pistol “in his hand” in a grocery sack. Considering
Burbridge’s conduct suspicious, the Celovskys followed him in their
car as he drove away on a black BMW motorcycle.
Mrs. Celovsky called 911 on her cellular phone and reported
what the couple had seen. She told the dispatcher that she and her
husband presently were following Burbridge, who was headed east on
Southeast Military Drive, and she described what he was wearing–“an
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aqua t-shirt and blue jeans.” Mrs. Celovsky told the dispatcher
that she thought “the man put the gun in the compartment on the
side of the motorcycle,” but that he “may have the gun between his
legs.”
The 911 dispatcher notified San Antonio Police Officer Robert
Handowski that a man was riding on a motorcycle through traffic
with a gun. Near an intersection along the suspect’s reported
route, Officer Handowski spotted a man on a motorcycle and pulled
in behind him. The Celovskys, who were still following Burbridge
and communicating with 911 on their cellular phone, saw the police
car pull in behind Burbridge’s motorcycle. They told the
dispatcher, who in turn told Officer Handowski, that the officer
“had the right guy.” They flashed their car’s headlights to signal
their affirmation directly to Handowski. Officer Handowski
testified that upon receiving the communication from the citizen
witnesses, he “knew right away that was the motorcycle.” He
turned on his emergency lights and directed Burbridge, who had been
waiting at a red light, to pull over to the shoulder of the road.
Handowski handcuffed Burbridge and frisked him, but did not
find a weapon on his person. Another officer arrived and the two
searched the motorcycle’s fiberglass saddlebag, which was within
reaching distance of a seated motorcycle driver. The officers
found a loaded .38 caliber pistol.
The citizen witnesses, the Celovskys, had pulled to the side
of the road and watched as the police searched Burbridge’s
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motorcycle. After Burbridge was Mirandized and placed under arrest
for unlawfully carrying a firearm, the Celovskys gave statements to
the police. Subsequently they testified at Burbridge’s suppression
hearing.
B. Probable Cause
The Celovskys’ citizen eyewitness accounts of Burbridge’s
illegal conduct,2 as communicated to Officer Handowski through the
911 dispatcher, along with their identification of Burbridge as the
handgun violator both through the 911 dispatcher and by directly
signaling Handowski with their car’s headlights, provided the
officers with probable cause to believe that Burbridge had
committed the offense of publicly carrying a handgun.3 Burbridge
did not have the weapon on his person when he was stopped.
However, 911 had relayed Mrs. Celovsky’s report of seeing Burbridge
put the weapon between his legs on the motorcycle. Also, the
Celovskys had not reported seeing him dispose of the handgun.
Therefore, the officers had probable cause to believe that the
handgun was somewhere on the motorcycle or in one of its
compartments, making the search of the saddlebag constitutionally
2
Carrying a handgun in public is a crime in Texas. TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 46.02. According to § 46.02, “A person commits an offense [of
unlawful carrying of a weapon] if he intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly carries on or about his person a handgun, illegal knife,
or club.”
3
While there are legal exceptions to the Texas prohibition
against publicly carrying a handgun, § 46.02, the officers had
probable cause to believe that Burbridge’s conduct did not fall
within any of the exceptions.
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permissible under United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809-824
(1982).4
An ordinary citizen’s eyewitness account of criminal activity
and identification of a perpetrator is normally sufficient to
supply probable cause to stop the suspect. See J.B. v. Washington
County, 127 F.3d 919, 930 (10th Cir. 1997); Gramenos v. Jewel
Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986). We agree with
the Sixth Circuit that
[a]n eyewitness identification will constitute sufficient
probable cause unless, at the time of the arrest, there
is an apparent reason for the officer to believe that the
eyewitness was lying, did not accurately describe what he
had seen, or was in some fashion mistaken regarding his
recollection of the confrontation. This comports with
the general notion that, since eyewitnesses’ statements
are based on firsthand observations, they are generally
entitled to a presumption of reliability and veracity.
Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999)(internal
quotations and citations omitted). Cf. Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135
F.3d 510, 516 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[O]nce a putative victim, like
Smith, has positively identified her attacker to the police and
they have no reason to disbelieve her, the officers need not take
any additional steps to corroborate the information regarding the
4
In Ross, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of an
automobile’s containers is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, so long as the searching officers have probable cause to
believe that (1) evidence or contraband is within the automobile
and (2) it may be in the container. See id. at 824. (“The scope
of a warrantless search of an automobile . . . is defined by the
object of the search and the places in which there is probable
cause to believe that it may be found.”) See also United States v.
McSween, 53 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 1995).
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crime before taking action.”) (Quotations and citations omitted).
As this court has stated, “[W]hen an average citizen tenders
information to the police, the police should be permitted to assume
that they are dealing with a credible person in the absence of
special circumstances suggesting that such might not be the case.”
United States v. Fooladi, 703 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir.
1983)(quotation and citation omitted). The citizen eyewitness’s
account is credible because eyewitnesses “are seldom involved with
the miscreants or the crime. Eyewitnesses by definition are not
passing along idle rumor, for they either have been the victims of
the crime or have otherwise seen some portion of it.” United
States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1972).
Furthermore, identified persons who claim to have been witnesses of
the offense may be held accountable if the information turns out to
be inaccurate. The Celovskys were present during the
identification, stop, and search of Burbridge and his motorcycle.
That the Celovskys, ordinary citizens, remained available in person
throughout the encounter ensured the credibility of the information
they provided.
Based on the credible information from the Celovskys (who had
followed Burbridge without reporting that he had discarded the
weapon) and Officer Handowski’s determination that the handgun was
not on Burbridge’s person, the officers had probable cause to
believe that evidence of the crime reported by the Celovskys was
inside a compartment of the motorcycle. Also, the dispatcher had
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told Officer Handowski that the citizens witnessed Burbridge with
the firearm on or about his person shortly before the officer
stopped Burbridge. Because Burbridge did not have immediate
possession of the weapon, it was reasonable for the officers to
believe that Burbridge had put the weapon in the saddlebag--which
was within his reach--while he rode the motorcycle.
III. The Bank Robbery Conviction
A. Facts
Bennie Rodriguez and Jennifer Quesnot worked as bank tellers
at the IBC bank in San Antonio on November 7, 1998, the day they
were robbed at gunpoint. According to Rodriguez and Quesnot, the
robber entered the bank, walked up to the counter, passed a note to
Rodriguez, and demanded, “Right now.” Then the robber lifted his
shirt and exposed the handle of a gun. Rodriguez went into the
vault, called Quesnot in, and handed her the note. Rodriguez then
put his cash drawer on the counter in front of the robber for him
to take what he wanted. Rodriguez was no more than two feet from
the robber during the robbery, while Quesnot was only five feet
away. Both had a good opportunity to observe his face.
Shortly after the robbery, Rodriguez and Quesnot gave separate
descriptions of the robber to the police. Both described the
robber as a white man who was 30-40 years old with a medium build,
wearing a t-shirt and a dark jacket or overshirt. Rodriguez and
Quesnot also said the robber wore a long white bandana with
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lettering or a design on it around his head.
As police at the crime scene interviewed witnesses, a caller
reported that a suspicious character had run through yards and shed
clothing in a neighborhood just one block from the bank. The
description of the suspicious individual matched that of the
robber. An officer was dispatched to investigate. He apprehended
the individual and placed him under arrest; the suspect was Wayne
Burbridge. The discarded clothing was recovered and linked by
forensic evidence to the tennis shoes, jeans, and t-shirt Burbridge
was wearing when he was arrested. The recovered clothing matched
the bank tellers’ descriptions of the robber’s garb, including a
white bandana with pinkish lettering. Another pair of witnesses
described seeing a man, on the day of the robbery, park a
motorcycle in the neighborhood near the bank, look around, and tie
a t-shirt bandana around his head. The motorcycle, belonging to
Burbridge, was later found abandoned in the neighborhood.
Rodriguez and Quesnot each independently identified Burbridge
as the bank robber within two hours of the robbery at separate
“show-ups.” Rodriguez immediately positively identified Burbridge,
stating that “he had the same look, the same eyes, the same
reactions . . . and he did the exact same like movements of his
head that I had remembered him doing.” Without knowledge of
Rodriguez’s identification of the suspect, Quesnot viewed Burbridge
at a separate show-up and identified him as the robber, stating
that the lower portion of Burbridge’s face was the same as the
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robber’s. Later, she testified that as soon as she saw Burbridge,
she recognized him as the robber. Rodriguez testified that his in-
court identification was based on Burbridge’s distinct facial
features.
Approximately five months later, Quesnot and Rodriguez again
separately identified Burbridge as the bank robber in a six-person
photographic line-up.5 They also identified Burbridge in court as
the robber during his criminal trial.
B. Applicable Law
When a defendant appeals his conviction on the basis that an
improper pretrial identification was made, the conviction must be
set aside if the identification “was so impermissibly suggestive as
to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968); U.S. v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1389 (5th Cir. 1993). A
two-step analysis is used to determine whether the district court
erred in admitting identification evidence: first, we determine
whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive;
5
Burbridge objects to the use of this line-up as impermissibly
suggestive because he was the only suspect depicted wearing a black
t-shirt. (He was arrested in and identified by Rodriguez and
Quesnot at the show-ups wearing a black t-shirt.) However, almost
five months had passed between the show-ups and the photographic
line-up, and the black t-shirt was barely visible in Burbridge’s
photo. Furthermore, FBI agent Walter Henry testified at trial that
a photo-technician put the line-up photos together by assembling
photographs of individuals similar in appearance to Burbridge.
Burbridge’s argument does not persuade us that the black t-shirt
was impermissibly suggestive under all of these circumstances.
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if it was, we determine whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the suggestiveness led to a substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification. U. S. v. Fletcher, 121 F.3d 187,
194 (5th Cir. 1997); Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.
1990); U.S. v. Shaw, 894 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1990).
Even if the one-on-one show-ups were suggestive, under the
totality of the circumstances we conclude that an irreparable
misidentification did not result. The Supreme Court enumerated
five factors in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), for
determining whether irreparable misidentification resulted from an
impermissibly suggestive identification procedure: the opportunity
of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’s prior
description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at
the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the
confrontation. See also Herrera, 904 F.2d at 947. Rodriguez and
Quesnot had ample opportunity to view the robber as he stood facing
them a few feet away for at least 15 seconds with his face
unmasked. Rodriguez and Quesnot stated that they closely observed
Burbridge’s face during the crime. Because Burbridge committed an
open armed robbery of them, they were very attentive to him. While
the pre-identification descriptions of Burbridge’s apparel given by
Rodriguez and Quesnot contained minor differences, the major
aspects of his appearance and attire they described were
consistent. Furthermore, both Rodriguez and Quesnot were certain
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that Burbridge was the perpetrator when they saw him at the show-
ups.6 Finally, less that two hours had passed between the robbery
and the show-ups, and the witnesses’ memories were still fresh at
the time they made their positive identifications. Under these
circumstances, the district court did not err in admitting the
identification evidence.
The district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence is
AFFIRMED.
6
Rodriguez was immediately certain, and while Quesnot took
several minutes to examine his face before declaring that Burbridge
was the robber during the show up, she testified later that she
knew it was him “as soon as she saw him.”
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