In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 08-4132
M ITCHELL R OSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JONATHON E. M ONKEN , Director,
Illinois State Police; and T RACY N EWTON,
Supervisor, Sex Offender Registration,
Illinois State Police,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 08-C-3541—Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.
A RGUED N OVEMBER 12, 2009—D ECIDED M ARCH 17, 2010
Before C UDAHY, M ANION, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
C UDAHY , Circuit Judge. After he was required to
register as a sex offender in Illinois, Mitchell Rosin
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
defendants failed to give full faith and credit to the
March 27, 2003 judgment of a New York court. In that
2 No. 08-4132
order, the court accepted a plea agreement that did not
require Rosin to register as a sex offender in New York.
He contends that Illinois is constitutionally required to
give effect to the New York judgment and thus cannot, on
the basis of that order, force him to register as a sex
offender within its jurisdiction. The district court
granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the
registration requirement in the New York order was
merely stricken, which left the order silent on the sub-
ject. Since the plea agreement did not purport to prevent
any state other than New York from registering Rosin as a
sex offender, and because any such provision would have
been ineffective even if it had been included, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mitchell Rosin was a resident of Oak Park, Illinois
from 2000 until 2008, when he was informed by the Com-
mander of the Oak Park Police Department that he
would have to move from the area and would also have
to register as a sex offender in Illinois for life.
The impetus for the Commander’s actions lay in a
2003 incident in New York, with respect to which Rosin
pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree. This
offense, which involves non-consensual sexual contact,
is a Class B misdemeanor under New York law. N.Y. Penal
Law § 130.55. As part of the plea agreement, the parties
struck paragraph 29 of the standard plea form. That
paragraph provides:
You shall be required to comply with the provisions
of the Sex Offender Registration Act, including, but not
No. 08-4132 3
limited to the duty to register as a sex offender
with the New York State Division of Criminal Justice
Services and the duty to register with the New York
State Division of Criminal Justice Services and notify
the law enforcement agency where you reside
within ten days prior to any change of address.
Rosin vehemently contends that he would never have
entered into that plea agreement but for the prosecutor’s
assurances that he would never have to register as a sex
offender, either in New York or in any other state. He
asserts that it was pursuant to this consensus that the
parties struck paragraph 29.
When Rosin was required to register under the
Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. C OMP.
S TAT. 150/1 et seq., he filed suit against Jonathon E.
Monken and Tracy Newton, who are responsible for estab-
lishing and enforcing Illinois sex-offender registration
policies, respectively. Rosin brought the present action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants’
actions violated his constitutional rights as guaranteed
by the Full Faith & Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
U.S. C ONST., Art. IV, § 1.
II. DISCUSSION
The appellant in the present case may consider his
situation to be somewhat unjust. Rosin, having pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor offense of non-consensual sexual
contact in New York under assurances that he would not
be required to register, has nevertheless been made
4 No. 08-4132
subject to mandatory life-long registration by Illinois. He
has also been required to leave his desired residence
of eight years.
Nevertheless, that Illinois’s sex-offense registration laws
may be draconian in the current application does not
render them invalid. Rosin contends, with apparent
reasonableness, that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the U.S. Constitution requires Illinois to recognize the
New York Order of Probation. See Matsushita Electric v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996); Kremer v. Chemical Con-
struction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982); Licari v. City of
Chicago, 298 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2002). But he then
goes a step further by arguing that the New York order
controls the manner in which Illinois can provide pro-
tection within its own borders. In particular, Rosin
asserts that Illinois is constitutionally prohibited from
requiring him to register as a sex offender on the basis
of his 2003 conviction. He maintains this position
despite the conspicuous absence in the order of any
provision relieving him of an obligation to register. Nor
does the order purport to prevent any other state
from requiring him to register.
The absence of such language is dispositive, for
without it there is no judgment to which Illinois is
required to afford full faith and credit. The printed provi-
sion in the Order that would require Rosin to register in
New York as a sex offender was simply crossed out. No
affirmative provision was added. Despite Rosin’s pro-
testations to the contrary, this section’s being eliminated
cannot fairly be construed as an attempt by New York to
No. 08-4132 5
preclude other states from requiring him to register.
And, of course, New York has no extra-territorial juris-
diction to exercise police power in Illinois. See, e.g.,
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-28 (1975).
The appellant nevertheless argues that paragraph 29’s
being struck has the same legal effect as would an af-
firmative provision providing that he need not register
in New York or any other state. He points out that New
York could not now attempt to require him to register.
Assuming, arguendo, that paragraph 29’s being deleted
should be interpreted in this manner, Rosin still cannot
prevail.
The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause “was to
alter the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations
created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of
the others, and to make them integral parts of a single
nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation
might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state
of its origin.” Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232
(1998) (quoting Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296
U.S. 268, 277 (1935)). By virtue of its “exacting” operation
with respect to judgments, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
results in “the judgment of the rendering State [gaining]
nationwide force.” Id. at 233. The primary operational
effect of the Clause’s application is “for claim and issue
preclusion (res judicata) purposes.” Id. at 233.
These observations are unremarkable. But it is a pro-
found mistake to jump from them to the conclusion
that New York can dictate the manner in which Illinois
6 No. 08-4132
may protect its citizenry. Illinois’s recognition of the
New York order does not carry with it an obligation
that Illinois enforce that order in the manner which it
apparently prescribes. True, it is generally no defense
for a state to decline to recognize a foreign judgment on
account of its public policy. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233
(noting that “our decisions support no roving ‘public
policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due judg-
ments”) (emphasis original). But an important exception
exists. In Baker, the Supreme Court made clear that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot be used by one state
to interfere impermissibly with the exclusive affairs of
another. Baker, 522 U.S. at 239 n.12 (holding that a Michi-
gan judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit
because it impermissibly interfered with Missouri’s con-
trol of litigation brought by parties who were not before
the Michigan court).
Illinois need not dispense with its preferred mechanism
for protecting its citizenry by virtue merely of a foreign
judgment that envisioned less restrictive requirements’
being imposed on the relevant sex offender. Illinois, as a
state of the Union, has police power over the health and
welfare of its citizens. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31
(1885) (observing that a state’s police power permits it to
enact laws promoting “the health, peace, morals, educa-
tion, and good order of the people”); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (“There is no doubt that
preventing danger to the community is a legitimate
regulatory goal.”). The Supreme Court has regularly
upheld states’ exercise of their police powers to protect
their citizens against sexual predators. See, e.g., Smith v.
No. 08-4132 7
Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997). As in Baker, the New York court in the present case
“cannot command obedience elsewhere on a matter
the [New York] court lacks authority to resolve.” Baker,
522 U.S. at 240. New York has no authority to dictate
to Illinois the manner in which it can best protect its
citizenry from those convicted of sex offenses.
Nor is this a case in which a state’s police power
conflicts with the U.S. Constitution or an Act of Congress,
for this would require state law to give way by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Morris v. Jones, 329
U.S. 545, 552-53 (1947). The Full Faith and Credit Clause
was enacted to preclude the same matters’ being
relitigated in different states as recalcitrant parties
evade unfavorable judgments by moving elsewhere. It
was never intended to allow one state to dictate the
manner in which another state protects its populace. This
being the case, there is no tension between Illinois’s police
power and the Full Faith and Credit Clause here. As a
result, New York could promise Rosin only that he
would never have to register as a sex offender within its
own jurisdiction. Rosin could not bargain for a
promise from New York as to what other states would
do based on his guilty plea to sexual abuse in the third
degree, for New York had no power to make such a
promise.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly dismissed Rosin’s lawsuit
because the New York order was silent as to registration
8 No. 08-4132
in any other state. Absent such language, there is no
relevant provision to which Illinois must give full faith
and credit. Even if there had been such a provision,
however, New York lacks power to dictate the means by
which Illinois can protect its public. The judgment of the
district court is therefore
A FFIRMED.
3-17-10