The petition for rehearing is denied. In answer to the proposition argued in the petition, that the effect of the court's decision is to permit declarations of the intent of the grantor in making the deed to control the language of that instrument, it is proper to point out that the hearing before the trial court was solely to determine whether or not a preliminary injunction should be granted. The language of this court was addressed solely to the case made in the trial court upon that hearing — a hearing which was had principally upon affidavits. The defendant having set up the quitclaim deed in its answer, it was open to plaintiff to meet and overcome its legal effect in any appropriate way. It did this by evidence tending to show that the quitclaim deed owed its existence to a mistake in law upon the part of the grantor, taken advantage of by the grantee. It is, of course, true that where an instrument is sought to be avoided for fraud or for mistake in law or in fact, evidence is admissible as to what the grantor intended to do or to convey (Civ. Code, sec. 1578, subd. 2.) Therefore, what is decided upon this appeal is that enough was shown to have justified the court in granting the temporary injunction. Whether the reformation of the deed is required; whether, if required, it may be accomplished under the implied replication to defendant's answer, or whether a separate action seeking affirmative relief on this ground should be brought by plaintiff, are one and all questions *Page 419 whose consideration pertain to the principal case when that case comes to be tried upon its merits and formal findings are made. Therefore those questions are left until that time.