Under the Code, § 89-9908, before an indictment charging the offense of malpractice in office is found true by the grand jury, a copy of the indictment must be served on the accused; and he and his witnesses must be given a reasonable opportunity of appearing before, and being heard by, the grand jury.
The Code section (89-9907) under which the defendant was indicted is followed by section 89-9908 which reads as follows: "An indictment under the preceding section shall specially set forth the merits of the complaint, and a copy thereof shall be served on the defendant before it is laid before the grand jury. The prosecutor and the defendant, andtheir witnesses, shall have the right of appearing before and being heardby the grand jury. . ." (Italics ours.) In Oliveira v. State, 45 Ga. 555,557, the supreme Court said: "The whole of this provision for the prosecution of public officers for malpractice indicates the intention of the legislature that the proceedings shall be guarded with more than ordinary strictness. The accused is entitled to notice of the charge, and to a copy of the bill of indictment, before the bill is found. He has, too, a right to go before the grand jury, to cross-examine the witnesses, and perhaps to bring forward matters in explanation and defense." The foregoing ruling in that case was quoted approvingly by this court in Morris v. State, 59 Ga. App. 804 (2 S.E.2d 240). The statement in Code, § 89-9908, that the defendant and his witnesses "shall have the right of appearing before *Page 173 and being heard by the grand jury," obviously means that the accused must be given a reasonable opportunity, a reasonable time, to get his witnesses and to appear with them before the grand jury. The section (89-9908) should be given a construction that will make it effective, rather than one which would defeat the intent of the legislature. Under the statements of fact and the allegations of the plea in abatement, was the accused given such an opportunity? We think that this question, if the allegations of the plea had been supported by evidence, should have been submitted to the jury, and that the dismissal of the plea on general demurrer was error. In our opinion, the sustaining of the demurrer to the other grounds of the plea and motion to quash was not error. The error pointed out rendered the further proceedings in the case nugatory.
Judgment reversed. Gardner, J., concurs. MacIntyre, J., dissents.