The declaration in attachment, alleging that the seller of realty knowingly made material false representations to the purchaser about the property being sold, and that the purchaser, by a physical examination *Page 420 of the property, could not have ascertained for himself the falsity of the alleged representations, and that he relied on and was induced by such representations to purchase the property in question, to his injury and damage in an alleged amount, set forth a cause of action. The court erred in dismissing the declaration on the general demurrer and the motion by the defendants.
Mrs. Ida Jones filed general and special demurrers to the declaration, and Roy Jones made a motion to dismiss the action. The court sustained the demurrer and the motion to dismiss. The exception is to that judgment.
We are of the opinion that the allegations of the declaration set out a cause of action, and that the court erred in dismissing the action. It was alleged that the defendants knowingly made certain false and material representations to the plaintiff about the property which they were proposing to sell to him, and that he, believing and relying on such representations, was thereby induced to purchase the property to his injury and damage as therein alleged. The Code, § 105-302, provides: "Wilful misrepresentation of a material fact, *Page 422 made to induce another to act, and upon which he does act to his injury, will give a right of action." But the defendants contend that the declaration fails to set out a cause of action, because the plaintiff could have ascertained for himself the true condition of the property before buying it, without relying on the alleged representations of the defendants, and they cite authorities to the effect that when the means of knowledge are at hand and equally available to both parties to a contract of sale, if the purchaser fails to avail himself of such means, he will not be heard to say in impeachment of the contract that he was deceived by the representations of the seller. This is a well-settled principle of law, but it is without application to the facts alleged in the declaration in the present case, so far as rendering such declaration subject to general demurrer. The plaintiff here could not determine the sufficiency of the water supply, which was under ground and obtained by a pressure pump, by an examination of the premises. He alleged that the main inducement for him to purchase the property was that he might operate the filling-station and keep satisfactory tenants in the dwelling on the premises, and that an adequate water supply was necessary for both of these purposes. He alleged that the defendants knowingly made material false representations to him that the water supply on the property in question was ample for the purposes just mentioned, that he relied on such representations, and was induced thereby to purchase the property to his injury and damage. It was also alleged that certain other false and fraudulent representations concerning the property were made to the plaintiff by the defendants, as set out in the above statement of facts.
Under the allegations of the declaration the plaintiff, by a physical examination of the property, could not have ascertained or determined for himself the falsity of the alleged representations of the defendants. It was held in Griffin v. Butler,45 Ga. App. 771 (166 S.E. 60), where the plaintiff was induced to purchase a house by false representations, knowingly made by the defendants, that the house was constructed of first-class material, when in fact the lumber of which the floors were made was not of first-class material and was not all right, but was infected with a certain insect, that a cause of action was set out, based on false representations knowingly made by the defendants and on which the plaintiff was induced to *Page 423 act to his damage. It was said in Lester v. Bank ofAdrian, 25 Ga. App. 116 (102 S.E. 846): "Misrepresentations as to an existing and material fact, amounting to fraud, when made either by a principal or through his agent, whereby another is induced to enter upon an obligation in writing, may, as between the parties, be alleged and proved." In Fenley v. Moody, 104 Ga. 790 (30 S.E. 1002), it was said: "A party can not close his eyes to a defect in a thing purchased, so patent that by mere inspection he could have ascertained its existence; but we are not aware of any rule of law, or decision of any court, that goes to the extent of saying that one who has been imposed upon by a deceitful and false statement can have no relief unless, before acting upon such a statement, he had exhausted all means at his command to ascertain its truth. This would be, in effect, holding that scarcely under any circumstances will relief be granted to one who has been the victim of misplaced confidence in his fellow-man." . . "Every essential element of an action of deceit is embodied in the declaration now under consideration. There was a wilful misrepresentation of a material fact; knowledge by the defendant of the false statement, which was made with the intention to deceive, which actually did deceive the plaintiffs, and which was acted upon by them to their injury." See alsoWalters v. Hagan, 53 Ga. App. 547 (186 S.E. 563). Clearly, the declaration as amended set out a cause of action as against general demurrer. The court erred in dismissing the action.
Judgment reversed. Stephens, P. J., and Felton, J.,concur.