The court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the petition.
Plaintiff in error insists that the petition shows that the acts of Hopper were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and that the demurrer should have been sustained. We think that the principle in Horton v. Sanchez, 57 Ga. App. 612,618 (195 S.E. 873), taken from Southern Ry. Co. v.Webb, 116 Ga. 152 (42 S.E. 395, 59 L.R.A. 109), is applicable here. We quote: "While the general rule is that if, subsequently to an original wrongful or negligent act, a new cause has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the former must be considered as too remote, still if the character of the intervening act claimed to break the connection between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury was such that its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrongdoer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrongdoer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act."
The acts alleged against the defendant, if they were the proximate cause of the injury, were sufficient to authorize a recovery. It is true that, construing the petition most strongly against the pleader, it may be said that Hopper was driving in the center of the road, was therefore over the center line of said road and was thereby negligent, and that except for such negligence of Hopper the accident would not have occurred. However, the petition also alleges that such situation and negligence of Hopper could have and would have been seen and discovered by the defendant except for his failure to keep a lookout ahead, and that if such negligence *Page 245 of Hopper had been discovered it could easily have been avoided. As an example, we may say that had the defendant brought an action against Hopper for any injury he might have sustained on that occasion, and Hopper had been able to show that although he was negligent the defendant could have avoided the result of such negligence after having discovered the same and that he refused to take such action, the defendant could not recover. Likewise, under the present allegations, although Hopper's negligence may have been an immediate cause of the plaintiff's injury, the jury would be authorized to say that the defendant here should have reasonably anticipated or apprehended that his driving as was alleged on the occasion and under the circumstances would itself probably result in just such an injury or collision, and therefore as to those to whom he owed a duty he would not be free from liability as a result of the consequences of the intervening act of Hopper. The causal connection between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the injury is not necessarily broken. Such an issue is for the determination of a jury, and the court did not err in overruling the demurrer.
Judgment affirmed. Broyles, C. J., and Guerry, J., concur.