[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 518 The liability of a master to his servant for injuries sustained while in his employ, by the wrongful or negligent act of another employe of the same master, does not depend upon the doctrine ofrespondeat perior.
If the employe whose negligence causes the injury is a fellow-servant of the one injured, the doctrine does not apply. (Conway v. Belfast, etc., Ry. Co., 11 Irish C.L. 353.)
A servant assumes all risk of injuries incident to and occurring in the course of his employment, except such as are the result of the act of the master himself, or of a breach by the master of some term, either express or implied, of the contract of service, or of the duty of the master to his servant, viz.: to employ competent fellow-servants, safe machinery, etc. But for the mere negligence of one employe, the master is not responsible to another engaged in the same general service.
The liability of the master does not depend upon the grade or rank of the employe whose negligence causes the injury. A superintendent of a factory, although having power to employ men, or represent the master in other respects, is, in the management of the machinery, a fellow-servant of the other *Page 521 operatives. (Albro v. Agawam Canal Co., 6 Cush. 75; Conway v. Belfast Ry. Co., supra; Wood's Master and Servant, § 438. See, also, §§ 431, 436, 437.) On the same principle, however low the grade or rank of the employe, the master is liable for injuries caused by him to another servant, if they result from the omission of some duty of the master, which he has confided to such inferior employe. On this principle the Flike case (53 N.Y. 549) was decided. CHURCH, Ch. J., says, at page 553: "The true rule, I apprehend, is to hold the corporation liable for negligence in respect to such acts and duties as it is required to perform as master, without regard to the rank or title of the agent intrusted with their performance. As to such acts the agent occupies the place of the corporation, and the latter is liable for the manner in which they are performed."
The liability of the master is thus made to depend upon the character of the act in the performance of which the injury arises, without regard to the rank of the employe performing it. If it is one pertaining to the duty the master owes to his servants, he is responsible to them for the manner of its performance. The converse of the proposition necessarily follows. If the act is one which pertains only to the duty of an operative, the employe performing it is a mere servant, and the master, although liable to strangers, is not liable to a fellow-servant for its improper performance. (Wood's Master and Servant, § 438.) The citation which the court read to the jury from 21 Am. Rep. 2, does not conflict with, but sustains this proposition; it says: "Where the master places the entire charge of his business in the hands of an agent, the neglect of the agent in supplying and maintaining suitable instrumentalitiesfor the work required is a breach of duty for which the master isliable." These were masters' duties. In so far as the case from which the citation is made goes beyond this, I cannot reconcile it with established principles. In England, by a late act of Parliament, the rules touching the point now under consideration have been modified in some respects, but in this State no such legislation has been had. *Page 522
The point is sharply presented in the present case, by the 13th, 14th and 17th requests to charge. 13th. That although John L. Babbitt may, as financial agent or superintendent, overseer or manager, have represented defendant, and stood in his place, he did so only in respect of those duties which the defendant had confided to him as such agent, superintendent, overseer or manager.
This the court charged.
14th. That as to any other acts or duties performed by him in and about the defendant's works or business at said works, he is not to be regarded as defendant's representative, standing in his place, but as an employe or servant of the defendant, and a fellow-servant of the plaintiff.
This the court refused to charge, but left as a question of fact to the jury, and defendant's counsel excepted. I think this was a question of law, and that the court erred in submitting it to the jury, but should have charged as requested.
The court was further specifically requested to charge that in letting on the steam John L. Babbitt was not acting in defendant's place. This, I think, was a sound proposition, as applied to the present case. It was the act of a mere operative for which the defendant would be liable to a stranger, but not to a fellow-servant of the negligent employe. As between master and servant it was servant's, and not master's duty to operate the machinery.
The judgment should be reversed.