In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-16-00038-CV
ULYSSES LEE LAUDERDALE, APPELLANT
V.
BEVERLY ANN LAUDERDALE, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 233rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 233-578528-15, Honorable William W. Harris, Presiding
June 30, 2016
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Appellant, Ulysses Lee Lauderdale, and appellee, Beverly Lauderdale, were
married in November of 1983. According to the pleadings of Beverly, they ceased to
live together as husband and wife in 1987. Beverly filed for divorce on June 15, 2015.
Ulysses was subsequently served with citation on October 1, 2015. Ulysses did not file
an answer to Beverly’s divorce petition.
On November 12, 2015, the trial court held a final hearing on the matter of the
marriage of Ulysses and Beverly. The trial court entered “Default Final Decree of
1
Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to
this Court from the Second Court of Appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013).
Divorce” on the same day. The making of a record of the final hearing was waived.
The final decree states that the marriage had become insupportable and the decree
was issued on that basis. The final decree found there were no children under the age
of 18 and that none were expected. The trial court then divided the property by ordering
each to retain the property in their respective possession and to pay all debts they may
have incurred.
Appellant filed notice of appeal and has furthered his appeal by filing a series of
documents with this Court that we have deemed Ulysses’ attempts to file briefs in
support of his appeal.
The briefs filed by Ulysses do not contain any claims of error committed by the
trial court in conducting the final hearing and rendering the final divorce decree. Rather,
Ulysses’ briefs are a rambling and confusing diatribe that alleges that Beverly is guilty of
numerous crimes. Nowhere in these briefs do we find any claims for appellate relief
regarding the actual divorce. Very simply put, Ulysses has not presented this Court with
any allegations of error that would require that we reverse or modify the trial court’s final
decree. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (h), and (i). Further, Ulysses does not request that
this Court take any action regarding the final decree. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(j).
Because we find that Ulysses has not requested any relief on the only matter
appearing before us, that is the final decree of divorce, we affirm the trial court’s final
decree in all respects.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
2