2. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company was the carrier on the risk.
3. The employee-employer relationship existed between the parties at all relevant times.
4. Judicial Notice is taken of the Opinion and Award filed on 29 October 2001, wherein plaintiff was found to have sustained injuries as a result of a specific traumatic incidents of the work assigned on 20 September 1999 and 19 April 2000. Defendants paid plaintiff all disability benefits under the Opinion on 17 December 2001.
5. Plaintiff's average weekly wage was $375.89, which yields a compensation rate of $250.50 per week.
6. The issue for determination is to what, if any, additional benefits is plaintiff entitled as a result of the compensable 20 September 1999 and 19 April 2002 incidents?
7. Judicial Notice is taken of Dr. Poehling's deposition transcript from the prior hearing at page 9, line 11 through page 10, line 5.
8. The defendant-employer terminated plaintiff on 10 December 2001.
2. Throughout his employment with defendant-employer, plaintiff had been reprimanded for his work attendance, both before and since the workplace injuries. In 1998, plaintiff was reprimanded in his performance review for his attendance.
3. On 11 December 2000, plaintiff returned to work for the defendant-employer.
4. Attendance is important due to the time-sensitive nature of defendant-employer's industry. Therefore, defendant-employer developed and uniformly applied its attendance policy to all its employees.
5. In accordance with the attendance policy, employees with six months to six years of employment were entitled to six days of sick leave and ten vacation days per year. Employees are charged with a Full Date Occurrence (FDO) anytime they are not at work if the absence does not qualify as vacation, sick, funeral, holiday or jury duty leave, as spelled out in the policy. Employees who incur two FDO's in twelve months are given a verbal warning. Those with three FDO's in twelve months receive a written warning. Those with more than three FDO's in twelve months may be terminated.
6. Under the attendance policy, employees are charged a partial day occurrence (PDO) for arriving late to work, returning late from lunch, leaving work for appointments, or leaving before the end of the shift. Employees who receive eight PDO's in 12 months receive a verbal warning, nine PDO's receive a written warning and more than nine PDO's in 12 months may be terminated.
7. In 2001, plaintiff's attendance record showed he took sick leave on January 2, 3, 18; February 15; March 5 and 6, for a total of six days. Plaintiff took vacation leave January 11; March 16; July 2, 3, 5; August 8, 22, 29, and October 8, 10, 17 and 25, for a total of twelve days.
8. Plaintiff had six PDO's (June 11, 21, 28; August 17; October 18 and November 13) and four FDO's (June 15; August 29; November 28 and December 7).
9. Plaintiff's absence on 18 January 2001 was primarily related to his compensable workers' compensation injury even though he also reported a problem with gastroenteritis.
10. Plaintiff contends that he was fired under false pretext shortly after receiving a favorable ruling from the Industrial Commission. However, this contention is not supported by the competent evidence presented at the hearing.
11. Plaintiff further testified that some of his occurrences should have been charged as compensatory leave. However, the competent evidence in the record establishes that plaintiff did not have any compensatory leave time noted on his timesheet. Therefore, he had no compensatory leave to be taken. Plaintiff's testimony on this issue is not accepted as credible.
12. Defendant-employer's attendance policy is uniformly applied to all employees. Plaintiff was well aware of the policy, as he had previously been reprimanded for his chronic absenteeism. Any other employee would have been terminated for such absenteeism under defendant's policy.
13. Plaintiff's disability relating to his compensable injury had ended by 7 December 2001. His treating physicians allowed him to lift up to 50 pounds on 22 February 2001. By 16 August 2001, plaintiff only complained to his doctor of muscular pain during his return examination and plaintiff was taking no medication. Dr. Wilson prescribed a muscle relaxer to be taken as needed and scheduled plaintiff to return in one year. Dr. Wilson rated plaintiff with a 15% permanent partial impairment to his back on 30 November 2001. At his return examination with Dr. Wilson on 1 August 2001, plaintiff reported some back pain without radiculopathy, but he was doing well.
14. Any inability to earn the same wages after 7 December 2001 is due to plaintiff's failure to comply with defendant-employer`s attendance policy.
2. Defendants may also rebut the presumption of disability by showing that "plaintiff was terminated from his employment (1) for misconduct or fault unrelated to the compensable injury and (2) for which a nondisabled employee would ordinarily have been terminated." Seagraves v. Austin Co.of Greensboro, 123 N.C. App. 228, 472 S.E.2d 587 (1996). If both prongs are found, this is termed a "constructive refusal" of suitable employment under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-32. The credible evidence clearly establishes that plaintiff's misconduct, his chronic absenteeism, is the basis for his dismissal. All employees are subject to the attendance policy and, moreover, due to the time sensitive nature of the airline industry, compliance with the policy is mandatory for employees, both nondisabled and those with injuries. Therefore, defendants have proven by greater weight of the evidence that plaintiff's termination was due to his chronic absenteeism, and this amounted to a constructive refusal to accept suitable employment.
3. Any contention by plaintiff that his unexcused absences were due to the workplace injury is not supported by his attendance record. Plaintiff's testimony to the contrary is not accepted as credible, particularly on the matter of compensatory time, and regarding absences for problems related to the compensable injuries, as the medical records and attendance records do not corroborate plaintiff's testimony.
2. Each side shall pay its own costs.
This the ___ day of September, 2003.
S/___________________ BERNADINE S. BALLANCE COMMISSIONER
CONCURRING:
S/_____________ PAMELA T. YOUNG COMMISSIONER
S/_____________ THOMAS J. BOLCH COMMISSIONER