Michalik v. Hermann

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 17, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30780
_____________________

MICHAEL E. MICHALIK, JR., Individually and on behalf of the
minor child, Hannah E. Michalik; DEBORAH P. MICHALIK, his wife,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

versus

MIKE HERMANN, Deputy Sheriff; ET AL.,

Defendants,

KEVIN GUILLOT; PAUL TOYE; MIKE HERMANN, Deputy Sheriff;
HARRELL CLARK; SHENNANDOAH JONES; ERIC LEVIS,

Defendants - Appellants.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
_________________________________________________________________

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

This § 1983 and Bivens Fourth Amendment related case has its

origins in the search of the home of Michael and Deborah Michalik

(“the Michaliks”). The search was conducted under a warrant issued

as part of an investigation into a New Orleans drug operation,

involving several local, state, and federal officers. The search

failed to uncover any evidence of illegal activity, and the

Michaliks brought suit against those involved in the procurement

and execution of the warrant. The Michaliks contend that the
officers relied on stale information to claim that Mr. Michalik’s

step-brother stashed drugs at their home.

In the over five years since the complaint was filed, the case

has provided an ever-shifting web of claims and defendants. At

issue in these consolidated appeals is the district court’s denial

of qualified immunity to six defendants-appellants on various

claims relating to the procurement of the search warrant, the

search of the home, and/or the forcible entry of the home. See

Michalik v. Hermann, 2003 WL 21805037 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2003).

We hold that Levis and Toye are entitled to qualified immunity

for claims based on the procurement of the warrant because neither

prepared, presented, nor signed the application for the search

warrant. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of

qualified immunity as to (1) Levis and Toye on claims relating to

the procurement of the warrant and (2) Toye on claims relating to

the search of the home. However, we hold that material issues of

fact exist as to the conduct of Guillot, Hermann, Clark and Jones

in the forcible entry of the home. Accordingly, we DISMISS this

interlocutory appeal as to those claims for want of jurisdiction.

I

A

In early 1998, Officer Paul Toye (“Toye”) of the New Orleans

Police Department and Agent Eric Levis (“Levis”) of the federal

2
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”)1 began separate investigations of

a drug ring in New Orleans, Louisiana. Toye and Levis combined

their efforts, and the investigation broadened to include police

authorities in Jefferson, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany Parishes.

In August 1998, the New Orleans Police Department requested

wiretaps through the Louisiana State Police. Trooper John

Fitzpatrick (“Fitzpatrick”) became the case agent for the Louisiana

State Police. The wiretaps were concluded in early November 1998.

Search warrants were then issued for seventeen houses, and arrest

warrants were issued for thirty-three individuals. Fitzpatrick was

the sole affiant on the Application for Search Warrant for 406 E.

St. Jean Baptiste in Chalmette, Louisiana, the Michaliks’ home. An

arrest warrant was also issued for Mr. Michalik’s step-brother,

Gene J. Taglialavore (“Taglialavore”). Taglialavore had resided at

406 E. St. Jean Baptiste from 1989 to 1991, but his permanent

address was in Nevada at the time the warrant was issued.

The search warrant was executed by eight to ten officers of

various jurisdictions on November 18 at approximately 5:30 a.m.

Only four of the executing officers have been explicitly identified

by name: Kevin Guillot (“Guillot”) of the New Orleans Police

Department; and Mike Hermann, Harrell Clark, and Shennandoah Jones,

all of the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Department (collectively,

the “St. Bernard defendants”). The Michaliks were detained for

1
Levis was on detail to the DEA from the St. Bernard Parish
Sheriff’s Office Bureau of Narcotics.

3
approximately two hours while the house was searched. No drugs or

other evidence of illegal activity was found in either the initial

search or in a second search conducted with the use of a drug dog.

The Michaliks filed their original complaint in November 1999,

alleging that their home was searched unlawfully because the

officers relied on stale information to determine that Taglialavore

had stashed drugs at 406 E. St. Jean Baptiste. In their original

complaint, they sought damages and other relief based on alleged

violations of the U.S. Constitution and Louisiana state law against

the federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and their

respective agencies and governmental entities, including the United

States.

Because of the number of parties and claims involved, the

procedural posture of this case is exceptionally complicated. We

will relate only what is necessary to understand the issues on

appeal.

On November 20, 2001, the Michaliks filed their first amended

and supplemental complaint, adding a claim under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”) against the United States, alleging violations

of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.2 The United States, along with

other named federal defendants, filed a motion to dismiss the

2
The United States previously had been dismissed without
prejudice by the district court in October 2000 for failure to
serve. Thereafter, the district court granted the United States’
motion to dismiss all named and/or fictitious federal employees on
sovereign immunity grounds.

4
Michaliks’ amended complaint. The district court dismissed the

claim with prejudice because the Michaliks failed to exhaust their

administrative remedies before filing, and more than six months had

elapsed from the date on which the plaintiffs actually exhausted

their administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2675(a) and

2401(b).

The Michaliks submitted two additional amended complaints,

naming federal defendants in their personal capacities and alleging

the dual status of Levis as a DEA agent and member of the St.

Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Department.

B

We now turn to recount the procedural history of this

litigation with respect to each defendant-appellant, beginning with

Levis. Levis filed no answer to the Michaliks’ third amended

complaint, but instead filed a motion to dismiss, asserting

qualified immunity and the judgment bar provision of the FTCA, 28

U.S.C. § 2676. The district court denied Levis’s motion to dismiss

and similarly denied Levis’s motion to reconsider. On May 27,

2003, Levis filed a motion for summary judgment, again raising

qualified immunity and the FTCA judgment bar. The district court

denied the motion for summary judgment on August 4. Levis now

appeals the district court’s order denying him both dismissal on

FTCA grounds and qualified immunity on federal law claims relating

to the procurement of the warrant.

5
 We next consider Toye and Guillot of the New Orleans Police

Department. On January 8, 2003, the district court granted summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, dismissing all federal

claims against all defendants, including Toye and Guillot. The

Michaliks filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion,

arguing that the court’s grant of summary judgment was premature in

view of ongoing discovery. The district court granted the

Michaliks’ motion in part, reinstating federal claims against Toye

as to the procurement of the search warrant. On May 19, the New

Orleans Police defendants filed for summary judgment on the

remaining claims. In its August 4 order, the district court

dismissed all claims against every named New Orleans Police

defendant, except Toye and Guillot. The district court reinstated

the federal claims against Guillot, noting that material issues of

fact exist as to Guillot’s role in the forcible entry of the

Michaliks’ home. The district court also reinstated claims against

Toye regarding the search and forcible entry of the home, as well

as the procurement of the search warrant as noted above. Toye and

Guillot now appeal the district court’s order.

Finally, we turn to the St. Bernard defendants. On December

3, 2003, the St. Bernard defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court

granted qualified immunity to the St. Bernard defendants on all

federal excessive force claims arising out of the search itself,

ordering the federal claims dismissed with prejudice. The district

6
court denied the Michaliks’ motion for reconsideration,

specifically holding that the police action during the search was

objectively reasonable. On May 5, 2004, the St. Bernard defendants

filed a separate motion for summary judgment to dismiss all

remaining state law claims. In its August 4 order, the district

court granted summary judgment to the St. Bernard defendants for

state law claims arising out of the procurement of the warrant, and

also held as a matter of law that the officers’ conduct inside the

house was not unreasonable under state tort law principles. The

district court, however, denied the motion for summary judgment as

to Hermann, Clark, and Jones on the federal and state law claims in

conjunction with the forcible entry of the Michaliks’ home. The

St. Bernard defendants now appeal.

To sum up, the six defendants-appellants appeal the denial of

qualified immunity for the following claims: (1) federal claims

only against Levis for procurement of the warrant; (2) federal and

state claims against Toye for procurement of the warrant, search of

the home, and forcible entry of the home; (3) federal and state

claims against Guillot for forcible entry of the home; (4) federal

and state claims against the St. Bernard defendants for forcible

entry of the home.3

3
The Michaliks have moved to dismiss each of the defendants’
appeals. These motions were carried with the case, but we do not
separately address these motions in this opinion. We consider the
arguments advanced in the motions briefing in conjunction with the
arguments raised in the merits briefing in arriving at our
conclusions.

7
 II

The denial of a motion for summary judgment is generally not

a final, appealable order over which we have jurisdiction. Under

the collateral order doctrine, however, “a small class of

interlocutory orders that (1) conclusively determine, (2) important

issues, which are separate from the merits of the action, and (3)

which would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final

judgment, are deemed ‘final’ for the purposes of appeal.” Reyes v.

City of Richmond, Texas, 287 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). A district court’s

denial of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an

issue of law, is an appealable decision under the collateral order

doctrine. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Johnson

v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-18 (1995). We have no jurisdiction to

hear an interlocutory appeal, however, when a district court’s

denial of qualified immunity rests on the basis that genuine issues

of material fact exist. See Reyes, 287 F.3d at 350-51.

We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment de

novo, applying the same standard as the district court. See

Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir.

2003). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Any

8
reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving

party. Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 507 (citations omitted).

Evaluating qualified immunity is a two-step process. First,

we determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a

clearly established constitutional or statutory right. See Siegert

v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). A right is clearly established if

its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 919 (5th Cir. 2000)

(internal citations omitted). If the plaintiff has alleged a

violation of a clearly established right, the next step for us is

to determine whether the official’s conduct was objectively

reasonable under the law at the time of the incident. See Sanchez

v. Swyden, 139 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a government

official is not entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Bennett

v. City of Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 1989).

A

(1)

We begin by examining the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity to Levis and Toye for claims related to procurement of the

search warrant.4 The district court concluded that neither Levis

4
The claims at issue are a federal Bivens action, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Toye for
Fourth Amendment violations based upon their roles in procuring the

9
nor Toye were subject to Franks liability5 because the Michaliks

identified no false statement attributable to Levis or Toye that

appeared anywhere in the warrant application. Nevertheless, the

district court denied qualified immunity to Levis and Toye, finding

that there were material factual disputes as to whether they were

liable under Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). The district

court concluded that if the officers are ultimately found to have

played a significant enough role in procuring the warrant, their

conduct may expose them to liability under the principles of

Malley. 2003 WL 21805037, at *11-12. So, let us examine Malley

and the district court’s application of it to this case.

In Malley, the officer in charge of the investigation

presented criminal complaints to the state judge charging the

defendants with felony marijuana possession. The complaints were

accompanied by supporting affidavits signed by the officer and by

unsigned arrest warrants for the judge’s signature. 475 U.S. at

337-39. On the basis of the complaints and affidavits, the judge

warrant.
5
The Supreme Court held in Franks v. Delaware that an officer
may be liable when he “makes a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” that
results in a warrant being issued without probable cause regardless
of whether he signed the application or was present when the
affiant appeared before the judge. 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Franks liability to also include
liability for an officer who makes knowing and intentional
omissions that result in a warrant being issued without probable
cause. See Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 448 (5th Cir. 1997),
abrogated in part by Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).

10
signed and issued the warrants. Id. The defendants were arrested,

tried, and acquitted. Id. They then brought a § 1983 claim

against the affiant officer, charging that he violated their Fourth

Amendment rights by applying for warrants without a showing of

probable cause. Id. The officer contended that he was entitled to

absolute immunity from suit because the state court judge had

approved, executed, and issued the warrants, exonerating the

officer from further liability. Id. at 339-45. The Supreme Court

described the issue thusly: “. . . the degree of the immunity

accorded a defendant police officer in a damages action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 when it is alleged that the officer caused the

plaintiffs to be unconstitutionally arrested by presenting a judge

with a complaint and a supporting affidavit which failed to

establish probable cause.” Id. at 337 (emphasis added). The Court

concluded that such an officer is not entitled to absolute

immunity. The Court further held, however, that the officer who

applies for a search warrant may be entitled to qualified immunity

if his actions are objectionably reasonable. Throughout its

opinion, the Court made clear that the specific and narrow question

before it was “whether a reasonably well-trained officer in

petitioner’s position would have known that his affidavit failed to

establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for

the warrant.” Id. at 345 (emphasis added). Thus, our reading of

the case makes clear to us that Malley specifically decided only

11
whether the officer who actually presents or applies for the

warrant is liable.

The district court here, however, stated that “[t]he

principles enunciated in Malley apply not only to those officers

who sign and present the warrant to the issuing judge but also to

those officers who prepare the warrant application.” 2003 WL

21805037, at *10. The district court cited Bennett v. City of

Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400, as support for this understanding of

Malley. We agree with the district court that Bennett seems to

move the Malley holding a step forward.

In Bennett, several officers were engaged in the

investigation, preparation, and presentation of the facts that

ultimately were presented to the magistrate judge who issued the

arrest warrant. 883 F.3d at 401-03. The detective in charge of

the investigation prepared, but did not present, the supporting

affidavit. Id. Under the procedures of that police department,

the affiant -- the officer who actually signed and presented the

affidavit to the judge -- acted only in a perfunctory role; that

is, he had no knowledge of the facts, but depended solely upon the

supplied affidavit.6 Id. The investigators, the detective in

6
Under such circumstances, we were prompted to chide police
departments to “seek to provide magistrates with warrant
applications from the law enforcement official most directly
involved in the investigation and most directly involved with the
facts stated in the affidavit.” Id. at 407.

12
charge, and the affiant were sued under § 1983 for effecting an

arrest without probable cause. Id.

Our opinion in Bennett focused primarily on the question of

whether probable cause supported the arrest of the two plaintiffs

-- not on the nuances of liability under Malley. We were concerned

largely with the detective who prepared the affidavit, and we

addressed in particular the reliability of the facts that he used

to make allegations in the affidavit. With respect to the narrow

Malley issue, we must say that the opinion is not absolutely clear

that the detective’s liability rested explicitly on Malley. We did

assume, for purposes of assessing the detective’s Fourth Amendment

liability and his entitlement to qualified immunity, that the facts

known to the detective would be insufficient to give him probable

cause to arrest the defendant and that the facts in the affidavit

that he prepared were insufficient to establish probable cause for

the arrests. Id. at 408. In assuming the detective’s Fourth

Amendment liability as the preparer of the affidavit, we made only

a short reference to Malley: “A police officer may be held liable

in his individual capacity for filing an application for an arrest

warrant without probable cause, the Supreme Court held in Malley v.

Briggs.” Id. at 409 (emphasis added). Citing Malley, we noted

that with respect to the detective the question was “‘whether a

reasonable well-trained officer in [the defendant’s] position would

have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause

and that he should not have applied for the warrant.” Id. Without

13
addressing that the detective had not, in fact, applied for the

warrant, we went on to find that the detective’s actions were

objectively reasonable and he was entitled to qualified immunity.

We will return later to the district court’s application of Malley

to deny qualified immunity to Levis and Toye on the warrant claims.

(2)

Turning now to the Michaliks’ arguments concerning the warrant

claims, they primarily urge that we lack appellate jurisdiction

because the denial of qualified immunity here is based on issues of

fact relating to Levis’s and Toye’s role in procuring the warrant.

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313; Reyes, 287 F.3d at 350-51. This

argument, however, assumes that there is no issue of law regarding

the applicability of Malley and that Malley applies to the alleged

facts.

In contending that Malley establishes liability for non-

affiant officers, the Michaliks argue that the Supreme Court has

cautioned against reading references to “officer” narrowly when

considering reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment -- that the

term “officer” should encompass more persons that a single officer.

They acknowledge that Malley addressed specifically the liability

of the affiant officer, but giving an inclusive meaning to

“officer,” they assert that the requirements of Malley are

applicable to any officer, however involved in the procurement

process, who had no reasonable ground for believing that the

14
warrant was properly issued.7 In support, they cite United States

v. Leon as holding that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is

appropriate where officers have no reasonable ground for believing

that the warrant was properly issued. 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.24

(1984). The Michaliks point out that the Supreme Court in Malley

said that the “same standard of objective reasonableness applied in

the context of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified

immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly

caused an unconstitutional arrest.” 475 U.S. at 345.

On the other hand, Levis and Toye assert that Malley only

applies to affiant officers and that an extension of liability to

non-affiant officers is inconsistent with the Malley rationale

because such officers do not have the opportunity to consider the

application as a whole and thus cannot make reasonable judgment as

to whether the warrant is truly supported by probable cause.

Furthermore, Levis and Toye contend that such an extension would

have adverse effects on legitimate law enforcement functions by

7
The Michaliks further assert that the collective knowledge
doctrine/fellow officer rule is applicable to Levis. Citing a
district court opinion from Massachusetts, the Michaliks argue that
a non-affiant participant cannot use another officer as a shield.
United States v. Bater, 830 F.Supp. 28, 36-37 (D. Mass. 1993)
(considering facts analogous to Leon). We find this reasoning
unpersuasive here for the reasons articulated by the district
court. 2003 WL 21805037, at *4.

Nor are we persuaded by the Michaliks’ arguments regarding
supervisory capacity. The district court correctly noted “that the
foundation upon which personal civil liability for constitutional
torts and the doctrine of qualified immunity are based is
individual conduct not imputed acts.” 2003 WL 21805037, at *4.

15
discouraging officers from providing information to be used in a

warrant application.8

(3)

Our understanding of Malley liability differs somewhat from

the district court and from the parties. Our analysis of Bennett

convinces us that, according to this precedent, liability under

Malley may lie not only against the affiant, but also against an

officer who is in the position of the detective in Bennett, that

is, an officer who actually prepares the warrant application with

knowledge that a warrant would be based solely on the document

prepared.9 Such an officer is in a position to see the whole

picture, to understand his responsibility, and thus fully to assess

probable cause questions. Accordingly, such an officer, who is not

the affiant, may be held liable, along with the affiant, under the

principles of Malley. We are unwilling, however, to extend such

liability on the basis of Bennett, under the Malley rationale,

8
Neither Levis nor Toye provide us any helpful guidance in
interpreting Bennett. Toye does not cite Bennett in his briefs,
and Levis simply notes that “Bennett did not . . . hold that an
officer could be subject to liability under Malley for preparing a
warrant, or discuss the issues that would pertain to establish such
a new rule of law.”
9
We do not read Bennett to extend Malley liability to the two
other officers involved in the investigation and sued by the
plaintiffs. Such fleeting reference to the conduct and liability
of these officers is insufficient for us to draw any conclusion in
relation to Malley. Id. at 408. To be sure, however, it would
extend Malley’s holding beyond its underlying rationale to hold any
officer liable for the arrest warrant who neither prepared nor
presented the application.

16
beyond the affiant and person who actually prepared, or was fully

responsible for the preparation of, the warrant application. Here,

it is undisputed that no officer other than Fitzpatrick, the

affiant officer, was responsible for the preparation or

presentation of the warrant application to the judge. Although

issues of fact may exist as to the roles that Levis and Toye played

in the investigation, and in providing some of the information to

Fitzpatrick, these issues of fact are not material to the warrant

claim because none of the evidence suggests that Levis and/or Toye

prepared or presented the warrant or were fully responsible for its

preparation or presentation. Accordingly, we hold that the

district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Levis and

Toye on claims related to the procurement of the search warrant.10

B

We next consider the denial of qualified immunity to Toye for

claims relating to the actual search of the house itself.

Concluding that material issues of fact exist as to whether Toye

was present during the search, the district court noted that if

Toye were present at the search,

then Toye would be additionally liable for
executing the warrant. The Court has already

10
Levis also appeals the district court’s denial of summary
judgment asserting that he is entitled to have the Bivens claims
dismissed on account of the FTCA’s judgment bar provision, 28
U.S.C. § 2676. Because our finding that Levis is entitled to
qualified immunity on the Bivens action ends the litigation against
him on this claim, we need not address claims with respect to §
2676.

17
 determined that the executing officers were
entitled to qualified immunity based upon
their lack of knowledge upon which to question
the seemingly valid warrant. However, the
same reasoning would not apply to an officer
in Toye’s position who because of his
participation in procuring the warrant perhaps
should have known that probable cause was
lacking.

2003 WL 21805037, at *12 (citing Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226,

231-32 (5th Cir. 2000)).

To the point, the basis of denying qualified immunity to Toye

on claims relating to the search was based on his liability in

procuring the warrant. We have exonerated him from that liability

under Malley. Toye can no more be charged with knowledge of

probable cause than can the other executing officers. It follows

that the district court erred in denying Toye qualified immunity

for the search of the house. The factual dispute as to whether

Toye was present at the time of the search is obviously irrelevant

to this determination.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of

qualified immunity to Toye on claims related to the search of the

Michaliks’ home.

C

We finally consider the claims against Toye, Guillot, and the

St. Bernard defendants relating to the forcible entry of the

Michaliks’ home. These claims are referred to by the parties and

the district court as the knock and announce claims. The district

court denied qualified immunity to these defendants because issues

18
of fact remain as to whether the entry was reasonable under state

law and the Fourth Amendment. See 2003 WL 21805037, at *14. The

district court specifically noted that “[a]ssuming that the

officers did in fact knock, a point which in and of itself is not

clear, the Court questions whether the officers waited long enough

for the Plaintiffs to respond . . . .” Id. Taking the evidence in

the light most favorable to the Michaliks, the district court

stated that it “would have no choice but to conclude that the

officers announced their presence simultaneously with breaching the

door.” Id. Because the officers had not pointed to any evidence

to justify such an entry, the district court concluded that

qualified immunity was inappropriate.11 Id.

Guillot and the St. Bernard defendants argue that the

Michaliks have offered no evidence that the officers acted

unreasonably. They further and correctly note that the usual

summary judgment burden of proof is altered in the case of a

qualified immunity defense. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481,

11
Guillot and the St. Bernard defendants argue that the
district court erred in considering the knock and announce claim
because the Michaliks never alleged the claim at any time before
oral argument on the summary judgment motion. The Michaliks assert
that the knock and announce claim was first briefed in the January
2004 Motion for Reconsideration, and furthermore, common law knock
and announce principles are part of any Fourth Amendment
reasonableness inquiry. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927
(1995). The district court noted that even though the knock and
announce claim was raised for the first time “at this late stage,”
it considered the issue because it is a part of the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness inquiry. We defer to the district court
in its management of this case and its ruling on this matter.

19
489 (5th Cir. 2001). An officer need only plead his good faith,

which then shifts the burden to the plaintiff, who must rebut the

defense by establishing that the officer’s allegedly wrongful

conduct violated clearly established law. Id. The plaintiff bears

the burden of negating the defense and cannot rest on conclusory

allegations and assertions but must demonstrate genuine issues of

material fact regarding the reasonableness of the officer’s

conduct. Id. Guillot and the St. Bernard defendants assert that

the Michaliks have not demonstrated that there was a failure to

knock and announce in this case. They assert that the Michaliks

never alleged that there was a failure to knock and announce their

presence or a failure to wait a reasonable time before entering the

plaintiffs’ home. Even if there were a failure, they assert that

uncontroverted facts demonstrate that their actions were

objectively reasonable in the light of the circumstances.

Toye additionally argues that no evidentiary basis exists for

determining that he may have been present during the forcible entry

or search of the Michaliks’ home. He contends that he has

presented documentary evidence proving that, during the execution

of the warrant at the Michaliks’ home, he was executing a search

warrant at another location in connection with the same “bust”.

The Michaliks argue material issues of fact preclude our

jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of this claim; there is

conflicting testimony as to who used the battering ram, who entered

the residence first, how long the officers waited, and whether

20
there was a knock and announcement at all. Furthermore, the

Michaliks assert that Toye’s presence at the Michaliks’ home when

the entry was made is disputed, pointing to testimony of Guillot as

well as evidence questioning the veracity of Toye’s documentary

evidence. In the light of the conflicting testimony, the Michaliks

further assert that the officers’ failure to present sufficient

evidence of exigent circumstances makes summary judgment

inappropriate.

Based on our review of the record, we cannot dispute that

material issues of fact remain as to the knock and announce claims.

Although Guillot and the St. Bernard defendants properly explain

the burdens of the respective parties, the district court found

that more than conclusory allegations and bare assertions underlie

the Michaliks’ contentions regarding the facts. It seems to us

that the arguments of Toye, Guillot, and the St. Bernard defendants

do not focus on the existence of evidence, but instead on the

weight that should be given to it. We thus conclude that these

material issues of fact deprive this court of jurisdiction to

entertain this interlocutory appeal asserting qualified immunity to

Toye, Guillot, and the St. Bernard defendants.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court

erred by denying qualified immunity to (1) Levis and Toye on claims

relating to the procurement of the search warrant and (2) Toye on

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claims relating to the search of the Michaliks’ home.12 Because the

district court found that material issues of fact exist, we dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction the appeal of claims related to the

forcible entry of the Michaliks’ home by Toye, Guillot, Hermann,

Clark, and Jones. Stated differently, the only claims that remain

to be tried are those claims against Toye, Guillot, Hermann, Clark,

and Jones for the forcible entry of the home. Accordingly, we

remand the case for further action and proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion.

REVERSED and RENDERED, in part;

DISMISSED, in part; and REMANDED.

12
It follows that qualified immunity is also granted to Toye
with respect to the concomitant state law claims relating to the
procurement of the search warrant and search of the Michaliks’
home. The appeals of state law claims remaining against Guillot,
and the St. Bernard defendants are dismissed in accordance with our
dismissal of the appeal of federal claims for want to jurisdiction.

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