The jury found, in response to interrogatories propounded by the court, that the money received by the appellee from his uncle was a gift from the latter's separate estate, and that the note was retained by F. H. Oberthier for the temporary protection of the appellee. Upon these and other findings, not necessary to mention, the court rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant below.
Upon further consideration we have reached the conclusion that the affirmance of the judgment in this case should be placed upon different grounds from those stated in the original opinion. It appears from the testimony and the findings of fact made by the jury and the court that in the transaction with Marwill the appellee fully discharged the note with funds exclusively his own. This had the legal effect of extinguishing the debt and the mortgage which had been given to secure its payment. The incumbrance held by Kangerga Bros. then became, as a matter of law, a first lien on the property. The fraud, if any, was in the scheme to conceal the payment of the note by indorsing a fictitious assignment to F. H. Oberthier. That transaction did not affect the legal right of Kangerga Bros. or those of any other creditor then holding a lien on the property. If as between the appellee and his uncle that indorsement created an obligation to pay the note again, it originated on that date; for the debt and lien could not be treated as a continuation of that which had been extinguished by payment. However improper the deception attempted in this instance may have been, it is not one denounced by our statute concerning fraudulent conveyances. Practically it was a mere attempt to conceal from Kangerga Bros. the fact that a prior lien had been discharged. The evidence shows that there never was any contract between F. H. Oberthier and the appellee regarding the debt. The entire transaction by which the indorsement of the note was made was without the knowledge or the consent of F. H. Oberthier. It was some time afterwards before he was informed of that fact. He could not without his consent be made a party to any such scheme.
We are of the opinion that the appellee is not estopped from proving the true facts which show a payment of the note and the extinguishment of the debt and lien while in the hands of Marwill.
The judgment of the county court will therefore be affirmed.
The former opinion filed in this case will be withdrawn.