Cox v. City of Dallas Texas

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 9, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-11304

HAROLD COX; SHIRLEY DAVIDSON; ROBERT STUBBLEFIELD; CYNTHIA
HERRING; ELOISE EDWARDS; BETTY CURLEY; LEO EASTER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

CITY OF DALLAS TEXAS; ET AL,

Defendants,

CITY OF DALLAS TEXAS

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Asserting racial discrimination, homeowners sued the City of

Dallas under the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983

for persistent failure to police the operation of an illegal dump

near their homes. The district court granted summary judgment to

the City on the Fair Housing Act claim and ruled for the City on

the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims after a bench trial. We affirm.

I

The City annexed the Deepwood neighborhood in 1956 and zoned
it residential. In 1963, the City issued a certificate of

occupancy for a gravel pit, part of a sand and gravel mining

operation, at 523 Deepwood Street. The pit required a certificate

because it was a non-conforming use. The City also re-zoned as

industrial a portion of the 85-acre site and issued a specific use

permit for a mining operation.

Plaintiffs purchased homes in Deepwood between 1970 and 1978.

It was a predominately white neighborhood according to the 1970

U.S. Census. By the 1980 Census, it was predominately black.

During the early years of this decade of racial transition, there

was open dumping of solid waste at the site, prompting visits to

the site by City and state officials. Their response was a call

for continuing surveillance.

Terry Van Sickle owned V.V. Construction. He also owned the

site from 1982 through 1992. In March of 1982, V.V. Construction

applied for a permit to remove sand and gravel from the site,

assuring the City that it would fill the old pits with solid waste.

The permit was issued the following month.

Within six months, one of the plaintiffs in this action filed

a complaint with the City, alleging massive illegal dumping at the

site. The City responded that Van Sickle had been cited for

improperly conducting a sanitary landfill operation in a

residentially zoned area. Weekly re-inspections followed but, as

late as December 9, 1982, had detected no additional illegal

dumping. Plaintiffs had a different take. They continued to

2
complain at City Council meetings about dumping. In the first four

months of 1983, residents appeared five times at City Council

meetings, each time expressing concern about the site; in

particular, they voiced concerns about truck traffic, noise, air

pollution, and illegal dumping.

On February 4, 1983, responding to these complaints, the

Assistant City Manager advised the mayor and the City Council that

Van Sickle had been fined for operating a sanitary landfill on the

site and that illegal dumping had ceased. The manager offered the

view that once truck traffic to the site was diverted away from

residential streets, most of the residents’ concerns would be

resolved. That did not prove to be accurate. Complaints by

residents of Deepwood continued, as did the efforts of staff to

reassure the elected officials. On May 18, 1983, a City employee

sent a memo to a City Councilwoman describing the site and

indicating that no contaminants were found in the soil or water

table and that continued monitoring was to take place every four to

six months for five years. Again, despite these assurances,

residents continued to complain that trash was being dumped at the

site.

The City Council remained attentive, if ineffectual,

requesting that the Board of Adjustment hold a public hearing to

consider terminating the nonconforming use of the site. The

resolution requesting the hearing pointed to the operation of a

“stone, sand, or gravel mining use” on the property. It did not

3
mention the complaints that it was being used as an illegal dump.

The Board of Adjustment held the requested hearing on July 26,

1983 to consider revoking the certificate of occupancy for the

nonconforming sand and gravel mining operation. The board members

visited the site on the morning of the hearing. In preparation for

the inspection, however, Van Sickle had moved the trash and covered

it with dirt. At the hearing, he testified that he had removed a

considerable amount of trash from the site and that he planned to

mine gravel for two more years and fill the resulting hole for

another three years. Two other individuals supported continuing

the nonconforming use. While two residents sent letters of

opposition to this plan to the Board of Adjustment, none attended

the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board decided

to take no action to revoke the certificate and to call another

hearing in nine months. There is no evidence in the record that

the board ever again considered the matter.

While Van Sickle owned the site, two City demolition

contractors dumped trash on the site. Illegal dumping continued

from 1985 to 1993, and during this time the City invested little

effort into deterring illegal dumping.1 Over these eight years,

the City issued fifteen citations for illegal dumping, six of which

were for dumping at the Deepwood site. A 1985 memo to the mayor

1
The district court noted that a coordinated effort by the Street and
Sanitation Service Department, the State Health Department, the Department of
Housing and Neighborhood Services, and the Public Works Department was begun in
1985 to clean up the site. This was apparently ineffective.

4
and City Council stated that the citations for illegal dumping at

the site had been only a partial deterrent and noted that control

of illegal dumping had been “loose.”

In 1987, the City sued Van Sickle, V.V. Construction, and

another defendant, Samson Horrice, for operating an illegal solid

waste facility. As if to make matters plain, in 1988 the site

caught fire and burned for over seven months. Finally, in December

of 1989, the City obtained a judgment against the defendants

ordering them to cease dumping at the site and to submit and

implement a plan to close the site. But nothing changed.

The Bureau of Solid Waste Management of the Texas Department

of Health inspected the site in April of 1991. The inspectors

reported continued unauthorized dumping and no efforts to clean up

the site as required by the 1989 judgment. According to the

reports, the City was informed of the failure to clean up the site.

In November of 1991, the City moved for contempt against Van

Sickle and Horrice for failure to comply with the judgment. No

hearing was held because the City failed to serve one of the

defendants. It appears that no further action was taken to enforce

the judgment and ensure closure of the site. With this inaction,

a decade of erratic enforcement staggered to a halt.

First State Bank had a lien on the site. In 1991, the

Department of Housing and Neighborhood Services informed the bank

that the site had been inspected and was in compliance with the

City code. In 1992, First State Bank acquired the site when Van

5
Sickle defaulted on a loan, and two years later it sold the site to

Herman Nethery.

On August 1, 1994, Nethery, the new owner, applied for a

construction permit from the City on behalf of Herman Nethery

Recycling. Nethery described the proposed project as “fill & mine

property.” A section of the application set aside for “office use

only” contains a notation that the application was not ready

because it needed an accompanying affidavit stating that the

proposed use had been in continuous operation since the original

certificate of occupancy was issued. An affidavit was submitted to

the City on August 2, 1994, stating, “VV Construction Company is in

fact in business and continuing business on said property since

1982 to present time.” The affiant was V.V. Construction Co. by

Herman Nethery Recycling. The same day, the City issued a permit

to Nethery for mining at the site. The accompanying contractor’s

authorization form notes that the City had to inspect the property

before Nethery could receive a certificate of occupancy.

Meanwhile, the City created an Illegal Dumping Team of six

code enforcement inspectors to prevent illegal dumping at Deepwood

and other sites. The inspectors issued numerous citations to

people operating the site beginning on August 22, 1994. Despite

the reports and citations, the City issued a certificate of

occupancy to Nethery on December 5, 1994, apparently without first

conducting the required inspection. The certificate allowed the

operator of the site to “dump rock, gravel, sand, clean dirt free

6
of vegetation and concrete, generated from Demolition efforts

associated with the Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board Demolition

Program.” The City continued to issue citations for illegal

dumping through November of 1996.

During the time that Nethery owned it, the site was operated

by Herman Lee Gibbons. Gibbons was also a subcontractor on certain

City contracts for demolition and hauling debris, and he dumped

waste at the site. Other subcontractors on City demolition

projects did the same. Gibbons and other site operators used

copies of the certificate of occupancy issued by the City to prove

to their customers that the site was a legal landfill.

Kenn Hornbeck, the City employee who supervised City

demolition contracts, did not seek to terminate those subcontracts

assertedly because he had been provided no proof that material from

City demolition projects was being dumped illegally. Yet Hornbeck

knew that Gibbons was operating an illegal dump at the site, and he

continued to forward contracts with Gibbons to the City Council for

approval without informing them of Gibbons’ connection with the

dump. His department’s attempts to monitor whether City demolition

debris was disposed of properly were limited to checking receipts

submitted for landfill disposal.

In April of 1995, the City sued Nethery for operating an

illegal solid waste facility. Despite a resulting temporary

injunction ordering Nethery to cease all operations at the site,

illegal dumping continued through the end of 1996. Nethery was

7
twice held in contempt of court and, as a result, spent 49 days in

jail and was ordered to pay $2,500 in fines.

On June 22, 1995, in a further attempt to eliminate the

continued illegal dumping, Environmental and Health Services code

inspectors, Dallas police officers, and Department of Public Safety

officers arrested 29 people and issued 152 code violation

citations. The depth of resistance to City regulation is evident

in the fact that the regulators requested police assistance because

the operators of the facility were armed.

The site again caught fire and burned from February 1997

through April 1997. In April, the City Council was briefed on the

site. At the briefing, several council members made statements

indicating surprise and dismay that the Deepwood site had not been

corrected. On member noted that “had it been in another area of

the City, it would not have occurred.”

On November 14, 1997, Nethery was permanently enjoined from

operating a dump at the site. In addition, both Nethery and

Gibbons were charged and convicted of organized criminal activity

in connection with their operation of the site. Both men were

sentenced to prison, although Nethery’s conviction was reversed on

appeal.

II

On February 5, 1998, homeowners filed a civil action in

federal district court against the City and others seeking

injunctive relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,

8
42 U.S.C. § 6901, injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. §§

1981 and 1983, and damages under the FHA and its accompanying

regulations. Plaintiffs filed a similar case on July 28, 1998

regarding a nearby dump.2 After consolidating the two cases, the

district court bifurcated the case for separate trials of the class

claim for injunctive relief under § 6901 and the non-class claims

for damages under the FHA and its regulations and §§ 1981 and

1983.3 After a bench trial, the district judge granted plaintiffs’

request for injunctive relief on August 27, 1999, a judgment

affirmed by this court.4

As for damages, plaintiffs claimed violation of Equal

Protection rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, violation of

the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1364(a),(b), and violation

of federal housing regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.70(b),(d)(4). The

district court granted summary judgment to the City on the FHA and

federal housing regulations claims.5 After a bench trial, the

court entered final judgment for the City on the remaining claims

2
It appears that the plaintiffs did not seek damages for this second dump,
the “South Loop 12 Dump,” after the injunction was issued for both dumps.
3
It appears that the bifurcation order ignored the claims for injunctive
relief under §§ 1981 and 1983, but they became moot after the court granted the
injunction under § 6901.

4
Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2001).

5
Cox v. City of Dallas, Civ. 3:98-CV-1763-BH, 2004 WL 370242, at *5-*9
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2004) (unpublished).

9
under §§ 1981 and 1983.6 Plaintiffs appeal the rejection of their

claims under the FHA and §§ 1981 and 1983, but not the rejection of

their claims under the federal regulations.

III

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the City on the FHA claim.7

A

Plaintiffs allege that the City violated § 3604(a) of the FHA

when it failed to prevent dumping at the site. Section 3604(a)

makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of

a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental

of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person

because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national

origin.”8

The issue here is whether the failures and omissions by the

City violate the FHA by “otherwise mak[ing] unavailable or

deny[ing]” a dwelling to any person because of race.9 In an

analogous context, we have stated that “[a]lthough the ‘otherwise

make available or deny’ phrase seems all-encompassing, its scope is

6
Cox v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98-CV-1763-BH, 2004 WL 2108253, at *16 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 22, 2004) (unpublished).
7
Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005).
8
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
9
Plaintiffs do not contend that any of the other clauses of § 3604(a)
apply.

10
not limitless.”10 Plaintiffs attack the district court’s conclusion

that, “[t]o effect [sic] the availability of housing within the

meaning of the FHA, the discriminatory actions must have a direct

impact on Plaintiffs’ ability, as potential home buyers or

renters...to secure housing” and that “[s]ection 3604(a) protects

the right of individuals to live where they choose, but it does not

protect intangible interests in already-owned property such as

habitability or value.”11

Plaintiffs argue that the City violated § 3604(a) because the

dump makes it more difficult for them to sell their houses and

lowers the value of their houses. This claim enjoys factual

support, but it is not a claim of “unavailability” or “den[ial]” of

housing under a proper reading of the FHA. The failure of the City

to police the Deepwood landfill may have harmed the housing market,

decreased home values, or adversely impacted homeowners’

“intangible interests,” but such results do not make dwellings

“unavailable” within the meaning of the Act.

Sister circuits deciding cases turning on the reading of

“unavailable” are in accord. The Seventh Circuit, in Southend

Neighborhood Improvement Association v. County of St. Claire, in

addressing claims that the county failed to clean up and maintain

adjacent properties, held that “plaintiffs’ claim that the county’s

10
Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir.
1996) (construing an analogous clause of the FDA, § 3604(f)).
11
Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *6 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

11
discriminatory refusal to properly manage the properties it owns

damaged their interests in neighboring properties” is “quite

different from most of the practices that courts have deemed

illegal under § 3604(a).”12 It then held that § 3604(a)

is designed to ensure that no one is denied the right to
live where they choose for discriminatory reasons, but it
does not protect the intangible interests in the already-
owned property raised by the plaintiffs’ allegations.
...
Courts have applied this subsection to actions having a
direct impact on the ability of potential homebuyers or
renters to locate in a particular area, and to indirectly
related actions arising from efforts to secure housing.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs here do not allege that
they have been hindered in an effort to acquire a
dwelling, but rather that the County’s conduct toward
certain properties damaged their own property.13

In Halprin v. Prarie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park

Association, the Seventh Circuit discussed §§ 3604(a) and (b):

[the] plaintiffs, however, are complaining not about
being prevented from acquiring property but about being
harassed by other property owners. So it is difficult to
see how they can have been interfered with in the
enjoyment of any right conferred on them by section 3604.
...
Title VII protects the job holder as well as the job
applicant, so an employer who resorts to harassment to
force an employee to quit is engaged in job
discrimination within the meaning of the Act. The Fair
Housing Act contains no hint either in its language or
its legislative history of a concern with anything but
access to housing. . . . Since the focus [of Congress]
was on [minority’s] exclusion, the problem of how they
were treated when they were included, that is, when they
were allowed to own or rent homes in such areas, was not
at the forefront of congressional thinking. That problem
- the problem not of exclusion but of expulsion - would

12
743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984).
13
Id.

12
 become acute only when the law forced unwanted
associations that might provoke efforts at harassment,
and so it would tend not to arise until the Act was
enacted and enforced. There is nothing to suggest that
Congress was trying to solve that future problem, an
endeavor that would have required careful drafting in
order to make sure that quarrels between neighbors did
not become a routine basis for federal litigation.14

The Fourth Circuit, in Jersey Heights Neighborhood Association

v. Glendening, similarly held that there was no claim under §

3604(a) for the government’s decision to locate a highway near a

neighborhood because the claim of the plaintiffs, as current

residents, “is too remotely related to the housing interests that

are protected by the Fair Housing Act.”15 The Third Circuit came

to the same conclusion in Tenafly Erv Association v. Borough of

Tenafly, where it held that the Orthodox Jewish plaintiffs, who

challenged the City’s removal of religious objects from utility

poles, had not stated a § 3604(a) claim because they were current

homeowners and the removal only made their residency less

desirable, not “unavailable.”16 Along the same lines, the D.C.

Circuit has held that “[b]y their plain terms [§ 3604(a),(f)(1)]

reach only discrimination that adversely affects the availability

of housing” rather than the “habitability.”17

14
388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
15
174 F.3d 180, 192 (4th Cir. 1999).
16
309 F.3d 144, 157 n.13 (3d Cir. 2002).

17
Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 719
(D.C. Cir. 1991).

13
 These cases buttress our conclusion that the simple language

of § 3604(a) does not apply to current homeowners whose complaint

is that the value or “habitability” of their houses has decreased

because such a complaint is not about “availability.” The

discriminatory practice alleged here against current homeowners is

quite unlike the discriminatory practices in other cases - for

example, “racial steering,” locking out owners of one race but not

another, mortgage redlining, insurance redlining, exclusionary

zoning - where the availability of housing for prospective owners

or tenants is implicated.18

18
Evans v. Tubbs, 657 F.2d 661, 663 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) (erecting gate
across the only access road to properties and giving gate keys only to white
owners made properties “unavailable” under § 3604(a)); United States v. Mitchell,
580 F.2d 789, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1978) (steering black to one section of large
housing complex and indicating that no other vacancies were available violated
§ 3604(a)); Southend Neighborhood, 743 F.2d at 1209 (emphasis added), citing
Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982) (discriminatory rental
decisions); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981)
(rejection of public and low-income housing and adoption of restrictive land use
ordinances); Marable v. H. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981), appeal
after remand, 704 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1983) (unequal application of rental
criteria by landlord); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1978)
(racial steering); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.
1974) (adoption of restrictive zoning law); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
978 F.2d 287, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1992). The non-controlling cases cited by amici
do not contradict this: they either do not deal directly with § 3604(a), see
Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 35 F.3d 361, 364-65 (8th Cir. 2003); DiCenso v.
Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088-
90 (10th Cir. 1993); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 62-66 (N.D. Ohio 1996),
do not address the “availability” issue head-on, see United States v. L&H Land
Corp., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 576, 579-80 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Lane v. Cole, 88 F. Supp.
2d 402, 405-06 (E.D. Pa. 2000), or deal with situations where current owners are
suing because houses have been made unavailable to others, see supra note 11;
Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1979); United
States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of Nat. Ass’n of Realtors, 442 F.
Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977). It is true that insurance redlining (although
generally not mortgage redlining) may injure current owners in their capacity as
current owners, in the unusual circumstance that they apply for insurance after
purchasing a house, but the evil there is still access to homes for new
owners/tenants - that is, the practice of insurance redlining serves to reduce
access to houses to future owners, as it “indirectly relate[s] [to] actions

14
 This is not to say that a current owner has no claim for

attempted and unsuccessful discrimination relating to the initial

sale or rental of the house, an issue we do not decide.19 And it

is not to say that a current owner or renter evicted or

constructively evicted from his house does not have a claim.20 We

hold only that § 3604(a) gives no right of action to current owners

claiming that the value or “habitability”21 of their property has

decreased due to discrimination in the delivery of protective city

services.

Plaintiffs argue that we found, in Hanson v. Veterans

arising from efforts to secure housing.” See Southend Neighborhood, 743 F.2d at
1210. Thus, it is properly within the ambit of § 3604(a). See, e.g., NAACP v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1992).
19
See, e.g., Heights v. Cmty. Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 629 F. Supp.
1232, 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Cmty. Hous. Trust v. Dep’t of Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs, 257 F. Supp. 2d, 208 (D.D.C. 2003); but see Halprin, 388 F.3d
at 329 (denying § 3604(a) claim where plaintiffs “are complaining not about being
prevented from acquiring property but about being harassed by other property
owners” (emphasis added)).

20
See Jersey Height, 174 F.3d at 192 (noting that plaintiffs had not
alleged “that anyone has for discriminatory reasons been evicted from his home
or denied the right to purchase or rent housing” (emphasis added)); Clifton
Terrace Assocs., 929 F.2d at 719-20 (noting that “the denial of certain essential
services relating to a dwelling, such as mortgage financing, sewer hookups,
zoning approval, or basic utilities, might result in the denial of housing” per
§ 3604(a)); but see Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329 (holding that attempted constructive
eviction by orchestrated harassment campaign of neighbors and housing association
was not covered by § 3604(a), and noting that plaintiffs “are complaining not
about being prevented from acquiring property but about being harassed by other
property owners” (emphasis added)).
21
We realize that a § 3604(a) claim for “constructive eviction” would be
a type of “habitability” claim - that the “habitability” has so decreased that
continued residency is not objectively reasonable. We reject only those
“habitability” claims that fall short of constructive eviction, leaving the
question of constructive eviction for another day. See supra note 21 (citing
Clifton Terrace Assocs., 929 F.2d at 719-20 (describing the denial of certain
“essential services” - a type of constructive eviction - as possibly resulting
in a § 3604(a) claim)).

15
Administration,22 that actions falling short of complete denial of

either the right to buy or sell may yet be covered by § 3604(a).

Plaintiffs point to language in Hanson said to suggest as much,23

but it will not bear that load. In Hanson, buyers and sellers

alleged that the Veterans Administration discriminated against them

by under-appraising houses because they were located in a black

neighborhood, appraisals determining the size of the housing loans

that the VA would guarantee. We first concluded that at least one

plaintiff - a man who had been precluded from purchasing a

particular house by virtue of the under-appraising - had standing

to sue under § 3604(a). Consistent with our holding that § 3604(a)

is not available for current owners who claim merely a decrease in

value or habitability, we assessed only the standing of a specific

buyer who had been precluded from acquiring his chosen home. Even

if one focuses on the fact that the court in Hanson allowed current

homeowners to sue, the heart of the case was about unavailability

for buyers - specific sales and purchases were being blocked.

22
800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986).
23
Id. at 1386 (“Courts have consistently given an expansive interpretation
to the Fair Housing Act; to state a claim under the Act, it is enough to show
that race was a consideration and played some role in a real estate
transaction”);

We conclude that section 804(a) [§3604(a)] does address the claim
asserted by appellants. Discriminatory appraisal may effectively
prevent blacks from purchasing or selling a home for its fair market
value. This interferes with the exercise of rights granted by the
Fair Housing Act.

Id.

16
 This reading of the case aligns it with the cases it cited.

In Hanson, we explained that, in United States v. Mitchell,

the district court found that the defendant, which owned
an apartment complex, steered black tenants to a
particular section of the complex and that this
effectively denied the black tenants access to equal
housing opportunities. We affirmed the conclusion of the
district court that these acts by the defendant made
unavailable or denied “a dwelling to any person because
of race.” We held that “steering evidences an intent to
influence the choice of the renter on an impermissible
racial basis. The government need only establish that
race was a consideration and played some role in the real
estate transaction.24

Hanson also cited Moore v. Townsend,25 where the Seventh Circuit

dealt with defendants who had refused to negotiate with plaintiffs

because plaintiffs were black and had thereby prevented the

plaintiffs from acquiring the home. The court affirmed the

district court’s award of specific performance to the plaintiffs,

noting that “[r]ace is an impermissible consideration in a real

estate transaction, and it need only be established that race

played some part in the refusal to deal.”26 This is consistent with

our reading of § 3604(a) because the refusal to deal involved the

acquisition, not value or “habitability,” of housing.

Plaintiffs also argue that the dump has made housing

24
Hanson, 800 F.2d at 1386 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d
789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted)).
25
525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975).
26
Id. at 485 (emphasis added). Although claims were brought under both
§ 3604(a) and § 1982, the court apparently addressed only the latter;
nonetheless, the case is consistent with our holding.

17
“unavailable” because the land underneath the dump is now

unavailable for housing for them or prospective residents. The

court in Jersey Heights, in rejecting the same argument, held that

the government, at most, made “unavailable” a portion of land that

could at some future time become host to homes, a possibility

insufficient to sustain an FHA claim.27 We agree. Although it is

true that the statutory definition of “dwelling” includes “vacant

land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or

location thereon” of residential buildings,28 there is no indication

that the Deepwood site, other than being partially zoned

residential, was offered for sale for the construction of

residential buildings; furthermore, there is no guarantee that

housing would have been constructed on the land, even had the City

stringently enforced its dumping laws. In addition, there is no

indication that other land is not available for housing. And, even

if there were no other land available for housing, it is not clear

that such a fact would be sufficient for a § 3604(a) claim,29 an

issue we need not decide. The “unavailability” of the land

27
Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 192-93 (plaintiffs claimed that the highway
“will serve as the northern boundary to their community, closing off expansion
in that direction and locking African Americans into what is allegedly the only
neighborhood open to them”).
28
42 U.S.C. § 3602(b).

29
See Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 192-93 (holding that § 3604(a) was not
violated even where there was allegedly no land for expansion)

18
underneath the dump does not support the FHA claim.30

Because housing was not made “unavailable” to plaintiffs, the

district court’s rejection of their § 3604(a) claim was proper.

B

Plaintiffs also allege that the City violated § 3604(b) of the

FHA when it failed to prevent dumping at the site. Section 3604(b)

makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the

terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,

or in the provision of services or facilities in connection

therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,

or national origin.”31 They contend that the City discriminated

30
Finally, plaintiffs cite 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a),(d), which interpret part
of § 3604(a), for the proposition that the § 3604(a) “is violated by actions that
impede, restrict[,] discourage, obstruct, or restrict persons’ attempt to sell
or buy housing or treat those persons’ attempt to sell or buy housing differently
because of race of color” (emphasis added). Again, however, plaintiffs have
incorrectly shifted the focus (here, the focus of the regulations) from
preventing restrictions on the buyers’ choice to preventing restrictions on the
buyers’ and sellers’ choice. Section 100.70(a) states that discrimination is
unlawful “in connection with seeking, negotiating for, buying or renting a
dwelling,” not in connection with selling a dwelling. And § 100.70(c) states
specifically that the acts prohibited under subsection (a) “are generally
referred to as unlawful steering practices;” our case does not involve unlawful
steering. Plaintiffs and amici also argue that § 100.70(d)(4), which states that
refusing to provide municipal services or insurance based on race is unlawful,
shows that plaintiffs have a § 3604(a) claim. However, the preface to §
100.70(d)(4) states that “[p]rohibited activities relating to dwellings under
paragraph (b) of this section include, but are not limited to . . . .” Section
100.70(b) states that it is unlawful to discriminate by “engag[ing] in any
conduct relating to the provision of housing or of services and facilities in
connection therewith that otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings to
person.” This language, which parrots the “otherwise make unavailable or deny”
language in § 3604(a), prohibits conduct only insofar as the conduct “denies”
housing or makes it “unavailable” - it does not (and cannot) expand the reach of
the underlying statute. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the other
prohibited activities listed in § 100.70(d)(1)-(3) relate to the sale or rental
of a dwelling, not its continuous use, and the title of § 100.70 is “Other
prohibited sale and rental conduct.” And, as we have shown, the alleged actions
here have not “denied” or made “unavailable” housing to plaintiffs.
31
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

19
against them in the provision of a service32 - the enforcement of

zoning laws - and they attack the district court’s conclusion that

§ 3604(b) “applies only to discrimination in the provision of

services that precludes the sale or rental of housing.”33 Even

assuming that the enforcement of zoning laws alleged here is a

“service,”34 we hold that § 3604(b) is inapplicable here because the

service was not “connected” to the sale or rental of a dwelling as

32
The only other language in § 3604(b) that could possibly apply is that
regarding the “privileges of sale.” It is not clear if plaintiffs argue that
they were denied such privileges (they never use the word “privileges” except in
quoting the statute), and the district court analyzed only the “services” claim.
Amici, however, argue the issue. Generously characterizing plaintiffs’ argument
to include this contention, we find it unavailing for the same reason that the
“services” claim is unavailing: the privileges here are not connected to the
“sale or rental of a dwelling.” Amici argue that “privileges” must include the
privileges of continued occupancy and quiet enjoyment, and they cite Halprin, 388
F.3d at 329, which they argue contains language supporting this position but
rejects “inexplicably” the § 3604(b) claim. But amici never explain why
“privileges” does not pertain only to the “sale or rental of a dwelling;” their
argument, relying solely on the meaning of the word “privileges,” is
unconvincing. And their reliance on Halprin is misplaced. The court in that
case conceded only that, “as a purely semantic matter the statutory language
might be stretched far enough to reach a case of ‘constructive eviction’ . . .”
(emphasis added). As we noted in Part A, supra, and as we note in Part B, infra,
we do not foreclose the possibility of a § 3604(a) or (b) claim as the result of
eviction or constructive eviction, because such actions may make housing
“unavailable” or deny “privileges of sale” or “services.”
33
Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *8.
34
There is some authority that it is such a service. See Southend
Neighborhood, 743 F.2d at 1210 (holding that § 3604(b) “applies to services
generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire protection or
garbage protection”); Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 193 (holding that § 3604(b)
applies to “garbage collection and other services of the kind usually provided
by municipalities” (quoting Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 424
(4th Cir. 1984)). However, there is also authority suggesting that it is not
such a service. See Clifton Terrace Assocs., 929 F.2d at 720 (suggesting that
§ 3604(b) may not apply to municipal services at all, and holding that § 3604(b)
does not apply to the provision of elevator repair services); Southend
Neighborhood, 743 F.2d at 1210 (holding that § 3604(b) does not apply to the
decision where to location a highway); Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 193 (holding
that § 3604(b) does not apply to a county’s failure to clean up, maintain, and
make safe property adjacent to a residential neighborhood). In any event, we do
not decide the issue.

20
the statute requires.

The district court observed that “it is necessary to decide

whether the language ‘in connection with’ refers to the ‘sale or

rental of a dwelling’ or merely the ‘dwelling’ in general.”35 And

as the district court correctly concluded, it is the former. This

reading is grammatically superior and supported by the decisions of

many courts.36 There is more.

Although the FHA is meant to have a broad reach, unmooring the

“services” language from the “sale or rental” language pushes the

FHA into a general anti-discrimination pose, creating rights for

any discriminatory act which impacts property values - say, for

generally inadequate police protection in a certain area. And,

unlike general discrimination prohibitions enforced by § 1983, the

FHA targets private activity, does not require a governmental

policy or custom, and does not require proof of both discriminatory

impact and intent. While sweeping widely, the FHA does so in the

35
Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *7 (quoting § 3604(b)).
36
See, e.g, Clifton Terrace Assocs., 929 F.2d at 720; Halprin v. Prarie
Single Family Homes, 208 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Laramore v. Ill.
Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 2002). To the extent
that some courts hold that general police and fire protection are within the
scope of § 3604(b), one may be able to read their holdings as to the contrary;
however, one can still conceivably connect police and fire protection to the
“sale or rental of a dwelling” (especially rental). See Southend Neighborhood,
743 F.2d at 1210 (holding that § 3604(b) “applies to services generally provided
by governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage protection”);
Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 193 (holding that § 3604(b) applies to “garbage
collection and other services of the kind usually provided by municipalities”
(quoting Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1984));
Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL 2026804, , at *7 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 2004) (unpublished).

21
housing field and remains a housing statute - the focus of

congressional concern. That the corrosive bite of racial

discrimination may soak into all facets of black lives cannot be

gainsaid, but this statute targets only housing. And the

“services” subject to the alleged discrimination must be “in

connection” with the “sale or rental of a dwelling . . . .”37

The claims here do not assert the requisite connection between

the alleged discrimination and the sale or rental of a dwelling -

that is, § 3604(b) does not aid plaintiffs, whose complaint is that

the value or “habitability” of their houses has decreased.

This is not to say that § 3604(b) applies only if the

plaintiff was precluded from finding housing. For example, §

3604(b) may encompass the claim of a current owner or renter for

attempted and unsuccessful discrimination relating to the initial

sale or rental or for actual or constructive eviction. Indeed, in

37
As with 24 C.F.R. § 100.70, see supra note 29, plaintiffs and amici
argue that § 100.65(b), which implements § 3604(b), shows that no such connection
is required. However, the preface to § 100.65(b) states that “[p]rohibited
actions under this section include, but are not limited to . . . .” The section
referenced (section a)) states that it is unlawful to discriminate by “impos[ing]
different terms, conditions, or privileges relating to the sale or rental of a
dwelling or to deny or limit services of facilities in connection with the sale
or rental of a dwelling.” This language, which parrots the language in §
3604(b), prohibits conduct only insofar as the conduct “relat[es] to” or is “in
connection with” the sale or rental of a dwelling.” And the alleged conduct here
does not “relate to” and is not “in connection with” any sale or rental. We
recognize that, while some of the actions prohibited by the regulations - using
different leases or contracts for sale and failing to process an offer or
application - clearly are connected to the “sale or rental of a dwelling,” others
appear not to be - for instance, failing or delaying maintenance or repairs. But
we decline to take such a cramped view of the latter type of actions - even they
can be “connected to” the sale or rental of a dwelling, as when, for instance,
such actions are aimed at evicting or constructively evicting a tenant. See
infra note 38 and accompanying text.

22
Woods Drake v. Lundy, this court held that the latter situation

could sustain a § 3604(b) claim.38 In Woods Drake, a landlord

refused to continue renting to a tenant because the tenant

entertained black guests. The tenant vacated and sued the landlord

under § 3604(b) for imposing a “whites-only” condition on the terms

of his lease, and the court held that he had a claim.39 This was

akin to constructive conviction and was a clear discriminatory

condition of “sale or rental of the dwelling.”

We are persuaded that the alleged service here was not

“connected” to the sale or rental of a dwelling, as the statute

requires. Thus, the district court properly rejected the § 3604(b)

claim.

III

Plaintiffs also appeal the district court’s judgment, after a

bench trial, in favor of the City on the § 1981 and § 1983 claims.

The district court concluded that there was no proof of official

action and, in the alternative, that there was no proof of

discriminatory intent.

The district court’s findings of fact are subject to clearly

erroneous review.40 “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although

38
667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982).
39
667 F.2d at 1201-02.
40
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
. . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon . . . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the

23
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.”41 We construe the evidence in the

light most favorable to upholding the district court’s finding.42

Rule 52(a) does not require the district court to “recite every

piece of evidence supporting its findings” or to “sort through the

testimony of each of [the] witnesses.”43 The rule “exacts neither

punctilious detail nor slavish tracing of the claims issue by issue

and witness by witness. . . . It simply require[s] findings that

are explicit and detailed enough to enable us to review them under

the applicable standard.”44

In much of their brief, plaintiffs assert their own version of

the facts. To that extent, their efforts are in vain.45 They also

argue that the district court failed to consider key evidence:

evidence of disparate treatment between black and white

credibility of the witnesses.”); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470
U.S. 564, 573 (1985).

41
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42
Travelhurst, Inc. v. Blandford, 68 F.3d 958, 965 (5th Cir. 1996).
43
Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 F.3d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1993).

44
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (brackets in
original).
45
Schlesinger, 2 F.3d at 139 (footnote omitted):

In essence, the appellants list their own version of the facts and
then complain that the district court violated Rule 52 by ignoring
these “facts.” The district court did not ignore facts. It simply
found facts contrary to the appellants’ liking.

24
communities. That evidence allegedly shows that the City

mishandled illegal dumping in black neighborhoods while more

diligently handling illegal dumping in white neighborhoods, and

that there were other illegal landfills in black neighborhoods, but

not in similar white neighborhoods, that accepted City demolition

debris. We have required that the district court explain or at

least acknowledge such evidence in, for example, Voting Rights Act

cases.46 The City argues that this heightened recitation

requirement is confined to such cases. Plaintiffs point to other

types of cases insisting that the district court address contrary

evidence.47 We need not decide this question because we conclude

that, even if such a requirement exists, the district court

complied with it by properly explaining its conclusion that there

46
See, e.g., Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872
F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that voting rights cases are unique and
require special attention to the record); Houston v. Lafayette County, Miss., 56
F.3d 606, 612 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding clear error in voting rights case and
remanding for more extensive explanation of why certain statistics were
rejected); Teague v. Attala County, 17 F.3d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1994) (“This court
is unable to discharge our appellate function in voting rights cases without more
guidance by the trial court concerning its credibility choices on the welter of
evidence before it.”)

47
See, e.g., Lopez v. Current Director, 807 F.2d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1987)
(noting in discriminatory discharge and treatment case that “[o]nly if the
district court specifies which evidence it adopted and which evidence it rejected
in making its finding can we properly and effectively apply the clearly erroneous
standard”); Ratliff v. Governor’s Highway Safety Program, 791 F.2d 394, 401 (5th
Cir. 1986) (noting in a national origin employment discrimination case that
district court “must at least refer to the evidence tending to prove and disprove
the merits of the proffered explanation and state why the court reached the
conclusion that the explanation has not been discredited. We have, therefore,
routinely reversed a trial court that has failed to set forth sufficient findings
of fact and conclusions of law in actions under Title VII.”); Collins v. Baptist
Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190, 196-97 (5th Cir. 1991) (remanding quid pro
quo claim for further consideration because that claim “was not separately
focused upon” by district court).

25
was no official policy and implicitly discounting the contrary

evidence.

Municipal liability under both48 § 1981 and § 1983 requires

proof of three elements in addition to the underlying claim of a

violation of rights: “a policymaker; an official policy; and a

violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the

policy or custom.”49 The district court found that the City Council

and the Board of Adjustment are policymakers and that the City

Manager and the City Attorney are not policymakers.50

An “official policy” is either a policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, etc., that has been officially adopted by a

policymaker, or a persistent, widespread practice of officials or

employees, which although not authorized by officially adopted and

promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute

a custom that fairly represents the municipality’s policy.51

Plaintiffs allege the latter. “[A]n act performed pursuant to a

‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate

decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the

48
Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 358 (5th Cir. 2001) (extending
the Monnell official action requirement to § 1981 claims).
49
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
50
Cox, 2004 WL 2108253, at *7-*9. The parties agree that the City Council
is a policymaker, but the City argues that the Board of Adjustment is not. We
assume, but do not decide, that the Board of Adjustment is a policymaker.

51
See Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273, 289 (5th Cir.
2002).

26
theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the

force of law.”52 The policymaker must have either actual or

constructive knowledge of the alleged policy.53 Plaintiffs allege

that there were two customs: 1) permitting disposal of City

demolition debris in predominantly black neighborhoods; and 2)

failing to protect black neighborhoods from illegal dumping.

Regarding disposal of debris from City projects, the district

court acknowledged that “[t]he evidence supports the inference that

City demolition debris was dumped at the Deepwood site” and that

various City employees “could have, through the exercise of proper

diligence, known about and stopped the dumping of City demolition

debris.”54 However, the district court found that even if there

existed such a policy, the policymakers had no actual or

constructive knowledge of it. The court was swayed by statements

made at a 1997 City Council meeting, finding that they “belie any

prior knowledge of illegal dumping of City demolition debris at

Deepwood.”55 The court concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that

either policymaker [the City Council or the Board of Adjustment]

had actual or constructive knowledge of this practice [dumping City

52
Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 379, 404
(1997).
53
See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579. (“Actual or constructive knowledge of
a custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an
official to whom that body has delegated policy-making authority.”); Webster v.
City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1984).
54
Cox, 2004 WL 2108253, at *10.
55
Id.

27
debris] at the time it occurred.”56

This finding is not clearly erroneous. The “missing” evidence

of disparate treatment of white and black neighborhoods would not

impact the finding that the policymakers here had no actual or

constructive knowledge that City debris was being dumped illegally

at Deepwood.

As for failing to protect black neighborhoods from dumping,

the district court rehashed attempts by the City to bring Deepwood

back in line, including evidence of citations issued for illegal

dumping, suits against Deepwood’s owner and operator, a judgment

requiring cessation of illegal dumping and cleanup, and the

creation of an Illegal Dumping Team.57 While the district court

observed that “the City’s efforts to stop the illegal dumping at

Deepwood were inconsistent, inadequate, and largely ineffective for

years,”58 it concluded that the City’s actions amounted to

“negligence,”59 not a custom. That conclusion is sound in law and

fact.

Plaintiffs assert that the district court should be reversed

56
Id.

57
Cox, 2004 WL 2108253, at *10-*12.
58
Id. at *11.
59
In discussing the general basis for its rejection of the § 1983 claim
as part of its summary rejection of the § 1981 claim, the court stated:
“Plaintiffs failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
City’s actions were more than negligence and were the result of an intent to
discriminate against them on the basis of race, rather than gross negligence.”).
Id. at *16.

28
for its failure to reference the evidence of disparate treatment

between black and white neighborhoods - that is, the evidence of

other black neighborhoods suffering the same plight and of white

neighborhoods that were better-treated. Such a requirement of

“punctilious detail”60 goes nowhere in this case. The district

court’s recitation of a litany of evidence, and its conclusion that

the City acted negligently, came with full awareness of this

“missing evidence.” Indeed, the court cited it in its denial of

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, implicitly discounting

its value at trial.

IV

The judgments of the district court in favor of the City are

AFFIRMED.

60
Schlesinger, 2 F.3d at 139.

29