In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐1599
LAURA J. HATCHER,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, and
KIMBERLY KEMPF‐LEONARD,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:13‐cv‐00407 — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 14, 2016
____________________
Before ROVNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and SHAH,
District Judge.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Dr. Laura Hatcher was denied ten‐
ure by Southern Illinois University (SIU), and claims that it
was because she is a woman, assisted a student in reporting
Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 15‐1599
an incident of sexual harassment by an SIU faculty member,
and filed a charge against SIU with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. SIU responds that it denied Dr.
Hatcher tenure because she produced insufficient scholar‐
ship. We agree with the district court that Dr. Hatcher did not
produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that SIU
was lying about its reason for denying her tenure. We also
agree that she was not engaging in speech protected under
Title VII or by the First Amendment when she assisted the
student with the sexual harassment report. But because her
complaint stated a plausible claim of retaliation under Title
VII for filing a charge with the EEOC, we reverse and remand
the dismissal of that claim.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2006, SIU hired Dr. Hatcher as a non‐tenured assis‐
tant professor in the political science department of the Col‐
lege of Liberal Arts (COLA). Dr. Hatcher was up for tenure
and promotion to associate professor in September 2011. SIU
denied Dr. Hatcher tenure in March 2012, and shortly after
terminated her contract.
Like at many universities, reviewing candidates for tenure
at SIU involves a multi‐level process. Candidates are evalu‐
ated first by an external review committee, second by the ten‐
ured faculty and chairperson of their respective departments,
third by the COLA promotion and tenure committee consist‐
ing of 10 tenured faculty members across departments, fourth
by the dean of the COLA, and finally by the provost and vice
chancellor of SIU. At each step, the decision‐makers consider
the candidate’s scholarship, teaching, and service.
No. 15‐1599 3
About a year before she was up for tenure, Dr. Hatcher
assisted a graduate student in the political science department
in making a complaint to SIU about a faculty member who the
student claimed was sexually harassing her. Dr. Hatcher tes‐
tified that she believed she was required to help the student
make the report based on Dr. Hatcher’s job description.
Before submitting her tenure dossier, Dr. Hatcher received
positive annual evaluations. The evaluations from her exter‐
nal reviewers, which were made a part of her dossier, all rec‐
ommended her for tenure. In reviewing her tenure dossier,
the political science department voted 4‐2 in favor of promo‐
tion and tenure for Dr. Hatcher. In light of that vote, the de‐
partment chair, Roger Clinton, recommended that Dr.
Hatcher receive tenure and promotion. At the next step of the
process, the COLA committee voted 5‐4 in favor of tenure and
5‐4 against promotion. The chair of the COLA committee
wrote in his letter to the dean of the COLA, Kimberly Kempf‐
Leonard, that the COLA committee recognized Dr. Hatcher’s
success in teaching and service, but was concerned about her
lack of academic publications in prestigious political science
journals. So the COLA committee recommended that Dr.
Hatcher receive tenure, but not promotion.
After receiving the COLA committee’s recommendation,
Dean Kempf‐Leonard made her own independent review. In
November 2011, Dean Kempf‐Leonard sent a letter to the
provost, John Nicklow, in which she wrote that while it was a
difficult decision, Dr. Hatcher “has not demonstrated excel‐
lence in research” and recommended that Dr. Hatcher receive
neither tenure nor promotion. Dean Kempf‐Leonard found
that “Dr. Hatcher has a lack of publications in both high‐pro‐
file venues and a lack of publications in mainstream political
4 No. 15‐1599
science venues.” However, Dean Kempf‐Leonard also noted
that Dr. Hatcher’s work was of high quality. After reviewing
her tenure file, Provost Nicklow also noted Dr. Hatcher’s lack
of peer‐reviewed publications, and recommended against
awarding her both tenure and promotion.
During the same tenure cycle, two male professors in Dr.
Hatcher’s department, Roudy Hildreth and Stephen Bloom,
were also considered for tenure and promotion. The political
science department voted 6‐0 in favor of promotion and ten‐
ure for Dr. Hildreth. Only 3 voted in favor of promotion and
tenure for Dr. Bloom, 1 voted against tenure, and 2 members
abstained. The COLA Committee voted 10‐0 in favor of ten‐
ure and promotion for Dr. Bloom, and 10‐0 in favor of tenure
and 9‐1 in favor of promotion for Dr. Hildreth. Dean Kempf‐
Leonard recommended tenure and promotion for both male
candidates, and the provost and vice chancellor adopted
those recommendations.
In April 2012, Dr. Hatcher filed a non‐contractual griev‐
ance with the University’s Judicial Review Board (JRB). The
JRB is limited to procedural review of tenure decisions. It
found that Provost Nicklow did not sufficiently outline the
reasons for denying tenure and promotion to Dr. Hatcher. As
a remedy, it recommended that Dr. Hatcher be awarded pro‐
motion and tenure. In reviewing the grievance proceedings,
Chancellor Rita Cheng agreed that the provost should have
been more specific in his denial, but declined to reverse Dr.
Hatcher’s denial of tenure. Instead, she ordered Provost Nick‐
low to rewrite his denial letter in greater detail, which he did.
Chancellor Cheng issued her final decision denying tenure to
Dr. Hatcher on November 27, 2012.
No. 15‐1599 5
In the meantime, on October 3, 2012, Dr. Hatcher filed a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Oppor‐
tunity Commission, claiming that she was unfairly denied
promotion because of her gender. After the denial became fi‐
nal, in April 2013, Dr. Hatcher filed a lawsuit against SIU,
Chancellor Cheng, and Dean Kempf‐Leonard, claiming dis‐
crimination and retaliation. The district court granted the de‐
fendants’ motion to dismiss Dr. Hatcher’s Title VII retaliation
and First Amendment claims. Her remaining claim of gender
discrimination was dismissed at summary judgment. Dr.
Hatcher now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Dr. Hatcher argues that the district court erred
in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss her Title VII and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 retaliation claims, abused its discretion in
denying her motion to reconsider its dismissal of those claims,
and erred in granting summary judgment for her Title VII
gender discrimination claim. We review the district court’s
dismissal of Dr. Hatcher’s Title VII and § 1983 claims de novo.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983). We review the
denial of Dr. Hatcher’s motion to reconsider under an abuse
of discretion standard. Gonzalez‐Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801,
808 (7th Cir. 2015). We review the district court’s grant of sum‐
mary judgment de novo and construe all the evidence in the
light most favorable to Dr. Hatcher. Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d
979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009).
A. Dismissal of Retaliation Claims
To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must be plausible
rather than merely conceivable or speculative. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
6 No. 15‐1599
556 (2007). The plaintiff must include enough details about
the subject matter of a case to present a story that holds to‐
gether, but the proper question to ask is “could these things
have happened, not did they happen.” Carlson v. CSX Transp.,
Inc. 758 F.3d 819, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Swanson v. Citi‐
bank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010)).
1. Title VII Retaliation Claim for Filing EEOC
Charge Was Sufficiently Pled
To state a claim for Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must
plead that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity and
was subjected to materially adverse actions as a result of that
activity. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 57 (2006). Title VII specifically prohibits retaliation for fil‐
ing a charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a).
Dr. Hatcher argues on appeal that the district court im‐
properly dismissed her Title VII retaliation claims. She says
her complaint makes out two plausible claims of retaliation:
first, that she was denied tenure because she assisted a grad‐
uate student in making a report of sexual harassment, and
second, that she was denied tenure because she filed a charge
of employment discrimination against SIU with the EEOC.
The defendants respond that assisting a graduate student in
making a complaint of sexual harassment is not statutorily
protected activity under Title VII. They further argue that be‐
cause Dr. Hatcher filed her charge with the EEOC long after
Dean Kempf‐Leonard and Provost Nicklow made their rec‐
ommendations to deny her tenure, Dr. Hatcher cannot estab‐
lish causation between a protected activity and a materially
adverse action by SIU. Finally, they claim that the district
court was correct to dismiss the retaliation count because Dr.
Hatcher failed to specifically plead that Chancellor Cheng’s
No. 15‐1599 7
final tenure decision was retaliation for filing a charge at the
EEOC.
While Dr. Hatcher’s complaint mentions in a few places
that she reported sexual harassment internally on behalf of a
student and discussed shortcomings of the sexual harassment
policy, there is no allegation in the complaint itself that the
student was an employee of SIU. That omission is crucial for
Title VII purposes. Under Title VII, an employee must identify
an unlawful employment practice that is prohibited by that
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000r‐3(a). Without this essential infor‐
mation, there is no suggestion in the complaint that in sup‐
porting the student, Dr. Hatcher was opposing unlawful em‐
ployment discrimination, and therefore engaging in a statuto‐
rily protected activity.1 See Roots P’ship v. Lands’ End, 965 F.2d
1411, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding dismissal proper where
complaint fails to allege an essential element of plaintiff’s
claim.). So the district court properly dismissed that claim.
More difficult is the issue of whether Dr. Hatcher properly
pled retaliation on the basis of her own filing of an EEOC
charge. We have held that a plaintiff must specifically identify
the protected activity that she alleges was the source of retal‐
iation. Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc. 758 F.3d 819, 828 (7th Cir.
2014). But the Supreme Court instructed in Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema that Title VII is not subject to a heightened pleading
standard. 534 U.S. 506, 513–15 (2002). Rather, all that is re‐
quired is a short and plain statement showing the pleader is
1 We have not ruled on whether allegations of retaliation against faculty
who support students in bringing sexual harassment claims to university
officials could state a claim for retaliation under Title IX, but Dr. Hatcher
does not make this argument so we do not address it here.
8 No. 15‐1599
entitled to relief. Id. Swierkiewicz survived the Twombly and Iq‐
bal standard of pleading. Luevano v. Wal‐Mart Stores, 722 F.3d
1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404. We
have also noted that requiring pleading of unknown details
before discovery would improperly deny plaintiffs the oppor‐
tunity to prove their claims. EEOC v. Cocentra Health Servs.,
Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2007).
Dr. Hatcher made the following relevant factual allega‐
tions in her complaint: (1) she filed her EEOC charge asserting
discrimination on the basis of gender on October 3, 2012, (2)
during his testimony at the JRB hearing on October 12, 2012,
Provost Nicklow told the panel that Dr. Hatcher had filed a
charge of discrimination, and (3) on November 27, 2012,
Chancellor Cheng declined the JRB’s recommendation to
grant Dr. Hatcher tenure, and instead denied her tenure. After
making these general factual allegations, the complaint con‐
tains a retaliation count which simply states that “by the con‐
duct described above,” SIU retaliated against Dr. Hatcher for
engaging in a statutorily protected activity. To be sure, the
count could have more clearly incorporated the above factual
allegations. But it is hard to conclude that the complaint was
so poorly drafted that SIU did not receive notice of facts which
supported Dr. Hatcher’s claim that SIU retaliated against her,
and “the intent of the liberal notice pleading system is to en‐
sure that claims are determined on their merits rather than
through missteps in pleading.” Id. at 779. And SIU could have
asked for a more definite statement if it truly did not under‐
stand the nature of the allegations against it. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(e).
Dr. Hatcher’s complaint specified a protected activity (fil‐
ing a charge at the EEOC for gender discrimination) and an
No. 15‐1599 9
adverse employment action (denial of tenure). It further pled
that SIU retaliated against her for engaging in a protected ac‐
tivity. The short timing between the filing of the charge and
Chancellor Cheng’s decision, the fact that the Chancellor de‐
clined to act on the JRB’s recommendation, and a lack of other
allegations in the complaint which rule out retaliation as a
cause for the decision, all take Dr. Hatcher’s retaliation claim
from the realm of the possible into the realm of plausible. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. While Chancellor Cheng may very
well have made her decision without any retaliatory motive,
this is precisely the type of factual question which entitles a
plaintiff to discovery. So we find that the district court erred
in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim of Title
VII retaliation, and remand that claim for further proceed‐
ings.
2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Properly Dismissed
Dr. Hatcher next argues that the district court erred in dis‐
missing her claim that SIU retaliated against her for engaging
in protected speech under the First Amendment by speaking
on behalf of a student about sexual harassment. SIU responds
that Dr. Hatcher’s speech was not protected under the First
Amendment because she made it pursuant to her employ‐
ment.
In order for a public employee to make out a claim of First
Amendment retaliation against a government employer, the
employee must first establish that he or she was engaging in
protected speech. “The threshold inquiry is whether the em‐
ployee was speaking as a citizen; only then do we inquire into
the content of the speech.” Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965
(7th Cir. 2007). When a public employee speaks on matters
10 No. 15‐1599
pursuant to employment duties, that speech is not protected
under the First Amendment. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,
422 (2006). This is because “restricting speech that owes its ex‐
istence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities
does not infringe on any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen.” Id. A mere speculative possibil‐
ity that an employee speaks as a citizen is no longer enough
to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. Abcarian v.
McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2010). So Dr. Hatcher
needed to plead specific facts that plausibly suggested her
speech was not made pursuant to her faculty role, but rather
was made in her capacity as a private citizen.
Dr. Hatcher argues she spoke as a citizen because of the
absence of mandatory reporting requirements for her posi‐
tion. But “the listing of a given task in an employee’s written
job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demon‐
strate that conducting the task is within the scope of the em‐
ployee’s professional duties.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25. We
instead take a “practical approach” to determining whether
an employee’s speech is pursuant to her employment. Id.; see
also McCardle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th
Cir. 2013) (“the question of whether speech is ‘pursuant to’ a
public employee’s duties is not answered by mere reference to
the definitions of the speaker’s legal obligations or job de‐
scription”); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.
2006) (employee speech unprotected because it contributed to
formation and execution of an official policy); cf. Morales v.
Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (statements a police of‐
ficer made pursuant to deposition subpoena were not em‐
ployee speech because he was not employed to give deposi‐
tions).
No. 15‐1599 11
Employees’ unsolicited reports of misconduct can be diffi‐
cult to view as part of their employment duties, since their
employers would often prefer that they keep quiet. But we
have rejected the notion that Garcetti applies only to speech
expressly commanded by an employer. Fairley v. Andrews, 578
F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2009). Instead, we have repeatedly held
that an employee’s speech about misconduct affecting an area
within her responsibility is considered pursuant to her em‐
ployment even when she is not strictly required to make it.
See Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding
that while sergeant went “above and beyond” in reporting
misconduct of detectives not under his supervision, it was not
beyond his official duty to ensure security and property of his
unit’s operations); Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1091
(7th Cir. 2008) (agency administrator had a duty to see law
was administered properly, which encompassed duty to bring
alleged wrongdoing within agency to relevant public author‐
ities); McArdle, 705 F.3d at 754 (7th Cir. 2013) (school official
speaking about predecessor and superior’s misconduct was
speech about matters that directly affected her area of respon‐
sibility).
Dr. Hatcher’s complaint first alleges that she was a man‐
dated reporter of sexual harassment. It goes on to allege that
“Hatcher told Kempf‐Leonard that female students subjected
to sexual harassment came to her because she (Hatcher) was
the senior female faculty in the Department.” Based on these
allegations, SIU filed a motion to dismiss the claim, arguing
that Hatcher essentially admitted that she considered the re‐
port of sexual harassment to Dean Kempf‐Leonard to be part
of her faculty duties. In her response to SIU’s motion to dis‐
miss, Hatcher changed course, asserting for the first time that
she mistakenly believed that she was a mandated reporter at
12 No. 15‐1599
the time she discussed sexual harassment issues with Dean
Kempf‐Leonard, but that Dean Kempf‐Leonard knew that she
was not required to make such a report.
In Heffernan v. City of Paterson, decided after oral argument
in this appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the government
could be liable for demoting an employee based on the em‐
ployer’s mistaken belief that the employee engaged in pro‐
tected political activity. 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419 (2016). Dr.
Hatcher appears to make an inverted argument: SIU knew her
speech was protected, and so it violated her rights, even if at
the time she made the speech, she believed she made it in the
course of her employment duties. But Heffernan does not ap‐
ply here because beliefs about whether Dr. Hatcher was a
mandated reporter do not determine whether her speech is
protected.
Rather, Dr. Hatcher must provide a plausible basis for
speaking as a citizen and not an employee of SIU. Her
amended complaint fails to do this. She nowhere explains
why she felt compelled to report the misconduct apart from
the fact that she was a professor at SIU and she believed it was
her job to do so. Because Dr. Hatcher’s amended complaint
indicates her speech was made pursuant to her faculty role,
and she failed to make any factual allegations indicating oth‐
erwise, Garcetti bars her retaliation claim. Abcarian, 617 F.3d at
938.
Dr. Hatcher also argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying her motion to reconsider the dismissal
of her retaliation claims. She argued in that motion that the
district court should have permitted her to amend her com‐
plaint, rather than dismissing it with prejudice for failure to
state a claim. Fatal to Dr. Hatcher’s motion to reconsider was
No. 15‐1599 13
her failure to explain how an amended complaint would cure
the deficiencies in her original complaint. Gonzalez‐Koeneke,
791 F.3d at 808. Even on appeal, Dr. Hatcher has not explained
how she would plead additional facts that demonstrate that
SIU had any reason to believe she was speaking as a citizen,
and not an employee, when she reported sexual misconduct
and noted shortcomings in the harassment policy. And she
also failed to attach an amended complaint or otherwise clar‐
ify her student’s employment status with SIU for Title VII pur‐
poses. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
B. Summary Judgment Proper for Title VII Gender Dis‐
crimination Claim
Finally, Dr. Hatcher argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to SIU on her Title VII claim of
gender discrimination. A plaintiff can survive summary judg‐
ment on a Title VII gender discrimination claim by providing
either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. Morgan v.
SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2013). Under the direct
method, a plaintiff can provide a convincing mosaic of cir‐
cumstantial evidence that allows a jury to infer intentional
discrimination by a decision‐maker. Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463
F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 2006). Such circumstantial evidence
could include (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements,
or comments directed at other employees in the protected
group, (2) evidence, statistical or otherwise, that similarly sit‐
uated employees outside of the protected group systemati‐
cally received better treatment, or (3) evidence that the em‐
ployer’s stated reason for the differential treatment is unwor‐
thy of belief. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712,
720–21 (7th Cir. 2005). If the plaintiff can “assemble from var‐
ious scraps of circumstantial evidence enough to allow the
14 No. 15‐1599
trier of fact to conclude discrimination occurred, then sum‐
mary judgment for the defendant is not appropriate.” Muham‐
mad v. Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir. 2014).
Under the indirect method, an employee must show that
she is a member of a protected class, she was qualified for ten‐
ure, she was denied tenure, and a similarly situated applicant
outside the protected class was granted tenure. Sun v. Bd. of
Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir. 2007). If a
plaintiff succeeds in establishing these four elements, the bur‐
den shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non‐dis‐
criminatory reason for the adverse employment action. And
if it is able to do so, the plaintiff must then produce evidence
showing that the stated reason is merely pretext for a discrim‐
inatory motive. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). To create a triable issue of pretext, a plaintiff must
present evidence suggesting that her employer is dissem‐
bling. O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th
Cir. 2011). “An inquiry into pretext requires that we evaluate
the honesty of the employer’s explanation, rather than its va‐
lidity or reasonableness.” Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 968
(7th Cir. 2013).
Nothing in Title VII bans outright an employer’s use of
subjective evaluation criteria, and differences in qualifications
between job candidates, on their own, cannot be evidence of
discrimination unless those differences are so favorable to the
plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable per‐
sons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was clearly better
qualified for the position at issue. Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280
F.3d 1169, 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 2002), but see David v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2003) (clarifying that Millbrook
is not controlling when plaintiff offers additional evidence of
No. 15‐1599 15
discrimination). In the academic context, we have held that
scholars are in the best position to make the highly subjective
judgments reviewing scholarship and tenure. Farrell v. Butler
Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Namenwirth v.
Bd. of Regents, 769 F.2d 1235, 1242 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Mere qual‐
ification [for a job] depends on objective measures … but ten‐
ure requires something more; it requires the department be‐
lieve that the candidate have a certain amount of promise.”).
We have noted that
Because so many factors influence the tenure
process and because statistical inferences of dis‐
crimination are difficult to draw when there is
only a small number of observations … it can be
difficult to infer the presence of an invidious in‐
fluence such as the sex of a candidate merely by
comparing successful and unsuccessful tenure
applicants.
Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2012).
But “faculty votes should not be permitted to camouflage dis‐
crimination, even the unconscious discrimination of well‐
meaning and established scholars.” Namenwirth, 769 F.2d at
1243; see also Novak v. Bd. of Trs., 777 F.3d 966, 976 (7th Cir.
2015) (“Congress did not intend that institutions of higher
learning enjoy immunity from the Nation’s anti‐discrimina‐
tion statutes.”).
Dr. Hatcher argues that the evidence in her case is suffi‐
cient under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. The
two methods are somewhat intertwined, because evidence
that an employer’s reasons for denying tenure are unworthy
of belief can serve both as circumstantial evidence under the
16 No. 15‐1599
direct method and as evidence of pretext to rebut a proffered
legitimate motive under the indirect method.
To support both theories, Dr. Hatcher points to the follow‐
ing evidence: (1) the similarity of her publication record to
male colleagues who received tenure, (2) testimony from de‐
partment colleagues that she should have been promoted and
was treated unfairly, (3) an email from the Executive Commit‐
tee Chair of the COLA committee to Dean Kempf‐Leonard
stating that “Bloom and Hatcher were much more close than
the vote, something is going on with the Bloom vote in the
department,” (4) Dr. Hatcher’s contention that Dean Kempf‐
Leonard “cherry‐picked” seemingly negative comments from
external reviewers for Dr. Hatcher’s tenure review, and did
not do the same for her male colleagues, (5) testimony from
Dean Kempf‐Leonard that she ignored Dr. Hatcher’s attempts
to correct factual errors in her denial letter, and (6) the politi‐
cal science department operating paper which recommends
that a tenure candidate’s scholarship should be judged by the
department. Dr. Hatcher argues that these facts point to a tri‐
able issue of the true motivations behind Dean Kempf‐Leon‐
ard’s recommendation against tenure.
The problem with Dr. Hatcher’s argument is that none of
the above evidence points to a lie by Dean Kempf‐Leonard, or
by extension, SIU, about the reason she was denied tenure.
Particularly problematic for her is that Dean Kempf‐Leonard’s
recommendation was based in large part on the findings of
the COLA Committee, which Dr. Hatcher does not appear to
contend were discriminatory. Dr. Hatcher’s tenure vote was
more divided than her comparators, so she cannot argue she
was clearly better qualified for the position at issue. And
while some colleagues expressed frustration and suspicion
No. 15‐1599 17
about Dean Kempf‐Leonard’s decision to recommend against
tenure, none provided testimony that pointed to dissembling
by SIU. Their testimony is the type of subjective disagreement
with a tenure decision that we have found insufficient to sup‐
port a claim of discrimination.
It is possible that the dean and provost were harder on Dr.
Hatcher than on her male colleagues during tenure review,
and some of her colleagues seemed to think that was the case.
It should not be a source of pride for SIU that Dr. Hatcher is
the first woman to be considered for tenure in the political sci‐
ence department in almost 20 years. The subjectivity of the
tenure review process can obscure bias, making it exceedingly
difficult to address entrenched inequalities which not only
have a negative impact on female faculty with tenure aspira‐
tions, but also on the institutions of higher learning that are
deprived of their contributions. However, Title VII only per‐
mits us to go so far in addressing this problem; in order for a
plaintiff to prevail at summary judgment, she cannot simply
show she was treated differently. She must provide evidence
that creates a material dispute over whether the reason her
employer gives for the differential treatment is unworthy of
belief. We see no evidence from which a reasonable jury could
draw that conclusion here. So the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to SIU on the gender discrimi‐
nation claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in
part and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opin‐
ion.