In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐1280
VONZELL WHITE,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, and CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER JOHN
O’DONNELL,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 11‐cv‐7802 — John Z. Lee, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 21, 2016
____________________
Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. From 2008 until 2010, the FBI and
Chicago Police Department conducted a narcotics investiga‐
tion on Chicago’s West Side called “Operation Blue Knight.”
As the operation was wrapping up, defendant Officer John
O’Donnell applied for dozens of arrest warrants, including
one for Vonzell White, the plaintiff in this civil case. Other of‐
ficers had observed White and his brother sell heroin to an
2 No. 15‐1280
informant. The observations were in a more comprehensive
report that O’Donnell used as the basis for his arrest warrant
application. White was arrested, but the charge was dropped.
He then brought this civil lawsuit alleging that Officer O’Don‐
nell’s actions and a City of Chicago policy violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. All of White’s claims are based on the the‐
ory that Officer O’Donnell failed to present the judge who is‐
sued the warrant enough information to establish probable
cause for the arrest.
The district court dismissed the policy claim against the
City on the pleadings and later granted summary judgment
to Officer O’Donnell on the individual claim against him. Al‐
though we agree with White on some important legal points,
in the end we affirm the judgment in favor of the defendants.
Officer O’Donnell’s written application for an arrest warrant,
supported by his oral testimony about the report of the sur‐
veillance of the drug deal, provided probable cause for the ar‐
rest warrant.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Operation Blue Knight
From 2008 until 2010, the FBI and the Chicago Police De‐
partment jointly targeted high narcotics areas on the West
Side of Chicago in “Operation Blue Knight.” Operation Blue
Knight used confidential informants to carry out and record
drug deals. On July 31, 2010, Operation Blue Knight officers
set up surveillance with an informant stationed near a bus
shelter. The officers were targeting Vernon Chapman, who is
plaintiff Vonzell White’s brother. Both Chapman and White
were known to law enforcement as members of the Traveling
Vice Lords gang, a target of the investigation. The officers
No. 15‐1280 3
watched Chapman and White drive up, park, and walk to‐
ward the bus shelter where the informant was waiting. The
officers reported that they watched White and Chapman both
speak with the informant. White testified at his deposition
that Chapman walked thirty feet away from White and spoke
alone with the informant. After the conversation, White and
Chapman drove away from the area and police ended surveil‐
lance. For purposes of reviewing the grant of summary judg‐
ment, we assume the officers did not actually see a hand‐to‐
hand transfer of heroin to the informant.
The informant then called the officers and told them that
he had purchased heroin from White and Chapman. The of‐
ficers met with the informant and retrieved the drugs. The in‐
formant identified White and Chapman in a photo array, and
field tests confirmed that the drugs were heroin. The officers’
observations from the July 31 purchase were summarized in
a Narcotics & Gang Investigations Section Supplementary Re‐
port, called the NAGIS Report, prepared by one of the partic‐
ipating officers.
B. Arrest Warrant
Several months later, in November 2010, Operation Blue
Knight officers prepared to arrest and prosecute numerous
suspects. Chicago Police Officer John O’Donnell, who did not
participate in the July 31 surveillance, was in charge of sub‐
mitting the arrest warrant requests for Operation Blue Knight.
He discussed the matter with the prosecutor and signed a
criminal complaint against White on the basis of the NAGIS
Report. The complaint form, which is used regularly by the
Chicago Police Department, contained spaces for personal de‐
tails and a brief description of the alleged offense. The com‐
plaint against White alleged in relevant part that “Vonzell
4 No. 15‐1280
White … committed the offense of Delivery of a Controlled
Substance in that he/she Knowingly and Unlawfully deliv‐
ered … a substance containing a controlled substance to wit:
3.0 grams of heroin.” The complaint gave the date and street
address of the charged delivery but contained no additional
factual details about White’s alleged drug deal or the basis for
the accusation.
On November 16, Officer O’Donnell and the prosecutor
appeared before a state court judge to seek an arrest warrant
for several Operation Blue Knight suspects, including White.
Officer O’Donnell presented the criminal complaint and testi‐
fied under oath about White’s actions as detailed in the
NAGIS Report. The judge issued a warrant to arrest White.
To support his claim that Officer O’Donnell failed to pro‐
vide the state court with sufficient information to establish
probable cause to arrest him, White emphasizes that Officer
O’Donnell and the prosecutor could not remember at their
depositions in this federal civil case exactly what Officer
O’Donnell told the judge about White’s participation in the
drug deal. Nevertheless, Officer O’Donnell specifically testi‐
fied: “On November 10, 2010, I signed a criminal complaint
against Vonzell White for delivery of a controlled substance
based on the 7/31/10 NAGIS report documenting that Vernon
Chapman and Vonzell White delivered a controlled substance
to the C/I in a covert narcotics purchase on July 31, 2010.” He
added that the “NAGIS report identifies Vonzell White, a/k/a
‘Zebo’ and Vernon Chapman a/k/a ‘C‐Dog’ as affiliated with
the Traveling Vice Lords and lists both Chapman and White
as the offenders who delivered heroin to the C/I on July 31,
2010, in the covert narcotics purchase. Based on my experi‐
ence and understanding of the incident, I believed the
No. 15‐1280 5
7/31/2010 NAGIS report set forth sufficient probable cause to
secure the arrest of Vonzell White for delivery of a controlled
substance.” The NAGIS report’s account of the controlled buy,
if believed, provided sufficient information to find probable
cause to arrest White.
C. Dismissal of Criminal Case and Filing of Civil Suit
White was arrested on November 17, 2010. He remained
in custody until January 5, 2011. On July 21, 2011, prosecutors
dismissed the charges against him, apparently because the in‐
formant was not available to testify against him.
White then filed this civil suit against both Officer O’Don‐
nell and the City of Chicago alleging that he was arrested in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and was
prosecuted maliciously under state law. White contends that
Officer O’Donnell knowingly sought an arrest warrant with‐
out probable cause. White argues that the sparse description
of the offense on the standard complaint form failed to pro‐
vide the state court judge with sufficient information to find
probable cause for the arrest. White also alleges a Monell claim
against the city for the allegedly widespread practice of seek‐
ing arrest warrants on the basis of the conclusory complaint
forms. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978) (rejecting respondeat supe‐
rior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but allowing claims
against local governments for official policies or customs that
violate federal rights).
The district court granted the city’s motion to dismiss the
Monell claim for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that the complaint
did not allege a sufficient factual basis to believe the alleged
6 No. 15‐1280
practice was actually so widespread as to support a Monell
claim. Defendants later moved for summary judgment on the
remaining claims. The district court granted summary judg‐
ment for Officer O’Donnell on the federal claim for false ar‐
rest, finding that he was entitled to qualified immunity, and
the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law malicious prosecution claim. White has ap‐
pealed.
II. Fourth Amendment Claim Against Officer O’Donnell
We first consider summary judgment on the Fourth
Amendment claim against Officer O’Donnell as an individ‐
ual. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2014).
We review the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable
to the non‐moving party—here, plaintiff White. Id. We give
him the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence,
id., citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986),
but not speculative inferences in his favor, see Tubergen v. St.
Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Center, Inc., 517 F.3d 470, 473 (7th
Cir. 2008), quoting McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d
992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate
when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the mov‐
ing parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); see also Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.
2012). The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier
of fact could find in favor of the non‐moving party on the ev‐
idence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion
for summary judgment. See Sweat v. Peabody Coal Co., 94 F.3d
301, 304 (7th Cir. 1996).
White asserts that he was arrested based on an invalid
warrant because Officer O’Donnell failed to present sufficient
No. 15‐1280 7
information to allow the state court judge to evaluate prob‐
able cause for arrest. White argues that the bare‐bones crimi‐
nal complaint could not establish probable cause and that the
insufficiency was not cured by Officer O’Donnell’s testimony
because he could not recall his testimony more specifically.
Defendants respond that Officer O’Donnell’s affidavit and
deposition testimony establish that he gave sworn oral testi‐
mony about the NAGIS Report. Both sides agree that the
NAGIS report contains information sufficient to establish
probable cause for White’s arrest. White argues that because
O’Donnell’s testimony to the state court judge was not rec‐
orded, there is a genuine issue of material fact about just what
he said and thus whether the warrant was issued on the basis
of probable cause.1
When a plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a facially valid
warrant, the plaintiff may prevail on a false arrest claim only
if a reasonable officer should have known that the infor‐
mation provided to the judge was insufficient to establish
probable cause. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 441–42 (7th
Cir. 2013). To succeed on this claim, the plaintiff must demon‐
strate that the officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reck‐
less disregard for the truth sought a warrant on the basis of
legally insufficient information. Beauchamp v. City of No‐
blesville, 320 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2003). Of course, the plain‐
tiff may not succeed if the officer did in fact present sufficient
1 While White disputes some of the facts contained in the NAGIS Re‐
port, this dispute is immaterial since he does not claim that Officer O’Don‐
nell actually lacked probable cause to seek an arrest warrant.
8 No. 15‐1280
evidence to “support the independent judgment of a disinter‐
ested magistrate.” Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Peniten‐
tiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 (1971); Williamson, 714 F.3d at 442.
This is not a case where an officer sought an arrest warrant
solely on the basis of a bare‐bones complaint. In fact, we agree
with White that the complaint in this case would be insuffi‐
cient by itself under Whiteley because it lacks any factual in‐
formation about the alleged offense or the basis for the accu‐
sation that would allow the judge to make an independent
judgment about probable cause. See Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568.
The Fifth Circuit addressed a similar situation in Spencer v.
Staton, 489 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2007), where a Mr. and Mrs. Spen‐
cer and one Zinnerman were suspected of being involved
with murders in a botched robbery attempt. Id. at 660–61. De‐
tectives went to the house where all three were staying and
discovered that they had left. Id. at 661. Fearing that they were
attempting to flee, the detectives obtained arrest warrants for
Mr. and Mrs. Spencer and Zinnerman, and they charged Mr.
Spencer and Zinnerman with armed robbery and first‐degree
murder. Id. Mrs. Spencer was charged as an accessory after
the fact. Id. She was acquitted of the accessory charge through
a plea deal involving her husband. Id. at 661. She then brought
a civil suit alleging that the arrest warrant application submit‐
ted by the detectives was facially invalid and unsupported by
probable cause to arrest her. Id.
The district court had granted summary judgment for the
detectives on the basis of qualified immunity, but the Fifth
Circuit reversed: “After reciting Spencer’s biographical and
contact information, the affidavit states nothing more than the
charged offense, accompanied by a conclusory statement that
No. 15‐1280 9
Spencer assisted her husband and Zinnerman in evading Lou‐
isiana authorities. It does not supply the factual basis for
probable cause necessary for issuance of an arrest warrant.”
Id. at 661–62. The lead detective sought to cure this problem
by asserting that he supplemented the affidavit with oral tes‐
timony “based on his personal knowledge and investigation
such that—in the aggregate—the information conveyed to the
judge” supported probable cause for Spencer’s arrest. Id. at
662. There was “significant uncertainty” in the record “con‐
cerning what oral testimony” the detective provided to the
judge and when. Id. at 662. The court concluded that the war‐
rant application to the issuing judge was “a textbook example
of a facially invalid, ‘barebones’ affidavit.” Id. at 661. The court
also noted that the detective did not allege that his statements
to the judge were made under oath. Id. at 663.
We do not disagree with the analysis or result in Spencer,
but there are two key differences here. The undisputed facts
here show that Officer O’Donnell did not seek the arrest war‐
rant on the complaint alone or on the basis of unsworn oral
assertions to the judge. Instead, Officer O’Donnell’s uncontro‐
verted deposition testimony establishes that he gave a state‐
ment under oath about White “being a named offender in a
narcotics transaction” based on the contents of the NAGIS Re‐
port, which gave detailed and specific grounds for probable
cause that White had been part of an illegal heroin deal. White
contends that there is no evidence “about the actual words
spoken by O’Donnell,” but we see no basis for finding a gen‐
uine issue of material fact simply because the testifying officer
cannot recount the precise words he spoke to the judge under
oath. A police officer seeking a warrant can rely on infor‐
mation from other officers. See United States v. Williams, 627
10 No. 15‐1280
F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The collective knowledge doc‐
trine permits an officer to … arrest a suspect at the direction
of another officer or police agency, even if the officer himself
does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the
necessary level of suspicion to permit the given action.”). It is
undisputed that the NAGIS Report detailed the surveillance
of the drug transaction involving White and that Officer
O’Donnell testified on the basis of that report. His deposition
testimony establishes that he presented sufficient evidence to
the judge to establish probable cause. White has offered no
evidence presenting a genuine issue of material fact.
In his reply brief, White argues that the “procedure” of
seeking arrest warrants on the basis of sworn oral testimony
“may result in distorted subsequent testimony as to what in‐
formation was presented orally”—though White is careful to
note that he does not challenge the constitutionality of the
practice. A written affidavit or recorded testimony would of
course make it easier for an officer to establish the sufficiency
of the evidence presented to a warrant‐issuing judge. But
White cites only authorities dealing with applications for
search warrants, not arrest warrants. See, e.g., United States v.
Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Un‐
like an arrest warrant, which describes a person with particu‐
larity when that person is identified, a search warrant requires
a “particular description of the things to be seized” and the
scope of the location to be searched. Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). The practi‐
cal concerns about establishing the evidentiary basis for par‐
ticularized descriptions for a search warrant are not as signif‐
icant for arrest warrants, where the officer must show only
probable cause for a person’s arrest. While the district court
No. 15‐1280 11
granted summary judgment for Officer O’Donnell on the ba‐
sis of qualified immunity, we conclude that he is entitled to
summary judgment on the merits of the Fourth Amendment
claim against him. The undisputed facts in the summary judg‐
ment record show that he provided the state court judge with
a sufficient factual basis to support the arrest warrant.
III. The Monell Claim of Unconstitutional Practice
The district court dismissed White’s Monell claim on the
pleadings. White v. City of Chicago, 2014 WL 958714 at *2–3
(N.D. Ill. 2014). The court held that White failed to state a Mo‐
nell claim because his claim was “based upon the sole allega‐
tion that O’Donnell acted in accordance with a widespread
practice of the police department of the City of Chicago when
seeking a warrant.” Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted). This,
the court said, was not enough to allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the City maintained a policy, cus‐
tom, or practice that deprived him of his constitutional rights.
Id. This was an error, but a harmless one.
The Supreme Court held in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164
(1993), that federal courts may not apply a “‘heightened
pleading standard’—more stringent than the usual pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce‐
dure—in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under
… 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” The Court emphasized that “Rule 8(a)(2)
requires that a complaint include only a ‘short and plain state‐
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re‐
lief.’” Id. at 168; see also Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d
743, 748, n.3 (7th Cir. 2012). The Leatherman holding has sur‐
vived the Court’s later civil pleading decisions in Iqbal and
Twombly, which require the pleader to allege a “plausible”
12 No. 15‐1280
claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
White alleged in his amended complaint: “In accordance
with a widespread practice of the police department of the
City of Chicago: O’Donnell requested the judge to issue a war‐
rant on the basis of O’Donnell’s conclusory allegation that
other law enforcement officers claimed or believed plaintiff
had committed an offense, and O’Donnell did not present the
judge with an affidavit setting out any affirmative allegation
of facts that would indicate that plaintiff had committed an
offense.” Together with the individual claim against O’Don‐
nell and the standard printed form that does not require spe‐
cific factual support for an application for an arrest warrant,
this allegation was enough to satisfy the “short and plain
statement of the claim” requirement of Rule 8(a)(2). White
was not required to identify every other or even one other in‐
dividual who had been arrested pursuant to a warrant ob‐
tained through the complained‐of process. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152–53 (7th Cir. 1995).
In the end, however, Officer O’Donnell’s sworn testimony
about the NAGIS Report provided sufficient evidence to es‐
tablish probable cause. Probable cause also establishes that
White did not suffer a constitutional injury, which is a neces‐
sary element of a Monell claim. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Since White’s Monell claim fails on other
grounds, the error on the sufficiency of the pleading was
harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.