UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
AZOROH et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Civil Action No. 14-1695
v. )
)
AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. of )
HARTFORD, CT., )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Christopher and Ngozi Azoroh (“Plaintiffs”) own a rental
property located at 133 Longfellow Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. First Am. Compl. (“Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 13 ¶ 1. Plaintiffs
allege that their property was damaged by a windstorm in 2011.
Id. ¶ 15. The Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford
Connecticut (“Hartford” or “Defendant”) insured Plaintiffs’
property. Id. ¶ 8. 1 Hartford denied Plaintiffs’ claim in January
2012 and Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in October 2014 alleging
the denial constituted breach of contract and breach of the
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at ¶¶ 19,
25-33. On February 23, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion for
1Plaintiffs incorrectly refers to Defendant as “Travelers”
throughout their pleadings. Def.’s Answer, ECF No. 14 at 1. The
Court will refer to Defendant as “Hartford.”
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Judgment on the Pleadings, arguing that (a) there is no coverage
obligation because the damages suffered by Plaintiffs were not
caused by a peril insured by the policy; (b) there is no
coverage obligation under the policy because the Plaintiffs
failed to comply with the two-year suit limitation provision;
and (c) there was no breach of any covenant of good faith and
fair dealing because Hartford did not breach any of the
provisions, terms or conditions of the policy. Def.’s Mem.
Supp., ECF No. 15-2 at 1-8. 2 Upon consideration of the Motion,
the response and reply thereto, and for reasons discussed below,
the Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
II. Background
Plaintiffs leased apartments on three floors of their property
under the “Section 8” program, which is supervised by the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and
the District of Columbia Housing Authority (“DCHA”). Id. ¶ 12.
Pursuant to the HUD/DCHA requirements, Plaintiffs’ property was
inspected by the government in June 2011 and received a passing
grade. Id. ¶ 14.
2 In May 2015, the parties agreed to the appointment of a
mediator to assist in settlement discussions. See May 27, 2015
Minute Order. On September 30, 2015, the parties informed the
Court that settlement was unlikely and that the parties agreed
the Court should rule on Defendant’s pending Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. Parties’ Status Report, ECF No. 32.
2
On September 8, 2011, a windstorm moved through the D.C. area.
Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs immediately submitted a claim to Hartford,
reporting damage to their property that they believed was caused
by the storm. Id. Defendant’s claims’ adjuster Deanna Carroll
(“Ms. Carroll”) concluded that the “significant water and mold
damage on all three levels of [Plaintiffs’] rental property” was
the result of “wear and tear” and “splits in the roof membrane
that occurred over a period of time.” Id. ¶ 20. Ms. Carrol
denied Plaintiffs’ claim as excluded under Section 1 of the
policy, which states:
Windstorm or hail. This peril does not include
loss to the inside of a building or the
property contained in a building caused by
rain, snow, sand or dust unless the direct
force of wind or hail damages the building,
causing an opening in a roof or wall and the
rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through
this opening.
Id. (citing Hartford denial letter, dated January 4, 2012)
(emphasis added).
In June 2014, Plaintiffs hired an engineer to complete an
inspection of the damaged property. Id. ¶ 16. The engineer
concluded that the damage to the roof and roof sheathing “was
most likely caused by a pointed instrument being pushed up
against the sheathing from the interior.” Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs
allege that “no indication or evidence exist[s], which indicates
that the said actions of this unknown third-party person were
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done for purposes of vandalism or mischief, nor can Defendant []
prove or show any such malicious intent by said unknown third-
party.” Id. ¶ 18.
III. Standard of Review
a. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
A Rule 12(c) motion is “functionally equivalent” to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and governed by the same standard.
Rollins v. Wachenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir.
2012). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). While detailed factual allegations are not
necessary, plaintiff must plead enough facts “to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
“The court is limited to considering acts alleged in the
complaint, and documents attached to or incorporated by
reference in the complaint, matters of which the court may take
judicial notice, and matters of public record.” Maniaci v.
Georgetown Univ., 510 F. Supp. 2d 50, 59 (D.D.C. 2007). The
Court must construe the complaint liberally in plaintiff's favor
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and grant plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences
deriving from the complaint. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16
F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). However, the Court must not
accept plaintiff's inferences that are “unsupported by the facts
set out in the complaint.” Id. “Nor must the court accept legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Id.
“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).
IV. Analysis
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed
due to Plaintiffs’ failure to file this action within two years
from the date of loss, as required under the plain language of
Plaintiffs’ insurance policy. Def.’s Mem. Supp. at 4. Plaintiffs
maintain that application of the discovery rule means that the
statute of limitations on their claim would not begin to run
until June 23, 2014. Pl.’s Mem. Opp., ECF No. 18 at 8.
Section I of Plaintiffs’ insurance policy states:
7. Suit Against Us. No action can be brought
against us unless there has been full
compliance with all of the terms under Section
I of this policy and the action is started
within two years after the date of loss.
Def.’s Mem. Supp. at 3 (emphasis added).
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Unambiguous suit limitation provisions included in
insurance policies are consistently enforced. Martinez v.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 2d 52, 61 (D.D.C. 2006)
(upholding a two-year limitations period found in the insurance
policy, noting that “[c]ontractual provisions limiting the
period within which insurance policy-holders may validly
initiate a lawsuit are generally enforceable under District of
Columbia law.”); Kron v. Young & Simon, Inc., 265 A.2d 293, 294-
95 (D.C. 1970) (upholding a one-year limitations period found
within an insurance policy).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they filed this action three
years after the date of loss. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.
As such, Plaintiffs filed suit one year after the two-year
policy limitation expired. As such, the terms of the policy bar
this action because Plaintiffs’ complaint was not timely filed.
The language of policy limitation is unambiguous, and Plaintiffs
do not argue otherwise. Rather, Plaintiffs’ argument against
dismissal centers on application of the discovery rule in an
attempt to circumvent the clear and unambiguous language of the
insurance policy. Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n at 2-4.
The discovery rule is generally applied to toll a statute of
limitations when the relationship between the injury and the
wrongful conduct is obscure and there is a need to protect the
interests of the injured party. Doe v. Medlantic Health Care
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Group, Inc., 814 A.2d 939, 945 (D.C. 2003); see also Moore v.
Dist. of Columbia, 445 Fed. Appx. 365, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“Under the discovery rule, a limitations period does not run
until the injured party ‘knows, or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence would have known, of some injury, its
cause-in-fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing.’”) (citations
omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that under the discovery rule, the two-year
contractual limitation to bring their claim “did not begin to
run until June 24, 2014, with that being when the Plaintiffs
could finally afford to pay for, then obtain, an in-depth
investigative report from their own privately retained
engineering exert . . .” Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n. at 3. Plaintiffs’
argument fails for at least two reasons. 3
First, although the District of Columbia has yet to explicitly
rule on whether the discovery rule applies to contractual
limitations provisions, other courts have held that the
discovery rule does not apply to unambiguous contractual
limitations provisions that clearly identify the time from which
3 Plaintiffs’ assertion that consideration of when they were able
to afford an independent inspection of their property should
extend the suit limitation included in their insurance policy is
rejected as baseless. Martinez v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 429 F.
Supp. 2d 52, 60 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The purpose of contractual
limitations provisions is to prevent the insured from engaging
in unreasonable delay in proceeding to enforce or pursue the
claim so that insurers may otherwise be protected.”)
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the limitations period begins to run. See Osmic v. Nationwide
Agribusiness In. Co., 841 N.W. 2d 853, 859 n.1 (Iowa 2014)
(denying application of the discovery rule and stating that an
“insurance company has the ability . . . to clearly articulate
the applicable limitations period for claims . . . and the event
upon which the limitations period begins to run.”); United
Techs. Auto. Sys. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 725 N.E.2d 871, 875
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (declining to adopt a discovery rule in
insurance coverage cases); Caln Village Assocs., L.P. v. Home
Indem. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 404, 413 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (denying
application of the discovery rule where insurance policy
contained an unambiguous two-year suit limitation). Plaintiff
cites no legal authority for the proposition that the discovery
rule should apply when a contractual limitation period is plain
and unambiguous. 4
Second, even if the discovery rule could be applied to this
case, the engineer’s report obtained by Plaintiffs does nothing
to show that Hartford wrongfully denied their claim. In fact,
Plaintiffs’ engineering expert supports Hartford’s claim denial.
4 Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to explain why, even if the discovery
rule could be applied to contractual limitation cases, it should
be applied to this case where the facts indicate that the
alleged injury was not hidden or obscure. Indeed, Plaintiffs
submitted their claim for damage immediately after the storm.
Am. Comp. ¶¶ 6-7. Thus, there is no basis for application of the
discovery rule, even if it were permitted in contractual
limitation cases.
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Plaintiffs do not dispute that their insurance policy only
covers storm damage where the “direct force of wind or hail
damages the building . . .” Am. Compl. ¶ 20. Ms. Carroll
concluded that the damage to Plaintiffs property was from “wear
and tear.” Id. Plaintiffs’ engineer concluded that the damage to
the roof sheathing and roofing “was most likely caused by a
pointed instrument being pushed up against the sheathing from
the interior.” Id. ¶ 17. Thus, even if Plaintiffs’ action was
not barred by the two-year limitation period included in the
insurance policy, Plaintiffs own complaint demonstrates that
Hartford properly denied Plaintiffs’ claim for coverage because
the relevant portion of the policy at issue only covers storm
damage that is caused by “direct force of wind or hail.” Id. ¶
20. Plaintiff does not allege any facts that their property was
damaged as a direct result of the September 2011 storm. As such,
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for breach of contract
or breach of any implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 5
5 Plaintiffs’ only allegation against Hartford in regard to its
alleged breach of good faith and fair dealing is that Defendant
did not have “a reasonable basis for denying prompt and
immediate payment of full benefits and compensation under the
parties’ contract of insurance.” Am. Compl. ¶ 30. As discussed
above, Hartford’s denial of Plaintiffs’ claim was reasonable
under the parties’ contract because, as affirmed by Plaintiffs’
own engineering expert, there was no evidence that the damage to
Plaintiffs’ property was directly caused by the windstorm as
required under the policy. Id. ¶ 17, 20.
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V. Conclusion
Because Plaintiffs failed to bring this action within the two-
year limitation period included in the contract insuring their
rental property, their claims are time-barred. In the
alternative, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim. For these
reasons, Hartford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is
GRANTED and this lawsuit is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
August 4, 2016
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