This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0068
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Peter James Trumble,
Appellant.
Filed August 15, 2016
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-12-23407
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s revocation of his probation and execution
of a previously stayed 42-month sentence for first-degree driving while impaired (DWI).
He argues that the state failed to prove that he violated a condition of probation. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Peter James Trumble pleaded guilty to first-degree DWI in October 2012.
The district court stayed execution of a 42-month sentence and placed Trumble on
probation for five years with several conditions. When reciting the conditions of probation,
the court stated: “You are ordered not to consume any alcohol or any drugs unless
prescribed. If there’s a positive test or refusal to submit to testing, then you would be
required to complete a chemical health assessment and follow any recommendations for
treatment or care recommended by probation.” Trumble and the court signed a sentencing
order stating that the conditions of probation included “[d]o not use any alcohol or illegal
or non-prescribed mood-altering drugs; testing as Probation determines” and “[i]f there is
a positive test or a refusal to submit to testing, then, at a minimum, complete a chemical
health assessment and follow all recommendations as directed by Probation.” The court
also signed a warrant of commitment stating that the conditions of probation included “[n]o
alcohol/controlled substance use.”
The corrections department filed a probation-violation report in June 2013, asserting
among other violations that Trumble violated conditions of probation by consuming
alcohol. Trumble admitted that he violated a condition of probation by consuming alcohol,
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and the court ordered him to complete chemical-dependency treatment and continue on
probation. During a review hearing, Trumble admitted that he left treatment before its
completion and agreed to submit to urinalysis. The court placed him at the workhouse or
on other monitoring as available pending a chemical-health assessment and the next review
hearing. During the following review hearing, the district court ordered Trumble to
complete a new chemical-dependency-treatment program.
The corrections department filed a second probation-violation report in February
2014, asserting that Trumble violated conditions of probation by failing to complete
chemical-dependency treatment and abstain from consuming alcohol. Trumble’s probation
officer claimed that Trumble had “submitted positive/diluted urine samples” 13 times since
the previous review hearing. During a failed attempt to resolve the violation without a
contested probation-violation hearing, Trumble admitted that he “provided a number of
UAs that were diluted” and stated “I guess in the eyes of the court and the law, it’s
positive.” Trumble admitted during a subsequent hearing that he violated conditions of
probation “by failing to complete [his] treatment program,” “us[ing] alcohol while . . . on
probation,” and “provid[ing] either positive or diluted urine samples [on] a number of
dates.” Trumble’s probation officer then mentioned that he “did talk to [Trumble] about
the dilute UAs . . . several times and about . . . what a diluted UA is.” The district court
ordered Trumble to serve one year on electronic-home monitoring and to continue on
probation.
The corrections department filed a third probation-violation report in June 2015,
asserting that Trumble violated a condition of probation by “[p]rovid[ing] [p]ositive [d]rug
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[s]creens” through “diluted drug tests” nine times. The corrections department filed an
amended report pending a contested probation-violation hearing, asserting that Trumble
was continuing to “[p]rovide[] [p]ositive [d]rug [s]creens” by “submit[ing] diluted drug
tests” and that he submitted one test that “was positive for alcohol.”
During the contested probation-violation hearing in October 2015, the district court
received a report indicating that Trumble had one positive test in August 2015 and 15 drug-
test results of “POSSIBLE DILUTE” due to low creatinine levels between February and
August 2015. Trumble’s probation officer testified that Trumble was “continu[ing] to
submit diluted urine specimens” and had “a positive drug test for alcohol” in August 2015.
The probation officer testified that a test result of “possible dilution” is “consider[ed] . . . a
positive specimen” because the result indicates a “low creatinine level,” which “means . . .
that someone is trying to flush their system, and by drinking a large amount of liquids . . .
my understanding is it’s harder for technology to detect if there’s any drugs in the system.”
A supervisor of the drug-testing and drug-court unit of the corrections department testified
that creatinine is “a naturally occurring substance in human urine, and if it is below the
level that’s the standard testing level . . . then it would be considered positive for possible
diluted sample.” The supervisor testified that a test result of “possible dilute” is
“consider[ed] . . . a positive sample” because the sample is “invalid . . . and by not
submitting a valid sample it would be considered positive.” The supervisor acknowledged
that a medical condition may “contribute to this type of sample being provided” but stated
that “we leave that up to the individual to bring . . . his medical proof or medical condition
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. . . to the probation officer” and that, “as far as [he] kn[e]w,” Trumble “never provided
any medical information.”
The district court stated that “given the history in this case I think it is a reasonable
conclusion to draw that [Trumble’s urine samples showing results of possible dilute were]
diluted given the prior violations in this case” and that “the numerous instances . . . of
possible dilutions are sufficient to show a pattern of possible dilutions that makes me
believe that it was actual dilution.” The court found that Trumble “violated the term of his
probation that requires him to abstain from the use of alcohol and drugs and that especially
because it involves dilution, that it was intentional and not excusable and repeated in the
past.” The court further found “that the policies favoring probation give way to the need
for confinement,” reasoning, “I do view dilution of samples as in effect a fraud on the court.
And so a person who does that is really not amenable to probation because there’s no trust
between the probation officer and the probationer as well as the court . . . .” The court
executed Trumble’s prison sentence. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Trumble argues on appeal that “[t]he district court did not impose a drug testing
condition on [him]” and that the prosecutor and his probation officer simply “assume[d
that he was] subject to such a condition.” Alternatively, Trumble argues that “the district
court never imposed any condition related to the dilution of urine samples nor was [he]
ever informed by the court that his probation could be revoked based on ‘diluted’ drug test
results,” and therefore his submission of diluted samples was not a probation violation.
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The state has the burden of proving a probation violation by clear and convincing
evidence. State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2008). “[B]efore revoking
probation, the court must: ‘1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were
violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that [the]
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.’” State v. Finch, 865
N.W.2d 696, 704-05 (Minn. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Austin, 295
N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980)). “A district court has ‘broad discretion in determining if
there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a
clear abuse of that discretion.’” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005)
(quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50). “Inherent in [an appellate court’s] consideration
of the specific condition designated as having been violated is the question of whether the
condition was actually imposed as a condition of probation.” State v. Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d
74, 79 (Minn. 2004).
A district court pronouncing a sentence must “[s]tate precisely the terms of the
sentence.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(A). If the court stays execution of the sentence
and “lawful conduct could violate the defendant’s terms of probation, the court must tell
the defendant what that conduct is.” Id., subd. 4(E)(3).
It is an essential component of due process that individuals be
given fair warning of those acts which may lead to a loss of
liberty. This is no less true whether the loss of liberty arises
from a criminal conviction or the revocation of probation.
When the acts prohibited by the probation conditions are not
criminal, due process mandates that the petitioner cannot be
subjected to a forfeiture of his liberty for those acts unless he
is given prior fair warning. It follows that before a probation
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violation can occur, the condition alleged to have been violated
must have been a condition actually imposed by the court.
Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d at 80 (quotations and citations omitted).
Trumble’s more general argument—that “[t]he district court did not impose a drug
testing condition on [him]”—is without merit. Trumble and the court signed a sentencing
order that stated that “testing as Probation determines” was a condition of probation. And
during the sentencing hearing the court discussed potential consequences of “a positive test
or refusal to submit to testing.”
Trumble’s principal argument is that the district court did not inform him that
submitting urine samples that were not diluted was a condition of probation, that diluted
samples would be viewed as positive for the presence of a drug or alcohol, or that
submitting diluted samples was a probation violation. Trumble therefore maintains that
submitting diluted samples was not a probation violation. But the court actually found that
Trumble “violated the term of his probation that requires him to abstain from the use of
alcohol and drugs” and based this finding on the diluted samples and Trumble’s history.
Trumble does not dispute that abstaining from consuming alcohol and non-prescribed
drugs was a condition of probation, nor does he assert that he did abstain from consuming
alcohol and non-prescribed drugs.
Moreover, the corrections department could implement the probation conditions
that Trumble abstain and submit to testing by interpreting a test result of “possible dilute”
as a positive test. “Determining conditions of probation is exclusively a judicial function
that cannot be delegated to executive agencies.” State v. Henderson, 527 N.W.2d 827,
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828-29 (Minn. 1995). However, “some flexibility in the administrative implementation of
probation conditions is desirable and . . . trial judges should not be burdened with
administrative issues relating to the implementation of conditions of probation.” Id. at 829;
see also State v. Bradley, 756 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Minn. App. 2008) (stating that “under
Henderson, administrative implementation of probation conditions is appropriately
delegated to an administrative body” and concluding that court could permit chemical-
health assessor to determine whether appellant needed treatment and appropriate type and
level of treatment); State v. Anderson, 720 N.W.2d 854, 863 (Minn. App. 2006)
(concluding that probation department could compel appellant to sign agreement requiring
him to “remain law abiding, avoid possessing firearms or illegal narcotics, inform his
probation officer before leaving the state, and submit to searches of his residence”), aff’d
on other grounds, 733 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 2007).
The corrections department interprets a diluted urine sample as an invalid and
positive sample due to the unreliability of testing a diluted sample, and dilution is seen as
intentional unless a probationer provides a medical reason for the dilution. The record
reflects that Trumble was well aware of this interpretation. The district court’s failure to
specifically inform Trumble about the consequences of a diluted urine sample did not
preclude the court’s finding that Trumble violated a condition of probation.
Affirmed.
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State of Minnesota v. Peter James Trumble
Combined Opinion