FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 24 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN P. BAKER, No. 15-15446
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01162-PGR-
MEA
v.
THOMAS BELL, Dr.; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Paul G. Rosenblatt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges
Arizona state prisoner John P. Baker appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
judgment); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Baker failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Bell was
deliberately indifferent in treating his various medical issues. See Toguchi, 391
F.3d at 1057-60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health; medical malpractice,
negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not
amount to deliberate indifference).
The district court properly dismissed defendant Wexford because Baker
failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. See
id.; see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se
pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Baker’s motions to
compel discovery because Baker failed to comply with procedural rules and
deadlines. See Jorgansen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting
forth standard of review and noting that “[t]he district court is given broad
discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation, and its decisions regarding
2 15-15446
the preclusive effect of a pretrial order. . . will not be disturbed unless they
evidence a clear abuse of discretion.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) overruled on other
grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Pro se
litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”).
We reject as without merit Baker’s contentions regarding judicial bias.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 15-15446