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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
COREY L. WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 1956 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 3, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000432-2002
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 24, 2016
Corey L. Williams (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered in the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition filed
for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
On June 3, 2003, a jury convicted Appellant of robbery, unlawful restraint,
receiving stolen property, conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a
license.2 On July 9, 2003, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
term of 8½ to 35 years’ incarceration. On April 13, 2004, this Court
affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. On November 29, 2006, our
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1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701, 2902, 3925, 903, and 6106, respectively.
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Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. On
February 27, 2007, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s application for
reconsideration. Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with
the Supreme Court of the United States. Appellant filed his first pro se PCRA
petition in May of 2008. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an
amended PCRA petition in December of 2010. After an evidentiary hearing,
the PCRA court denied Appellant relief on August 10, 2011. On November
27, 2012, this Court affirmed the order that denied Appellant’s first PCRA
petition.
On July 13, 2015, Appellant filed the present PCRA petition. On
August 5, 2015, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent
to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Appellant responded to the notice,
and the PCRA court dismissed the petition on September 3, 2015. On
September 28, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both
Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH
VIOLATED THE ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT?
B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH DID
NOT ADHERE TO STATUTORIAL LAW SET FORTH IN 42
PA.C.S. § 9757, BY NOT REALIZING THAT [APPELLANT’S]
WHOLE SENTENCE WAS THE COMBINATION OF HIS 432-
02 CASE AND HIS 511-02 CASE?
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C. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH DID
NOT USE THE WORDS SET FORTH WITHIN PENNSYLVANIA
LAW IN ITS ORIGINAL USAGE?
D. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] CLAIM THAT THE [TRIAL] COURT FAILED
TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT [APPELLANT’S] AGGREGATED
SENTENCE WOULD BE ONE CONTINUOUS SENTENCE
INSTEAD OF TWO SEPARATE SENTENCES?
E. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED
TO ADHERE TO 42 PA.C.S. §9781(C)(2) OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA STATU[T]E BY NOT CONSIDERING THE
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF [APPELLANT] BY IMPOSING
SUCH AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE?
F. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED
TO FOLLOW STATUTORIAL LAW SET FORTH BY THE
LEGISLATURE WHEN [IT] FOCUSED SOLELY UPON THE
VICTIMS’ STATEMENTS AND NOT THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE CRIME OR [APPELLANT’S] CHARACTER?
G. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH DID
NOT STATE ON THE RECORD AND REASONS FOR THE
LENGTH OF [APPELLANT’S] SENTENCE, NOR WHY IT WAS
SET IN A CONSECUTIVE MANNER?
H. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH
IMPOSED A CLEARLY UNREASONABLE SENTENCE WHICH
IS A VIOLATION OF 41 PA.C.S. § 9781, BY IMPOSING A
SENTENCE THAT WOULD KEEP [APPELLANT] ON PAROLE
UNTIL HE WOULD BE IN HIS SIXTIES?
Appellant’s Brief, Statement of Questions Involved.3
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3
Appellant’s brief is not paginated.
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Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine
whether his PCRA petition was timely. The timeliness of a PCRA petition
implicates the jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal
denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania law makes clear that no
court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Id. To “accord
finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no authority
upon [appellate courts] to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA
timebar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011). With
respect to jurisdiction under the PCRA, this Court has further explained:
The most recent amendments to the PCRA...provide a
PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. A judgment is deemed final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.
Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010)
(citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa.2011);
see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). This Court may review a PCRA petition filed
more than one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final only if the
claim falls within one of the following three statutory exceptions, which the
petitioner must plead and prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim was the result of
interference by government officials with the
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presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, if a petition pleads one of these
exceptions, the petition will not be considered unless it is “filed within 60
days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on February 27,
2007, when his time to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant’s patently untimely PCRA
petition, filed July 13, 2015, fails to allege any of the statutory exceptions to
the PCRA time bar.4
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4
Appellant’s contention that this Court directed the trial court to vacate his
judgment of sentence on this docket is without merit. At 82 MDA 2014, this
Court directed the trial court to vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence at
Docket No. CP-28-CR-0000511-2002 (“No. 511”). Although Appellant’s
present sentence at Docket No. CP-28-CR-0000432-2002 (“No. 432”) was
imposed consecutively to his sentence at No. 511, it was a separate
judgment of sentence imposed on convictions that stemmed from a separate
crime. This Court’s order at 82 MDA 2014 had no bearing on the present
case.
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Because Appellant failed to plead and prove any of the statutory
exceptions to the PCRA time limitation, the PCRA court correctly determined
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear this untimely PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/24/2016
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