FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 25 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IMRAN AHMAD JAMALI, No. 13-17283
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00613-DGC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF MARICOPA, a private
municipal corporation; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Imran Ahmah Jamali appeals pro se from the district court’s order
dismissing his action alleging federal claims arising out of his arrest photograph.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156
(9th Cir. 2007). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson
v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Dismissal of Jamali’s federal claims was proper because Jamali failed to
allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 355 (2001) (an arrest and booking process that included
photographing the arrestee was “not so extraordinary as to violate the Fourth
Amendment”); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that the dissemination of a booking photograph and arrest information to
local retail stores violated his right to privacy as guaranteed by the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d
668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments applies only after conviction and sentence.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d
680, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing the types of takings protected by the Fifth
Amendment); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1986)
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(The Ninth Amendment “has never been recognized as independently securing any
constitutional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil rights claim.”).
Contrary to Jamali’s contentions, there was no federal subject matter
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also
Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] party
seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege affirmatively the
actual citizenship of the relevant parties.”).
We reject as without merit Jamali’s contentions that the district court acted
outside its authority and otherwise violated his rights in dismissing his action.
We do not consider materials not presented to the district court. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b); United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.
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