In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14‐3781
LEROY ANDERSON,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW MORRISON and MARCUS HOLTON,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 13 CV 8622 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED MAY 6, 2016* — DECIDED AUGUST 26, 2016
____________________
Before FLAUM, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Leroy Anderson, an Illinois pris‐
oner, alleges that he fell and was knocked unconscious after
guards at Stateville Correctional Center ordered him to walk
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs
and the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 14‐3781
handcuffed down stairs covered with milk and garbage. In his
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Anderson claims that the
guards violated the Eighth Amendment by subjecting him to
this hazard. The district court granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss, ruling that slippery stairs do not pose a sufficiently
serious risk of harm to state a claim under the Eighth Amend‐
ment. Because Anderson faced not only stairs slicked with
milk, but also scattered trash and guards who required him
to negotiate his descent while unaided and cuffed behind his
back, the risk of serious harm was substantial. Therefore, we
vacate and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we “tak[e] all well‐pleaded allega‐
tions of the complaint as true and view[] them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,
751 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). During a “shakedown” of several cells, the defend‐
ants handcuffed Anderson behind his back and ordered him
to walk down a set of stairs to wait in a holding area while his
cell was searched. These stairs were “covered [with] food,
milk, and other garbage, and had been for several days.” The
defendants refused Anderson’s request to help him walk. He
slipped and fell down a flight of thirteen stairs. He was
knocked unconscious and suffered “continuing and perma‐
nent” injuries.
Anderson sued the two guards who had ordered him
down the stairs. He alleged that by cuffing him, leaving the
greasy surface and debris in place, and refusing his request
for help, they were deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk
No. 14‐3781 3
of harm the stairs posed. The district court granted the de‐
fendants’ motion to dismiss. It recognized that prison condi‐
tions violate the Eighth Amendment if they pose a substantial
risk of serious harm and prison officials are deliberately indif‐
ferent to the risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994). It also acknowledged that Anderson adequately al‐
leged that the guards were deliberately indifferent to a risk of
harm. But, the district judge ruled, the risk was not substantial
enough. He relied heavily on our ruling in Pyles v. Fahim,
771 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2014), where an inmate slipped on stairs
wet with water from prisoners’ shower shoes. We held that
“slippery surfaces and shower floors in prison, without more,
cannot constitute a hazardous condition of confinement” that
violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 410–11.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Anderson persuasively distinguishes Pyles by
supplying the “more.” Unlike the prisoner in that case, who
was uncuffed, Anderson faced a hazard that posed, in three
respects, a significant risk of severe harm. First, the stairs were
not only slippery with milk, but also clogged with several
days’ of accumulated food and rubbish, creating an obstacle
course. Second, by handcuffing him behind his back, the
guards prevented Anderson from steadying himself to avoid
tripping, slipping, or tumbling down the flight of stairs.
Third, even though they knew that Anderson could not
steady himself, the guards refused to assist him. Anderson
has thus alleged circumstances perilous enough to constitute
“an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health,”
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993), and to state an
Eighth Amendment claim, see Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929,
4 No. 14‐3781
932 (7th Cir. 2007) (prison conditions that recklessly “endan‐
ger[]” a prisoner’s health state an Eighth Amendment claim);
Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (“known or
obvious dangers” to health state a claim under Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
The defendants respond by arguing, unhelpfully, that the
risk of slipping in a prison shower does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. They cite cases in which our sister circuits have
ruled that keeping a violent prisoner shackled while he uses
the shower, see LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.
1993), and failing to drain standing water in a shower area
used by an inmate on crutches, see Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d
1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004), do not pose sufficient risks of harm
to state a claim. But these cases are distinguishable for two
reasons. First, plummeting down a flight of 13 steps presents
a far greater risk of physical injury than does slipping on a
shower floor. Second, the floors in LeMaire and Reynolds and
the stairs in Pyles were unavoidably wet: showers necessarily
produce wet floors, and in Pyles, the water on inmates’ shower
shoes inevitably tracked onto the exit stairway, see Pyles,
771 F.3d at 405. But here, stairs slicked with milk and cluttered
with garbage are not a necessary condition of prison. And by
cleaning the stairs, the high risk of serious harm would ebb.
Prisons are not required to provide a “maximally safe en‐
vironment,” Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001),
but they must address easily preventable, observed hazards
that pose a significant risk of severe harm to inmates, see With‐
ers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 710 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir.
2013); Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2011); Gates v.
Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 338 (5th Cir. 2004). Forcing someone to
walk handcuffed and unaided down stairs needlessly strewn
No. 14‐3781 5
with easily removable milk, food, and garbage, as Anderson
alleges, poses an unreasonable peril.
Of course, these are only allegations. Further proceedings
must determine their truth. We encourage the district court
on remand to consider recruiting counsel for Anderson. Cf.
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 784 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hether
there has been deliberate indifference on the part of a defend‐
ant is an issue that requires the subtle appreciation of legal
causation and of the duties imposed upon state prison offi‐
cials by the Eighth Amendment. Even a pro se litigant with a
meritorious claim may fail to grasp these subtleties.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND
for further proceedings.