J-S56021-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTOBAL R. RUIZ
Appellant No. 2091 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004826-2002
CP-06-CR-0005250-2002.
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED AUGUST 26, 2016
Christobal R. Ruiz (“Appellant”) appeals from the order dismissing his
timely petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On May 7, 2003, Appellant was found guilty, at two separate dockets,
of burglary and related crimes. Concluding that Appellant had two prior
convictions for crimes of violence, the trial court subsequently imposed a life
sentence pursuant to Pennsylvania’s “three strikes law.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9714(a)(2). In doing so, the trial court determined that the otherwise
applicable mandatory twenty-five year sentence was “insufficient to protect
the public safety.” Id. Following the denial of his post-sentence motions,
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Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant filed an appeal to this Court. In an unpublished memorandum filed
on June 6, 2004, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and
our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on
March 2, 2006.
Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition in October 2006. After multiple
continuances and several substitutions of counsel, PCRA counsel filed an
amended PCRA petition and the PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s appellate
rights, nunc pro tunc. Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely appeal. In an
unpublished memorandum filed on November 11, 2009, we rejected
Appellant’s claims, including his challenge to the trial court’s discretion by
imposing a life sentence and affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
After Appellant, via another PCRA petition, was granted the right to seek
allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc, our Supreme Court denied the petition on
April 5, 2011.
Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on February 8, 2012. The PCRA
court appointed counsel. PCRA counsel subsequently filed a “no-merit” letter
and permission to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544
A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
Super. 1988) (en banc). Thereafter, the PCRA court filed notice of its intent
to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro se
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response.1 By order entered on March 31, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s PCRA petition and permitted counsel to withdraw. Appellant filed
a timely pro se appeal.
In an unpublished memorandum, this Court disagreed with the PCRA
court’s conclusions, finding that Appellant raised an issue of arguable merit
in his pro se response. See Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 702 MDA 2014 (Pa.
Super., filed June 2, 2015) (Panella, J.). Specifically, the panel found that
Appellant’s challenge to the legality of his life sentence was properly raised
in a timely petition and stated that “it is at the very least an open question
whether the imposition of a life sentence under section 9714 violates a
defendant’s right to a jury trial under [Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000),] and its progeny.” Id. at 4. We thus remanded the case for the
appointment of new counsel and directed new counsel to develop the
Apprendi issue, and to also “review the entire record and independently
determine whether any other issues have arguable merit.” Id. at 5.
Upon remand, the PCRA court appointed new counsel. Counsel filed a
“Motion for New Jury Trial,” based upon Appellant’s claim that his life
sentence was imposed by the trial court in violation of his right to a jury
trial. After considering the answer filed by the Commonwealth, the PCRA
court denied Appellant’s motion. This timely appeal follows. Appellant raises
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1
Appellant also filed a response to PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley letter.
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the following issue: “Did the [PCRA] court err in denying the motion for new
trial based on the fact the sentence imposed was unconstitutional per
[Apprendi]?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We consider Appellant’s motion for new trial based upon Apprendi as
a supplement to Appellant’s pending PCRA petition. Our standard of review is
well settled.
Under the applicable standard of review, we must determine
whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record
and is free of legal error. The PCRA credibility determinations,
when supported by the record, are binding on this Court.
However, this Court applies a de novo standard of review to the
PCRA court’s legal conclusions.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 249 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted).
In rejecting Appellant’s claim that he was sentenced in violation of
Apprendi, the PCRA court properly noted that this Court rejected the exact
same argument raised by a similarly sentenced defendant in
Commonwealth v. Lane, 941 A.2d 34 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). In
Lane, we stated:
In summary, we hold that Section 9714(a)(2) does not
require a jury determination as to the protection of public safety.
This section only requires the showing of two prior convictions
for crimes of violence before it affords the trial court discretion
to impose a life sentence. Because the trial court had the
statutory discretion, but was not mandated to impose a life
sentence, we hold that the trial court did not err in its imposition
of sentence. We determine that the court did not violate [Lane’s]
constitutional rights by considering facts that were not
considered by the jury, but properly exercised its discretion to
consider the protection of public safety in reaching its sentencing
decision in accordance with the precepts of Apprendi[.]
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
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941 A.2d at 38 (footnote omitted).
While within his brief Appellant discusses how various decisions in
several of our sister states deal with similar sentencing provisions, he does
not acknowledge this Court’s en banc decision in Lane.2 Thus, because Lane
establishes that Appellant’s right to a jury trial was not violated by the trial
court’s imposition of a life sentence pursuant to § 9714(a)(2), we affirm the
order denying post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/26/2016
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2
Moreover, Appellant does not provide any argument within his brief that
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. U.S., 132 S.Ct.
2151 (2013), renders his life sentence illegal. Reference to Alleyne is found
only in Appellant’s quotation of a case from our sister state; a decision which
finds Alleyne inapplicable. See Appellant’s Brief at 18 (quoting State v.
Witherspoon, 329 P.3d 888 (Wash. 2014)). This Court has likewise
recognized that Alleyne is inapplicable to § 9714, since Alleyne did not
eliminate the exception for prior convictions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Reid, 117 A.2d 777, 784-85 (Pa. 2015).
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