Markle, Lesle

PD-0287-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 4/22/2015 4:31:08 PM
Accepted 4/23/2015 10:14:22 AM
No. PD-0287-15 ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK

TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

LESLE MARKLE
Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

______________________________________________________

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
______________________________________________________

On Petition For Discretionary Review from the First Court of Appeals
Cause No. 01-13-01028-CR, affirming the judgment in Cause No. 1865367
from the County Criminal Court No. 12 of Harris County, Texas.
______________________________________________________

ALEXANDER BUNIN
Chief Public Defender
Harris County, Texas
April 23, 2015
SARAH V. WOOD
Assistant Public Defender
Harris County, Texas
Texas Bar Number 24048898
1201 Franklin, 13th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: (713) 368-0016
Fax: (713) 368-9278
Sarah.Wood@pdo.hctx.net

Counsel for Appellant
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

APPELLANT: Lesle Markle

DEFENSE COUNSEL ON APPEAL: Sarah V. Wood
Assistant Public Defender
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, 13th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002

TRIAL PROSECUTOR: Abigail Anastasio
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, 6th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002

DEFENSE COUNSEL AT TRIAL: Gus Saper
600 Travis Street, Suite 1900
Houston, Texas 77002

PRESIDING JUDGE: Hon. Shelly Hancock, Presiding
County Criminal Court No. 12
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, 8th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Parties and Counsel ............................................................................................ ii

Table of Contents ................................................................................................................. iii

Index of Authorities ............................................................................................................. iv

Statement Regarding Oral Argument................................................................................... v

Statement of the Case ............................................................................................................ v

Statement of Procedural History ......................................................................................... v

Grounds For Review .............................................................................................................. v

Argument ................................................................................................................................. 1

Reasons for Review ............................................................................................................. 1

Factual Background............................................................................................................. 1

Reliability of Radar Device ................................................................................................ 2

Prayer for Relief ...................................................................................................................... 5

Certificate of Service and Compliance ................................................................................ 5

Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 6

iii
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Hall v. State, 297 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ......................................................... 4

Mills v. State, 99 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd) ............................ 2

iv
 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument as it may aid the Court in its analysis of the

issues.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lesle Markle was charged by information with driving while intoxicated

on December 1, 2012 (C.R. at 6). Defense counsel filed a written motion to suppress

which, after a hearing with testimony, was denied by the trial court (C.R. at 36). Ms.

Markle then pled guilty on November 4, 2013, and was sentenced to fifteen months

of probation. (C.R. at 44). This appeal concerns the motion to suppress.

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in an

unpublished opinion. Markle v. State, 01-13-01028-CR, 2015 WL 505194 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 5, 2015). No motion for rehearing was filed.

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

When radar technology is used, but no evidence is presented as to the
reliability of the device itself, can the State meet its burden to justify the
appellant’s detention for speeding?

v
 ARGUMENT

Reasons for Review

In Hall v. State, this Court determined that it was necessary to show that the use

of LIDAR technology is reliable in order to establish probable cause to stop someone

for speeding. Hall v. State, 297 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). While this

Court did distinguish the necessary showing from that required for admissibility at

trial under the Rules of Evidence, it declined to elaborate upon the weight of the

State’s burden at a suppression hearing. This case would provide an opportunity to

flesh out and further specify the amount of evidence that is necessary to show the

reliability of technological devices used to develop probable cause.

Factual Background
Ms. Markle was driving on Beltway 8 in Houston one night when she was

pulled over and arrested for DWI. The arresting deputy testified inconsistently at a

motion to suppress regarding his reasons for detaining her. He first testified that he

noticed her car when the radar machine in his vehicle indicated she was going 95 mph

(R.R. at 6, 40). But then he testified that he thought she was actually travelling 107

mph (R.R. at 6). However, in his offense report he wrote 95 mph, but then when he

finally pulled over Ms. Markle, he told her it was 90 mph (R.R. at 33-34). Moreover,

the deputy did not initiate a detention until he had followed her car for seven minutes,

during which time everything was recorded on video.

1
 The deputy gave several reasons for eventually deciding to pull over Ms.

Markle, each of which is discredited in the appellant’s original brief to the court of

appeals. However, since the court’s opinion only addressed the speeding, it is

unnecessary to discuss any other details of this case.

Radar Reliability
The deputy in this case relied upon technological devices to determine

appellant’s speed. As this Court determined in Hall v. State, even though the rules of

evidence do not apply at a motion to suppress, the State is still required to show that

the evidence used to justify a detention is reliable. Hall v. State, 297 S.W.3d 294, 297

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

The court of appeals declined to apply the reasoning of Hall to this case

because Hall dealt with the reliability of LIDAR and this case deals with radar. While

it is true that the underling scientific principles of radar technology has been accepted

as a matter of law, the testimony in this case does not provide enough information to

simply rest on what we already know of radar. See Mills v. State, 99 S.W.3d 200, 202

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd). The general principle of radar technology

may be valid, but without any information about the device itself, it is impossible to

determine whether it was reliable as applied in this instance. Just as in Hall, the State

failed to show a reliable basis for the appellant’s speed due to a dearth of information

regarding the device.

The deputy never testified regarding what type of radar device he used; he was

2
inconsistent as to the readings he observed on the device, and in fact never mentioned

the device in his offense report. (R.R. at 6, 22-23). He also stated that he had “no

idea” how often the device was serviced and that he did not “normally pay attention”

to any servicing of the device.

Additionally, the court of appeals erroneously described additional independent

bases for determining the car’s speed. The court wrote that the deputy “testified that

he personally saw appellant traveling at an ‘[e]xcessive speed,’ 107 mph in a sixty-five

mph zone.” Markle, at 3. However, he never gave any indication that he could actually

tell she was speeding just from looking at her car. The deputy was driving around with

his radar running continuously on his dash. (R.R. at 40). He testified:

Q. And what drew your attention to her?

A. Excessive speed.

Q. How fast was she going?

A. I paced her at 95 miles per hour in a posted 65 mile-an-hour zone.

Q. Was she actually going the 95?

A. Yeah, she slowed down to the 95. She was—I believe when I first came in
contact with her she was traveling 107.

Q. How did you pace her?

A. By using the radar mounted in my vehicle and along with GPS.

(R.R. at 6). Therefore the deputy did not testify that he determined she was speeding

3
based on his personal observations and unassisted by any devices. While the deputy

did testify that he also calculated the vehicle’s speed using “GPS,” the record contains

no description of the device, how it worked, or whether it was reliable. In Hall, Judge

Price explained in his concurrence:

Suppose [the officer] had testified that he believed the appellant was
speeding only because a blue cube on [the officer’s] dashboard had
indicated so. Without knowing any more about the blue cube, a rational
fact finder (here, the trial court as arbiter of pre-trial suppression issues)
would have no way to conclude that [the officer’s] belief was a
reasonable one. Neither common sense nor common experience
informs the fact finder that a blue cube is capable of accurately gauging
the speed of an automobile.

Hall, 297 S.W.3d at 300. Likewise, without any significant description of the

technological devices relied upon to justify the appellant’s detention, the evidence is

insufficient to establish that the appellant had been speeding.

.

4
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the reasons stated above, the Appellant prays that this Court grant her

petition, review the case, and hold that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the

trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

Respectfully submitted,

ALEXANDER BUNIN
Chief Public Defender
Harris County Texas

/s/ Sarah V. Wood
SARAH V. WOOD
Assistant Public Defender
Harris County Texas
1201 Franklin, 13th Floor
Houston Texas 77002
(713) 368-0016 (phone)
(713) 368-9278 (fax)
State Bar Number 24048898

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing petition for discretionary review
has been served on the District Attorney of Harris County, Texas, by the efile service
and to the State Prosecuting Attorney and that this petition has 1,070 words according
to the computer program used to draft it.

/s/ Sarah V. Wood
SARAH V. WOOD

5
 APPENDIX
2015 WL 505194
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FOR DESIGNATION AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(B).
Court of Appeals of Texas,
Houston (1st Dist.

Lesle Markle, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee

NO. 01–13–01028–CR | Opinion issued February 5, 2015

Attorneys and Law Firms

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 12, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Case No. 1865367

Sarah V. Wood, for Appellant.

Devon Anderson, Alan Curry, for State of Texas.

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Lloyd.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Terry Jennings, Justice

*1 After the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence, appellant, Lesle Markle, with an agreed punishment
recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the offense of driving while intoxicated.1 In accordance with the
plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to 180 days in jail, suspended the sentence, placed her on
community supervision for fifteen months, and assessed a fine of $500. In her sole issue, appellant contends that the
trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence.

We affirm.

Background

At a pretrial hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, Harris County Sheriff’s Office Deputy E. Goodney testified
that, while on patrol on December 1, 2012, at approximately 2:15 or 2:20 a.m., he saw appellant “[e]xcessive[ly]
speed[ing]” and driving a car at 107 miles per hour (“mph”) in a sixty-five mph zone on Beltway 8. She
subsequently slowed down to ninety-five mph, which Goodney determined by using his patrol car’s radar device,
along with a separate, independent GPS device. Although Goodney also saw appellant “fail [ing] to maintain a

6
single lane of travel” at least three times, he was not able to stop her immediately because there was not a safe place
to do so.

Deputy Goodney subsequently pursued appellant to a toll booth, where she stopped her car for approximately two
minutes. Thereafter, appellant exited the Beltway, and Goodney activated the emergency lights on his patrol car in
order to make a traffic stop. Although appellant did not stop initially, even though Goodney instructed her to “place
[her] vehicle in park,” she eventually stopped her car in a private driveway. According to Goodney, he initiated the
stop of appellant’s car at the “[e]arliest” time when he “could conduct the traffic stop safely.”

Deputy Goodney explained that he “pulled [appellant] over” because she was speeding, failed to maintain a single
lane of travel, obstructed the roadway while at the toll booth, disregarded a traffic-control device, and failed to yield
to an emergency vehicle.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Turrubiate
v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of
discretion and the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. At a suppression hearing, the trial court
is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility and may choose to believe or disbelieve
all or any part of the witnesses’ testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v.
Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When, as here, a trial judge does not make explicit findings of
fact, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Almost total deference should be given to a trial court’s implied findings, especially those
based on an evaluation of witness credibility or demeanor. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory
of law applicable to the case. Id. at 447–48.

Motion to Suppress Evidence

*2 In her sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence because
Deputy Goodney had no “legal justification” to stop her car. She first asserts that the State “failed to make any
showing that the radar device used to gauge [appellant’s] speed was reliable or accurate, as necessary to justify a
stop on th[e] basis [of speeding].”

A “stop” by a law enforcement officer “amounts to a sufficient intrusion on an individual’s privacy to implicate the
Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, a
law enforcement officer may stop and briefly detain a person suspected of criminal activity on less information than
is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968);
Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328. In order to stop or briefly detain an individual, an officer must be able to articulate
something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at
1883. Instead, an officer must have “reasonable suspicion” that an individual is violating the law. Ford v. State, 158
S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Doyle v. State, 265 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st
Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (“An officer may stop a driver if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation was in
progress or had been committed.”). Reasonable suspicion exists when the officer has some minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop; in other words, when the officer can “point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.” Terry, 392
U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329–30, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990). We
disregard the subjective belief of the officer in our reasonable suspicion analysis and consider the totality of the
circumstances objectively. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492–93.

It is well-established that an officer may lawfully stop an individual for a traffic violation. Walter v. State, 28

7
S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). And driving a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of a posted speed limit
constitutes prima facie evidence that the driving speed is not reasonable and prudent and is unlawful. TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.352(a) (Vernon Supp. 2014); see also id. § 545.351(a) (Vernon 2011) (speeding
constitutes violation of Texas Transportation Code).

Here, Deputy Goodney testified that he initiated the traffic stop of appellant after he saw her driving her car at an
“[e]xcessive speed,” 107 mph in a sixty-five mph zone. After his initial encounter with appellant, she slowed down
to ninety-five mph, which Goodney confirmed by using his patrol car’s radar device and a separate, independent
GPS device.

In support of her argument that the speeding violation may not be used to justify Deputy Goodney’s traffic stop
because the State did not make “any showing that the radar device used to gauge [appellant’s] speed was reliable or
accurate,” appellant relies on Hall v. State, 297 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In Hall, the defendant argued
that “the arresting officer lacked probable cause because the State failed to prove the reliability of the LIDAR device
which the officer used to determine [the defendant] was speeding.” Hall v. State, 264 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. App.–
Waco 2008), aff’d but criticized, 297 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed and concluded that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s suppression motion, holding that “the
State failed to establish that [the law enforcement officer], who relied solely on LIDAR technology to conclude that
[the defendant] was speeding, had probable cause to stop [the defendant].” Hall, 297 S.W.3d at 298.

*3 Appellant’s reliance on Hall misplaced. We note that the court of criminal appeals limited its holding to the facts
of that particular case, and the LIDAR technology at issue in Hall is markedly different from the radar technology
utilized by Deputy Goodney in the present case. See id. (“Our holding today is limited to the facts of this case.”);
Hall, 264 S.W.3d at 349–50 & n.1 (differentiating between technologies). Further, the court repeatedly emphasized
in reaching its decision in Hall that the law enforcement officer “relied solely on LIDAR technology” in making his
determination that the defendant was speeding. Hall, 297 S.W.3d at 298.

In contrast, here, Deputy Goodney testified that he personally saw appellant traveling at an “[e]xcessive speed,” 107
mph in a sixty-five mph zone. He then “paced” appellant driving ninety-five mph, using his patrol car’s radar device
and a separate, independent GPS device. In other words, Goodney did not develop his reasonable suspicion that
appellant had committed a traffic violation based solely on his patrol car’s radar device.

Deputy Goodney’s observation of appellant’s speeding was alone sufficient to justify the traffic stop. See Icke v.
State, 36 S.W.3d 913, 915–16 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d); see also Dillard v. State, 550
S.W.2d 45, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding officer had reasonable suspicion defendant speeding based on his
testimony defendant “seemed to be travelling at an exceptionally high rate of speed” (internal quotations omitted));
McAfee v. State, 204 S.W.3d 868, 870 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref’d) (holding officer’s visual
observation provided reasonable suspicion defendant speeding); Hesskew v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 144 S.W.3d
189, 191 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2004, no pet.) (“When a law enforcement officer observes a vehicle traveling what he
believes to be fifteen miles over the posted speed limit, a traffic stop is justified.”). And the evidence supports the
trial court’s implied finding that Goodney had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant for violating the law. 2

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Footnotes

8
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (Vernon Supp. 2014).

2
Having concluded that Deputy Goodney had reasonable suspicion that appellant was speeding, it is not necessary for us to address
the evidence concerning the other traffic violations challenged by appellant. See Hesskew v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 144 S.W.3d
189, 192 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2004, no pet.).

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

9