CAUSE NO. 01-13-00415-CR, 01-13-00416-CR, 01-13-00417-CR
FILED IN
JAVIER NOEL CAMPOS * IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 1STcourtofappeals
Petitioner * Houston, texas
* FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^ •
vs. * FEB - 2 2015
THE STATE OF TEXAS * ^Z^^ *' PR,NE
Respondent * CLERK- 1
MOTION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT TO TRAP RULE 49.7
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, JAVIER NOEL CAMPOS, Petitioner in the above entitled and numbered
cause and respectfully moves this Honorable Court to order En Banc
Reconsideration of the Court's judgment pursuant to TRAP Rule 49.7 and would
show the Court the following:
1. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. Petitioner filed his
Appellant brief on April 25, 2014 and the State filed the Appelle brief on
September 5, 2014. The Appeals Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and
issued it's opinion on January 13, 2015.
2. The State misconstrued the facts of the case to the Court and painted a
false factual picture that contributed to the Court's ruling.
3. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground One. The State failed to
establish that Petitioner sexually assaulted the complainant beyond a
reasonable doubt. The complainant originally denied any abuse. Petitioner
denied allegations. The State did hot produce any physical evidence or an
eyewitness. No witness saw Petitioner do anything inappropriate to
complainant. Ground One is a reversible error.
4. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground Two. The State went beyond
the scope of an opening statement by introducing an inadmissible extraneous.
The State violated Petitioner's Motion in Limine granted by the Court.
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The Trial Court abused it's discretion by overruling defense counsel's
objection and Motion for Mistrial. The State never introduced a police
report during trial. The State's opening statement prejudiced Petitioner's
trial process. Ground Two Is a reversible error.
5. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground Three and Four. Trial
Court abused it's discretion in allowing Stephanie Jones to testify beyond
the scops of an outcry witness over defense counsel's objection. Trial
Court also abused it's discretion by allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony
over defense counsel's objection. The testimony is not based on personal
knowledge of the witness. Evidence of Petitioner's guilt is weak and Jones'
testimony plays an important role in the determination of Petitioner's guilt.
Jones' inadmissible hearsay testimony prejudiced Petitioner's trial process.
Ground Three and Four are reversible errors.
6. The Appeals Court erred In overruling Ground Five and Six. Trial Court
abused it's discretion by allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony of
unproven text messages from unknown third party. The State did not introduce
prro of the exsitence of the text messages nor that they were from
Petitioner. Testimony of the text messages prejudiced Petitioner's trial process.
Ground five and Six are reversible errors.
7. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground Seven. The State introduced
correspondence between Petitioner and complainant. The complainant stated
the letters were from Petitioner while he was in prision. After defense
counsel's objection was sustained and request for jury instruction granted,
counsel requested a mistrial. Trial Court abused it's discretion when it
denied defense counsel's request. Testimony of the letters from Petitioner
while in prison prejudiced Petitioner's trial process. Ah Instruction to
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disregard can not cure the harm already done. Ground seven is a reversible
errors.
8. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground Eight. Trial Court abused
it's discretion in denying Appellant's Theus Motion. Allowing the State to
introduce Petitioner's prior convictions to impeach severely harmed him.
The probative value of admitting Petitioner's prior convictions does not
outweigh it's prejudicial effect. Alimiting instruction can not cure the
harm caused by the introduction of Petitioner's prior convictions. The
introduction prejudiced Petitioner's trial process. Ground Eight is a reversible
error.
9. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground Nine. Trial Court abused
it's discretion by allowing the State to introduce Petitioner's 1992
conviction (over tens years old) by taking a 2006 midemeanor conviction
over defense counsel's objection. The misdemeanor assault is not a crime of
moral turpitude making it improper to tack to the 1992 conviction. The
probative value of the ihtroductidh of the 1992 conviction does not outweigh
it's prejudicial effect. The introduction of the conviction prejudiced
Petitioner's trial process. Ground Nine is a reversible error.
10. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground Ten and Eleven. The Trial
Court abused it's discretion by allowing the introduction of two misdemeanor
convictions for impeachment purpose over defense counsel's objection.
Neither conviction is a crime of moral turpitude. The Court stated,"I just
think that has to be common sense in the law if assaulting a woman is a moral
turpitude, you would think that assaulting a minor child is moral turpitude."
The Court does not state any authorities, just assumptions. The probative
value of the introduction of the two misdemeanor convictions does not
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outweigh it's prejudicial effect. The introduction of the convictions
prejudiced Petitioner's trial process. Ground Ten and Eleven are reversible
errors.
11. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground Twelve. Trial Court abused
it's discretion by allowing the State to shift burden of proof to Petitioner
over defense counsel's objection. The burden of proof is on the State. The
State's argument to the jury is improper and not permissible. This put the
jury in a position to consider Petitioner's guilt for failing to offer
proof against the complainant. The State's improper argument prejudiced
Petitioner's trial process. Ground Twelve is a reversible error.
12. The Appeals Court erred in overruling Ground Thirteen. Trial Court
abused it's discretion by cumulating Petitioner's prison sentences.
Petitioner elected to have the jury assess punishment. The jury had a choice
between 5 to 99 years of life; they chose sixtyeight years. Without stacking
sentences, Petitioner is required to do thirtyfour years before being
eligible for parole. By stacking Petitioner's sentences, the Court essentially
overrid the jury's decision and gave him life in prison without the chance
of parole. This is overkill and cruel punishment. Trial Court prejudiced
Petitioher's trial process. Ground Thirteen ia s revesible error.
Respectfully Submitted,
ri&r N.
Javier Campos-I
N. Campos-Petitioner
Pro Se Representation
T'DCJ No. 1854678
3060 FM 3514
Beaumont, TX. 77705
page 4 of 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Javier N. Campos, certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion was mailed to the District Attorney, Harris County, 1201 Franklin, Suite
600, Houston, Texas 77002 on this 27th day of January, 2015.
Respectfully Submitted,
/•i^er N.
Javie'r" N. Caofoos-Petitioner
G
page 5 of 5
'STCOURT OF4PPPai
HOUSTON.^8
Javier Noel Campos FEB -2 20i5
TDCJ No. 1854678
Stiles Unit
3060 FM 3514
Beaumont, TX. 77705
January 27, 2015
Clerk
Court of Appeals
First District
301 Fannin St.
Houston, TX. 77002
Re: Motion for En Banc Reconsideration
Dear Clerk:
Enclosed please find Motion for Eh Banc Reconsideration. Please file it
and bring it to the attention of the Court for consideration. Also, please
date stamp the copy and return it to me in the SASE. If you have any questions
please feel free to contact me at anytime at the above address.
Respectfully Submitted,
a
Javifer N. Qjfopos-Petitioner
Q^mipos-P
Pro Se Representation
CC:
Campos File
RtcflvED ~~
ST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
FEB - 2 2015 (Clerk
HRISTOPHER A; PRINE
ERK.
;:
FILED IN
first Qtetrici- -»>
1ST COURT OF APPEALS
5USTON, TEXAS B>6\ Fannin Stfeet
FEB ^2 2015
CHRISTOPHER ASPRINE
CLERK.