NUMBER 13-15-00323-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN RE THE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. STEPHEN B. TYLER
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez1
By petition for writ of mandamus, relator, the State of Texas ex rel. Stephen B.
Tyler, contends that the trial court erred in convening a sentencing hearing before the
bench because the State had not waived its right to a jury trial. We agree with the State
and conditionally grant mandamus relief in this case and in three companion cases
decided this same date. See In re State of Tex. ex rel. Stephen B. Tyler, No. 13-15-
00316-CR, 2015 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2015, orig. proceeding)
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); TEX.
R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
(mem. op., not designated for publication); In re State of Tex. ex rel. Stephen B. Tyler,
No. 13-15-00317-CR, 2015 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2015, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication); In re State of Tex. ex rel. Stephen
B. Tyler, No. 13-15-00339-CR, 2015 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2015,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
I. BACKGROUND
The real party in interest, Jaimie Rene Runnels, was charged by information in trial
court cause number 1-103420 with the offense of driving while intoxicated. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). On July 13, 2015, the
case was called for trial by the respondent, the Honorable Eli Garza of the 377th District
Court of Victoria County, Texas.2 That day, Runnels pleaded guilty and waived his right
to a jury trial. The prosecutor representing the State, Jake Srp, did not sign a waiver of a
jury trial and objected to proceeding without a jury. The respondent overruled the State’s
objection and accepted Runnels’s plea of guilty. In so doing, the respondent articulated
his reliance on statutory interpretation and stated that he was taking judicial notice that
the State’s policy of refusing to waive jury trials was “interfering with the orderly
administration of the business of the courts” and requiring the appointment of counsel in
all such cases.
The State requested a stay in the proceedings to seek review in this Court. The
trial court denied the request for a stay and ordered the State to proceed with the
punishment hearing. The State filed a petition for writ of mandamus with a request for
2 Runnels’s case was pending in the County Court at Law Number One of Victoria County, Texas.
According to Runnels’s response to the petition for writ of mandamus, Judge Garza was sitting as a judge
of the County Court at Law in order to assist in presiding over the eight misdemeanor driving while
intoxicated cases scheduled for that day on the county court trial docket.
2
emergency relief with this Court; however, the punishment hearing was completed and
the trial court issued its sentence almost simultaneously with the State’s filing. The trial
court found Runnels guilty, sentenced him to confinement in the Victoria County Jail for
180 days, assessed a fine of $750 and costs, and placed him on community supervision
for a period of nine months. This Court therefore dismissed the State’s petition for writ of
mandamus as moot. See In re State ex rel. Tyler, No. 13-15-00315-CR, 2015 WL
4381222, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 13, 2015, orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
This original proceeding subsequently ensued. By one issue, the State contends
that the trial court erred in convening a sentencing hearing before the court when the
State had not signed a written waiver of its right to trial before a jury. The State requests
that we grant the petition and order the respondent to vacate the judgment and sentence
issued on July 13, 2015 and empanel a jury to hear the case. This Court requested that
Runnels, or any others whose interest would be directly affected by the relief sought, to
file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2.
On July 22, 2015, the respondent filed a response to the petition for writ of
mandamus. The respondent stated that it took judicial notice of the State’s policy that it
would no longer be offering plea bargain agreements in misdemeanor driving while
intoxicated cases; that this policy had caused an “extreme backlog”; that the district court
judges had offered to assist the county court judges to alleviate the backlog; and that the
State’s policy caused additional expense to the citizens of Victoria County and burdened
its court system. The respondent’s arguments, as restated, are that: (1) the State does
not have an absolute right to a jury trial in misdemeanor pleas; (2) the defendant’s right
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to waive a jury trial is being denied; and (3) the trial court has broad discretion to control
its docket which outweighs the State’s assertion of its right to a jury trial in a case involving
a misdemeanor guilty plea.
On July 27, 2015, Runnels filed his response to the petition for writ of mandamus.
Runnels alleged that the State’s policy prohibiting plea bargains in misdemeanor driving
while intoxicated cases caused a delay in his trial of almost one year. Runnels further
argues that the State’s right to a jury trial in misdemeanor cases is not guaranteed under
Texas law. Runnels bases his argument on statutory construction, that is, the differences
between pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in felony and misdemeanor cases, and the
legislative intent regarding the 1991 revisions to article 1.13. Runnels further argues that
he has been sentenced following a hearing at which both the State and his attorney
offered evidence and argument, and has begun to carry out the terms and conditions for
his community supervision.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must show: (1) that he has no
adequate remedy at law, and (2) that what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act. In re
State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If
the relator fails to meet both of these requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus
should be denied. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236
S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). A remedy at law, though it
technically exists, “may nevertheless be so uncertain, tedious, burdensome, slow,
inconvenient, inappropriate, or ineffective as to be deemed inadequate.” Greenwell v. Ct.
of Apps. for the Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 159 S.W.3d 645, 648–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
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(orig. proceeding). The act sought to be compelled must be a ministerial act that does
not involve a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210.
The ministerial-act requirement is satisfied if the relator can show a clear right to the relief
sought. In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122. A clear right to relief is shown
when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision “under unequivocal,
well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly
controlling legal principles.” Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805, 810 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011); see In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122.
In criminal proceedings, the State has a limited right to appeal, which does not
include the right to appeal the trial court’s decision to waive a jury trial without the State’s
consent. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.)
(listing the orders that the State is entitled to appeal in criminal cases); State v. Redus,
445 S.W.3d 151, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (examining the State’s statutory right to
appeal in criminal cases). Therefore, if the State challenges a defendant’s jury waiver
and contends that the Court failed to perform the ministerial duty of impaneling a jury,
mandamus is the proper vehicle with which to seek relief. In re State ex rel. Tharp, 393
S.W.3d 751, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (orig. proceeding); State ex. rel. Turner v.
McDonald, 676 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (orig. proceeding) (en banc);
State ex. rel. Curry v. Carr, 847 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (orig.
proceeding) (en banc) (per curiam); see also In re Roach, No. 05-09-01451-CV, 2010 WL
537751, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)
(conditionally granting mandamus relief when the trial court allowed the defendant to
5
plead guilty and waive a jury trial without the State’s consent). Accordingly, we proceed
with our review regarding the merits of this original proceeding.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
By one issue, the State contends that the respondent committed error when he
convened a sentencing hearing before the trial court when the State had not signed a
written waiver of its right to trial before a jury. Runnels and the respondent assert that
Runnels does not need the State’s consent to plead guilty, waive a jury, and have the
respondent perform sentencing.
The issue before us is whether a defendant in a misdemeanor case may
unilaterally waive a jury and plead guilty before the court without the State’s consent and
approval. The Dallas Court of Appeals and other courts have concluded that under article
1.13(a), a misdemeanor defendant may not waive a jury without the State’s consent and
approval, even when the defendant pleads guilty. See In re State ex rel. O’Connell, 976
S.W.2d at 905; State v. Fisher, 212 S.W.3d 378, 381 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d)
(holding that the trial court lacked authority to adjudicate the defendant’s guilt in a
misdemeanor case because State did not agree to the defendant’s jury waiver); see also
In re Escamilla, No. 03-12-00341-CV, 2012 WL 2989170, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jul.
10, 2012, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (conditionally granting mandamus relief in favor
of the district attorney where the trial court erred in proceeding to accept a guilty plea in
a bench trial without the State’s consent to a jury waiver); In re Watkins, No. 05-11-01067-
CV, 2011 WL 3570520, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 16, 2011, orig. proceeding)
(concluding that the trial court erred in acting as the fact-finder in a driving while
intoxicated case when the State did not consent to a jury waiver, but denying mandamus
6
relief on grounds that the State had the right to appeal the defendant’s order of acquittal);
McCutchen v. State, No. 04-09-00350-CR, 2010 WL 3699987, at *6 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Sept. 22, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding
that the trial court did not err in allowing the State to refuse to waive a jury trial where the
appellant argued that the State was insisting on a jury trial for an “ignoble and
unreasonable purpose”); cf. In re Watkins, 390 S.W.3d 583, 584 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
orig. proceeding) (“The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure . . . clearly states that a
defendant can only waive his right to a trial by jury if the State consents and approves.”).
In a case similar to the one before this Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
considered an original proceeding brought by the District Attorney of Tarrant County
seeking a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to empanel a jury and to prohibit the
entry of a judgment. State ex rel. Curry, 847 S.W.2d at 561. The defendant in that case
stated that she wished to waive a trial by jury. Id. Relying on article 1.13, the State
refused to consent to the defendant’s jury waiver. Id. The trial court denied the State’s
request that the matter be set for a jury trial. Id. at 561–62. The court of criminal appeals
held that the trial court “does not have the discretion to serve as a factfinder in the trial of
a misdemeanor case absent the consent and approval of the State as prescribed by
[article 1.13(a)] to the accused’s waiver of [a] jury trial.” Id. at 562. Specifically, the court
held that under the circumstances presented, the trial court had a “ministerial duty to
conduct a jury trial.” Id. In so holding, the court of criminal appeals relied on its previous
analysis in State ex rel. Turner v. McDonald, 676 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en
banc), in which it held that a district court did not have the discretion to serve as a
factfinder in a felony case absent the State’s consent to the defendant’s jury waiver. Id.
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at 374; see also In re State ex rel. Tharp, 393 S.W.3d at 752 (conditionally granting
mandamus relief in favor of the State requiring the trial court “to submit the entire case—
both guilt and punishment—to the jury after the defendant plead guilty” to a felony
offense); In re Roach, 2010 WL 537751, at **2–3 (conditionally granting mandamus relief
in favor of the district attorney in a felony case where the trial court erred by accepting a
guilty plea when the State did not consent to the waiver of a jury trial).
Accordingly, the trial court has a ministerial duty to empanel a jury when the State
refuses to consent to the defendant’s jury waiver. In such a case, where the defendant
pleads guilty and the trial court accepts the plea, but the jury has not or cannot be waived,
the proper procedure is for the trial court to direct a verdict of guilt and proceed with
punishment. Morin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also In re
State ex rel. Tharp, 393 S.W.3d at 758–59 (stating that when the defendant pleads guilty
and the State refuses to join the defendant’s waiver of a jury trial, the trial court must
submit all relevant issues, including punishment, to the jury).
IV. CONFLICTING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Runnels and the respondent contend that articles 27.14 and 1.13 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure are in irreconcilable conflict, that article 27.14 is narrower in
scope than article 1.13, and thus article 27.14 controls our analysis of the situation before
the Court. According to Runnels and the respondent, article 27.14 does not require the
State to consent to the defendant’s jury waiver in a misdemeanor case.
The analysis in this case concerns the interaction between article 1.13, entitled
“waiver of trial by jury,” and article 27.14, entitled “plea of guilty or nolo contendere in
misdemeanor.” Article 1.13 provides in relevant part:
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(a) The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a
capital felony case in which the state notifies the court and the
defendant that it will seek the death penalty shall have the right, upon
entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury, conditioned,
however, that, except as provided by Article 27.19,[3] the waiver must
be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the
consent and approval of the court, and the attorney representing the
state. The consent and approval by the court shall be entered of
record on the minutes of the court, and the consent and approval of
the attorney representing the state shall be in writing, signed by that
attorney, and filed in the papers of the cause before the defendant
enters the defendant’s plea.
....
(c) A defendant may agree to waive a jury trial regardless of whether the
defendant is represented by an attorney at the time of making the
waiver, but before a defendant charged with a felony who has no
attorney can agree to waive the jury, the court must appoint an
attorney to represent him.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13. Thus, a defendant in any case other than a capital
felony case involving the death penalty can waive a trial by jury if the waiver is made with
the “consent and approval of the court, and the attorney representing the state.” Id. art.
1.13(a) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Ex parte Garza, 337 S.W.3d 903, 912 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (holding that a trial court erred in declaring a mistrial in a misdemeanor case
over the defendant’s objection when “the defendant waives his right to trial by a complete
jury under Article 1.14, and the State and the trial court are willing to consent to do so
under Article 1.13(a)”). In contrast, article 27.14, which concerns pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere in misdemeanor cases, provides in section (a) that:
A plea of “guilty” or a plea of “nolo contendere” in a misdemeanor case may
be made either by the defendant or his counsel in open court; in such case,
the defendant or his counsel may waive a jury, and the punishment may be
3 Article 27.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides the requirements for accepting
pleas from persons confined in a penal institution. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.19 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
9
assessed by the court either upon or without evidence, at the discretion of
the court.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.14.
When interpreting statutes, a court must “seek to effectuate the ‘collective’ intent
or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation.” Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d
20, 22–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991)). Toward that end, a court must focus its “attention on the literal text of
the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at
the time of its enactment.” Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. However, when the application
of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences, or when the language
is not plain but rather ambiguous, a court may consider extra-textual factors such as the
legislative history of the statute. Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 22–23; Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at
785–86. In this context, ambiguity exists when a statute may be understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses; conversely, a statute
is unambiguous when it permits only one reasonable understanding. Mahaffey v. State,
364 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Except under unusual circumstances, it is
best to effectuate the legislative intent evidenced by the plain language of statutes.
Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 799–800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Camacho v. State,
765 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see also Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d
938, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Otherwise, courts risk invading the legislature’s
province by reading into the law that which is clearly not there. Ex Parte Halsted, 182
S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944).
It is our duty to harmonize all of the statutory provisions and give full effect to each
if it is possible to do so under the established rules of statutory construction. Postell v.
10
State, 693 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc); Cuellar v. State, 521
S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Focusing on the literal text of article 26.14 and
article 1.13, article 26.14 governs pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in misdemeanor
cases and article 1.13 governs the waiver of jury trials. Construing the articles together,
we see no conflict between these articles. Article 1.13(a) sets out the specific and
required procedure for waiving a jury trial and clearly requires the State’s consent and
approval to validate a defendant’s jury waiver. Nothing in article 27.14(a) is to the
contrary. Article 27.14 is not rendered meaningless by this interpretation because it
instead delineates the procedure for making pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in
misdemeanor cases—that is, such pleas may be made either by the defendant or
counsel.
Moreover, as acknowledged by the parties, the Dallas Court of Appeals has
considered this same argument and rejected it. In re State ex rel. O’Connell, 976 S.W.2d
902. In a thorough and lengthy analysis, the court considered the plain language of these
two articles, parsed the words and phrases therein, analyzed these articles’ interaction
with article 27.13, reviewed the history of Texas jurisprudence regarding jury waivers, and
contemplated the application of the rule of in pari materia. See id. at 905–08. The Dallas
Court of Appeals concluded that articles 1.13 and 27.14 did not conflict and article 1.13
requires the State’s consent to a defendant’s jury waiver in a misdemeanor case. See id.
Based upon our analysis, we agree with the Dallas Court of Appeals and conclude
that the code of criminal procedure provisions can be harmonized, and we reject
arguments otherwise. See id.
V. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
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Runnels contends that the legislative history of article 1.13 indicates that “there is
serious doubt” that it was intended to apply to any cases other than capital felonies. As
an initial matter, we note that we do not typically resort to extra-textual factors such as
legislative history unless application of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd
consequences, or when the language is not plain but rather ambiguous. Garcia, 387
S.W.3d at 22–23; Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785–86. Accordingly, our holding in this case is
not dependent on the legislative history of article 1.13. However, even if we were to
consider the legislative history of article 1.13 in analyzing its application to misdemeanor
offenses, we would conclude that the legislative history does not indicate that article 1.13
applies only to felony pleas.
Article 1.13 was amended in 1991. See Act of May 27, 1991 (H.B.9), 72nd Leg.
R.S., ch. 652, 1991 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2394. The caption to House Bill 9 reads: “[a]n act
relating to the waiver of jury trial for a person charged with a capital offense and to the
punishment, sentencing and availability of parole for a person convicted of a capital
offense.” Id. An examination of House Bill 9 shows thirteen amendments to the Texas
Penal Code and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, all concerning capital felony
prosecutions, and section 15(a) of House Bill 9 states that the amendments to articles
1.13 apply “to the trial of a capital offense that commences on or after the effective date
of the act.” Id. Runnels thus urges that the history of the amendments to 1.13 indicates
that it was not intended to apply to any cases other than capital felonies.
As stated previously, in 1992, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
trial court “does not have the discretion to serve as a factfinder in the trial of a
misdemeanor case absent the consent and approval of the State as prescribed by Art.
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1.13(a), supra, to the accused's waiver of jury trial,” and instead “has a ministerial duty to
conduct a jury trial.” State ex rel. Curry, 847 S.W.2d at 562. The court so held despite a
sharp dissenting opinion reviewing the legislative history of article 1.13 and the rules of
statutory construction. See id. at 562–63 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“My research reveals
that the legislature never intended to give the State the power to force a jury trial in a
misdemeanor case when it amended Article 1.13(a).”). Accordingly, in view of the court
of criminal appeals’ handling of the legislative history of article 1.13, we conclude that the
legislative history of article 1.13 does not indicate that misdemeanor offenses were
intended to be excluded from the scope of that article. See id.; Chaouachi v. State, 870
S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no pet.) (analyzing the dissent in State ex
rel. Curry v. Carr and determining that the legislative history of article 1.13 did not indicate
that it was intended to apply only to felony offenses).
VI. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL & WAIVER
Runnels contends that the State has no guaranteed right to a jury trial in
misdemeanor cases. The respondent further contends that the State’s actions in
demanding a jury trial have deprived Runnels of his right to waive a jury trial.
A criminal defendant has the right to a trial by jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district . . . .”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“The right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate. The [l]egislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to
regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 1.12 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate.”); Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A defendant
13
has an absolute right to a jury trial.”). Subject to the conditions of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, a criminal defendant also has the right to waive a jury trial. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) (“The defendant
in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured him by law except
that a defendant in a capital felony case may waive the right of trial by jury only in the
manner permitted by Article 1.13(b) of this code.”). Further, when a criminal defendant
pleads guilty, he waives several constitutional rights, such as the right to a trial by jury.
Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ex parte Zantos-Cuebas,
429 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). In contrast, the State
“technically” has no “right” to trial by jury, and due process and due course of law are
guarantees applicable to citizens and not governments or their agents. State ex rel.
Turner, 676 S.W.2d at 373–74.
To the extent that Runnels and respondent contend that forcing individuals to a
jury trial infringes on their rights, this issue has been determined as a question of federal
constitutional law in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). The court there
reasoned:
In light of the Constitution’s emphasis on jury trial, we find it difficult
to understand how the petitioner can submit the bold proposition that to
compel a defendant in a criminal case to undergo a jury trial against his will
is contrary to his right to a fair trial or to due process. A defendant’s only
constitutional right concerning the method of trial is to an impartial trial by
jury. We find no constitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this
right on the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if
either refuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject
to an impartial trial by jury—the very thing that the Constitution guarantees
him. The Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper
method of determining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a
legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is
warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as
most likely to produce a fair result.
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Id. at 36. Quoting and following Singer, our highest criminal court in Texas has concluded
that article 1.13 is not unconstitutional on grounds that it grants the State a “right” to a jury
trial. See State ex rel. Turner, 676 S.W.2d at 374. Specifically, there is no violation of
the due process or due course of law provisions of the federal or state constitutions in
applying the provisions of article 1.13 to require the State’s consent to a jury waiver. See
id. Accordingly, there is no constitutional impediment to conditioning a defendant’s ability
to waive trial by jury on the State’s consent. See id.
VII. TRIAL COURT’S DISCRETIONARY CONTROL OF ITS DOCKET
The respondent contends that judicial economy and a responsible use of
resources are compelling reasons to accept Runnels’s guilty plea in order to “effectively
control its docket.”
We agree that the control of the business of the court is vested in the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (en banc); see Wheatfall v. State, 882 S.W.2d 829, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Specifically, the “trial court is vested with broad discretion to manage and control its
docket in order to promote the orderly and efficient administration of justice while
protecting the statutory and constitutional rights of all persons who come before the
court.” Taylor v. State, 255 S.W.3d 399, 402 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref'd).
The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the appellate court, the
facts present an appropriate case for the trial court's action, but rather, “whether the trial
court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” State v. Thomas, 428
S.W.3d 99, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
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However, while we agree that the trial court has broad discretion in administering
its docket, the trial court’s duty to impanel a jury is ministerial in nature. State ex. rel.
Curry, 847 S.W.2d at 562; State ex. rel. Turner, 676 S.W.2d at 374. A ministerial act, by
its nature, does not involve the use of judicial discretion. In re Allen, 462 S.W.3d 47, 49
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (orig. proceeding). Accordingly, the trial court lacked discretion
to refuse to impanel a jury when the State refused to consent to Runnels’s waiver of a
jury trial.
VIII. POLICY
The respondent points out that the State’s refusal to accept plea bargains in
misdemeanor driving while intoxicated cases has caused an “extreme backlog” of cases
and results in defendants “who would otherwise be pleading guilty” being required to hire
an attorney or request representation by a court-appointed attorney. The respondent
asserts that the State’s policy has caused “an ever increasing docket and waste of
economic and judicial resources,” and that “[a]rbitrary actions . . . requesting jury trials
accomplish nothing but delays in justice.”
We appreciate and acknowledge the ramifications of the State’s bright-line policy
rejecting plea bargains and requiring jury trials in all misdemeanor driving while
intoxicated cases. We further empathize with the frustration experienced by the
respondent in attempting to handle these matters. However, as an intermediate appellate
court, we are bound by the precedent of our state’s highest criminal court. Lockard v.
State, 364 S.W.3d 920, 924–25 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); Bolen v. State, 321
S.W.3d 819, 828 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d); Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49,
53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d); Zarchta v. State, 44 S.W.3d 155, 162
16
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref‘d); see TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 5(a) (providing
that the court of criminal appeals is the final authority for criminal law in Texas). Our court
of criminal appeals has determined that the trial court does not have the discretion to
serve as a factfinder in the trial of a misdemeanor case absent the consent and approval
of the state. See State ex rel. Curry v. Carr, 847 S.W.2d at 562. Similarly, our legislature
declares the public policy of the state. Martinez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 493, 501 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). We may not override the legislature’s intent in favor of countervailing policy
considerations. Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 25; Martinez, 323 S.W.3d at 501; Boykin, 818
S.W.2d at 785. The legislature has determined that the State has an interest in the
method of trial which it has chosen to protect by statute. See State ex rel. Turner, 676
S.W.2d at 373 (stating that the State has “legitimate interests, representing the collective
citizenry as it does, in the method of trial of criminal accusations” and the State may
conclude that it is “essential to the interest of doing justice that a particular accused be
tried by a fair and impartial jury of his peers”); Watson v. State, 730 S.W.2d 150, 152
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987, pet. ref'd).
Accordingly, while we recognize the full implications of the State’s policy to
demand jury trials in all misdemeanor driving while intoxicated cases, it is not within our
province to address these issues here.
IX. INJUSTICE
Runnels argues that mandamus should be denied in this case because he “has
been sentenced in accordance with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and has begun
to carry out the requirements of his sentence.” Runnels contends that if the petition for
writ of mandamus is granted, “the overriding injustice is the possibility that all of [his]
17
efforts . . . to comply with a lawful judgment and sentence . . . will be for naught.” Runnels
offers no other argument or authority in support of his assertion that this defeats
mandamus relief.
We have already determined that the trial court had a ministerial duty to empanel
a jury when the State refused to consent to Runnels’ jury waiver, thus the trial court’s act
of proceeding to sentencing before the bench was improper and the resulting sentence
was a nullity. Criminal defendants always stand the risk of an appeal of an illegal
sentence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(b) (“The state is entitled to appeal
a sentence on the ground that the sentence is illegal.”). Further, a trial or appellate court
which otherwise has jurisdiction over a criminal conviction may always notice and correct
an illegal sentence. Mizell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 804, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Accordingly, we reject Runnels’ argument that his efforts to comply with the sentence
previously imposed renders mandamus relief inappropriate.
X. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,
the response, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that the State has met its burden
to obtain mandamus relief. See State ex rel. Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210; Ex Parte George,
913 S.W.2d at 526; State ex. rel. Curry, 847 S.W.2d at 562; State ex. rel. Turner, 676
S.W.2d at 374. Accordingly, we conditionally grant relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
Respondent is directed to vacate the judgment and sentence issued on July 13, 2015,
set this cause for a jury trial at the earliest possible day, and thereafter preside over jury
selection and trial of the case in the manner prescribed by law. Respondent may not
enter a judgment in this cause except upon verdict of a jury as prescribed by law or in the
18
event the State exercises its discretion to consent to the waiver of a jury trial. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Turner, 676 S.W.2d at 374.
/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
CHIEF JUSTICE
Do Not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
30th day of October, 2015.
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in Re the State of Texas Ex. Rel. Stephen B. Tyler
Combined Opinion