PD-0517-15
PD-0517-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 5/7/2015 1:28:00 PM
Accepted 6/10/2015 10:10:32 AM
ABEL ACOSTA
IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS CLERK
Shane Allen Mikel,
Petitioner
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Respondent.
From Trial Court Cause Number 1372459 in the 232nd Judicial District
of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Mary Lou Keel Presiding
And Appellate Court Cause Number 01-14-00277-CR
In the First Court of Appeals, Houston, Texas
Petition for Discretionary Review
The Law Office of Lori Elaine Laird
Lori E. Laird
State Bar No: 24046260
Emily Foster
State Bar No: 24059768
June 10, 2015 711 W. Bay Area Blvd., Suite 420
Webster, TX 77598
Tel: (832) 699-1966
Fax: (832) 699-1965
Lori@LoriLaird.com
Attorneys for Petitioner
Shane Allen Mikel
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITIES OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL
Trial Court Judge: The Honorable Mary Lou Keel
232nd Criminal District Court
Harris County, Texas
Defendant: Shane Allen Mikel
Mikel’s trial counsel: Thomas J. Lewis
1602 Washington Avenue
Houston, Texas 77007
Mikel’s appellate counsel: J. Sidney Crowley
214 Morton St.
Richmond, Texas 77479
Mikel’s counsel on Petition for Lori Elaine Laird
Discretionary Review: Emily Foster
711 W. Bay Area Blvd.
Suite 1420
Webster, Texas 77598
Counsel for the State at trial: Markay A. Stroud
1201 Franklin
Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
Counsel for the State on appeal: Markay A. Stroud
Devon Anderson
Clinton A. Morgan
1201 Franklin
Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identities of Judge, Parties, and Counsel .................................................ii
Table of Contents .................................................................................... iii
Index of Authorities................................................................................... v
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...................................................... 1
Statement of the Case ............................................................................... 1
Statement of Procedural History .............................................................. 1
References to the Record ........................................................................... 2
Grounds for Review ................................................................................... 2
Argument ................................................................................................... 2
Statement of the evidence at trial ......................................................... 3
There was insufficient evidence to believe that Mikel was involved in
the robbery.............................................................................................. 5
i. Officer Robles’s description of the suspect was so scant that it
would not have even provided probable cause to arrest a suspect .... 6
iii
ii. Officer Robles identification of Mikel was based on a suggestive
procedure and unreliable and as such cannot be considered more
than a modicum of evidence .............................................................. 10
Prayer for Relief ...................................................................................... 17
Appendix .................................................................................................. 19
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Goldberg v. State, 95 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
pet. ref’d) ................................................................................................. 7
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........................ 6
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) .................................................. 5
McGruder v. State, No. 10-07-00348-CR (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 17,
2008, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) ............................. 7, 12
Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ........................ 5
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) ............................................... passim
People v. Jones, 429 N.E.2d 1101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) .......................... 7, 8
State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 285 Wis.2d 143 (Wis. 2005) ............. 13
Weatherly v. State, No. 04-06-00573-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct.
31, 2007, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) ..................... 11, 12
Williams v. State, 243 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. ref’d)
.............................................................................................................. 13
v
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Petitioner believes that oral argument would be helpful in this case
as it would help Petitioner clarify how the standards for probable cause
or the reliability of a show-up identification relate to his argument that
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and allow
Petitioner to respond to the Court’s questions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns a conviction for aggravated robbery pursuant to
§ 29.03(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code in cause number 1372459 in the
232nd District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Mary Lou
Keel, presiding. (RR: vol. 4, p. 35.) Petitioner Shane Allen Mikel was
sentenced to 20 years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (RR: vol. 5, p. 37.) The conviction
was appealed to the First Court of Appeals in cause number 01-14-00277-
CR.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Date of opinion from Court of Appeals: April 7, 2015
Date of Motion for Rehearing: None filed
Date of Motion for Rehearing: N/A
1
REFERENCES TO THE RECORD
For the purposes of the petition, references to the Reporter’s Record
will be made as follows: (RR: vol. ___, p. ___), where the blanks refer to
the volume number and page number, respectively.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
course of judicial proceedings by effectively determining that there is a
lower burden of proof for a conviction than there would be to make an
arrest.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
course of judicial proceedings by effectively determining that the
identification resulting from a suggestive show-up without indications
that Petitioner had not been misidentified constitutes more than a
modicum of evidence.
ARGUMENT
At trial, the State and the Defense agreed that the only issue in this
case was the identity of the man in the gray sweater who robbed the
Flemingo Supermarket on December 28, 2012. (RR: vol. 4, p. 6-8.) Mikel
2
argued, at trial and on appeal, that the evidence was insufficient to prove
Mikel’s involvement beyond a reasonable doubt. Here Mikel argues that
the evidence linking him to the robbery is so scant that, in affirming the
judgment of the trial court, the Court of Appeals departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by effectively holding
that there is a lower burden of proof for a conviction than there would be
to make an arrest and that an identification from a suggestive show-up
constitutes more than a modicum of evidence.
Statement of the evidence at trial
The only evidence that suggested that Mikel could have been
involved in the robbery was his presence in the neighborhood the
afternoon of the robbery and the identification by Officer Robles. Briefly,
the evidence at trial showed the following:
In the afternoon of December 28, 2012, three masked men robbed
the Flemingo Supermarket on the corner of Canal Street and Edgewood
Street in Houston, Texas. (RR: vol. 3, p. 21, 30, and 39.) One of the men
wore a gray sweater with a red stripe. (RR: vol. 3, p. 71.) The men left the
supermarket and stole the truck of Raphael Gonzales. (RR: vol. 3, p. 47.)
Officer Jesus Robles chased after the men down North Edgewood Street
3
until they reached Avenue I, where the men jumped out of the vehicle.
(RR: vol. 3, p. 64-66.) At this point, the men were no longer wearing
masks. (RR: vol. 3, p. 70.) One of the men—Daniel Edison—stops for
Officer Robles, and Officer Robles holds him at gunpoint while the other
two men walk off. (RR: vol. 3, p. 70.)
Officer Rojilio Carrreon arrived to assist and was told by Officer
Robles that one of the men “was wearing a gray sweater and he went that
way.” (RR: vol. 3, p. 111.) Officer Carreon followed the man’s path and
located a glove, a mask, and a gray sweater. (RR: vol. 3, p. 113 and 118-
19.) He spoke to a resident identified as Mr. Herrero, who stated that he
saw a man taking off a gray sweater. (RR: vol. 3, p. 117-18.) He stated
that the man was white, had a baby blue T-shirt on under the sweater,
and was wearing baggy jeans. (RR: vol. 3, p. 118-20.)
Diana Gutierrez testified that she was in the neighborhood with her
family when she saw a white man coming down Avenue H. (RR: vol. 3, p.
130.) She testified that he was wearing a “greenish blueish” shirt and
khaki shorts and that he was “scruffy” as though he had not shaved. (RR:
vol. 3, p. 131-32.) The man then turned east on Canal Street. (RR: vol. 3,
p. 133.)
4
Officer Richard Trejo was driving on Canal Street when heard a
description of a white man in a “blue shirt with brown shorts” being a
suspect to the robbery at the Flemingo Supermarket. (RR: vol. 3, p. 140-
41.) He stopped a man, Petitioner Mikel, who fit that description and took
him into custody. (RR: vol. 3, p. 143-44.) Mikel was then brought to
Officer Robles who identified him as the man he saw exiting Gonzales’s
truck. (RR: vol. 3, p. 88.) Though the area was searched, the pair of jeans
that Mikel allegedly shed as he was fleeing was never found. (RR: vol. 3,
p. 120.)
There was insufficient evidence to believe that Mikel was involved in the
robbery
A review for sufficiency of the evidence impinges on a jury’s
discretion “only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental
protection of due process of law.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). This Court must ask whether “any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(emphasis in the original). “[A] verdict must stand unless it is found to be
irrational or unsupported by more than a ‘mere modicum’ of the
evidence.” Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
In the present case, Mikel argues that the Court of Appeals departed
5
from the accepted course of judicial proceedings because no rational trier
of fact could have found Mikel was involved in the robbery beyond a
reasonable doubt.
i. Officer Robles’s description of the suspect was so scant that it would
not have even provided probable cause to arrest a suspect
While Mikel does not argue here that Officer Trejo did not have
probable cause to arrest or even that Mikel was under arrest when
stopped by Officer Trejo. Indeed, such an argument in the lower courts
may have been futile, as, other than the questionable identification itself,
no incriminating evidence was gleaned after Mikel was stopped by Officer
Trejo. Rather, Mikel turns to the standard of probable cause only to
illustrate the weakness of the evidence against him, thus arguing that
the evidence was so weak that it would not even have provided probable
cause. Probable cause to arrest a suspect is based on reasonableness.
“Probable cause exists where the police have reasonably trustworthy
information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe a
particular person has committed or is committing an offense.” Guzman
v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Mikel questions what
6
is reasonable information to identify a particular person as having
committed an offense.
In Goldberg v. State, 95 S.W.3d 345, 356 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d), a witness “described the assailant as a white male,
approximately six feet tall, 18-19 years old, 165 pounds, with short-to-
medium sandy blonde hair.” The court found this description, among
other incriminating evidence, to be adequate to provide officers with
probable cause to arrest the suspect. Id. at 463.
In McGruder v. State, No. 10-07-00348-CR (Tex. App.—Waco Dec.
17, 2008, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication), a man who had just
committed a burglary was described to police by the victim. The victim
described the burglar’s clothes and general appearance and told police
that the burglar was “bleeding profusely” from when the victim had cut
the burglar in a struggle. Id. That the defendant matched the description
and was found with a blood-soaked towel wrapped around his arm gave
officers probable cause to believe he was the same man who had
committed the burglary. Id.
In a case from Illinois, in People v. Jones, 429 N.E.2d 1101, 1102-
03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) a description of a suspect including his race, sex,
7
and body type, and as well as a description of, coincidentally, the
suspect’s “gray turtleneck sweater with a red stripe across the chest”
allowed police to identify the suspect. The court noted that this
information, including the description of the “uniquely patterned
sweater,” “narrows considerably the population of potential suspects” and
gave the officers probable cause to arrest the suspect. Id. at 1103-04.
With the exception of the description of the sweater, in the present
case, Officer Robles provides no descriptive information that would have
narrowed the pool of potential suspects to a degree needed to allow police
to believe Mikel was probably the suspect. When asked on the witness
stand to describe the person he saw exiting the truck, Officer Robles said
only that the man was wearing blue jeans, had a mustache, a beard,
“some hair,” and was upset. (RR: vol. 3, p. 78.) He did not make note of
the man’s race. (RR: vol. 3, p. 74 and 78.) He did not provide an estimate
of his age, weight, or height. (RR: vol. 3, p. 78.) He could not describe the
hair color or give a more descriptive account of the style of mustache and
beard. (RR: vol. 3, p. 78.)
By contrast, the State’s witness Diana Gutierrez, not a law
enforcement officer trained to observe, was better able to describe the
8
facial hair of the man she saw, describing him as “scruffy,” as though he
“hadn’t shaved,” and identifying him as white. (RR: vol. 3, p. 130 and
132.) Perhaps more concerning, Officer Carreon testified that the only
description Officer Robles gave on the day of the robbery was that the
suspect “was wearing a gray sweater and he went that way.” (RR: vol. 3,
p. 111.) The eventual stop of Mikel by Officer Trejo was thus based on a
game of identification Telephone, with each player giving only vague and
differing description.
Neither Officer Robles’s description of a man going “that way,” nor
the description heard by Officer Trejo of a man in “blue shirt with brown
shorts,” nor Mr. Herrero’s description of a white man in a blue shirt and
baggy jeans are descriptive enough to narrow the pool of potential
suspects to allow the officers to even arrest a man fitting any one of those
descriptions, let alone find a man guilty of robbery beyond a reasonable
doubt. (RR: vol. 3, p. 111, 118-20, and 140-41.) Unlike the gray sweater
with a red stripe in Jones and here, there is nothing distinctive about a
blue T-shirt, even in a mild Houston December. As such, the Court of
Appeals departed from the accepted course of judicial proceedings by
9
effectively placing a lower burden of proof on convictions than there is to
arrest.
ii. Officer Robles identification of Mikel was based on a suggestive
procedure and unreliable and as such cannot be considered more than a
modicum of evidence
Again, Mikel cannot and does not argue here that the identification
of him done by Officer Robles should have been excluded for being
impermissibly suggestive. Rather, by analogizing to cases where show-
up identifications have violated a defendant’s due process, Mikel argues
that any rational fact finder would have considered the identification by
Officer Robles to be so untrustworthy as to amount to only a modicum of
evidence of Mikel’s involvement in the robbery and is therefore
insufficient to support his conviction. See Moreno, 755 SW 2d at 867. The
Court of Appeals therefore departed from the accepted course of judicial
proceedings by affirming Mikel’s conviction on only a modicum of
evidence.
While one-person show-ups do not per se violate a defendant’s due
process rights, when they are impermissibly suggestive, a court must ask
whether the procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of
10
misidentification. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). Courts
will examine “whether, under the totality of the circumstances’ the
identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was
suggestive.” Id. Factors to consider are “the opportunity of the witness to
view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of
attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal,
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” Id. at
199-200. Thus in addition to potentially violating a defendant’s due
process rights, show-up identifications are often excluded from evidence
as courts are concerned that the witness is wrong.
In Weatherly v. State, No. 04-06-00573-CR (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Oct. 31, 2007, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication), the
appellate court analyzed a show-up where two witnesses identified the
assailants. There, both witnesses had opportunities to view the
assailants before and during the course of the robbery. Id. One witness
“passed so close to the men on the sidewalk that they almost touched
shoulders.” Id. The other “was close enough to both participants for them
to converse about what he had that was worth stealing, for each man to
11
reach out and grab one of his pockets, and for one assailant to push the
gun into his ribs.” Id.
Additionally, the descriptions provided by the witnesses in that
case were accurate. Id. The witnesses described the race of the assailants
and their relative heights and ages. Id. They described one assailant as
being “skinny” and “grungy” with “wild hair” while the other was “real
rugged looking.” Id. The court found that the reliability factors
“outweigh[ed] any corrupting influence created by any undue
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.” Id.
McGruder, No. 10-07-00348-CR also involved a show-up. There, the
victim described him as being “[a] very big man, built across the chest.”
Id. As this was an accurate description of the defendant, the
identification was considered more reliable. Id.
In the present case, an identification was made by Officer Robles.
Though Officer Robles is a police officer and not merely a layperson
victim or witness to a crime, factors that show his identification was
reliable—or unreliable—are still instructive. The show-up was
suggestive, and, when considering the totality of the circumstances
12
surrounding the show-up, one could not conclude Officer Robles’s
identification was reliable.
Mikel was shown to Officer Robles while Mikel was in the back of a
patrol vehicle. (RR: vol. 3, p. 88.) This itself is suggestive but not fatal to
the identification. See generally Williams v. State, 243 S.W.3d 787 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. ref’d) (considering identification of a suspect
from the back of a police vehicle to be suggestive), and see generally State
v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 285 Wis.2d 143, 167 (Wis. 2005) (holding that
“[s]howups conducted in police stations, squad cars, or with the suspect
in handcuffs that are visible to any witness, all carry with them
inferences of guilt, and thus should be considered suggestive.”)
Addressing the Biggers factors, the first inquiry is the opportunity
the witness had to observe the suspect. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
Officer Robles testified that he was able to look at the suspect as he was
fleeing from the truck for “about a minute, minute and a half.” (RR: vol.
3, p. 98.) During this time, however, Officer Robles is holding Edison on
the ground at gunpoint and the suspect is heading away from them. (RR:
vol. 3, p. 70-72.) While the suspect turns around a few times to face
Officer Robles, he is still headed away from Officer Robles and turning
13
down streets, thus it is unknown how long Officer Robles is able to get a
good look the suspect’s face. (RR: vol. 3, p. 70, 74, 82, and 102.)
Next, Biggers considers the witness’s degree of attention to the
suspect. Id. As stated above, while observing the suspect, the suspect was
headed quickly away from Officer Robles. (RR: vol. 3, p. 70-72.) Moreover,
while trying to observe the suspect, Officer Robles was also holding
Edison at gunpoint. (RR: vol. 3, p. 70-72.) While he alleges that he was
able to keep Edison at bay while still tracking the suspect, the description
he provides of the suspects may lead one to suspect he was not paying
careful attention to the features of the suspect. (RR: vol. 73 and 102.)
When asked at trial to describe the person he saw, he said only that
the man was wearing blue jeans, had a mustache, a beard, “some hair,”
and was upset. (RR: vol. 3, p. 78.) He did not make note of the man’s race.
(RR: vol. 3, p. 74 and 78.) He did not provide an estimate of his age,
weight, or height. (RR: vol. 3, p. 78.) He could not describe the hair color
or give a more descriptive account of the mustache and beard. (RR: vol.
3, p. 78.) Additionally, Officer Carreon testified that the only description
Officer Robles gave on the day of the robbery was that the suspect “was
wearing a gray sweater and he went that way.” (RR: vol. 3, p. 111.) Officer
14
Robles’s lack of any detail that would narrow the pool of potential
suspects suggests that he was not able to pay attention to the features of
the suspect as he fled and makes it likely that Mikel had been
misidentified.
Next, Biggers asks about the accuracy of the witness’s description.
Id. On the day of the offense, Officer Robles says only that the suspect
“was wearing a gray sweater and he went that way.” (RR: vol. 3, p. 111.)
While there is an explanation for the change in clothing and there was
no evidence to contradict which way the suspect went, Mikel would argue
that if this description is accurate, it is not precise. It is not sufficient to
instill confidence that Mikel was not misidentified.
Neither is the description Officer Robles gave at trial precise.
Again, at trial, Officer Robles testified that the suspect was wearing blue
jeans, had a mustache, a beard, “some hair,” and was upset. (RR: vol. 3,
p. 78.) He does not state the suspect race, age, build, height, hair color,
or facial hair style. (RR: vol. 3, p. 78.) This testimony is too general and
imprecise to allow a rational trier of fact to be confident that Mikel was
not misidentified.
15
The next Biggers factor considers “the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness.” Id. While Officers Robles does not attach
a level of certainly to his identification, he does tell the jury why he is
certain the man brought to him is the man he saw fleeing. He says “he
had the same angry look,” referring to the upset face the suspect had
when fleeing. (RR: vol. 3, p. 78 and 88.) Thus apparently Officer Robles
confidence that he had identified the right man is based on the fact the
fleeing suspect and Mikel shared the same emotion.
Finally, Biggers asks after the length of time between the witness’s
first opportunity to see the suspect and the confrontation. Id. Mikel
concedes this factor weighs in favor of the State in this case.
When looking at the suggestive identification of Mikel by Officer
Robles—a one-person show-up while Mikel sat in the back of a police
car—and the lack of indications that would make the identification
reliable—that Officer Robles was unable to provide an adequate
description of the suspect, that Officer Robles was distracted when
looking at the suspect, and that Officer Robles did not have a good
opportunity to view the suspect—a rational fact finder must conclude
that Officer Robles’s identification was not reliable. Notably, the State
16
did not call Mr. Herrero to testify, the only person who could have
confirmed that the man he saw removing the distinctive gray sweater
was the one on trial. (RR: vol. 3, p. 117-18.) As Officer Robles’s
identification was unreliable and the only evidence incriminating Mikel,
there was insufficient evidence to convict Mikel of the robbery and the
Court of Appeals so far departed from the accepted course of judicial
proceedings by affirming Mikel’s conviction that was based only on a
modicum of unreliable evidence.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Shane Allen Mikel respectfully prays that this Honorable Court
grant his Petition for Discretionary Review, reverse his conviction, order
a judgment of acquittal, and for all further relief to which he has shown
himself justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
The Law Office of Lori Elaine Laird
11200 NASA Parkway, Suite 107
Houston, TX 77058
Tel: (832) 699-1966
By: ___________________________
Lori E. Laird
State Bar No: 24046260
Emily Foster
17
State Bar No: 24059768
Attorneys for Petitioner
Shane Allen Mikel
Certificate of Service
I do hereby certify that on this 5th day of May, 2015, a true and
correct copy of this Petition for Discretionary Review was served on
Counsel for the State Markay A. Stroud, Devon Anderson, and Clinton
A. Morgan, 1201 Franklin, Suite 600, Houston, Texas 77002 by electronic
service.
___________________________
Attorney for Petitioner
Shane Allen Mikel
18
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this response is in compliance with Rule 9.4(i)(2)(B) of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure because its relevant portions
contain 3,456 words.
___________________
Lori Elaine Laird
Attorney for Petitioner
APPENDIX
April 7, 2015 Judgment of a Panel of the First Court Exhibit A
of Appeals, Shane Allen Mikel v. The State of Texas,
No. 01-14-00277-CR.
19
Opinion issued April 7, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-14-00277-CR
———————————
SHANE ALLEN MIKEL, Appellant
V.
STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 232nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1372459
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Shane Allen Mikel, guilty of the offense of
aggravated robbery1 and assessed his punishment at confinement for twenty years.
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2), (b) (Vernon 2011).
In his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction.
We affirm.
Background
The complainant, Inayat Maredia, testified that on December 28, 2012,
while he was working alone at his grocery store on Canal Street in Houston, he
noticed three men, wearing masks, approaching the store. One of the men, holding
a gun, was wearing a gray sweater with a horizontal red stripe and white tennis
shoes. And the complainant, through video feeds of the store’s security cameras,
saw smaller guns in the hands of the other two men. He ducked under the check-
out counter and pushed a button to lock his front doors automatically, but a
customer held the doors open, which allowed the men to enter before the doors
could lock. The doors then closed, locking the men in the store.
The man wearing the gray sweater and white tennis shoes jumped over the
counter, went into the store’s office, and took a cash box containing $60,000. One
of the other men began shooting at the locked door in an effort to open it.
Throughout this time, the complainant sat on the floor, afraid that one of the men
might shoot or kill him. When the three men left the store and walked into the
parking lot, the complainant telephoned for emergency assistance. The store’s
surveillance videotapes, which were admitted into evidence, show the men
2
entering and exiting the store, the man in the gray sweater and white tennis shoes
jumping over the counter, and the subsequent events that occurred in the parking
lot.
Raphael Zavala, a regular customer at the complainant’s grocery store,
testified that he was in his truck outside the store when he heard a loud noise from
inside the store. When he exited his truck to investigate, he discovered broken
glass at the front of the store. Zavala returned to his truck, where he was accosted
by three men wearing ski masks, at least two of whom had guns. When one of the
men told Zavala in Spanish, “Give me the keys or I will kill you,” he handed over
his keys. The same man, holding what Zavala described as a “machine gun,” fired
a shot into the ground and the masked men then got into Zavala’s truck and drove
off. Zavala flagged down Houston Police Department (“HPD”) Officer J. Robles,
who happened to be driving by, and explained what had happened. After Officer
Robles told Zavala to stay where he was, he pursued the robbers.
Officer Robles testified that while on patrol near the grocery store on
December 28, 2012, he heard multiple gunshots and slowed his patrol car to
determine from where the shots were fired. A man then ran up to his patrol car
from the grocery store and stated that men were taking his truck and wanted to kill
him. As Robles told the man to wait for him, a truck “flew out of the parking lot”
of the grocery store at high speed, and the man identified the truck as his. Robles
3
followed the truck down Canal Street and North Edgewood Street until it crossed
over Avenue I, at which point three men began “hopping out” without stopping the
truck, which eventually collided with a parked vehicle. Robles then drew his gun
and commanded the men to “get down.” One man complied, but the others did
not. And one of the men who refused to stop was wearing “a gray sweater with a
red line in the center,” which Robles identified as in evidence, and dark blue jeans.
When Robles was within a few yards of this man, he saw his face clearly, but lost
eye contact with him at the corner of Avenue I and Engle Street.
Officer Robles then described the fleeing suspects over the radio in his
patrol car. When he searched the truck, he found an AK-47 rifle that contained a
magazine loaded with eleven live rounds of ammunition. The man that Robles
detained, Daniel Edison, admitted that the gun was his. After another officer
detained appellant and brought him to Robles, Robles identified him as the man he
had seen wearing the gray sweater, and he identified him in court for the jury. The
third man who had been in the truck was never apprehended or identified.
HPD Officer R. Carreon testified that when he arrived at Officer Robles’s
location, he found a mask and a glove. He then spoke with a witness, Herrero,
who stated that he had just seen a white man take off and discard a gray sweater,
and then run away. Herrero also told Carreon that the man was wearing baggy
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jeans and a baby blue t-shirt. Carreon then found in a ditch on Engle the gray
sweater, which he identified in evidence.
Diana Gutierrez testified that on December 28, 2012, she and her father had
stopped in their car at the corner of Canal and Lenox, where they saw police
activity. She saw a white man wearing long khaki shorts, “bright white” tennis
shoes, and a “greenish bluish short sleeve shirt,” walking quickly. The man and
his attire struck Gutierrez as unusual because “everybody in that neighborhood is
basically Hispanic,” and “[i]t was cold so [the man’s clothing] was just kind of
awkward.” And she noted that the man had “real short” and “kind of scruffy” hair.
Gutierrez then identified appellant in court as the man that she had seen.
Former HPD Officer R. Trejo 2 testified that on December 28, 2012, he
assisted in the search for suspects in the robbery. Over the radio in his patrol car,
he heard a description of a suspect as a white male wearing a blue shirt with
brown, khaki shorts. He then saw, walking along Canal Street, a man matching the
description, sweating, flushed, and red in the face. Trejo detained the man, and he
identified appellant in court as the man that he had detained. Other officers took
the man back to Officer Robles, who identified him at the scene as the same person
that he had seen wearing the gray sweater with a red stripe “just minutes before.”
2
Officer Trejo retired before trial.
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Courtney Price testified that she met appellant at the home of a mutual
friend, Kate, in Houston the night before the robbery. She noted that appellant,
who was wearing blue jeans and a t-shirt at the time, had used methamphetamine
with her throughout the night before the robbery and into the next morning, until
about noon. Price, Kate, and appellant then left in Kate’s car, and Kate and Price
stopped several times on the street to ask people for narcotics. Price explained that
appellant, who was high on methamphetamine, then “freaked out” because he
“didn’t want to be there. It made him paranoid.” He left Price and Kate at around
12:30 or 12:45 p.m.
Appellant testified that he has had “a problem with drugs off and on most of
[his] life.” He further testified, consistent with Price, that he had used narcotics
throughout the night before the robbery at an apartment in Houston. Around noon
on the day of the robbery, just a few minutes after he exited Kate’s car, a police
officer confronted and arrested him. Appellant denied participating in the robbery,
being present at the complainant’s grocery store, or having a gun in his possession
on the date of the robbery.
Standard of Review
We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” to determine whether any
“rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
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reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
2788–89 (1979). Our role is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the
rationality of the trier of fact’s finding of the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Moreno v. State, 755 S. W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988). We give deference to the responsibility of the fact finder to
fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences from the facts. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). However, our duty requires us to “ensure that the evidence presented
actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed” the criminal offense
of which he is accused. Id.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction because neither the complainant nor Zavala saw the robbers’
faces; Zavala did not observe the robbery and “did not positively [identify] the men
who robbed his truck as the same ones who had robbed the . . . store”; Officer
Robles’s “chance for observation was fleeting”; appellant, when detained, was not
wearing the same clothes described by Robles; and appellant was not carrying cash
from the robbery or a weapon when he was detained. He asserts that given these
facts, combined with the testimony given by him and Price, “no rational trier of
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fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] participated in the
robbery of the complainant’s store.”
A person commits theft if he “unlawfully appropriates property with intent
to deprive the owner of property.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2014). He commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing
theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, he (1) intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another or (2) intentionally or
knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.
Id. § 29.02(a) (Vernon 2011). The robbery is aggravated if he does any of the
following three things:
(1) causes serious bodily injury to another;
(2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon; or
(3) causes bodily injury to another person or threatens or places
another person in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, if the
other person is:
(A) 65 years of age or older; or
(B) a disabled person.
Id. § 29.03(a) (Vernon 2011).
In this case, the testimony of the complainant and the videotape from
surveillance cameras in his store establish that on December 28, 2012 three men,
each carrying a gun and wearing a mask, entered and robbed the complainant’s
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store, placing the complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. The
videotape shows that the man who took the cash box wore a gray sweater with a
horizontal red stripe. It also shows that one of the men fired shots at the store’s
door in an effort to open it to exit the store after the door had locked. The
testimony of Zavala and the videotape further show that the same men then stole
Zavala’s truck outside of the store, and one of the men fired a shot from his gun.
Moreover, both Zavala and Officer Robles testified that Zavala identified the
truck for Robles, who immediately pursued the truck. And, Robles later saw three
men exit the truck, one of whom, Edison, admitted to owning the rifle found in the
truck and participating in the robbery. Robles got a clear look at the face of one of
the other men, who had been in the truck and was wearing a gray sweater with a
horizontal red stripe. After Robles had described the fleeing suspect over his radio,
an eyewitness told Officer Carreon that he had just seen a white man, who was
wearing a gray sweater, jeans, and a light blue shirt, remove his sweater. After
Carreon recovered the sweater, Gutierrez saw a man in the same area matching the
description that Robles had given earlier, except he was wearing khaki shorts.
Officer Trejo then detained appellant, and Robles later identified appellant as the
man who he had seen in Zavala’s truck and who had been wearing a gray sweater
with a red stripe. And Robles, Trejo, Gutierrez each identified appellant as the
man that they had seen on December 28, 2012.
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Given the above evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the
men who robbed the complainant’s store were the same men who stole Zavala’s
truck and who later exited the truck in sight of Officer Robles. The jury could
have further reasonably concluded, based on Robles’s positive identification of
appellant as one of the men he saw exit the truck, that appellant was one of the
robbers. This conclusion is further supported by Officer Carreon’s testimony that
he found a mask and Herrero had told him that he had just seen a man in the same
area removing a sweater with a red stripe, revealing a baby-blue t-shirt. Moreover,
Gutierrez placed appellant in the same area as the suspect, and Officer Trejo
testified that he detained appellant in the area and he was wearing clothes matching
the description given to him by Gutierrez and Herrero. “[T]he jury was free to take
all of the evidence into account and to believe or disbelieve any portion of [the
defendant’s] statements.” Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). It was thus free to reject both appellant’s and Price’s testimony.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that the jury could have reasonably found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that appellant committed a robbery of the complainant’s grocery store and, in the
process of committing the robbery, used and exhibited a firearm, a deadly weapon,
placing the complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Accordingly,
we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
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We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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