Davis, Roxanne Yvette

PD-1303-15 PD-1303-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 10/1/2015 1:52:10 PM Accepted 10/2/2015 11:16:40 AM ABEL ACOSTA No.______________   CLERK   IN  THE   COURT  OF  CRIMINAL  APPEALS   OF  TEXAS   AUSTIN,  TEXAS     ROXANE  YVETTE  DAVIS,  APPELLANT   V.   THE  STATE  OF  TEXAS,  APPELLEE     APPELLANT’S  PETITION  FOR  DISCRETIONARY  REVIEW     CASE  NUMBER  12-­‐15-­‐00077-­‐CR   COURT  OF  APPEALS   FOR  THE  12TH  DISTRICT  OF  TEXAS   AT  TYLER,  TEXAS     ON  APPEAL  FROM  NO.  241-­‐1149-­‐14   IN  THE  241ST  JUDICIAL  DISTRICT  COURT  OF   SMITH  COUNTY,  TEXAS   HONORABLE  JACK  SKEEN,  JR,  JUDGE  PRESIDING     J.  BRANDT  THORSON   STATE  BAR  NO.  24043958   606  E.  METHVIN  ST.   P.O.  BOX  3768   LONGVIEW,  TEXAS  75606   (903)  758-­‐4878   (903)  212-­‐3038  FACSIMILE     APPELLANT  REQUESTS  ORAL  ARGUMENT               October 2, 2015   IDENTITY  OF  JUDGE,  PARTIES,  &  COUNSEL   Appellant:   Roxane  Yvette  Davis   Appellee:   The  State  of  Texas,  by  and  through  her  Criminal  District     Attorney  of  Smith  County,  D.  Matt  Bingham     Trial  Judge   Hon.  Jack  Skeen,  Jr.   241st  Judicial  District  Judge   100  N.  Broadway,  Room  220   Tyler,  Texas  75702     Appellant’s  Trial  &  Appellate  Counsel:   J.  Brandt  Thorson   State  Bar  No.  24043958   J.  Brandt  Thorson,  PLLC   606  E.  Methvin  St.   P.O.  Box  3768   Longview,  Texas  75606   jbt@jbtfirm.com     Appellee’s  Trial  &  Appellate  Counsel:   Lucas  R.  Machicek  (Trial  Counsel)   State  Bar  No.  24064230   Michael  J.  West  (Appellate  Counsel)   State  Bar  No.  21203300   Smith  County  Assistant  Criminal  District  Attorney   100  N.  Broadway,  Ste.  400   Tyler,  Texas  75702                           2   TABLE  OF  CONTENTS   Cover  Page…………………………………………………...……………………………………1     Identity  of  Judge,  Parties  &  Counsel…………………………………………………….2     Table  of  Contents……………………………………………………………………………….3     Index  of  Authorities…………………………………………………………………………...4     Statement  Regarding  Oral  Argument………………………………………………..…5     Statement  of  the  Case…………………………………………………………………………5     Statement  of  Procedural  History………………………………………………………...5     Grounds  for  Review……………………………………………………………………………6   The  Court  of  Appeals  erred  when  it  held  that  Appellant’s   punishment  assessed  was  not  cruel  and  unusual  punishment,  as   the  relationship  between  the  punishment  assessed  and  the   underlying  criminal  act  is  grossly  disproportionate.     Argument………………………………………………………………………………………..…6     Prayer  for  Relief………………………………………………………………………………10     Certificate  of  Compliance………………………………………………………………….11     Certificate  of  Service………………………………………………………………………...11     Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………………12                       3   INDEX  OF  AUTHORITIES       Atkins  v.  Virginia,  536  U.S.  304,  122  S.Ct.  2242,  153  L.Ed.2d  335  (2002).8     Davis  v.  Texas,  2015  WL  5157530  (Tex.App.-­‐Tyler,  delivered  Sept.  2,   2015)……………………………………………………………………………………...…….5,12     Ford  v.  Wainwright,  477  U.S.  399,  106  S.Ct.  2595,  91  L.Ed.  2d  335   (1986)……………………………………………………………………………………………….8     Roper  v.  Simmons,  543  U.S.  551,  125  S.Ct.  1183,  161  L.Ed.  2d  1  (2005)….8     Rummel  v.  Estell,  445  U.S.  263,  100  S.Ct.  1133,  63  L.Ed.2d  382   (1980)………………………………………………………………………………………….7,8,9     Solem  v.  Helm,  463  U.S.  277,  103  S.Ct.  3001,  77  L.Ed.2d  637  (1983)……...7     Weems  v.  U.S.,  217  U.S.  349,  30  S.Ct.  544,  54  L.Ed.  793  (1910)……………8.9       Tex.  Penal  Code  §  31.03…………………………………………………………………...…5     Tex.  R.App.Pro.  9.4(i)(3)…..  …………………………………………………………..….11                                   4   STATEMENT  REGARDING  ORAL  ARGUMENT   The  Appellant  respectfully  requests  oral  argument.     STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE     Appellant  was  charged  by  indictment  with  the  offense  of  Theft,  of   the  value  of  less  than  $1500,  with  enhancement  of  two  previous   convictions  of  theft,  in  violation  of  Tex.  Penal  Code  §  31.03.    (CR.,  p.  1).     Appellant  entered  an  open  plea  to  the  Court.    Appellant  entered  a  plea  of   guilty  to  the  offense  of  theft  as  alleged  in  the  indictment  and  entered   pleas  of  true  to  the  enhancement  allegations  contained  in  the  indictment   on  February  2,  2015  (Vol.  1,  p.  3,  13).    On  February  26,  2015,  the  Court   conducted  a  Sentencing  Hearing,  assessing  punishment  at  16  months  in   a  State  Jail  Facility.    (Vol.  2,  p.  80).    Appellant  timely  perfected  the   appeal.    (CR.,  p.  60).         STATEMENT  OF  PROCEDURAL  HISTORY     Appellant  presented  two  issues  in  the  appellate  brief.    The   conviction  was  affirmed  in  the  Memorandum  Opinion  issued  on   September  2,  2015.    Roxanne  Yvette  Davis  v.  Texas,  2015  WL  5157530   (Tex.App.-­‐Tyler,  delivered  Sept.  2,  2015)(See  Appendix).    No  Motion  for     5   Rehearing  was  filed;  therefore,  no  date  for  said  motion  was  overruled  or   otherwise  disposed  of.    This  petition  is  due  to  be  filed  on  October  2,   2015,  and  therefore,  it  is  timely  filed.     GROUND  FOR  REVIEW     The  Court  of  Appeals  erred  when  it  held  that  Appellant’s   punishment  assessed  was  not  cruel  and  unusual  punishment,  as  the   relationship  between  the  punishment  assessed  and  the  underlying   criminal  act  is  grossly  disproportionate.       ARGUMENT     The  Trial  Court’s  assessment  of  a  16  month  confinement  in  a  State   Jail  facility  for  an  underlying  theft  with  a  restitution  figure  of  $275  is   unconstitutionally  disproportionate  (Vol.  2,  p.  26).  Limiting  the  scope  of   the  8th  Amendment  to  death  penalty  cases  has  no  foundation  in  the   Constitution.         The  logic  of  the  opinion  from  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  circular.    The   Court  rationalizes  that  the  Legislature  is  vested  with  the  power  to  define   crimes  and  proscribe  punishment,  and  that  as  long  as  the  punishment  is   within  the  confines  of  a  valid  statute,  it  is  necessarily  not  excessive,     6   cruel  or  unusual.    This  gives  the  legislative  branch  unbridled  power  to   legislate  any  punishment  it  desires.    It  eliminates  the  oversight  function   of  the  Courts.    Just  because  an  assessed  punishment  falls  within  the   legislated  confines  of  the  law  does  not  mean  that  said  punishment  is   necessarily  not  cruel  or  unusual.     The  Court  then  goes  onto  outline  the  3  prong  test  found  in  Solem   v.  Helm,  463  U.S.  277,  103  S.Ct.  3001,  77  L.Ed.2d  637  (1983)  and  define   the  threshold  issue  of  analysis  as  disproportionality.    In  analyzing   disproportionality,  the  Court  relies  exclusively  on  Rummel  v.  Estell,  445   U.S.  263,  100  S.Ct.  1133,  63  L.Ed.2d  382  (1980).       Times  have  changed  and  so  should  the  standards  for  analyzing   proportionality  in  sentences.    In  Rummel  v.  Estell,  a  5-­‐4  majority  opinion   from  1980  upheld  a  Mandatory  Life  conviction  for  a  habitual  Texas  thief.     At  first  glance,  this  case  is  analogous  to  the  case  at  hand.    Both  involve   Texans  that  had  two  previous  convictions.    Both  cases  involve  theft,  and   both  result  in  enhanced  sentences.    The  problem  with  this  analysis,   however,  is  that  it  doesn’t  take  a  closer  look  at  the  underlying   assumptions  of  the  1980  case  and  how  jurisprudence  has  changed  in  the   last  35  years.    The  time  of  the  ruling  in  Rummel  is  dramatically  different   than  the  times  in  which  we  find  ourselves  today.     7   Looking  at  Death  Penalty  cases  from  the  last  35  years,  the  view  of   Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishment  has  changed.    Our  society,  in  a  large  part   because  of  the  decisions  of  the  Courts,  has  moved  forward.    A   microcosm  of  this  change  is  Death  Penalty  cases  in  the  Supreme  Court.     Examining  a  timeline  from  1980  until  today  reveals  that  the  mentally   retarded,  minors,  and  insane  can  no  longer  be  executed.    See  Atkins  v.   Virginia,  536  U.S.  304,  122  S.Ct.  2242,  153  L.Ed.2d  335  (2002),  Roper  v.   Simmons,  543  U.S.  551,  125  S.Ct.  1183,  161  L.Ed.  2d  1  (2005)  and  Ford  v.   Wainwright,  477  U.S.  399,  106  S.Ct.  2595,  91  L.Ed.  2d  335  (1986).    This   is  not  a  result  of  a  change  in  the  Constitution,  but  a  change  in  the   interpretation  of  such.    The  same  is  true  of  how  the  8th  Amendment   should  be  viewed  in  light  of  individuals  charged  in  cases  such  as  the   instant  case  and  Rummel.   A  closer  look  at  Rummel  reveals  that  the  majority  opinion  heavily   cites  Weems  v.  U.S.  in  an  effort  to  steer  8th  Amendment  analysis  away   from  non-­‐death  penalty  cases.    Weems  v.  U.S.,  217  U.S.  349,  30  S.Ct.  544,   54  L.Ed.  793  (1910).    By  focusing  on  an  extreme  case  where  time  was   not  the  only  condition  of  confinement,  the  Court  effectively  creates  a   standard  that  “as  punishable  by  significant  terms  of  imprisonment  in  a     8   state  penitentiary,  the  length  of  the  sentence  actually  imposed  is  purely   a  matter  of  legislative  prerogative”  Rummel,  445  U.S.  at  275.   As  Justice  Powell  states  in  the  dissent,  “The  Court  concedes  today   that  the  principle  of  disproportionality  plays  a  role  in  the  review  of   sentences  imposing  the  death  penalty,  but  suggests  that  the  principle   may  be  less  applicable  when  a  noncapital  sense  is  challenged.    Such   limitation  finds  no  support  in  the  History  of  Eighth  Amendment   jurisprudence.”    Id.  at  288.    It  is  time  that  the  wrong  of  Rummel  be   corrected.    An  honest  analysis  of  proportionality  reveals  that  from  a   historical  perspective,  the  idea  of  disproportionality  applies  to  both   capital  and  non-­‐capital  cases.    Whether  dating  back  to  the  extraordinary   circumstances  of  Weems  in  1910  or  merely  using  common  sense,   proportionality  and  reason  deserve  a  chance.   In  the  case  at  hand,  the  Appellant  admits  during  testimony  at   Sentencing  to  a  restitution  amount  of  $270.    (Vol.  2,  p.  26).    Dividing  that   sum  over  the  sixteen-­‐month  period  of  confinement,  the  Appellant’s   monthly  payment  of  time  to  society  is  only  worth  $16.875  per  month.     Taken  further,  her  time  is  worth  less  than  56  cents  per  day.    Granted,   she  plead  true  to  the  two  enhancement  allegations  in  the  second     9   paragraph  of  her  indictment,  but  the  severity  of  her  previous  crimes   leads  one  to  question  the  rationality  of  such  a  steep  sentence.   Times  are  changing,  and  so  are  the  standards  used  to  determine   what  is  a  just  sentence.    As  is  evident  with  President  Obama’s  recent  call   to  eliminate  Mandatory  Minimum  Sentencing  guidelines  in  the  federal   system  and  the  overrunning  costs  of  keeping  non-­‐violent  offenders   incarcerated,  Appellant  prays  that  this  Court  will  re-­‐examine  this  issue.       PRAYER  FOR  RELIEF     WHEREFORE,  PREMISES  CONSIDERED,  Appellant  respectfully   prays  that  this  Court  grant  discretionary  review  and,  after  full  briefing   on  the  merits,  issue  an  opinion  reversing  the  Court  of  Appeals’  judgment   and  remanding  the  cause  to  the  trial  court  for  a  new  trial.     Respectfully  Submitted,   /s/J.  Brandt  Thorson   J.  Brandt  Thorson   State  Bar  No.  24043958   J.  Brandt  Thorson,  PLLC   606  E.  Methvin  St.   P.O.  Box  3768   Longview,  Texas  75606   jbt@jbtfirm.com           10   CERTIFICATE  OF  COMPLIANCE     I,  J.  Brandt  Thorson,  do  hereby  certify  that  the  word  count   specified  in  Tex.  Rules  of  App.  Proc.  9.4(i)(3)  provided  by  the  computer   program  used  to  prepare  this  brief  is  1621  words.     /s/J.  Brandt  Thorson   J.  Brandt  Thorson     CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE     We  hereby  certify,  by  affixing  my  signature  below,  that  a  true  and   correct  copy  of  the  foregoing  Petition  for  Discretionary  Review,  was   delivered  via  the  electronic  filing  manager  to  (1)  D.  Matt  Bingham,   Criminal  District  Attorney  of  Smith  County,  Texas  and  (2)  to  the  Office  of   the  State  Prosecuting  Attorney  on    October  1,  2015.       /s/J.  Brandt  Thorson   J.  Brandt  Thorson                             11   APPENDIX     Roxanne  Yvette  Davis  v.  Texas,  2015  WL  5157530  (Tex.App.-­‐Tyler,   delivered  Sept.  2,  2015)     12   NO. 12-15-00077-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS ROXANNE YVETTE DAVIS, § APPEAL FROM THE 241ST APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Roxanne Yvette Davis appeals her conviction for theft, for which she was sentenced to confinement for sixteen months. In two issues, Appellant argues her sentence is excessive and grossly disproportionate to the crime of which she was convicted. We affirm. BACKGROUND Appellant was charged by indictment with theft. The indictment further alleged that Appellant had twice been previously convicted of theft. Appellant pleaded “guilty,” and the matter proceeded to a trial on punishment. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Appellant to confinement for sixteen months, and this appeal followed. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT In her first and second issues, Appellant argues that the sixteen month sentence imposed by the trial court amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. However, Appellant made no timely objection to the trial court raising the issue of cruel and unusual punishment and has, therefore, failed to preserve any such error. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (waiver with regard to rights under the Texas Constitution); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (waiver with regard to rights under the United States Constitution); Ajisebutu v. State, 236 S.W.3d 309, 311–12 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (waiver with regard to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 1.09); see also TEX R. APP. P. 33.1; Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). (“Preservation of error is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate court should ordinarily review on its own motion[;] . . . it [is] incumbent upon the [c]ourt itself to take up error preservation as a threshold issue.”). But even despite Appellant’s failure to preserve error, we conclude that the sentence about which she complains does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. This provision was made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 1420–21, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962)). The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons v. State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. In the case at hand, Appellant was convicted of theft of property valued at less than $1,500 with two prior theft convictions, the punishment range for which is one hundred eighty days to two years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.35(a), 31.03(e)(4)(D) (West Supp. 2014). Thus, the sentence imposed by the trial court falls within the range set forth by the legislature. Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se. Nonetheless, Appellant urges the court to perform the three part test originally set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 2 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) to require a threshold determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before addressing the remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992); see also Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845–46 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, no pet.). We first must determine whether Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate. In so doing, we are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estell, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court addressed the proportionality claim of an appellant who had received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas habitual offender statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. See id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. A life sentence was imposed because the appellant also had two prior felony convictions––one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods or services and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1134–35. After recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as felonies and, further, considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court determined that the appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 445 U.S. at 285, 100 S. Ct. at 1145. In the case at hand, the offense committed by Appellant––theft of less than $1,500 with two prior theft convictions––is more serious than the combination of offenses committed by the appellant in Rummel, while Appellant’s sixteen month sentence is far less severe than the life sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Rummel. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if the sentence in Rummel was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, then neither is the sentence assessed against Appellant in the case at hand. Therefore, since we do not find the threshold test to be satisfied, we need not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. Appellant’s first and second issues are overruled. DISPOSITION Having overruled Appellant’s first and second issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. JAMES T. WORTHEN Chief Justice Opinion delivered September 2, 2015. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J. (DO NOT PUBLISH) 3