UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Joseph P. REDLINSKI, Seaman Apprentice
U.S. Coast Guard, Appellant
No. 02-0135
Crim. App. No. 1116
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued November 5, 2002
Decided February 21, 2003
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, EFFRON and ERDMANN JJ., joined. CRAWFORD, C.J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Commander Jeffrey C. Good (argued).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Daniel J. Goettle (argued).
Military Judge: Thomas R. Cahill.
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A military judge, sitting as a special court-martial,
convicted the Appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of attempted
wrongful distribution of marijuana, wrongful possession of
marijuana, wrongful use of marijuana, wrongful use of marijuana
while on board a vessel used by the armed forces, wrongful
distribution of marijuana, and wrongful distribution of marijuana
while on board a vessel used by the armed forces in violation of
Articles 80 and 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice
[hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 880 and 912a (2002). The
Appellant was sentenced to confinement for four months, forfeiture
of $600 pay per month for six months, reduction to pay grade E-1,
and a bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approved
the sentence as adjudged, but suspended all confinement in
excess of 100 days in accordance with a pretrial agreement. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and sentence,
but credited the Appellant with eight days of pay because of a
violation of Rule for Court-Martial 305(k)[hereinafter R.C.M.].
United States v. Redlinski, 56 M.J. 508, 521 (C.G. Ct. Crim.
App. 2002).
This Court granted review of the following issues:
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I. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO
ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN THE ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTED
DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA TO APPELLANT, THEREBY
RENDERING HIS PLEAS OF GUILTY TO THAT OFFENSE
IMPROVIDENT.
II. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY ACCEPTING
APPELLANT’S PLEAS OF GUILTY TO ATTEMPTED DISTRIBUTION OF
MARIJUANA (SPECIFICATION 2 OF THE CHARGE) WHERE THE
FACTS SHOW THAT APPELLANT MADE NO MORE THAN INITIAL
PREPARATION TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE OF DISTRIBUTION OF
MARIJUANA BEFORE BEING ARRESTED.
For the reasons stated below, we find that the military
judge erred by failing to adequately explain the elements of
attempted distribution of marijuana to the appellant. Because
we resolve this case on Issue I, we do not reach the second
granted issue.
FACTS
During the providence inquiry, the military judge listed
the elements of attempted distribution of marijuana for the
appellant as follows:
Essentially that at Long Island, New York, on or about
16 February 1999[,] you attempted to distribute some amount
of marijuana, a controlled substance. Again, that you
actually knew you attempted to distribute the substance,
that you actually knew that the substance you attempted to
distribute was marijuana or of a contraband nature, and
that the distribution, if completed, would have been
wrongful.
Record at 194.
The Appellant then admitted to the military judge that he
had agreed to buy marijuana for a fellow sailor, accepted $300
from that sailor to make the purchase, and drove off in his car
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with the intent to consummate the sale. Shortly thereafter, the
Appellant's car was stopped by law enforcement agents, and the
Appellant was apprehended. No marijuana was ever purchased.
The Appellant now asserts that his plea was improvident because
the military judge failed to adequately explain the elements of
attempted wrongful distribution of marijuana.
DISCUSSION
For this Court to find a plea of guilty to be knowing and
voluntary, the record of trial "must reflect" that the elements
of “each offense charged have been explained to the accused” by
the military judge. United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 541
(1969). See Art. 45(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(a) (2002); R.C.M.
910(c)(1). If the military judge fails to do so, he commits
reversible error, unless "it is clear from the entire record
that the accused knew the elements, admitted them freely, and
pleaded guilty because he was guilty." United States v. Jones,
34 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1992). Rather than focusing on a
technical listing of the elements of an offense, this Court
looks at the context of the entire record to determine whether
an accused is aware of the elements, either explicitly or
inferentially. Id.; United States v. Pretlow, 13 M.J. 85, 88
(C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Kilgore, 21 C.M.A. 35, 37
(1971).
The elements of attempt are:
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United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
(1) That the accused did a certain overt act;
(2) That the act was done with specific intent to
commit a certain offense under the code;
(3) That the act amounted to more than mere
preparation; and
(4) That the act apparently tended to effect the
commission of the intended offense.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2002 ed.) Part IV, at
para 4(b). In this case, although the military judge advised
the Appellant of the elements of the intended offense, he failed
to explain explicitly to the Appellant any of the four elements
of the offense of attempt. The Appellant was never advised that
the offense requires that he commit an "overt act," with
"specific intent," and that the act amount "to more than mere
preparation" and apparently tend "to effect the commission of
the intended offense." Nor does the record reflect that the
Appellant understood all of these concepts.
Unlike some simple military offenses, attempt is a more
complex, inchoate offense that includes two specific elements
designed to distinguish it from mere preparation. See United
States v. Byrd, 24 M.J. 286, 288-90 (C.M.A. 1987). See also
United States v. Schoof, 37 M.J. 96, 103 (C.M.A. 1993). The
distinction between preparation and attempt has proven difficult
for courts and scholars alike. See United States v. Church, 32
M.J. 70, 72 (C.M.A. 1991); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 544-552
(3d ed. 2000)(discussing four tests, to include "The Proximity
Approach," "The Probable Desistance Approach," "The Equivocality
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United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
Approach," and "The Model Penal Code Approach."). Although the
Appellant is not entitled to receive a hornbook review of the
distinction, the record must objectively reflect that the
Appellant understood that his conduct, in order to be criminal,
needed to go beyond preparatory steps and be a direct movement
toward the commission of the intended offense. Pretlow, 13 M.J.
at 87-89. Because the record before us does not evidence,
either explicitly or inferentially, that the Appellant
understood the distinction or that he had sufficient knowledge
of any of the four elements of attempt, we conclude that the
Appellant's plea of guilty to attempted distribution of
marijuana was improvident.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed as to Specification 2 of the Charge
and as to sentence, but is affirmed in all other respects. The
finding of guilty of Specification 2 of the Charge and the
sentence are set aside. The record of trial is returned to the
General Counsel of the Department of Transportation for remand
to the Court of Criminal Appeals. That court may either dismiss
Specification 2 of the Charge and reassess the sentence, or it
may order a rehearing. Thereafter, Article 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 867 (2002), will apply.
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CRAWFORD, Chief Judge (dissenting):
Rule for Courts-Martial 910(c) [hereinafter R.C.M.], like
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c) [hereinafter Federal
Rule], requires that Appellant understand the nature of the
offense to which a guilty plea is offered. As the Supreme Court
has indicated, this may be satisfied by the “factual statement,”
the “stipulation,” or “representation” by counsel that the
offense was committed. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 646
(1976). Because R.C.M. 910(c) is similarly satisfied here, I
respectfully dissent.
When an accused enters a guilty plea, the military judge
must ensure that the plea meets the requirements of the
Constitution, Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter
UCMJ], and Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2002 ed.)
[hereinafter MCM]. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,
466 (1969), the Supreme Court stated:
By personally interrogating the defendant, not
only would the judge be better able to ascertain
the plea’s voluntariness, but he also will
develop a more complete record to support his
determination in a subsequent post-conviction
attack . . . . Both of these goals are
undermined in proportion to the degree the . . .
judge resorts to “assumptions” not based upon
record responses to his inquiries.
United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
In United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969),
the Court applied McCarthy to the military, establishing a much
more detailed plea inquiry than had previously been required.1
In 1984, R.C.M. 910(c)(1)-(5) codified the elements of a
Care inquiry, requiring that the accused understand (1) the
1
It will be seen that the . . . [military judge] explained that he had
to determine voluntariness and providency personally and asked the
accused (1) if he knew his plea subjected him to a finding of guilty
without further proof; (2) if he knew he could be sentenced to the
maximum sentence; (3) if he understood the meaning and effect of his
plea; (4) if he knew that the burden was on the Government to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) if he knew he was entitled to plead
not guilty; (6) if he knew the elements of the offense; (7) if he had
adequate opportunity to consult with counsel on any matters he felt
necessary; (8) if he was satisfied with his counsel; (9) whether counsel
advised him of the maximum punishment; (10) if the decision to negotiate
a plea originated with him; (11) if his plea was given voluntarily; (12)
if anyone used force or coercion to get him to enter a guilty plea; (13)
if he believed it was in his best interest to plead guilty; (14) if his
plea was the product of free will and a desire to confess his guilt; and
(15) if he knew he could withdraw his plea. In each instance, the
answer was “yes.”
The procedure that was followed here fell short of the one
recommended ... because the . . . [military judge] did not personally
inform the accused of the elements constituting the offense and he did
not establish the factual components of the guilty plea....
* * *
[T]he record of trial ... must reflect not only that the elements
of each offense charged have been explained to the accused but also that
the military trial judge . . . has questioned the accused about what he
did or did not do, and what he intended (where this is pertinent), to
make clear the basis for a determination by the military trial judge ...
whether the acts or the omissions of the accused constitute the offense
or offenses to which he is pleading guilty . . . .
Further, the record must also demonstrate the military trial judge
. . . personally addressed the accused, advised him that his plea waives
his right against self-incrimination, his right to a trial of the facts
by a court-martial, and his right to be confronted by the witnesses
against him; and that he waives such rights by his plea.
United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 539-41, 40 C.M.R. 247, 251-53
(1969).
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nature of the charges to which the plea is offered; (2) the
possible sentence for each offense to which the plea is offered;
(3) the consequences of the plea; (4) right to counsel; and (5)
what rights will be waived as a result of the plea. Rule for
Courts-Martial 910 does not violate either the Constitution or
the UCMJ, and therefore is binding upon us. See, e.g., United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998); United States v.
Kossman, 38 M.J. 258 (C.M.A. 1993).
The analysis to R.C.M. 910(c) indicates that “this
subsection is taken from [Federal Rule] 11(c) and is consistent”
with the Supreme Court cases of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969), and McCarthy. Rule for Courts-Martial 910(d), like
Federal Rule 11(d), also requires a factual basis for the plea.
Most significantly, the language of R.C.M. 910(c) tracks
verbatim the language of Federal Rule 11(c). Given the link
between Federal Rule 11(c) and R.C.M. 910(c), Supreme Court
precedent is applicable in our interpretation of R.C.M. 910.
In Morgan, the Supreme Court addressed how a trial court
may determine that the defendant understands the nature of a
charge. The defendant, who had a functioning intelligence
quotient ranging between 68 and 72, was indicted for first
degree murder, but pleaded guilty to second degree murder on the
advice of counsel and based on an agreement with a prosecutor.
The Court noted that
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United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
[i]n direct colloquy with the trial judge
respondent stated that his plea was based on the
advice of his attorneys, that he understood he
was accused of killing Mrs. Francisco . . ., that
he was waiving his right to jury trial and that
he would be sent to prison. There was no
discussion of the elements of the offense of
second-degree murder, no indication that the
nature of the offense had been discussed with the
respondent, and no reference of any kind to the
requirement of intent to cause the death of the
victim.
426 U.S. at 642-43. The Court held that “[s]ince respondent did
not receive adequate notice of the offense to which he pleaded
guilty, his plea was involuntary and the judgment of conviction
was entered without due process of law.” Id. at 647.
There is nothing in this record that can serve as
a substitute for either a finding after trial, or
a voluntary admission, that respondent had the
requisite intent. Defense counsel did not
purport to stipulate to that fact; they did not
explain to him that his plea would be an
admission of that fact; and he made no factual
statement or admission necessarily implying that
he had such intent. In these circumstances it is
impossible to conclude that his plea to the
unexplained charge of second-degree murder was
voluntary.
Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
As to the “critical” elements of the offense, the Court
noted:
There is no need in this case to decide whether
notice of the true nature, or substance, of a
charge always requires a description of every
element of the offense; we assume it does not.
Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element of
the offense of second-degree murder that notice of
that element is required.
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United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
Id. at 647 n.18.
While the Court did not say what obligation the judge had
with respect to the elements of the offense, the Court suggested
that even if the judge makes no such inquiry, “a representation
[on the record] by defense counsel that the nature of the
offense has been explained to the accused” will suffice. Id. at
647. Indeed, “it may be appropriate to presume that in most
cases defense counsel routinely explained the nature of the
offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what
he is being asked to admit.” Id. The Court presumed that the
defense counsel had informed the defendant of the element of the
charges that included a count of attempted murder, but no other
attempt charges.
In Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 (1983), the
Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s plea was voluntary
because he must “have understood the judge’s reference to [his]
‘attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife’ as a reference to the
indictment’s charge of attempt to kill.” Morgan further
suggests that if defense counsel does not certify such advice as
to the nature of the offense, a plea is valid only if a
defendant provides a “factual statement or admission necessarily
implying that he [met all critical elements].” 426 U.S. at 646.
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Such a factual statement absolves the judge from making an
inquiry into the defendant’s understanding of the charges.
Rule for Courts-Martial 910(d), like Federal Rule 11(d),
requires that the court ensure that the plea is voluntary and
intelligently made. It requires the military judge to address
the accused personally to determine that the plea is voluntary
and not “the result of force or threats or of promises apart
from the plea agreement under R.C.M. 705.” The discussion to
R.C.M. 910 requires that there be a “factual basis for the
plea.” In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970), the
Court upheld the plea “[i]n view of the strong factual basis for
the plea demonstrated by the State and Alford’s clearly
expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his
innocence.” The Court continued:
Because of the importance of protecting the
innocent and of insuring that guilty pleas are a
product of free and intelligent choice, various
state and federal court decisions properly caution
that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should
not be accepted unless there is a factual basis
for the plea ... and until the judge taking the
plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the
conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim
of innocence.
Id. at 38 n.10 (citations omitted). Conversely, if such a
factual basis is established, the judge is not prevented from
accepting an otherwise intelligent and voluntary plea even if in
the civilian sector he refuses to admit guilt. Such an Alford
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United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
plea is not permissible under Article 45, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845
(2002).
In sum, Supreme Court precedent implies that R.C.M. 910(c),
like its Federal Rule 11(c) counterpart, may be satisfied by a
factual inquiry, stipulation, or counsel’s assurance that the
accused committed the offense. The facts in this case show
comportment with this precedent and further demonstrate that
there is no “‘substantial basis’ in law and fact for questioning
the guilty plea.” United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436
(C.M.A. 1991). Appellant read the stipulation and discussed it
with his defense counsel, and he agreed that the facts set forth
in the stipulation of fact were accurate and that it was entered
into voluntarily. Appellant understood that the stipulation
would be used during his providence inquiry. Appellant’s clear
understanding of the nature of the offense becomes even more
evident when the elements of wrongful distribution are
considered in discrete components as follows:
(1) That the accused did a certain overt act;
(2) That the act was done with the specific intent
to commit a certain offense under the [UCMJ];
(3) That the act amounted to more than mere
preparation; and
(4) That the act apparently tended to effect the
commission of the intended offense.
MCM Part IV, para. 4(b)(1)-(4)(emphasis added).
Overt act. Twice Appellant admitted on February 16 he
again “agreed to meet Petty Officer Agati someplace outside of
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United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
Montauk and this time . . . to give him two ounces of marijuana
for $300.”
Intent. He twice admitted that he took “the $300 and . . .
intended to buy marijuana . . . .”
More than mere preparation. Once he received the money he
had planned on buying the marijuana and then “meet up with
[Petty Officer Agati] again later that day.” Appellant admitted
that but for having been stopped by the Drug Enforcement Agency
agents and the agents from the Coast Guard Investigative
Service, he would have carried out the crime.
Act tended to affect commission of offense. He fully
admitted that he intended to carry out the distribution of the
marijuana. The only reason he did not do it was because he was
pulled over in his car by five black unmarked cars. He admitted
that he intended to distribute marijuana wrongfully on February
16, 1999. Defense counsel assured the military judge that no
further questions were necessary to establish a knowing and
voluntary plea.
In addition to Appellant’s personal admissions under oath,
the stipulation of fact supports all four elements.
On 16 February 1999, SA Redlinski agreed to meet MK2
Agati at a corner store in a small town outside of
Montauk, New York. SA Redlinski agreed to take $300.00
from MK2 Agati to purchase 2 ounces of marijuana for MK2
Agati. SA Redlinski believed MK2 Agati was going to sell
the marijuana to his cousin to make some quick money to
pay bills incurred by his wife. MK2 Agati gave SA
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United States v. Redlinski, No. 02-0135/CG
Redlinski $300.00, and SA Redlinski took the money back
to Montauk. On the way back to Montauk to purchase the
marijuana, SA Redlinski was stopped by Drug Enforcement
Agency and Coast Guard Investigative Service Agents in 5
black cars. SA Redlinski was apprehended at that time.
In keeping with Morgan, this case contained a stipulation
of fact, factual admission, a factual inquiry, and assurance
from defense counsel that Appellant committed the offense of
attempted distribution of marijuana. Given the existence of
these factors, R.C.M. 910 was satisfied, and accordingly,
Appellant’s plea was knowing and voluntary.
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision below.
9