PD-0180-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 7/14/2015 2:24:41 PM
Accepted 7/14/2015 2:30:54 PM
July 14, 2015
Cause No. PD-0180-15 ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
In the
Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas
PATRICIA ELIZABETH HARKCOM,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appeal from Cause No. 02-12-00576-CR
In the Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, Texas
Dismissing the Appeal from
Cause No. CR12165
in the 355th Judicial District Court, Hood County, Texas
STATE’S BRIEF ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Robert T. Christian
Hood County District Attorney
Megan Chalifoux
Assistant District Attorney
Hood County District Attorney’s Office
State Bar No. 24073674
1200 W. Pearl Street
Granbury, Texas 76048
Telephone: (817) 579.3245
Facsimile: (817) 579.3247
da.appellate@co.hood.tx.us
Attorneys for the State
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................. 2
Index of Authorities .............................................................................................................. 4
Identity of Parties and Counsel .......................................................................................... 6
Issue Presented ...................................................................................................................... 7
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ................................................................................ 8
Statement of the Case .......................................................................................................... 8
Statement of Facts................................................................................................................. 9
Summary of State’s Argument .......................................................................................... 12
Argument .............................................................................................................................. 14
1. Harkcom did not comply with Rules 21.4, 25.2, 26.2, or 26.3 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure. ............................................................................ 14
2. The court of appeals did not ignore Few v. State, 230 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). .................................................................................................... 17
3. No court has ever held that an “application for appointment of counsel” in
the “trial of the charge pending,” alone, is a sufficient notice of appeal. ...... 19
4. The pronouncement of sentence is the appealable event—not the signing of
the written judgment. ............................................................................................. 23
5. The trial court certified that, on the day sentence was pronounced in open
court, Harkcom was informed of her rights concerning an appeal. .............. 25
6. If this Court holds Harkcom’s application for court-appointed counsel to be
sufficient, then practically any language contained within any type of
document could serve as a notice of appeal. ..................................................... 26
7. Harkcom’s argument that the notice of appeal, filed seven days past the
deadline, was an implied motion for extension under Rule 26.3 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure .................................................................................. 28
7.1 This Court should not consider this issue because it was neither
considered by the court of appeals nor included in Harkcom’s
petition for discretionary review. .............................................................. 28
2
7.2 Even so, this Court should not overrule Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) or ignore Rule 26.3’s plain language. ............. 29
7.3 Harkcom is not without access to the appellate courts as she may still
file an application for a writ of habeas corpus. ....................................... 31
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 34
Prayer..................................................................................................................................... 35
Certificate of Word Count ............................................................................................... 36
Certificate of Service .......................................................................................................... 36
3
Index of Authorities
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Cases
Castillo v. State, 369 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)..................................... 19, 30
Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ............................................. 24
Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)............................................... 25
Ex parte Caldwell, 383 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964)........................................ 33
Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ......................................... 24
Farrell v. State, 864 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). ............................................ 29
Few v. State, 230 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ............................... 7, 17, 18, 28
Gonzales v. State, 421 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ........................................ 18
Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ........................................ 16
Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ....................................... passim
Schute v. State, 744 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)............................................... 19
Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam) ..................... 14
Taylor v. State, 424 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ............................................... 18
Texas Supreme Court Cases
Hone v. Hanafin, 104 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. 2003)........................................................ 12, 28
Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997) ..............................................12, 27, 28
Texas Courts of Appeals Cases
Alejandro v. State, No. 14-06-00539-CR, 2006 WL 2074819 (Tex. App.Houston
[14th Dist.], Jul. 27, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
............................................................................................................................................ 21
Clark v. State, 287 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) ............. 20, 22
Cooper v. State, 917 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d) .......... 21
Currie v. State, No. 09-06-225-CR, 2006 WL 2506419 (Tex. App.—Beaumont,
Aug. 30, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ..................... 21
Hall v. State, No. 11-05-00222-CR, 2006 WL 944647 (Tex. App.—Eastland, Apr.
13, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) .......................... 22
4
Harkcom v. State, __ S.W.3d __, No. 02-12-00576-CR, 2014 WL 4923003 (Tex.
App.Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2014, pet. granted)...................................... 8, 16, 19, 26
Jarrels v. State, No. 01-01-00721-CR, 2001 WL 1301636 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.], Oct. 25, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 21
Lair v. State, 321 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d,
untimely filed) .................................................................................................................. 32
Massey v. State, 759 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1988, no pet.) .................. 22
Rivera v. State, 940 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.) ............... 21
Roberts v. State, 270 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.)...... 21, 27
Williford v. State, 909 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no pet.)............. 21
Constitutional Provision
TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 6 ................................................................................................. 14
Statute
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.201 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014) .................................... 14
Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a) ......................................................................................................... 15
TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(c)(2) .................................................................................................... 15
TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a) .................................................................................................. 14, 23
TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3 .............................................................................................................. 30
Treatise
43A George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Criminal Practice and Procedure §
43.251a (2d ed. Supp. 2005) (Dix & Dawson) .......................................................... 18
5
Identity of Parties and Counsel
The parties to the trial court’s judgment are the State of Texas and Patricia
Elizabeth Harkcom.
The trial judge was the Honorable Ralph Walton Jr.
Counsel for Harkcom at trial was Andrew Ottaway, P.O. Box 1679, Granbury,
Texas 76048.
Counsel for Harkcom on appeal is Richard Mitchell, 211 S. Rusk Street,
Weatherford, Texas 76086.
Counsel for the State at trial was Patrick Berry, 101 North Trinity, Suite 200,
Decatur, Texas 76234.
Counsel for the State on appeal is Megan Chalifoux, Assistant District Attorney,
Hood County, 1200 W. Pearl Street, Granbury, Texas 76048.
6
Issue Presented
1. Did the Court of Appeals disregard the perfection of appeal rules set forth
in Few v. State, 230 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) and Texas Rules
[sic] of Appellate Procedure 25.2(c)(2)?
7
Statement Regarding Oral Argument
When this Court granted review, it announced that oral argument would
not be permitted.
Statement of the Case
Patricia Elizabeth Harkcom was charged by indictment with the offense of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, of less than one gram.
(C.R. at 7). The jury found Harkcom guilty of the charged offense and assessed
punishment at 24 months confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice and a $2,250.00 fine. (C.R. at 16, 19). The trial
court sentenced her accordingly on October 2, 2012. (3 R.R. at 134-35).
The Second Court of Appeals dismissed Harkcom’s appeal on October 2,
2014. Harkcom v. State, __ S.W.3d __, No. 02-12-00576-CR, 2014 WL 4923003
(Tex. App.Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2014, pet. granted). On January 15, 2015, the
court of appeals denied Harkcom’s motion for en banc consideration. This Court
granted Harkcom’s petition for discretionary review on May 20, 2015.
8
Statement of Facts
On October 2, 2012, Harkcom was sentenced in open court to serve a
term of 24 months in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, and to pay a fine of $2,250.00. (3 R.R. at 1, 135). On October 31, 2012,
Harkcom filed a sworn “Application for Appointment of Counsel.” Harkcom’s
application stated:
On this 30 day of October, 2012, I have been advised of my right to
representation by counsel in the trial of the charge pending against
me. I certify that I am without means to employ counsel of my own
choosing and I hereby request the court to appoint counsel for me. I
further certify that all statements in the attached Declaration of
Financial Inability to Employ Counsel are true and correct.
(C.R. at 26).
Harkcom attached a declaration to her application stating that she had no funds,
no ability to obtain credit to raise funds, and was not free on bail. (C.R. at 27).
On the same page, but below Harkcom’s sworn application, was a
proposed “Order Appointing/Denying Counsel.” (C.R. at 26). On October 31,
2012, the trial judge signed the proposed Order and appointed counsel. (C.R. at
26). The words, “ON APPEAL” were written on the Order and the word,
“APPEAL” at the top of the page above Harkcom’s application. (C.R. at 26). That
same day, the trial court also signed the Judgment of Conviction by Jury. (C.R. at
21-22).
9
On November 8, 2012, appointed counsel filed five documents:
(1) Written Designation of Matters for Inclusion in Reporter’s Record;
(2) Written Designation Specifying Matters For Inclusion in Clerk’s
Record;
(3) Motion for New Trial and Motion in Arrest of Judgment;
(4) Notice of Appeal; and
(5) a proposed Order for a Setting on the Motion for New Trial and
Motion in Arrest of Judgment.
(C.R. at 28-35).
On December 3, 2012, a hearing was held on Harkcom’s motion for new
trial. (4 R.R. at 1, 6). Even though the motion for new trial stated that it was not
timely, neither side brought this to the trial court’s attention at the hearing. (C.R.
at 32). Whether Harkcom desired to appeal from the judgment and whether she
filed a timely notice of appeal were also not discussed at the hearing. After
receiving testimony from Harkcom, trial counsel, and one other witness, the trial
court denied Harkcom’s motion for new trial. (4 R.R. at 6-7, 47-48).
On January 22, 2013, the Second Court of Appeals sent a letter to
Harkcom’s counsel stating that it was concerned it may not have jurisdiction over
the appeal. The court of appeals noted that the notice of appeal was due on
November 1, 2012, but was not filed until November 8, 2012. Harkcom’s counsel
responded that Harkcom’s application for appointment of counsel gave sufficient
10
notice of appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(c)(2). On
February 25, 2013, the court of appeals sent a letter stating that it considered
counsel’s response and determined it would continue the appeal. Both parties
then filed their briefs on Harkcom’s complaint that she received ineffective
assistance of counsel during her trial. On July 3, 2014, the court of appeals again
sent a letter stating that it remained concerned about its jurisdiction and asked
that the parties come prepared to discuss its concerns at oral argument on July 9,
2014. Following oral argument, the court of appeals issued its opinion dismissing
Harkcom’s appeal.
11
Summary of State’s Argument
The court of appeals correctly dismissed this appeal because Harkcom filed
her notice of appeal seven days after it was due and requested no extension of
time. Harkcom’s “Application for Appointment of Counsel” made no mention of
an appeal or her desire to appeal; instead, her application referenced the “trial of
the charge pending” and stated, “I hereby request the court to appoint counsel
for me.” Because Harkcom’s application for appointment of counsel did not show
her desire to appeal, it was insufficient to constitute a notice of appeal under the
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because Harkcom did not timely file a notice of
appeal, she did not properly invoke the jurisdiction of the court of appeals.
Harkcom also argues that her notice of appeal filed in the trial court seven
days past the deadline included an “implied” motion for extension of time.
Harkcom asks this Court to adopt the Texas Supreme Court’s view that a motion
for extension of time is implied when appellant, acting in good faith, files a notice
of appeal beyond the time permitted by Rule 26.1, but within the 15-day period in
which an appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline under
Rule 26.3. The court of appeals did not address this issue and this Court did not
grant review. Even if this Court considers Harkcom’s argument, this Court should
not overrule its decision in Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996),
because doing so ignores the plain language of Rule 26.3. Moreover, Harkcom’s
12
equitable argument ignores the fact that criminal appellants may seek an out-of-
time appeal under an Article 11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus when no
motion for extension of time is filed, as occurred in this case.
13
Argument
1. Harkcom did not comply with Rules 21.4, 25.2, 26.2, or 26.3 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The rules of appellate procedure do not define a court of appeals’s
jurisdiction; the Texas Constitution does. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 6; TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.201 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014). However, a court of
appeals may have jurisdiction to hear a case but be unable to exercise jurisdiction
because it has not been properly invoked by compliance with the appropriate
appellate rules. Rule 26.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
specific periods of time in which a party may file its notice of appeal and is one of
many procedural rules a party must follow in order to successfully invoke a court
of appeals’s jurisdiction. See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522-23 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996) (parties must follow rules to invoke jurisdiction); see also Slaton v.
State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam) (reaffirming
applicability of Olivo).
A defendant’s notice of appeal is timely if filed within 30 days after the day
sentence is imposed or suspended in open court, or within 90 days after the day
sentence is imposed or suspended in open court if the defendant timely files a
motion for new trial. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a). A motion for new trial is timely if
filed no later than 30 days after the date when the trial court imposes or suspends
14
sentence in open court. TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a). A notice of appeal “is sufficient if it
shows the party’s desire to appeal from the judgment or other appealable order.”
TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(c)(2).
In this case, Harkcom did not timely file a motion for new trial.1 As a result,
Harkcom had 30 days from the day sentence was imposed in open court to file
her notice of appeal. Because sentence was imposed in open court on October 2,
2012, her notice of appeal was due on November 1, 2012. But the only document
Harkcom filed in the trial court within this 30-day window was an “application for
appointment of counsel.” (C.R. at 26). Harkcom’s application stated:
On this 30 day of October, 2012, I have been advised of my right to
representation by counsel in the trial of the charge pending against me.
I certify that I am without means to employ counsel of my own
choosing and I hereby request the court to appoint counsel for me. I
further certify that all statements in the attached Declaration of
Financial Inability to Employ Counsel are true and correct.
(C.R. at 26) (emphasis added).
Harkcom asks this Court to consider her request for court-appointed
counsel as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. But in her application,
Harkcom never mentioned anything about an appeal, let alone her desire to
appeal. Nor did Harkcom’s application mention a judgment or other appealable
order from which she could appeal, as her application was in regards to a “trial of
1
Harkcom’s motion for new trial was filed on November 8, 2012, seven days after it was due.
(C.R. at 32).
15
the charge pending.” (C.R. at 26). Counsel was requested for “trial” at a time
when trial filings could be filed.
The only mention of an appeal made within the 30-day deadline came from
the trial judge2not Harkcomwhen he noted, “APPEAL” and “ON APPEAL”
on the application and order appointing counsel, respectively. (C.R. at 26).
Harkcom argues that because the trial judge thought she wanted to appeal her
case, so should this Court. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-15. But it is the appellant
that must indicate his or her desire to appeal—not the trial court. It is true that
an otherwise insufficiently specific request will be considered sufficient if it is clear
that the trial court understood it, but there has to be some basis in the record.
See Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The trial
court should not speak for the defendant. Absent an agreement to the judge’s
notations, they cannot serve as a proper notice of appeal.
Because Harkcom’s “application for appointment of counsel” gave no
indication that she desired to appeal her case, it was not a notice of appeal. And
because Harkcom did not timely file a notice of appeal, she did not properly
2
The court of appeals assumed these notations were made by the trial judge. See Harkcom,
2014 WL 4923003, at *1 (“On its order, the judge handwrote “ON APPEAL” to the end of typed
words stating “ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL.”). Harkcom also assumes that these notations
were made by the trial court. There is nothing in the record to show who made these
notations, but the State does not contest the assumption made by the court of appeals and
Harkcom.
16
invoke the court of appeals’s jurisdiction. The court of appeals was correct to
dismiss her appeal.
2. The court of appeals did not ignore Few v. State, 230 S.W.3d 184
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Harkcom argues that the court of appeals ignored this Court’s decision in
Few v. State, 230 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), when it dismissed her
appeal. In Few, the defendant filed his pro se notice of appeal in the wrong cause
number. 230 S.W.3d at 185-86. The State originally indicted the appellant in one
cause number and re-indicted him two years later in a second cause number. Id.
at 185. After being tried and convicted in the second cause number, the appellant
mistakenly filed his pro se notice of appeal in the original cause number. Id. at 186.
This Court held that the appellant’s notice of appeal was sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Id. at 190. As a result, the court of appeals
should have given the appellant a reasonable opportunity to correct the defect in
his timely filed notice of appeal before dismissing the appeal. Id.
The facts in Few are distinguishable from Harkcom’s case. In Few, the
appellant actually filed a timely notice of appeal showing his desire to appeal from
the judgment; he just filed it in the wrong cause number. In Harkcom’s case, there
was no timely filed notice of appeal. Harkcom did not just leave off the correct
cause number like Few did, she failed entirely to mention the fact that she wanted
17
to appeal her case. Harkcom’s act of filing an application for court-appointed
counsel instead of an actual notice of appeal was not a harmless procedural defect
like in Few.
Few simply recognizes that defective notices of appeal may be amended at
any time before the appealing party’s brief is filed. Appellants must still show their
desire to appeal by timely filing a notice of appeal. See Few, 230 S.W.3d at 189
(“The rules thus ‘retain the requirement of notice of appeal. But they now permit
amendment to cure apparently any defects in notices of appeal.’”) (quoting 43A
George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 43.251a
at 192 (2d ed. Supp. 2005) (Dix & Dawson)). The court of appeals recognized
Few’s holding and properly considered its application in Harkcom’s case:
Finally, we recognize that in recent years, the court of criminal
appeals has explained that we should liberally construe rules related
to the perfection of an appeal. Few v. State, 230 S.W.3d 184, 190
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Nonetheless, the court’s cases do not
dispense with the requirement of a bona fide notice of appeal. See id.
at 189-90 (noting that the rules “retain the requirement of notice of
appeal” but holding that an unquestioned notice of appeal was
sufficient to appeal the defendant’s conviction although the defendant
filed the notice of appeal under a wrong cause number); see also
Taylor v. State, 424 S.W.3d 39, 41, 44-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(concluding that an unquestioned notice of appeal was sufficient to
invoke jurisdiction although it was mistakenly sent to a court of
appeals and later forwarded to a trial court); [Gonzales v. State, 421
S.W.3d 674, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)] (holding that an
unquestioned notice of appeal in one cause number was sufficient to
bring appeals in three related cases). Despite liberal construction of
the rules, the court of criminal appeals has not dispensed with them
18
altogether; it still dismisses appeals when there is no timely notice of
appeal. See [Castillo v. State, 369 S.W.3d 196, 202-03 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012); Schute v. State, 744 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)].
Harkcom, 2014 WL 4923003, at *4.
In its decision, the court of appeals discussed Few, correctly determined
that a notice of appeal is still required under the law to invoke the jurisdiction of
a court of appeals, and rightly held that Harkcom’s application for appointment of
counsel was inadequate to serve as a notice of appeal. So, contrary to Harkcom’s
argument, the court of appeals did not improperly ignore Few in reaching its
decision.
3. No court has ever held that an “application for appointment of
counsel” in the “trial of the charge pending,” alone, is a sufficient
notice of appeal.
What Harkcom asks this Court to do is unprecedented. Harkcom fails to
cite any case recognizing an application for court-appointed counsel in the “trial of
the charge pending,” alone, to be a sufficient notice of appeal. In Jones v. State, this
Court held appeal had not been timely perfected when trial counsel filed a motion
to withdraw and request for court-appointed counsel with an affidavit of
indigence within 30 days of sentencing. 98 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003). This Court held the documents put the trial court on notice of the
defendant’s desire to appeal, but did not hold that the documents functioned as a
19
notice of appeal. Id. at 702-03. This Court ordered an out-of-time appeal because
trial counsel failed to perform his responsibilities when he did not
contemporaneously file a pro se written notice of appeal with the motion to
withdraw. Id. at 703-04.
This Court also held that the trial court erred when it failed to appoint
appellate counsel because the motion to withdraw along with the request for
court-appointed counsel on appeal demonstrated the appellant’s desire to appeal.
Id. at 703. The motion in Jones stated that appellant requested appointed counsel
“for the purpose of a motion for new trial, appeal and . . . a copy of the court
reporter’s notes.” Id. In the attached affidavit, the appellant attested to his inability
“to afford counsel on a motion for new trial and/or appeal [or] to pay for the
court reporter’s notes [in his case].” Id. Jones is distinguishable because Harkcom’s
trial counsel never filed a motion to withdraw like Jones’s trial counsel did. And
the language used in Jones’s request for appointed counsel specifically mentioned
that he was requesting counsel for the purpose of an appeal. Harkcom’s
application for court-appointed counsel did not contain the same language and
instead referred to a “trial of the charge pending.” (C.R. at 26).
Many courts of appeals in Texas have held requests for court-appointed
counsel to be inadequate to serve as a notice of appeal. See Clark v. State, 287
S.W.3d 355, 356 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (post-conviction
20
application for court-appointed counsel not a notice of appeal); Roberts v. State,
270 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (“Statement of
Inability to Afford Counsel” not a notice of appeal); Currie v. State, No. 09-06-225-
CR, 2006 WL 2506419, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 30, 2006, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (pauper’s oath not a notice of appeal);
Alejandro v. State, No. 14-06-00539-CR, 2006 WL 2074819, at *1 (Tex.
App.Houston [14th Dist.] Jul. 27, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (pauper’s oath and designation of record on appeal not a notice of
appeal); Jarrels v. State, No. 01-01-00721-CR, 2001 WL 1301636, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 25, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (request for court-appointed counsel not a notice of appeal); Cooper
v. State, 917 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d) (order
appointing counsel not a notice of appeal); Rivera v. State, 940 S.W.2d 148, 149
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (pauper’s oath and request for appellate
counsel not a notice of appeal); Williford v. State, 909 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1995, no pet.) (affidavit of indigence and request for appointment of
counsel on appeal not a notice of appeal).
The cases cited by Harkcom are distinguishable because the appellants in
those cases did considerably more to show their desire to appeal than Harkcom
did. In Hall v. State, for example, the appellant filed a pro se “Motion for
21
Appointment of a Court Appointed Appellate Attorney.” No. 11-05-00222-CR,
2006 WL 944647, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 13, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (emphasis added). At the hearing on Hall’s motion
the State acknowledged that appellant “did appear to evidence a desire to take his
case up on appeal.” Id. In this case, Harkcom requested court-appointed counsel
for her trial, rather than on appeal. And while there was a hearing on Harkcom’s
untimely motion for new trial, neither side mentioned anything about Harkcom’s
desire to appeal. Even if Hall were persuasive authority, the facts are
distinguishable from Harkcom’s case.
Harkcom also cites Massey v. State, 759 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.Texarkana
1988, no pet.). There, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a written
request for a copy of the record and for appointment of an attorney for
representation on appeal served as written notice of appeal. Massey v. State, 759
S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1988, no pet.). The Texarkana Court cited
no authority in support of its conclusion. Regardless, Massey did considerably
more to indicate his desire to appeal than did Harkcom. Compare Clark, 287
S.W.3d at 356 (“An affidavit of indigence and request for counsel alone cannot
serve as the notice of appeal or as a motion for extension of time.”).
The lack of authority supporting Harkcom’s argument provides further
reason for this Court to affirm the court of appeals’s decision.
22
4. The pronouncement of sentence is the appealable event—not the
signing of the written judgment.
Harkcom argues that her desire to appeal is evident from the fact the
judgment was signed on the same day she filed her application for appointment of
counsel, but this analysis is misguided. Harkcom seems to argue that she was
unable to express her desire to appeal until after the trial court signed the
judgment. Harkcom opines that requiring a defendant to express a desire to
appeal before the written judgment is signed is “Kafka-esque.” See Appellant’s
Brief at 13. Regardless of her view, it is clear what is required by the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 26.2(a)(1) plainly requires that the notice of appeal be filed within 30
days after the day sentence is imposed in open court. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). Thus,
the appellate time table begins with the pronouncement of sentence—not the
written judgment. The appealable event is the pronouncement of sentence:
A trial court’s pronouncement of sentence is oral, while the
judgment, including the sentence assessed, is merely the written
declaration and embodiment of that oral pronouncement. When the
oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment vary, the
oral pronouncement controls. The rationale for this rule is that the
imposition of sentence is the crucial moment when all of the parties
are physically present at the sentencing hearing and able to hear and
respond to the imposition of sentence. Once he leaves the
courtroom, the defendant begins serving the sentence imposed.
Thus, “it is the pronouncement of sentence that is the appealable
event, and the written sentence or order simply memorializes it and
should comport therewith.”
23
Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting
Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)) (internal citations
omitted).
The pronouncement of sentence was the pivotal moment in Harkcom’s
journey to the court of appeals—not the signing of the written judgment. The
written judgment simply reflected what occurred when sentence was pronounced
in open court. The fact that the trial court signed the written judgment on the
same day Harkcom filed her application for appointment of counsel has nothing to
do with whether Harkcom desired to appeal her case. And Harkcom’s assertion
that she received the written judgment the same day she signed her application
for appointment of counsel is unsupported by the record.3 See Appellant’s Brief at
13. Even if a written judgment were required to trigger the appellate clock,
Harkcom’s request for counsel may have been for the purpose of filing a motion
for new trial. Because the oral pronouncement is the appealable event, Harkcom’s
argument regarding the written judgment is mistaken.
3
Harkcom’s application for appointment of counsel signed October 30, 2012 and filed October
31, 2012. (C.R. at 26). Judgment of Conviction by Jury signed by trial court October 31, 2012.
(C.R. at 22). Harkcom’s right thumbprint affixed to Judgment November 14, 2012. (C.R. at 25).
24
5. The trial court certified that, on the day sentence was
pronounced in open court, Harkcom was informed of her rights
concerning an appeal.
Harkcom asserts that, following her conviction, her attorney “abandoned”
her and she was without guidance on how to appeal her case. See Appellant’s
Brief at 7, 13, 15-16. Harkcom seems to argue that this somehow proves that her
application for appointment of counsel served as a notice of appeal. But, whether
or not this allegation supports her argument, it is unsupported by the record.
As this Court held in Jones, it was trial counsel’s duty to advise Harkcom of
her appellate rights:
[T]rial counsel, retained or appointed, has the duty, obligation and
responsibility to consult with and fully to advise his client concerning
meaning and effect of the judgment rendered by the court, his right
to appeal from that judgment, the necessity of giving notice of appeal
and taking other steps to pursue an appeal, as well as expressing his
professional judgment as to possible grounds for appeal and their
merit, and delineating advantages and disadvantages of appeal.
See Jones, 98 S.W.3d at 702-03 (quoting Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369, 374
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
Trial counsel must first ascertain whether the defendant wishes to appeal.
Id. at 703. The decision to appeal lies solely with the defendant. Id. If the
defendant does not wish to appeal, trial counsel’s representation ends. Id. If the
defendant decides to appeal, the attorney must ensure that written notice of
appeal is filed with the trial court. Id.
25
There is nothing in the record to show that trial counsel did not fulfill these
duties. To the contrary, the record seems to show that trial counsel did, in fact,
advise Harkcom of her appellate rights because Harkcom, trial counsel, and the
trial court signed a certification that trial counsel fulfilled his duties and that
Harkcom was aware of her rights concerning an appeal. (C.R. at 20). As the court
of appeals noted:
After the trial court sentenced appellant on October 2, on the same
day, it certified her right to appeal. Appellant and her trial counsel
signed the certification, which recited that appellant had been
informed of her rights concerning an appeal.
Harkcom, 2014 WL 4923003, at *1.
6. If this Court holds Harkcom’s application for court-appointed
counsel to be sufficient, then practically any language contained
within any type of document could serve as a notice of appeal.
The requirement for giving notice of appeal is simple.
Criminal defendants need only file a notice of appeal showing their desire to
appeal from the judgment within 30 days of the pronouncement of sentence in
open court. Harkcom’s argument on appeal complicates this straightforward
requirement.
If asking “the court to appoint counsel for me” evidences a desire to appeal,
then practically any language contained in any type of document filed in the trial
court could constitute a notice of appeal. As the San Antonio Court of Appeals
26
warned, courts will be “saddled with the added responsibility of exploring every
nook and cranny of the record—even in unlikely places—to seek out language
that might be stretched to conceivably serve as a ‘notice of appeal.” Roberts, 270
S.W.3d at 665 (internal quotations omitted). And similarly, the State will be left to
guess whether a criminal defendant has perfected an appeal.
The extended timeline of this case shows the result of failing to follow
simple rules. All of the parties involved in this trial must await this Court’s opinion
on a matter that could have been avoided, if intended, by a simple heading.
“Under any number of circumstances, time plays a critical role in justice.” Verburgt
v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex. 1997) (Enoch, J., dissenting).
Ultimately, adopting Harkcom’s argument leads to a system difficult to
administer and opens the door to a whole host of other filings constituting a
“desire to appeal” even when those filings say nothing about appealing anything.
Finding Harkcom’s application for court-appointed counsel sufficient is
tantamount to dispensing with the necessity of filing any such notice. Such a
holding would be contrary to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and would invite
unnecessary and unfair delay.
27
7. Harkcom’s argument that the notice of appeal, filed seven days
past the deadline, was an implied motion for extension under
Rule 26.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
The Supreme Court of Texas has held, in civil cases, “a motion for
extension of time is implied” when appellant, acting in good faith, files notice of
appeal beyond time permitted by Rule 26.1, but within the 15-day period in which
appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline under Rule 26.3.
Hone v. Hanafin, 104 S.W.3d 884, 885-86 (Tex. 2003); see Verburgt v. Dorner, 959
S.W.2d 615, 615 (Tex. 1997). This equitable rule would benefit Harkcom.
Harkcom recognizes that adopting it would require this Court to overrule
its decision in Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Because
review was not granted on this issue, this Court should decline to consider
Harkcom’s argument. But even if the Court finds that review is appropriate, this
Court should overrule Harkcom’s point of error and reject the Texas Supreme
Court’s holdings in Verburgt and Hone.
7.1 This Court should not consider this issue because it was
neither considered by the court of appeals nor included in
Harkcom’s petition for discretionary review.
When this Court granted Harkcom’s petition for discretionary review,
review was limited to whether the court of appeals improperly disregarded this
Court’s decision in Few v. State, 230 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) and Rule
28
25.2(c)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure when it held that Harkcom’s
“application for appointment of counsel” did not evidence her desire to appeal
from the judgment in her case. 4 No mention was made of whether Harkcom’s
notice of appeal filed on November 8, 2012, seven days after it was due, properly
invoked the appellate court’s jurisdiction as an implied motion for extension
under Rule 26.3. Because this Court’s review is limited to decisions by the courts
of appeals, it has held a party “may not expect this Court to consider a ground
for review that does not implicate a determination by the court of appeals of a
point of error presented to that court in orderly and timely fashion.” Farrell v.
State, 864 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Because Harkcom raises a
new point of error in her briefone that this Court did not grant reviewthis
Court should not consider its merits.
7.2 Even so, this Court should not overrule Olivo v. State, 918
S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) or ignore Rule 26.3’s
plain language.
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, “[t]he appellate court may
extend the time to file the notice of appeal if, within 15 days after the deadline for
filing the notice of appeal, the party: (a) files in the trial court the notice of
appeal; and (b) files in the appellate court a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b).
4
See Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review at 6 (“The Appellant’s argument is simple.
Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, did the Appellant make a bona fide
attempt to invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction when she filed her application?”).
29
TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3 (emphasis added). In this case, Harkcom filed a notice of
appeal in the trial court seven days after it was due, (C.R. at 34), but never filed a
motion for extension of time in the court appeals explaining the need for the
extension.
Following Harkcom’s argument and the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Vergburgt and Hone simply ignores the rule’s requirement that both a notice of
appeal and a motion for extension of time reasonably explaining the need for the
extension must be filed. The plain, unambiguous language of Rule 26.3 speaks to
the filing of a motion to extend time in the court of appeals in addition to the
notice of appeal filed in the trial court. This Court has always recognized Rule
26.3’s dual requirement. In Olivo, this Court held, “[w]hen a notice of appeal is
filed within the fifteen-day period but no timely motion for extension of time is
filed, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction.” 918 S.W.2d at 522. This Court
characterized the lack of a motion for extension of time as a jurisdictional defect
rather than a “mere procedural irregularity.” Id. at 522. And, more recently, in
Castillo v. State, this Court re-affirmed Rule 26.3’s requirements:
. . . Rule 26.3 provides a measure of relief for the inadvertent
slowpoke. It permits an extension of time after the deadline to file
notice of appeal, if, within fifteen days after the deadline, the party
files (a) the notice of appeal in the trial court; and (b) a motion for
extension of time under Rule 10.5(b)(2) in the court of appeals.
369 S.W.3d 196, 201-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
30
No mention would be made of a separate motion in Rule 26.3 if a notice of
appeal filed in the trial court were all that was required to extend the time to
perfect an appeal during the 15 days following the deadline. And if only a notice of
appeal were required, then the Rules of Appellate Procedure’s 30-day deadline to
file a notice of appeal under Rule 26.2 would be meaningless because appellants
would actually have 45 days, provided they acted in good faith filing their notice
beyond the initial 30-day window. Until and unless this Court and the Supreme
Court of Texas change the language of Rule 26.3, a separate motion to extend
time filed in the appellate court is still required to perfect an appeal within 15 days
following Rule 26.2’s deadline for filing the notice of appeal.
7.3 Harkcom is not without access to the appellate courts as
she may still file an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
It is unfortunate that Harkcom’s appellate counsel was appointed the day
before the notice of appeal was due and that counsel was notified of his
appointment on the day the notice of appeal was due and waited seven days to
file the notice of appeal. This misfortune, of course, assumes that Harkcom
communicated her desire to appeal to her appointed counsel in a timely manner.
Counsel may not have been an “inadvertent slowpoke,” but the additional time
provided by Rule 26.3 is available to all who need it. In any event, no motion for
31
extension of time was filed under Rule 26.3 and no explanation was given for why
the notice of appeal could not be timely filed.
But even with all of these missed deadlines, Harkcom is still not without a
remedy, as she may be able to claim ineffective assistance of counsel in an Article
11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus. Because of this potential solution,
Harkcom is not without access to the appellate courts and any perceived sense of
unfairness in Olivo in light of the Texas Supreme Court’s holdings in Verburgt and
Hone is resolved.
One may argue, as Justice Sharp did in Lair v. State, 321 S.W.3d 158, 160
(Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d, untimely filed) (Sharp, J.,
concurring), that an application for writ of habeas corpus requesting an out-of-
time appeal is cumbersome, costly, and inefficient. But would it be more
cumbersome, costly, and inefficient than what has occurred in this case? Harkcom
was sentenced to two years in the State Jail in October 2012 and has,
presumably 5, watched the merits of her argument on appeal go unresolved as the
appellate courts consider a jurisdictional matter, long after she has discharged her
sentence. It seems the solution to ensuring that criminal appellants are given fair
and timely access to the appellate courts is to simply follow the Rules of Appellate
5
Harkcom’s whereabouts and involvement in this appeal are unclear, as counsel lists her
address as “unknown” in his briefings before the Court. See Appellant’s Petition for
Discretionary Review at iii; Appellant’s Brief at ii.
32
Procedure and to allow them to seek out-of-time appeals under an Article 11.07
application for writ of habeas corpus when counsel fails to follow those rules.
Because a separate motion for extension of time was never filed during the
15-day window following the deadline to perfect her appeal, Harkcom simply did
not do what the Rules of Appellate Procedure require. And “[j]urisdiction of a
court must be legally invoked, and when not legally invoked, the power of the
court to act is as absent as if it did not exist.” Olivo, 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (quoting
Ex parte Caldwell, 383 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964)). Thus, under the
plain language of Rule 26.3, Harkcom’s notice of appeal, filed seven days after it
was due, did not invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction. As a result, the court of
appeals was without power to act except to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
In sum, even if this Court considers Harkcom’s argument, this Court
should not adopt the Texas Supreme Court’s reasoning in Verburgt and Hone
because doing so improperly extends the court of appeals’s jurisdiction. This
Court should instead follow its holding in Olivo and conclude that the court of
appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Harkcom’s appeal because, even though
Harkcom filed a notice of appeal in the trial court within the 15-day grace period
allowed under Rule 26.3, she never filed a motion to extend time in the court of
appeals explaining the need for the extension.
33
Conclusion
Harkcom failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the court of appeals because
she did not timely file a notice of appeal. Her notice of appeal was filed seven days
past the deadline. And her application for appointment of counsel, filed before the
deadline, did not evidence her desire to appeal from the judgment, and thus, was
insufficient to constitute a notice of appeal. As a result, the court of appeals had
no option but to dismiss Harkcom’s appeal.
Because review was not granted, this Court should not consider the
argument Harkcom makes for the first time in her brief that her notice of appeal
filed in the trial court seven days past the deadline included an “implied” motion
for extension of time. Even if this Court does consider this issue, this Court has
repeatedly affirmed the plain language of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3
and should decline the invitation to ignore it.
As this Court held in Olivo, Rule 26.3 means exactly what it says. When no
notice of appeal is filed within 30 days of the pronouncement of sentence and no
motion for extension explaining the need for the extension is filed during the 15-
day grace period that follows, a court of appeals is without jurisdiction to
consider the appeal. The Texas Supreme Court’s holdings in Verburgt and Hone
ignore Rule 26.3’s plain language and should not be extended to criminal cases.
Even though Harkcom filed a notice of appeal during the 15-day grace period, the
34
court of appeals was without jurisdiction to consider her appeal because she
failed to file a motion for extension of time. For these reasons, this Court should
affirm the court of appeals’s dismissal of Harkcom’s appeal.
Prayer
The State prays that this Court deny relief to Harkcom and affirm the
decision of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Megan Chalifoux
Robert T. Christian
District Attorney
Hood County, Texas
Megan Chalifoux
Assistant District Attorney
Hood County District Attorney’s Office
State Bar No. 24073674
1200 W. Pearl Street
Granbury, Texas 76048
Phone: (817) 579.3245
Facsimile: (817) 579.3247
da.appellate@co.hood.tx.us
Attorneys for the State
35
Certificate of Word Count
The undersigned attorney certifies that according to the word count
generated in Microsoft Word this document contains 6,307 words, exclusive of
the items excepted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Megan Chalifoux
Megan Chalifoux
Certificate of Service
The undersigned attorney certifies that the State’s brief on discretionary
review has been emailed to the following via eFile Texas, on July 14, 2015:
Richard Mitchell
Attorney for Appellant Patricia Elizabeth Harkcom
211 S. Rusk Street
Weatherford, Texas 76086
Richard@richardmitchelllaw.com
Lisa McMinn
State Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 13046
Austin, Texas 78711
information@spa.texas.gov
/s/ Megan Chalifoux
Megan Chalifoux
36
Harkcom, Patricia Elizabeth
Combined Opinion