Opinion by
MATHEWS, C.(after stating the facts as above). Defendant asserts the following three propositions :
“First Proposition. The universal and well-established rule is that taxes voluntarily paid cannot be recovered unless paid through mistake of fact and not of law, provided the mistake of fact was not caused by the taxpayer’s own neglect of duty, or unless paid under duress.
“Second Proposition. That part of section 14, c. 152, Session Laws of Oklahoma 1910-11, which provides, ‘And if any such taxes so erroneously assessed shall have been *192paid, the same shall be a valid charge against the county and shall be refunded by the board of county commissioners, etc./ is unconstitutional and void for the reason that it is • in direct conflict with section 57, art. 5, of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, which provides that each act of the Legislature shall contain but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title,- for the reason that the subject of section 14 is not expressed in the title to said act, and said act contains more than one subject.
“Third Proposition. That the entire Act of March 25, 1911, c. 152, ■ Session Laws of Oklahoma 1910-11, is unconstitutional, and void for the reason that the same is a revenue bill and was passed in direct violation of section 33, art. 5, of the Constitution, which provides that no revenue bill shall be passed during the five last days of the session of the Legislature.”
The plaintiff asserts the following two propositions:
“First Proposition. Section 14 of the Act of the Legislature of March 25, 1911, is not in conflict with section 57, art. 5, of the Constitution, which provides in substance that every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.
“Second Proposition. The act of March 25, 1911, is not a revenue measure within the meaning of section 33. art. 5, of the .Constitution, and is not void because passed within five days of the adjournment of the Legislature.”
The proposition thus presented for our consideration is: Conceding the land was nontaxable, can a tax' voluntarily paid without protest be recovered from the county or refunded by order of the county commissioners?
In arriving at a decision thereon, the first point to be examined is whether or not the act approved March 25, 1911 (chapter 152, Session Laws 1910-11), is a reve*193nue bill. The defendant attacks the entire act upon the ground that it is an act for raising revenues, and therefore in conflict with section 38, art. 5, of the Constitution, which provides that no revenue bill shall be passed during the last five days of the session of the Legislature, it being conceded by all parties that the act under consideration was passed by the Legislature on the last day of its session, and the trial court sustained the demurrer upon this ground.
It is not necessary to look further than the well-considered and exhaustive case of Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 22 Okla. 761, 98 Pac. 1002, by Chief Justice Kane, to answer this point in the negative, because that case settled this one.
In Anderson v. Ritterbusch, supra, the court had under consideration an act which provided, in substance, that the board of county commissioners may contract with a person to assist the county officers in the 'discovery of property not listed for taxation, and provided that all such property not listed should be listed and assessed for each year that it had been omitted and charged with the levy for that year. The validity of the act was questioned upon the ground that it was a revenue bill and had been passed by the Legislature during the last five days of its session, and the court therein said that “revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word,” and that the act there under consideration, being an act for the discovery of property not listed for taxation and providing for the assessment and collecting of taxes thereon, is not a revenue bill. This decision draws clearly the distinction between “bills that levy taxes” and “acts which provide for the assessment of property for taxation.”
*194It is too plain to admit of argument that the act of March 25, 1911, c. 152, Session Laws 1910-11, in no sense has for its object the levy of a tax or the creation of a revenue, but has for its general purpose the assessment and equalization of property for taxation. It only provides for the assessment of property for taxation. For the law providing for the raising of revenue we must look elsewhere. Cornelius v. State, 40 Okla. 733, 140 Pac. 1187.
But the ruling of the court will not be disturbed, for we are of the opinion that the second proposition advanced by defendant is sound and sustains the judgment of the lower court.
Chapter. 152, Session Laws of Oklahoma 1910-11, known as the Act of March 25, 1911, is an act creating the office of county assessor, and for other purposes relative thereto. The title to such act is as follows, to wit:
“An act creating the office of county assessor; prescribing his qualifications and duties; providing for his election and appointment; 'fixing his term of office and compensation; providing for the appointment of deputies and prescribing their qualifications and duties; creating the county board of equalization and prescribing its duties; and providing for appeals from boards of equalization ; prescribing certain duties for the county clerk ánd county excise board; abolishing the offices of township assessor and township board of equalization, and repealing all conflicting laws.”
Section 14 thereof is as follows:
“The board of county commissioners of each county may hear and determine allegations of erroneous assessments or mistakes or differences in the description or value of land or other property, at any session of said board, before the taxes shall have been paid, on applica*195tion of any person or persons who shall, by affidavit, show good cause for not having attended the meeting of the county board of equalization, for the purpose of correcting such error, difference or mistakes, and wherein a lot of land or portion thereof, or any other property, has been assessed to any one person, firm or corporation who or which did not own the same, or property exempt from taxation has been assessed, or which has been doubly or erroneously assessed, the board of county commissioners shall have power,'and it shall be their duty to correct all such assessments; and if any such taxes so erroneously assessed shall have been paid, the same shall be a valid charge against the county and shall. be refunded by the board of county commissioners and the amount of such refunded taxes, which have been paid over to any municipality, or to the state, shall be deducted from the tax money due the state or such municipality at the next settlement.”
It is apparent that the last portion of section 14, providing that erroneous tax payments should be a valid charge against the county, was not included or mentioned in the title to said act; that no reference whatever was made to the subject thereof in the title; and that there was nothing whatever in the title which would indicate in the slightest degree that such section would make such a provision,- authorizing the refund of taxes already paid and directing the treasurer to withhold the proportional part refunded from money due the state or such municipality at the next settlement.
Section 57, art. 5, of the Constitution, provides:
“Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be- clearly expressed in its title, * * * except general revenue bills. * * * Provided, that if any subject be embraced in any act contrary to the provisions of this section, such act shall be void only as to *196so much of the law as may not be expressed in the title thereof.”
A provision similar to this has been adopted in almost every state in the Union; and it is perfectly- clear, and has been universally held, that this provision of the Constitution is mandatory and must be followed, and that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which must be clearly expressed in its title. This provision has been the subject of much discussion by the courts of almost every state in the Union. Divet v. Richland County, 8 N. D. 65, 76 N. W. 993; Kafka v. Wilkinson, 99 Md. 238, 57 Atl. 617; Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 21 Atl. 56; Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 533; Holcomb v. Rock Island Ry. Co., 27 Okla. 667, 112 Pac. 1023; State v. Cumberland & P. Ry. Co., 105 Md. 478, 66 Atl. 458; State v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 South. 929; Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 South. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191; State v. Tibbets, 52 Neb. 228, 71 N. W. 990, 66 Am. St. Rep. 492; State v. Burlington M. Ry. Co., 60 Neb. 741, 84 N. W. 254; Ives v. Norris, 13 Neb. 252, 13 N. W. 276; City of Pond Creek v. Haskell, 21 Okla. 711, 97 Pac. 338; County Com’rs v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 Atl. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874; Black on Interpretation of Laws, c. 6, sec. 76, p. 175; Cooley, Const. Lim. (7th Ed), p. 205.
Black on Interpretation of Laws, c. 6, sec. 76, p. 175, says:•
“Where the Constitution of the state provides that each act of the Legislature shall relate to but one subject, which shall be expressed in the title, the effect is to make the title a part of the enactment, so that any provision of the act which lies outside of the title will be rejected by the courts as unconstitutional, if that can be done without destroying the entire law. In this case, it *197is very clear that the title may be resorted to as an aid in the interpretation of the statute, and that it will be entitled to greater weight than belongs to it in the absence of the constitutional provision, since it must be presumed that the mind of the Legislature was directed to the title no less than to the provisions of the enacting clause. * * * The constitutional mandate that the subject of every law shall be expressed in its title has given the title of an act a twofold effect. It has added additional force to the title as an indication of legislative intent in aid of the construction of a statute couched in language of doubtful import, and it also operates as a constitutional limitation upon the enacting part of the law. The enacting part of the statute, however, clearly expressed, can have no effect beyond the object expressed and embraced in the title. To maintain- any part of such a statute, those portions not embraced within the purview of the title must be rescinded and if the superad-dition to the declared object cannot be separated and rejected the entire act must fall.”
In the case of Holcomb v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 27 Okla. 667, 112 Pac. 1023, Chief Justice Dunn, of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, said:
“This constitutional provision, or one of similar import, is contained in the Constitutions of practically all of the states in the Union, and its purpose and scope has received consideration at the hands of the appellate courts of practically every jurisdiction. Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed., p. 205)', says: ‘The intent of this provision of the Constitution was to prevent the union, in the same act, of- incongruous matters, and of objects having no connection, no relation. And with this it was designed to prevent surprise in legislation, by having matter of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expressed another.’ And similar expressions will be found in other reported cases. It may therefore be assumed as settled that-the purpose of these *198provisions was: First, to prevent hodge-podge or ‘logrolling’ legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the objects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have an opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.”
This case involved the validity of an act of the Legislature which fixed the jurisdiction of the county court, compensation of the judge thereof, provided for a clerk in certain counties, providing for a county stenographer, fixing his duties and compensation. Section 8 of the act provided that the county court should have, concurrent with the district court, appellate jurisdiction of judgments of justices of the peace. This was a case which had been appealed from a justice court to the district court of Comanche county, attempting to give the district court jurisdiction under this act. Nothing in the act fixes the jurisdiction of the district court other than this section, and there is nothing in the title to indicate that it fixes the jurisdiction of the district court at all. Justice Dunn held that no appeal could be had to the district court, and further on in the body of the opinion, says:
“The question is now squarely presented, and, after a full consideration of the same, the only conclusion which we deem at all justifiable, under the authorities, is that, even if sufficient in terms, the subject of the concurrent appellate jurisdiction of the district court not being embraced nor expressed in, nor referable to, the title of the act, that reference thereto in section 3 was in viola*199tion of the section of the Constitution above noted and is therefore inoperative and void. It is clear that an act, the title to which simply defined the jurisdiction of the county court, could not embrace within it, within the terms of this constitutional provision, a section fixing the jurisdiction of the district court. It would not be correlative to the subject expressed in the title, nor would it appear to follow as a natural and legitimate complement, and hence it cannot stand.”
The case of City of Pond Creek v. Haskell, supra, involved the same provision of the Constitution, and in that case the court said:
“Under this clause of the Constitution, the title of a bill may be very general, and need not specify every clause in the statute, it being sufficient if they are all referable and cognate to the subject expressed; and, when the subject is expressed in general terms, everything which is necessary to make a complete enactment in regard to it, or which results as a complement of thought contained in the general expression, is included in and authorized by it. But, if clauses are contained in the act which are not so correlated to the subject expressed in the title as to appear to follow as a natural and legitimate complement, they cannot stand.”
Judge Cooley, in his work (6th Ed.), p. 178), says:
“The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the' title; they are vested with no dispensing power; the Constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation; it is no answer to say that the title might have been more comprehensive, if in fact the Legislature has not seen fit to make it so.”
Section 14 of the act under consideration, after making provisions for the duties of the county board of equalization with reference to taxes which had been erroneously assessed, but not paid, provides:
*200“And if any such taxes, so erroneously assessed, shall have been paid, the same shall be a valid charge against the county and shall be refunded by the board of county commissioners, etc.”
In the case of Divet v. Richland County, supra, the title to the legislative act in question read:
“An act prescribing the mode of making assessments of property, the equalization of and levy * * * of taxes for all other purposes relative thereto.”
Section 88 of such act (Laws 1897 N. D., c. 126), among other things, provided:
“And in cases where taxes have been or may be paid on lands not subject to taxation, * * * the money so paid and all subsequent taxes, penalties and costs which have been or which may be paid, shall be refunded, with interest at seven per cent, per annum from the date of payment to the person making such payment, his heirs or assigns; and the same shall be refunded out of the county treasury to which such money was paid, etc.”
Divet filed suit against Richland county, N. D., for the refund of taxes paid. Judgment was rendered for the defendant county, and the plaintiff appealed. The judgment was affirmed. The opinion of the court and the contention of the defendant were based upon the fact that the statute under which Divet based his suit was unconstitutional and in conflict with the provision of the Constitution which required that each act of the Legislature should contain but one subject, which must be expressed in its title. In that case the court, in passing upon the constitutionality of such section, used the following language :
“We hold that section 88 is unconstitutional, because it is a wide and radical departure from the subject of *201the law as that subject is set forth by its title. Eliminating from the title its repealing features, which are entirely irrelevant to the question we are discussing, the title reads, ‘An act prescribing the mode of making assessments of property, the equalization of and levy and collection of taxes, and for all other purposes relative thereto.’ Section 61 of the state Constitution provides: ‘No bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, but a bill which violates this provision shall be invalidated thereby, only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.’ Reverting to the title of the statute as above quoted, we discover that it relates to the subject of taxation, and to that alone. In short, it relates to the subject of the assessment of taxes, the equalization of such assessments, and ■ the levy and the collection of the taxes for public revenues, and this to the exclusion of all other matter whatever. The words ‘and all other purposes relative thereto,’ found in the title; while unnecessary, in our judgment, are nevertheless of pla’n and obvious meaning. They embody and express notice to all interested parties that the act will embrace other matters not in the terms expresesd in the title, but which other matters are germane to the subject of law as expressed in plain terms in the title of the act. These general words, while wholly unnecessary to the constitutional validity of the title, are nevertheless not at all misleading. These words need not have been added, however, because the Legislature, having clearly indicated the subject of the enactment, * * * were possessed of full constitutional power to place in the body of the law any matter or provision which, by any fair construction, would relate to the subject of the act as stated in the terms of its title. * * * Turning now to section 88 of the statute, we discover that, except in one feature —that authorizing a reassessment in cases where sales made and deeds issued pursuant to this act were adjudged vo’d — the section has nothing whatever to do with either taxation or the public revenue. With the exception stated, *202the entire section is devoted to the creation of causes of action in favor of taxpayers and against counties, for which judgment may be obtained for the use of private persons. Instead of being in furtherance of any of the purposes of the act, as such purposes are set out in its title, section 88, with the exception stated, is in direct opposition .to all of such purposes. With the exception stated, the section not only has nothing whatever to do with the assessment, levy, or collection of taxes; but, on the contrary, its purpose is to deplete the public treasury of money derived from taxation in the interest of private parties. With the exception stated, we regard the purposes of section 88 as being entirely foreign to the subject of law as expressed in its title, and hence, to that extent, repugnant to the constitutional provision above cited. We concede that this constitutional provision has uniformly received a liberal construction by the courts, and this court has held in another case (State v. Nomland, 3 N. D. 427, 57 N. W. 85 [44 Am. St. Rep. 572]), that it should not be construed as to unduly clog or restrict legislation. But in the case cited the following language was also used: ‘But we have no duty higher or more sacred than is the duty to preserve in all its integrity' every provision of the fundamental law of the state. The provisions of our state Constitution are, by the terms of the instrument itself, declared to be mandatory — mandatory alike both upon the Legislature and upon this court. If the Legislature, in any act, disregard the mandate, it is the duty of the court to nullify the act, and the fact that the abortive legislation may be highly beneficial and salutary in its nature can in no manner control the duty.’ In addition to the numerous authorities cited in State v. Nomland, we cited the following as cases illustrative of the construction to be given to the constitutional provision we are considering: Ives v. Norris, 13 Neb. 252, 13 N. W. 276. In the case at bar the body of the act is' broader than its title, and hence it must be annulled in so far as it transcends the title, and is inconsistent there*203with. Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 232, vol. 23, note 6; People v. Congdon, 77 Mich. 351, 43 N. W. 986. * * * The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.”
In that case the act under consideration was a complete revenue and taxation law, containing something over a hundred sections, and repealed all former laws concerning the levy and collection and apportionmeht of taxes, and the court there held that a section inserted therein, almost identical to the section under consideration in the case at bar, and, too, in a complete revenue law, was not germane to the subject, had nothing whatever to do with either taxation or the public revenue or the equalization of taxes; and that it was devoted to the creation of causes of action in favor of taxpayers and against counties, where none existed before; and that, instead of being in furtherance of the purposes of the act, as set out in the title to said act, it was in direct opposition to such purposes; and that, contrary to the subject, its purpose was to deplete the treasury in the interests of private parties. What can we say of the section now under consideration in this case? The act of March 25, 1911, creates the office of county assessor and county board of equalization and provides for the equalization of. taxes and for the method of levying and collecting taxes, and not the refund of taxes. The latter part of section 14 is not germane to the subject, has nothing whatever to do with the equalization of taxes or the public revenue, and the entire latter part of such section is devoted to the creation of causes of action in favor of private persons and against counties where none existed before, and, instead of being in furtherance of the avowed purpose of the bill, is in direct opposition thereto, and seeks to deplete the public treasury in the interest of *204private parties. The title does state that the act provides for the equalization of taxes, and so did the title to the act considered in Divet v. Richland, supra, and yet it was held that the same provision was not germane to the subject, was foreign thereto, and in direct conflict with the object of the act, and then in this case the provision for the refund of the taxes cannot be said to be germane to the subject of equalization and levy and assessment of taxes; there is no similarity, no relation, no kinship whatever.
The title to chapter 152, Session Laws 1019-11, makes, briefly stated, the following provisions: (1) Creates office of county assessor, (2) prescribes his qualifications and duties, (3) method of election, (4) fixes term of office and compensation, (5) provides for deputies, etc., (6) creates county board of equalization, (7) prescribes its duties, (8) provides appeals from board of equalization, (9) fixes certain duties of county clerk and excise board, (10) abolishes township assessor, (11) and township board of equalization, etc. This does not contain the general provisions contained in the act in Divet v. Richland, supra, “and for all other purposes relative thereto,” and this omission makes the title to the Oklahoma act very restrictive and very narrow. Under such circumstances, can it be said that there is anywhere in the title any intimation that the act makes provision for the refund of taxes, or makes erroneous tax payments charges against the county?
The constitutional provision contained in the other state Constitutions provides “that each act of the Legislature shall contain but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title,” but the Constitution of Oklahoma contains the provision that every act of the Legislature *205shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, thus going a step further than the other Constitutions, and using the word “clearly,” giving to this provision of the Constitution greater efficacy, greater weight, and greater scope. It is’ clear to our minds that the framers of our Constitution desired to go, in their progressive spirit and anxiety to protect their people, a step further; hence the insertion of the word “clearly.” This was in all likelihood intended to go toward curing the evils at which this provision in other Constitutions was primarily leveled. The evil at which this provision was leveled is one which is a menace to good government. We think laws in this state, under this provision of the Constitution, should be more carefully scrutinized than if the word “clearly” were omitted. “Clearly,” in this instance, must mean visibly, unmistakably, in words of no uncertain meaning, and under this provision there must be no doubt as to the subject of the act as expressed in the title. Webster defines the word “clearly” as “in a clear manner; without obscurity, without obstruction, without entaiiglement or confusion, without uncertainty.” And without doubt this is what is meant by the word “clearly” in our Constitution. Then the title must express the subject of the act “without obscurity, without confusion, and without any uncertainty.”
Nowhere in the title to this act is there any reference to the contents of the last clause of section 14. No mention is made in any manner whatsoever that section 14 or any other section provides for the refund of erroneous tax payments, or that the same shall be a valid charge against the county. Not only is the subject of the last clause of section 14 not expressed in the title clearly— *206that is, without obscurity, without confusion, or without uncertainty — but, on the other hand, there is not the slightest reference or clue to the contents of the last clause of section 14, in the title to said act; not the slightest suggestion; directly or indirectly, that the act contains any provision for the refund of taxes, or that the same shall be a charge against the county. It is quite true that section 14 does refer to the board of county commissioners and does provide for them to perform certain duties in the correction of erroneous assessments where taxes have not been paid and where complainant shows good cause for not attending the meeting of the board of equalization, and then makes the provision we now complain of. It is true that the title refers to the board of equalization and to its duties, but this is not a reference to the board of county commissioners. And it is true that the board of equalization is composed of the board of county commissioners, but the board of equalization is clearly a separate and distinct body from the board of county commissioners. The board of equalization exists at only one timé in the year. Section 11 provides that the board of equalization shall meet the first Monday in June, and when it completes its work at that time it loses its identity as a board of equalization. It is as completely and clearly a separate and distinct board or body as if it were composed of different men from those constituting the board of county commissioners. It is as much separate and apart from the board of county corn-miss.'oners as two national banks would be separate and distinct from each other, if organized at different times, and perchance should have the same officers and directors. Therefore a reference to the board of equalization in the title is not a reference to the board of county commis*207sioners, and a reference in the title to equalization and levy and assessment of taxes is not, and cannot be said to be, a reference to refund of taxes, or to making the erroneous payments a valid charge against the county.
This provision of the Constitution, as shown by the great weight of authority, was directed at hodge-podge and log-rolling legislation; and was to prevent surprise and fraud in legislation; and was to prevent provisions being inserted in bills not germane to the question under consideration so that no “jokers” could be run over the unsuspecting.
Our Supreme Court, in City of Pond Creek v. Haskell, supra, said that under this clause of the Constitution the title of a bill might be very general, and need not specify every clause in the statute; it being sufficient if they are all related and cognate to the subject expressed. Let us see if the provisions of section 14 are related and cognate to the subject expressed. The object of section 14 is to create causes of action in favor of individuals where none existed before. The object of the bill is to .create certain offices and provide for the equalization of taxes and for the general method of levying and assessing taxes, and therefore the refund of taxes paid is not related to or cognate to the question of equalization of taxes or the method of levying -and collecting taxes. Equalization must occur before the tax is paid. Taxes cannot be equalized after they are paid, for the reason that no one has authority to equalize after payment.
' The court then in the same case goes on and says further that, when the subject is expressed in general terms, everything which is necessary to make a complete enactment in regard to it, or which results as á complement of thought contained in the general expression, is *208included in and authorized by it. Following this rule, we say that the latter part of section 14 is not only not necessary to make a complete enactment in regard to the subject, but the subject of the latter part of section 14 is wholly foreign to the subject of the act, and is not in any way germane thereto; and not only is it not a complement of thought contained in the general expression, but it is directly repugnant and contrary to the subject of the act, which has for its object the raising of funds with which to run the government, and the creation of office» looking to that end. And the clauses contained in the last part of section 14 are not so correlated to the subject expressed in the title as to appear to follow as a natural and legitimate complement, and therefore that section cannot stand.
The title to the act of March 25, 1911, contains not even the slightest intimation of the matters contained in the last clause of section 14; and the provisions of the last clause of section 14 are sadly out of harmony with the object of the act, which has for its purpose the creation of officers, whose duties are to levy taxes for the support , of the government; and this clause in section 14 seeks to deplete the treasury. This clause in section 14 of the act of March 25, 1911, must be declared unconstitutional in the face of all of these authorities in order to uphold the principle upon which the provisions of the Constitution in question is based. County Com’rs v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., supra; Magemau v. Bell, 13 Neb. 247, 13 N. W. 277; State v. Township Committee of Northhampton (N. J.), 14 Atl. 587; State v. Burlington & M. Ry. Co., 60 Neb. 741, 84 N. W. 254; State v. Tibbets, 52 Neb. 228, 71 N. W. 990, 66 Am. St. Rep. 492; State v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 South. 929; Ex parte Knight, *209supra; Kafka v. Wilkinson, supra; Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 21 Atl. 56.
Nothing short of a legislative provision for that purpose will suffice to enable one to recover taxes paid under similar conditions to those presented in this case. The law upon this subject is well established in this state that where a person voluntarily pays taxes to the county or state, however erroneous the assessment may be, the taxes so paid cannot be recovered from the county or state to which they were paid unless such taxes were paid under mistake of fact and riot of law, which mistake of fact was not caused by the taxpayer’s own.neglect. It is a condition precedent to the recovery of such taxes that they be paid .under protest, compulsion, or duress, and none of those conditions appear in this case. Louisiana Realty Co. v. McAlester, 25 Okla. 726, 108 Pac. 391; Pioneer Tel. Co. v. State, 40 Okla. 417, 138 Pac. 1033; Cooley on Taxation (3d Ed.), pp. 1495-1505; 37 Cyc. 1178 et seq.
For the reasons given, the judgment will be affirmed, with costs.